Toolkit · Maritime

The Maritime Law Toolkit

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2

Type
Toolkit
Jurisdiction
National
Date
2026-10-20
Topic
Maritime

This toolkit is the front door to admiralty and maritime law on UpLaw. It maps the field pillar by pillar — admiralty jurisdiction and the saving-to-suitors clause, the peculiar procedure of Rule 9(h) and the Supplemental Rules, vessel status and maritime liens, the three seamen's remedies (Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure), the LHWCA and passenger claims, cargo carriage under COGSA, charter parties, collision, salvage, and general average, the Limitation of Liability Act, marine insurance, OPA 90 pollution liability, and Coast Guard and cabotage compliance. Each pillar gives you the plain-English doctrine, the anchor statute or case, the classic traps, and links into UpLaw's deeper guides and checklists. A recurring worked example follows a fictional operator, Kestrel Marine Transport, through an injury, a cargo claim, and a spill. Maritime law is overwhelmingly federal and startlingly old; use this as the map before you go looking for the rule.

The Maritime Law Toolkit

Maritime > Admiralty | Published 20 October 2026 - Updated 17 November 2026 | UpLaw - uplaw.us

Admiralty is the oldest body of commercial law still in daily use, and it does not behave like the rest of American law. The ship is a defendant. The plaintiff can seize it before judgment. A shipowner can cap its liability at the value of the wreck. And a deckhand who slips on a wet deck has three separate causes of action that no land-based worker has ever heard of. This toolkit is the map.

Keywords: admiralty jurisdiction, saving to suitors, Rule 9(h), in rem, maritime lien, vessel status, Jones Act, seaman status, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, LHWCA, COGSA, charter party, general average, salvage, limitation of liability, marine insurance, OPA 90, cabotage

How to read this toolkit

Maritime law is not one subject. It is a federal common-law system, older than the Constitution, that has been partly codified in Title 46 and partly left in the hands of the courts, and it carries its own jurisdiction, its own procedure, its own remedies, and its own vocabulary. The practical consequence is that you cannot reason from land law to sea law by analogy. You have to know which pillar you are standing on.

So this toolkit is organized as twelve pillars, walked in the order a maritime problem usually presents itself: first is this even a maritime case, then how do I litigate it, then what are the substantive regimes. Each pillar gives you the plain-English doctrine, the anchor authority, the trap that catches people, and a link into UpLaw's deeper treatment. It is a research map, not a treatise. When you need the full doctrinal build-out, go to Admiralty and Maritime Law: A Comprehensive Guide, which sits underneath everything below.

Use it three ways. Read it end to end once to build the mental model. Jump to a pillar when you have a live question — "is the barge a vessel?", "can I arrest the ship?", "is my cargo claim time-barred?" — and follow the deep-dive links. Or run the consolidated gated checklist near the end as an intake audit on any new maritime matter.

One running example keeps it concrete. Meet Kestrel Marine Transport, a fictional mid-size operator. Kestrel owns the M/V Selkie, a U.S.-flagged coastwise product tanker, and time-charters the foreign-flag M/V Cormorant Trader for Gulf-to-Rotterdam container runs. Over the course of this toolkit, Kestrel will face a deckhand's injury, a wet-cargo claim, an allision with a dock, and an oil spill — and every pillar below will bear on one of them.

The maritime landscape at a glance

  1. Admiralty jurisdiction and saving to suitors — Is it maritime, and where can it be heard? (U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1333; Grubart)
  2. Maritime procedure — Rule 9(h), in rem actions, vessel arrest, and pre-judgment attachment. (Supplemental Rules B, C, D, E)
  3. Vessel status and maritime liens — What counts as a vessel, and who has a claim against the hull itself? (1 U.S.C. § 3; 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343)
  4. Seamen's remedies — Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. (46 U.S.C. § 30104; Chandris)
  5. Longshore workers and passengers — The LHWCA comp scheme and cruise-passenger claims. (33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950; 46 U.S.C. §§ 30508–30509)
  6. Cargo and carriage — COGSA, bills of lading, the $500 package limit, the one-year bar.
  7. Charter parties and shipping contracts — Voyage, time, and bareboat charters; safe-berth warranties; arbitration.
  8. Collision, salvage, and general average — COLREGS, comparative fault, "no cure, no pay," and the York-Antwerp Rules.
  9. Limitation of liability — The shipowner's ancient right to cap exposure at the value of the vessel. (46 U.S.C. ch. 305)
  10. Marine insurance — H&M, P&I, cargo; Wilburn Boat; utmost good faith.
  11. Pollution liability — OPA 90, the Clean Water Act, MARPOL/APPS.
  12. Regulatory compliance — Coast Guard, documentation, cabotage, the Federal Maritime Commission.

Pillar 1 — Admiralty jurisdiction and the saving-to-suitors clause

Article III, § 2 extends the federal judicial power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Congress implemented that grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which gives district courts original jurisdiction "exclusive of the courts of the States" over any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction — "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Those twelve words are the hinge of the entire field.

