Opinion · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Joseph Carroll v. Paul A. Gross, Sr., Bette Ellen Quial, Patricia A. Seitz
984 F.2d 392
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1993-02-25
- Topic
- bankruptcy
concluding that such a certification is warranted if an appeal’s “legal theories are indisputably meritless.” | holding that a case is frivolous under the IFP statute when it appears that the plaintiff has little or no chance of success | holding that members of the Florida Bar attorney grievance committees were entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting as agents of the Florida Supreme Court | holding that a case is frivolous for IFP purposes if, at any stage of the proceedings, it appears the plaintiff “has little or no chance of success” | holding that a case is frivolous for IFP purposes if, at any stage of the proceedings, it appears the plaintiff “has little or no chance of success” | holding that claims are frivolous if it is apparent “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless” | finding that a case is frivolous when it appears that the plaintiff has little to no chance of success | holding complaint is frivolous when it “has little or no chance of success” or “legal theories are indisputably meritless” | explaining that a case is frivolous for in forma pauperis purposes if it appears there is “little or no chance of success” | holding complaint is frivolous when it “has little or no chance of success” or “legal theories are indisputably meritless” | noting “a case is frivolous for section 1915(d) [now 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)] when it appears the plaintiff has little or no chance of success” | noting that a frivolous claim is one that “has little or no chance of success” – for example, when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” (internal quotations omitted) | noting that a frivolous claim is one that “has little or no chance of success” – for example, when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless” (internal quotations omitted) | noting that a frivolous claim is one that “has little or no chance of success” – for example, when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless” (internal quotations omitted) | noting that a frivolous claim is one that “has little or no chance of success” – for example, when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless” (internal quotations omitted) | “A case is frivolous for section 1915(d) [now section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)] when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous … when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous . . . when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A] case is frivolous … when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’” | “[A
Citator
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- 381 opinions
Appellant Joseph Carroll filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various members of the Florida State Bar violated his due process rights. Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court dismissed Carroll’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We affirm.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), district courts have discretion to dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis complaints. Denton v. Hernandez, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 741 (11th Cir.1987). At any stage of the proceedings, a case is frivolous for section 1915(d) when it appears the plaintiff “has little or no chance of success.” Menendez, 817 F.2d at 740; see Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463-66 (1972) (dismissing under section 1915(d) after filing of defensive pleadings and affidavits by all parties), aff'd adopting district court opinion, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.1973). 1 A district court may conclude a case has little or no chance of success and dismiss the complaint before service of process when it determines from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably merit-less.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Denton, — U.S. at ---, 112 S.Ct. at 1733-34. Even if the complaint otherwise states a claim and the alleged facts are not fantastic, the defendant's absolute immunity justifies dismissal before service of process. See Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons and Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n. 2 (11th Cir.1990).
Carroll argues dismissal was improper because defendants violated his constitutional rights and were entitled to no immunity. But the district court determined from the complaint that defendants were acting as agents of the Florida Supreme Court. See Florida Bar Rules 3-3.1, 3-7.3 (West Supp.1992). As such, defendants were entitled to absolute immunity. See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1266 (5th Cir.) (members of state bar grievance committee immune from suit because they acted as arm of state supreme court), modified on other grounds, 583 F.2d 779 (1978), overruled in part on other grounds by Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976, 978 (1979) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); see also Ginger v. Circuit Court, 372 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 2061, 18 L.Ed.2d 998 (1967); Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C.Cir.1980). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Carroll’s action as frivolous. 2
AFFIRMED.
. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.19891) ten banc ), we adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided before October 1, 1981.
. Carroll also argues the district court should have allowed him to amend his complaint. The record does not show that Carroll ever tried to amend his complaint in district court, although the order of dismissal—which does not state that it was with prejudice—left open that possi *394 bility. See Czeremcha v. Int'l Ass’n of Mach. & Aero. Workers, 724 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir.1984). Also, considering the essence of Carroll's complaint, it seems clear that no amendment could avoid the immunity defense for these state bar agents.