Maritime tort jurisdiction turns on a two-part test synthesized in Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). The location test asks whether the tort occurred on navigable waters, or whether an injury on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water (the Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101). The connection test asks (a) whether the incident, described at an intermediate level of generality, had a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, and (b) whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Grubart built on Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), and Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990). The upshot: mere location on water is never enough.

Maritime contract jurisdiction uses a different, conceptual test. Under Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004), a contract is maritime if its principal objective is maritime commerce — the point is not where the contract was made or performed. Marine insurance policies, charter parties, bills of lading, towage, and ship-repair contracts are maritime. A contract to build a vessel traditionally is not.

Saving to suitors means that a plaintiff with an in personam maritime claim is not locked into federal court. She may sue in state court, or in federal court on some other jurisdictional basis such as diversity, and she gets a jury there. What she does not get is a different body of law: substantive federal maritime law follows the case into state court, and state rules that would "work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law" are displaced (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)). Two things are reserved exclusively to federal admiralty: in rem actions against the vessel, and limitation of liability proceedings.

Removal is the recurring fight. Jones Act cases filed in state court are generally not removable, because the Jones Act incorporates FELA and 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) bars removal of FELA claims. For general maritime claims, most courts continue to hold that a saving-to-suitors claim filed in state court is not removable absent an independent basis such as diversity or the federal-officer statute, though the question generated a genuine district-court split after the 2011 amendments to § 1441. Check the law of your circuit before you remove — and before you plead.

Kestrel's problem. When deckhand Ray Ocampo is injured aboard the Selkie, his lawyer files in Louisiana state court, joining a Jones Act count precisely to defeat removal and keep the jury. Kestrel's first strategic decision is a forum decision — the same decision analyzed generally in Choosing a Dispute-Resolution Forum: Litigation, Arbitration, and Mediation Compared.

Pillar 2 — Maritime procedure: Rule 9(h), in rem, arrest, and attachment

If your case is maritime and you have another jurisdictional hook, Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h) lets you elect. Designating the claim "an admiralty or maritime claim" has four consequences: (1) no jury right — the case is tried to the bench; (2) the Supplemental Rules become available; (3) Rule 14(c) lets a defendant tender a third party directly to the plaintiff; and (4) certain interlocutory decrees become immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). Electing 9(h) trades the jury for the arrest and attachment machinery. That is the trade, and it should be a conscious one.

The Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims are the field's crown jewels:

  • Rule B — maritime attachment and garnishment. If the defendant cannot be "found within the district," a plaintiff with an in personam maritime claim may attach the defendant's tangible or intangible property there, up to the amount of the claim. Rule B does double duty: it secures the claim and it manufactures quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a foreign defendant with no U.S. presence.
  • Rule C — in rem. The vessel itself is the defendant. Rule C is available only to enforce a maritime lien or a statute providing for an in rem action. The marshal arrests the ship.
  • Rule D — possessory, petitory, and partition actions over vessels (ownership and title disputes).
  • Rule E — the procedural spine for all of the above: a verified complaint pleading the facts with particularity, judicial review of the attachment or arrest, a prompt post-seizure hearing at which the plaintiff must show why the seizure should not be vacated (Rule E(4)(f)), release on security, countersecurity, custodia legis expenses, and interlocutory sale of a deteriorating vessel.
  • Rule F — the limitation of liability action (see Pillar 9).

The traps. Rule B is not a general asset freeze; the Second Circuit shut down the once-booming practice of attaching electronic funds transfers passing through New York correspondent banks in Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd. (2d Cir. 2009), overruling its earlier Winter Storm decision. Rule C requires a maritime lien, not merely a maritime claim — plead the lien, not the wrong. And a wrongful arrest exposes the arresting party to damages if made in bad faith. Post-seizure, expect an immediate Rule E(4)(f) hearing; be prepared to prove up your prima facie case in days, not months. For the general federal-court sequence that surrounds these motions, see The Civil Pretrial Toolkit: From Pleadings to Summary Judgment and The Federal Discovery Toolkit: A Roadmap From Rule 26(f) to Sanctions.

Pillar 3 — Vessel status and maritime liens

Almost everything downstream — seaman status, in rem jurisdiction, limitation, the Jones Act — depends on a single threshold question: is it a vessel?

The definition is in 1 U.S.C. § 3: "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water." The Supreme Court has read that twice, and the two readings bracket the field. In Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005), a massive dredge that moved only by manipulating its anchors was a vessel: "capable of being used" means a practical possibility, not a theoretical one, and a watercraft need not be primarily engaged in transportation. In Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013), a floating home with no rudder, no engine, and no raked bow was not a vessel: the test is whether a reasonable observer, looking at the craft's physical characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a practical degree for carrying people or things over water. Work barges, jack-up rigs, and semi-submersibles usually clear the bar. Fixed platforms and dead ships in permanent mooring usually do not.

Maritime liens are the field's signature invention. A maritime lien is a property interest that attaches secretly to the vessel at the moment the claim arises — no filing, no notice — and it travels with the hull into the hands of a good-faith purchaser. The vessel is personified: it is the defendant, and it can be sued, arrested, and sold.

Liens arise from maritime torts (collision, personal injury), seamen's wages, salvage and general average, preferred ship mortgages (46 U.S.C. § 31322), and necessaries. Under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342, a person providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner "has a maritime lien on the vessel" and "may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien." Necessaries are defined broadly at § 31301(4) — repairs, supplies, towage, and use of a dry dock or marine railway — and courts read them to include fuel (bunkers), stevedoring, and agency services.

Priority is not first-in-time. Maritime liens rank by class, roughly: expenses of justice and custodia legis; seamen's wages; salvage and general average; maritime tort liens; preferred ship mortgages; contract liens for necessaries; then state-created and non-maritime claims. Within some classes courts apply an inverse-order rule — the later lien outranks the earlier, on the theory that the last supplier preserved the fund for everyone. There is no statute of limitations; laches governs. And a judicial sale in rem wipes prior liens and delivers clean title, which is precisely why buyers of distressed tonnage insist on one.

Kestrel's exposure. The Selkie carries a preferred ship mortgage. If Ocampo obtains a tort lien and a bunker supplier goes unpaid, Kestrel's lender is not automatically first in line — a preferred maritime lien (wages, salvage, tort, general average) outranks the mortgage. The mortgage's priority is not the comfort a land-based lender would assume.

Pillar 4 — Maritime personal injury: seamen

A seaman injured in the service of the ship has three overlapping remedies, and a competent complaint pleads all three.

1. Jones Act negligence (46 U.S.C. § 30104). The Jones Act gives a seaman a statutory negligence action against the employer, at law, with a jury, incorporating the substantive standards of FELA (45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60). The causation standard is famously "featherweight": the employer is liable if its negligence "played any part, even the slightest," in producing the injury — the Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957), formulation, imported into Jones Act practice. Contributory negligence merely reduces recovery on a pure comparative basis; assumption of risk is not a defense. The three-year limitations period runs from 46 U.S.C. § 30106.

2. Unseaworthiness. A separate, general-maritime claim against the vessel owner, resting on the warranty that the ship and her appurtenances are reasonably fit for their intended purpose. Under Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), this is liability without fault: notice is irrelevant, and a transitory unsafe condition can breach the warranty. But the warranty is not absolute — the owner does not warrant an accident-free ship, and the causation standard is ordinary proximate cause, not the Jones Act's featherweight test. An unseaworthy condition can be defective gear, an inadequate crew, an unsafe method of work, or a crewmember with a savage disposition.

3. Maintenance and cure. The oldest of the three, and the one that pays first. Owed regardless of fault, from the moment a seaman falls ill or is injured in the service of the ship, and continuing until maximum medical improvement (Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949)). Maintenance is a daily living allowance; cure is medical expense. Ambiguities are resolved in the seaman's favor, and an arbitrary or willful refusal to pay exposes the owner to attorney's fees (Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)) and, under Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), to punitive damages. The classic defense is McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp. (5th Cir. 1968): willful concealment of a material pre-existing condition on a pre-hire medical questionnaire forfeits the remedy. Daily maintenance rates vary enormously and are often fixed by collective bargaining agreement — never quote a figure without checking the applicable CBA and the local case law.

Who is a seaman? Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995) supplies the two-part test: (1) the worker's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the worker must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an identifiable fleet under common ownership or control) that is substantial in both duration and nature. The rule of thumb is roughly 30 percent of time in the service of a vessel — a guideline, not a statute. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997) requires common ownership or control for a "fleet," and directs courts to take a snapshot of the whole employment relationship rather than the single voyage. The Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas (5th Cir. 2021) added a nature-of-the-connection inquiry — does the worker owe his allegiance to the vessel, is the work sea-based, and is the connection transitory or substantial? Seaman status is the single most litigated question in maritime injury practice, and it is often the whole case.

Two damages limits every practitioner must know. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) held that a seaman's general-maritime wrongful-death claim cannot recover loss of society or lost future earnings, because the Jones Act does not permit them and uniformity forbids the courts from going further than Congress. And The Dutra Group v. Batterton, 588 U.S. 358 (2019) held that punitive damages are not available on an unseaworthiness claim — reserving Townsend punitive damages to maintenance and cure. Do not brief this backwards.

Overruled doctrine — read this before you cite an old case. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) once extended the unseaworthiness warranty to longshore workers ("Sieracki seamen"), and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) gave the vessel an indemnity claim back against the stevedore. The 1972 LHWCA amendments swept both away for covered longshore workers: 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) gives them a negligence claim against the vessel only, and bars the vessel's indemnity claim against the employer. Pre-1972 unseaworthiness cases involving shoreside workers are traps.

For the step-by-step workup of a seaman's claim — status, notice, maintenance rate, MMI, the McCorpen file, the limitation clock — run Handling a Jones Act Seaman's Injury Claim: A Practical Checklist. For the general negligence architecture underneath it all, see Tort Law: A Comprehensive Guide to Negligence, Intentional Torts, and Strict Liability and The Tort and Products Liability Toolkit; for the intake and valuation mechanics, Evaluating a Personal Injury Claim: A Practical Checklist; and for proving up the number, The Litigation Damages Toolkit: Valuing and Proving Money Awards.

Death cases split by geography. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308, governs death occurring beyond three nautical miles from shore and permits pecuniary loss only — no loss of society, and under Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998), no survival recovery for pre-death pain and suffering. Inside territorial waters, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) created a general-maritime wrongful-death action (overruling the century-old rule of The Harrisburg), and Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) preserved state-law remedies for the death of a non-seafarer in territorial waters. Three miles is a substantive line, not a technicality.

Pillar 5 — Longshore workers (LHWCA) and passengers

The LHWCA (33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950) is a no-fault federal workers' compensation scheme for maritime workers who are not seamen. Coverage requires both:

  • Status (§ 902(3)): the worker must be engaged in "maritime employment" — longshoring, ship repair, shipbuilding, shipbreaking, and related work — subject to enumerated exclusions (clerical, marina employees, certain small-vessel repair, and others).
  • Situs (§ 903(a)): the injury must occur on navigable waters including an adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel.

Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977) and P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979) built out the "maritime employment" concept, and Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297 (1983) held that a worker injured on actual navigable waters in the course of employment is covered without further status analysis.

Compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer (§ 905(a)). But § 905(b) preserves a negligence action against the vessel — and Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) defines the vessel's three narrow duties: the turnover duty (deliver the ship and its equipment in reasonably safe condition and warn of hidden hazards), the active control duty (exercise reasonable care in areas that remain under the vessel's control), and the duty to intervene (act when the vessel knows of an obviously dangerous condition and knows the stevedore is unreasonably failing to protect its workers). The vessel is not the stevedore's safety supervisor.

Two important extensions ride on the LHWCA: the Defense Base Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654), covering contractors on overseas military bases, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1333(b)), covering offshore energy workers — where Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 565 U.S. 207 (2012) adopted a substantial-nexus test rather than a strict situs rule. Claims run through the district director, an ALJ, the Benefits Review Board, and then the court of appeals; the notice and filing deadlines in §§ 912–913 are short and unforgiving, and they are the most common malpractice trap in the field.

Passengers. A cruise or ferry passenger's claim is general-maritime negligence: the operator owes reasonable care under the circumstances (Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959)), and most courts require actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition. Two statutes police the ticket contract. 46 U.S.C. § 30508 forbids a carrier from shortening the notice-of-claim period below six months or the suit period below one year for personal injury or death. 46 U.S.C. § 30509 forbids a passenger-vessel carrier from limiting its liability for negligence at all — exculpatory clauses are void. What is enforceable is the forum-selection clause printed on the ticket: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Read the ticket before you read the complaint. And where the cruise line's conduct injured a whole cohort of passengers, the aggregation question is governed by ordinary federal class practice — see Class Action Litigation: A Comprehensive Guide to Rule 23.

Pillar 6 — Cargo and carriage: COGSA and bills of lading

The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) is the U.S. enactment of the Hague Rules. A drafting note that trips people up: COGSA was not carried into the positive-law text when Title 46 was recodified — it now appears as a statutory note to 46 U.S.C. § 30701, and it is still universally cited by its original section numbers (§ 3(6), § 4(5), and so on). Cite it correctly.

COGSA applies by force of law to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading, in foreign trade to or from U.S. ports, and only tackle to tackle — from loading to discharge. Parties routinely extend it by a clause paramount to domestic trade and to the pre-loading and post-discharge periods. Where COGSA does not reach, the Harter Act (46 U.S.C. §§ 30701 et seq.) still governs the gaps.

  • The carrier's duties. Exercise due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage to make the ship seaworthy, properly man and equip her, and make the holds fit (§ 3(1)); and properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods (§ 3(2)).
  • The seventeen exceptions (§ 4(2)). Perils of the sea, act of God, act of war, inherent vice, insufficiency of packing, latent defects — and two that have no land-law analogue: error in the navigation or management of the ship (the "nautical fault" defense, which excuses the carrier for its own crew's negligent seamanship) and fire not caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. There is also a catch-all "q" clause for causes arising without the carrier's fault.
  • The $500 package limitation (§ 4(5)). Absent a declared higher value inserted in the bill of lading, the carrier's liability is capped at $500 per package or customary freight unit. This is a flat statutory figure — it is not indexed to inflation, and it has not changed since 1936. The billion-dollar question in container litigation is what counts as a "package": courts generally look to whether the bill of lading discloses the number of units inside the container. Declare value, or self-insure.
  • The one-year time bar (§ 3(6)). Suit must be brought within one year of delivery or of the date the goods should have been delivered. It is a bar, not a limitations period subject to ordinary tolling. Diary it the day the claim comes in.

Proof structure. The cargo claimant makes a prima facie case by showing the goods were delivered to the carrier in good order (a clean bill of lading does this), came out damaged or short, and the amount of loss. The burden then shifts to the carrier to prove an excepted cause and due diligence as to seaworthiness. Then it shifts back.

The through-bill problem. Modern cargo moves door to door. In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a through bill of lading is a maritime contract governed by federal law and that a Himalaya clause can extend the ocean carrier's liability limitation to a downstream rail carrier. In Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89 (2010), it held that the Carmack Amendment does not govern the inland rail leg of an overseas import shipment moving under a through bill. Note also what the U.S. has not adopted: the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules, and the Rotterdam Rules are not U.S. law.

Kestrel's cargo claim. A container of pharmaceuticals lands in Houston off the Cormorant Trader, wet. The shipper's insurer subrogates and sues. Kestrel's defenses are the § 4(2) exceptions (heavy weather as a peril of the sea; inherent vice), the § 4(5) package limit (the bill of lading says "1 container, said to contain 640 cartons" — is it one package or 640?), and the § 3(6) one-year bar. Every one of those is worth more than the merits. For the customs, tariff, and sanctions layer sitting on top of the same shipment, see International Trade Law: A Comprehensive Guide to Customs, Tariffs, and Trade Remedies and The International Trade and Sanctions Toolkit.

Pillar 7 — Charter parties and shipping contracts

A charter party is a contract for the use of a vessel, and it is a genuine freedom-of-contract zone: COGSA's mandatory terms do not apply to charter parties as between owner and charterer (though a bill of lading issued under a charter and negotiated to a third party generally is subject to COGSA in that holder's hands). Three species:

Type What the charterer gets Key money terms Who is the "owner" for liability
Voyage charter Carriage of a cargo on a stated voyage Freight; laytime and demurrage; deadfreight Registered owner
Time charter The vessel's commercial employment for a period Hire; off-hire clause; safe port/berth warranty; employment-and-indemnity clause Registered owner (owner keeps the master and crew)
Bareboat / demise charter The bare vessel; charterer mans, victuals, and navigates it Charter hire The charterer — owner pro hac vice, including for limitation purposes

The industry runs on standard forms — GENCON (voyage), NYPE (time), BARECON (bareboat), SHELLTIME and ASBATANKVOY (tanker trades) — heavily amended by rider clauses. Read the riders first; they are where the deal actually lives.

Two doctrines carry outsized weight. First, the safe-berth warranty. In CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. (the Athos I case), 589 U.S. 348 (2020), the Supreme Court held that a safe-berth clause in a voyage charter is a warranty of safety — it imposes liability without fault, not merely a duty of due diligence. Charterers who nominate a berth are guaranteeing it. Second, forum and choice-of-law clauses are strong in admiralty: M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) made forum-selection clauses presumptively enforceable, and Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., 601 U.S. 65 (2024) confirmed that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime law.

Most charters arbitrate — London (LMAA) or New York (SMA) — and foreign awards are enforced under the New York Convention, implemented at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208. If you are drafting the clause, do it deliberately: Drafting an Arbitration Clause: A Practical Checklist and Arbitration and ADR: A Toolkit for Choosing a Forum, Drafting Clauses, and Running a Case. For the sale-of-goods contract riding under the bill of lading — Incoterms, letters of credit, UCC Article 2 — see The Commercial Contracts Toolkit: Drafting, Reviewing, and Enforcing Business Agreements.

Pillar 8 — Collision, salvage, and general average

Collision. The rules of the road are the COLREGS — the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, given U.S. effect at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1608 — and the Inland Navigation Rules for waters inside the demarcation lines. Two presumptions do most of the work:

  • The Pennsylvania Rule (The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874)): a vessel in violation of a statutory navigation rule at the time of a collision bears the burden of showing that its fault could not have been a cause. That is not a rebuttable presumption; it is close to a conclusive one.
  • The Oregon Rule: a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object is presumed at fault.

And the rule that changed everything. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) abolished the old divided-damages rule, under which two mutually-at-fault vessels split the loss 50/50 no matter how lopsided the blame. Damages are now apportioned by comparative degree of fault. Any pre-1975 authority applying an equal division is dead law — this is one of the classic citation traps in the field.

Salvage. Three elements: (1) a marine peril; (2) voluntary service — no pre-existing duty to act; and (3) success, in whole or in part. That third element is the industry motto: "no cure, no pay." The award is discretionary and computed on the six Blackwall factors (The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869)): the salvors' labor; their promptitude, skill, and energy; the value of the property they risked; the risk they incurred; the value of the property saved; and the degree of danger from which it was rescued. Salvage generates a maritime lien enforceable in rem — which is why the salvor arrests the ship. The International Convention on Salvage, 1989 (to which the United States is a party) added special compensation for environmental salvage even where no property is saved, a concept operationalized commercially through the SCOPIC clause under Lloyd's Open Form. Note also: there is no award for saving life alone, though a life salvor shares in a property award arising from the same casualty.

General average. The oldest surviving rule of commercial law: when an extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made for the common safety of the maritime adventure, all interests — ship, cargo, and freight — contribute pro rata to their saved values. Jettison of deck cargo in a storm is the schoolbook case; salvage awards, port-of-refuge costs, and engine-room firefighting damage are the modern ones. General average is administered under the York-Antwerp Rules, which are not law — they are a private code incorporated by reference into bills of lading and charter parties, and they exist in several vintages (2016 is the most recent). When general average is declared, cargo does not move until the receiver posts a general average bond and a guarantee from its cargo underwriter, and an average adjuster spends months producing the adjustment. Ask anyone whose container sat on the Ever Given in 2021.

Two contract clauses cluster here. The Jason clause preserves the carrier's right to general-average contribution even where the peril arose from negligence for which COGSA excuses it. The Both-to-Blame Collision clause attempts to pass a carrier's collision exposure back to cargo — and the Supreme Court held it invalid in the carrier-cargo context in United States v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 236 (1952). It still appears in printed forms; it still does not work.

Pillar 9 — Limitation of liability

The Limitation of Liability Act — enacted in 1851, now codified in chapter 305 of Title 46 (long cited as 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512; Congress renumbered the chapter in a recent recodification, so verify the current section numbers before you cite them) — lets a shipowner cap its aggregate liability for a casualty at the post-casualty value of the vessel plus her pending freight, provided the loss occurred without the privity or knowledge of the owner.

Read that again. If a ship sinks with all hands, the owner's exposure can be the value of a wreck at the bottom of the sea. It is why the Titanic's owners faced a fund measured in lifeboats.

How it works. Within six months of receiving written notice of a claim, the owner files a limitation action in federal district court under Supplemental Rule F, deposits the value of its interest in the vessel (or files a security bond), and the court issues a monition enjoining all other proceedings and directing every claimant into a single concursus. The court then decides, in two steps: (1) what acts of negligence or unseaworthiness caused the casualty; and (2) whether the owner had privity or knowledge of them. Privity is the whole ballgame. For a corporate owner, it means the knowledge of a managing officer or supervisory employee — and for unseaworthiness, the owner is charged with what it should have discovered through reasonable diligence. Bad safety-management systems, ignored inspection findings, and a hands-on owner are how limitation is lost. For seagoing vessels, if the fund is inadequate to pay personal-injury and death claims, the statute requires the owner to add a supplemental amount per gross ton — a figure Congress has adjusted over time, so check the current number rather than a treatise's.

The clash with saving to suitors. A limitation action is exclusively federal and tried to the bench; a Jones Act plaintiff wants a state jury. The Supreme Court resolved the standoff in Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001): the district court may dissolve its injunction and let the claimant proceed in her chosen forum where the owner's right to limitation is adequately protected — most commonly under the single-claimant exception or via a set of stipulations conceding the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over limitation and the priority of its ruling. Drafting those stipulations correctly is high-stakes, technical work.

Reform is live. After the Conception dive-boat fire, Congress restricted the availability of limitation for covered small passenger vessels in 2022 legislation. Expect continued pressure on the Act. Verify the current scope before advising an owner that limitation is available.

Kestrel's casualty. The Selkie allides with a dock at Baton Rouge. Kestrel files a limitation action within six months, deposits the vessel's value, and enjoins Ocampo's state suit and the dock owner's claim into a single concursus. Whether it holds depends on privity — and on whether Kestrel's port engineer knew the Selkie's bow thruster had been intermittently failing for a month.

Pillar 10 — Marine insurance

Every pillar above ultimately routes to an underwriter. The market is layered:

  • Hull & machinery (H&M) — physical loss of or damage to the vessel, plus (in most forms) a collision liability clause and the sue and labor clause obliging the assured to mitigate.
  • Protection & indemnity (P&I) — third-party liabilities: crew injury, cargo, pollution, wreck removal, collision excess. P&I is written by mutual clubs, not commercial insurers, and clubs operate on a "pay to be paid" rule: the member must pay the claim before the club reimburses. That rule collides badly with state direct-action statutes.
  • Cargo — usually written on Institute Cargo Clauses (A), (B), or (C), which run from broadest to narrowest.
  • Builder's risk, war risks, loss of hire, and charterer's liability fill out the tower.

The doctrinal oddity. Marine insurance is a maritime contract, but there is often no controlling federal admiralty rule on a given policy question — and under Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955), state law fills the gap. That single holding turns marine coverage into a forum-shopping exercise. It also makes the choice-of-law clause the most valuable sentence in the policy, which is why Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., 601 U.S. 65 (2024) — presumptively enforcing such clauses under federal maritime law — mattered so much.

Uberrimae fidei. Marine insurance is a contract of utmost good faith: the assured must volunteer every fact material to the risk, whether asked or not, and a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure voids the policy ab initio — no reliance showing, no intent requirement. Most circuits treat this as an entrenched rule of federal maritime law, though its status is not uniformly settled. Marine policy warranties are likewise strictly enforced. This is far harsher than the policyholder-friendly rules taught in general coverage law, and it is the most common way a shipowner discovers, after the casualty, that it has no insurance at all.

For the coverage-litigation architecture — duty to defend, allocation, bad faith, reservation of rights — start with Insurance Coverage Law: A Comprehensive Guide for Policyholders and The Business Insurance and Coverage Toolkit, then adjust for the maritime overlay above.

Pillar 11 — Pollution and environmental liability

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., was Congress's answer to the Exxon Valdez. Its architecture:

  • Strict liability on the responsible party — for a vessel, the owner, operator, or bareboat charterer — for removal costs and a broad menu of damages (natural resource damages, real and personal property, lost subsistence use, lost government revenues, lost profits and earning capacity, public services) arising from a discharge or the substantial threat of a discharge of oil into navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone (§ 2702).
  • Three narrow defenses (§ 2703): act of God, act of war, and the act or omission of an unrelated third party — each with demanding proof requirements.
  • Liability caps (§ 2704) — but the caps evaporate where the discharge was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, by violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regulation, or by the responsible party's failure to report the incident or to cooperate with removal (§ 2704(c)). The cap figures are adjusted for inflation by regulation and change; do not quote a number from a treatise — pull the current Coast Guard limits.
  • No preemption. Section 1018 (33 U.S.C. § 2718) expressly preserves state law imposing additional or unlimited liability. Several coastal states do exactly that. A federal cap is not a national ceiling.
  • Compliance infrastructure: Certificates of Financial Responsibility, vessel response plans (33 C.F.R. part 155), qualified individuals, and the double-hull mandate of 46 U.S.C. § 3703a.

Riding alongside OPA 90: Clean Water Act § 311 (33 U.S.C. § 1321) civil penalties, assessed per barrel discharged and multiplied for gross negligence — the mechanism that produced the Deepwater Horizon penalties — and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1915), which implements MARPOL. APPS is the source of the government's aggressive "magic pipe" prosecutions: the U.S. does not prosecute the overseas discharge itself, it prosecutes the false Oil Record Book presented to the Coast Guard in a U.S. port, often paired with obstruction charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. Crews get indicted. Ballast water is regulated under the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act, and fuel sulfur under MARPOL Annex VI (the 0.50% global cap, 0.10% in Emission Control Areas).

One remedies limit worth memorizing. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) capped punitive damages in maritime cases, as a matter of federal maritime common law, at a 1:1 ratio to compensatory damages.

For the statutory environmental regimes that sit onshore of the waterline — CERCLA, RCRA, the Clean Air Act, and the rest of the Clean Water Act — go to Environmental Law: A Comprehensive Guide to CERCLA, RCRA, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act and The Environmental Law Toolkit.

Pillar 12 — Regulatory compliance: Coast Guard, cabotage, and documentation

The Coast Guard (within DHS) is the primary maritime regulator: vessel inspection and certification (the Certificate of Inspection), merchant mariner credentialing, manning, marine casualty investigation, and port state control. Casualties are reported on Form CG-2692 under 46 C.F.R. part 4, which also triggers post-serious-marine-incident drug and alcohol testing — a step that must happen within hours, and that is routinely botched.

Documentation and cabotage. A vessel's Certificate of Documentation carries endorsements — registry, coastwise, fishery, recreational — and the coastwise endorsement is the gateway to the U.S. domestic trades. The Jones Act's cabotage provision, 46 U.S.C. § 55102, forbids the transportation of merchandise between points in the United States except in a vessel that is U.S.-built, U.S.-documented, and U.S.-owned (for a corporation, at least 75% U.S.-citizen ownership). Its siblings cover passengers (the Passenger Vessel Services Act, 46 U.S.C. § 55103), dredging (§ 55109), and towing (§ 55111). Enforcement runs through U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the penalty for an unlawful coastwise transport is measured by the value of the merchandise — a company-ending number on a large cargo. Waivers exist only in narrow national-defense circumstances.

International codes, domesticated. SOLAS; the ISM Code (a Safety Management System, a Document of Compliance for the company, a Safety Management Certificate for the ship); the ISPS Code and the Maritime Transportation Security Act; and STCW for crew training and certification. Classification societies (ABS and its peers) certify structural and mechanical fitness. A gap in the ISM paper trail is not just a regulatory problem — it is the evidence a plaintiff uses to defeat limitation of liability by proving the owner's privity and knowledge. Pillar 12 and Pillar 9 are the same file.

The Federal Maritime Commission regulates the commercial side: the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 U.S.C. §§ 40101 et seq.), ocean common carriers, NVOCCs and other ocean transportation intermediaries, service contracts, and — since the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 — detention and demurrage billing practices and unreasonable refusals to deal. Sanctions and export controls layer on top of every voyage; see The International Trade and Sanctions Toolkit.

A note on the neighboring mode. Aviation runs on a structurally similar architecture — a comprehensive federal regulator, a specialized liability regime, and an international convention layer — and the parallels are genuinely useful when reasoning about maritime preemption and federal-agency deference. Compare Aviation Law: A Comprehensive Guide to FAA Regulation and Liability and The Aviation and Drone Law Toolkit — with the caveat that FAA drone rules (Part 107, remote identification, beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations) are among the fastest-moving regulations in federal practice, including where drones are used for vessel inspection, spill surveillance, and ship-to-shore delivery. Verify the current rule before you rely on any statement about unmanned aircraft.

The landscape as a working checklist

Run this on every new maritime matter, in order. Each gate either closes the file or opens the next one.

Gate 1 — Jurisdiction

  • [ ] Is the tort on navigable waters (or land-injury caused by a vessel — 46 U.S.C. § 30101)? Does it satisfy both Grubart connection prongs?
  • [ ] Is the contract's principal objective maritime commerce (Kirby)?
  • [ ] Federal admiralty, federal diversity, or state court under saving to suitors? Is a jury available — and do you want one?
  • [ ] Removal analysis run before any responsive pleading (Jones Act counts are generally non-removable).

Gate 2 — Procedure

  • [ ] Rule 9(h) election made consciously (jury vs. Supplemental Rules).
  • [ ] Is there security to seize? Rule B attachment (defendant not found in district) or Rule C arrest (a genuine maritime lien)?
  • [ ] Verified complaint drafted with Rule E particularity; team ready for a Rule E(4)(f) hearing within days.

Gate 3 — The res

  • [ ] Is it a vessel (1 U.S.C. § 3; Stewart; Lozman)?
  • [ ] What liens attach, and in what class do they rank? Any preferred ship mortgage of record?

Gate 4 — Injured people

  • [ ] Seaman (Chandris — mission contribution + substantial connection in duration and nature)?
  • [ ] If yes: plead Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Start maintenance and cure now; pull the pre-hire medical questionnaire (McCorpen).
  • [ ] If no: LHWCA status and situs? Preserve the § 905(b) vessel-negligence claim (Scindia). Calendar §§ 912–913 deadlines.
  • [ ] Passenger? Read the ticket: forum clause, notice period, one-year suit bar (46 U.S.C. § 30508).
  • [ ] Death: inside or beyond three nautical miles? DOHSA (pecuniary only) or Moragne/Yamaha?
  • [ ] Punitive damages available? Yes for maintenance and cure (Townsend); no for unseaworthiness (Batterton).

Gate 5 — Cargo and contract

  • [ ] COGSA by force of law, or extended by clause paramount? Harter Act in the gaps?
  • [ ] One-year bar diaried the day the claim opens (§ 3(6)).
  • [ ] Package limitation analyzed — what does the bill of lading say is inside the container (§ 4(5))?
  • [ ] Charter type identified (voyage / time / bareboat — the last one moves owner liability to the charterer). Safe-berth warranty? Arbitration clause?

Gate 6 — Casualty

  • [ ] Any statutory rule-of-the-road violation? (Pennsylvania Rule shifts the burden.) Allision? (Oregon Rule presumes fault.)
  • [ ] Comparative fault apportionment (Reliable Transfer) — the 50/50 rule is dead.
  • [ ] Salvage services rendered? Marine peril + voluntariness + success.
  • [ ] General average declared? Bonds and guarantees before cargo releases.
  • [ ] Six-month limitation clock started by written notice of claim — file the Rule F action or lose the right.
  • [ ] Privity-and-knowledge audit: what did shore management know, and what does the ISM paperwork show?

Gate 7 — Insurance and pollution

  • [ ] Notify H&M and the P&I club immediately; note the "pay to be paid" rule.
  • [ ] Disclosure review — any uberrimae fidei or warranty exposure that could void the policy?
  • [ ] Discharge or substantial threat of discharge? OPA 90 responsible party; report immediately (failure to report breaks the cap); activate the vessel response plan.
  • [ ] Confirm state-law overlay — OPA 90 does not preempt state liability (33 U.S.C. § 2718).

Gate 8 — Regulatory

  • [ ] CG-2692 filed; post-incident drug and alcohol testing completed on time.
  • [ ] Coastwise trade compliant (46 U.S.C. § 55102 / § 55103)? CBP penalty exposure assessed.
  • [ ] Documentation, COI, ISM/ISPS certificates, and crew credentials current.

Primary Authority

Constitutional and jurisdictional

Procedure

  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h), 14(c); Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims B, C, D, E, and F

Vessels and liens

Personal injury and death

Cargo, charters, and casualty

Limitation, insurance, pollution, and regulation

Secondary sources. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law; Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty; Benedict on Admiralty; Force, Admiralty and Maritime Law (Federal Judicial Center); Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims. The York-Antwerp Rules and Lloyd's Open Form are private codes, not statutes — they bind only because a contract says they do.

A standing accuracy warning. Dollar figures in this field move: OPA 90 liability caps are adjusted by regulation, the Limitation Act's per-gross-ton supplemental fund has been amended, and maintenance rates are set by contract and local practice. The COGSA $500 package limit, by contrast, has not moved since 1936. Never quote a maritime dollar amount from memory or from a secondary source — pull the current regulation.

And a scope warning. Maritime law is overwhelmingly federal, and that is the premise of this toolkit — but it is not federal all the way down. Marine insurance is the great exception: under Wilburn Boat, state law supplies the rule of decision wherever no established federal admiralty rule governs, so coverage answers genuinely differ from state to state. Pollution liability likewise has a state overlay that OPA 90 expressly preserves (33 U.S.C. § 2718). Wrongful-death remedies for non-seafarers in territorial waters may sound in state law under Yamaha. And a saving-to-suitors case litigated in state court runs on that state's procedure. So: do not assume a nationwide answer on insurance, pollution damages, or non-seafarer death claims. Identify the forum, then identify whose law fills the gap. Coast Guard regulations, Federal Maritime Commission rules on detention and demurrage, and the scope of the Limitation Act after the 2022 small-passenger-vessel amendments are all moving targets — treat every statement about them here as verify-before-relying.

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This toolkit is general legal information from UpLaw (uplaw.us), not legal advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Admiralty and maritime law is overwhelmingly federal, but state law fills real gaps — most notably in marine insurance and in some pollution and wrongful-death contexts — and both the statutes and the dollar figures in this area change. Verify current requirements and consult qualified maritime counsel before acting.