State v. Knapp

The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. . . . Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.

We consider it significant to our decision in this case that the officers' failure to advise the respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in

Miranda

. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the

Miranda

rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place, we instead place our holding on a narrower ground.

The

Tucker

and

Elstad

holdings could not be clearer: the "poisonous tree" in

Wong Sun

is a constitutional violation and, absent such a violation, there is no tainted fruit. It is well established that the failure to deliver

Miranda

warnings is not itself a constitutional violation. (Citing

Elstad

). Accordingly, derivative physical evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement that was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is not "tainted fruit."

Policemen investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be expected to] make no errors whatsoever. If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic

Miranda

procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.

We conclude that the First Circuit is correct that the physical fruits of a violation must be suppressed where necessary to serve

Miranda

's deterrent purpose. However, we part company with the first circuit in the application of that standard, because we conclude that

Miranda

's deterrent purpose requires suppression of the physical fruits of a negligent

Miranda

violation. We therefore conclude that suppression of the gun in the present case was appropriate.

We do not believe that "the role of deterrence . . . becomes less primary" once the statement itself has been suppressed. Instead, the relevant question remains whether suppression of the statement alone provides deterrence sufficient to protect citizens' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

The State conceded below (52:1) that Detective Roets violated the requirements of

Miranda

when, withoutPage 313an advisement and waiver of

Miranda

rights, he asked Matthew Knapp in his bedroom on December 13, 1987, what clothing he had been wearing on the evening of December 11 and the early morning of December 12.

[I]t is clear that if the police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained confessions for links and leads rather than being required to gather evidence independently, then

Miranda

warnings would be of no value in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. The requirement of a warning would be meaningless, forPage 314the police would be permitted to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish directly, and there would exist no incentive to warn.

Although this remedial principle appears to be the sole pillar supporting the Supreme Court's contemporary rationale for application of the exclusionary rule a second principle, judicial integrity, has been cited in the Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence:

It was of this [judicial integrity] that Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis so eloquently spoke in

Olmstead v. United States

. . . . "For those who agree with me," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge." . . . "In a government of laws," said Mr. Justice Brandeis, "existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face."

If the defendant had been read his

Miranda

rights, he most likely would not have spoken. If the defendant had not been deceived as to the nature and scope of the interview, he almost definitely would not have spoken.

There is no question in the Court's mind that but for the deception and failure to follow

Miranda

, the defendant would not have made a statement to DCI agents on November 10th, 1998.

In determining whether a confession was voluntarily made, the essential inquiry is whether the confession was procured via coercive means or whether it was the product of improper pressures exercised by the police. . . . The presence or absence of actual coercion or improper police practices is the focus of the inquiry because it is determinative on the issue of whether the inculpatory statement was the product of a "free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice."

[T]he coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be "accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment . . . not to be compelled to incriminate himself."

The relevant personal characteristics of the confessor include his age, his education and intelligence, his physical and emotional condition, and his prior experience with the police. These factors must be balanced against the police pressures and tactics which have been used to induce the admission, such as the length of the interrogation, any delay in arraignment, the general conditions under which the confessions took place, any excessive physical or psychological pressure . . . any inducements, threats, methods or strategies utilized by the police to compel a response, and whether the individual was informed of his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination.

[T]he

Miranda

presumption, though irrebutable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted. Despite the fact that patently

voluntary

statements taken in violation of

Miranda

must be excluded from the prosecution's case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for impeachment purposes on cross-examination.

(1) It is reasonably probable that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means but for the intervening police misconduct;

(2) Before the misconduct occurred, the police already had the leads making the discovery inevitable, and

(3) The police were actively pursuing these leads at the time of the illegality.

The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.

(1) Knapp had his own key to the apartment. (R. 101:24; Def. App. 324).

(2) He was given that bedroom because it had a door with a lock and was the most private bedroom. (R. 101:21, 30; Def. App. 321, 327)

(3) Knapp kept the door closed when he was not home and left it open occasionally when present. (R. 11:30-31; Def. App. 327-28).

(4) Knapp brought with him a television, personal papers, clothing and effects, a dresser, and "pretty much everything" he owned. (R. 101:22-23, 29; Def. App. 322-23, 329; R. 104:9; Def. App. 412).

(5) George testified that he would have no need to enter the room to retrieve hunting rifles because during the time Knapp lived there hunting season was over. (R. 101:31; Def. App. 328).

(6) The circuit court found that the presence of the guns in the room was "simple continued storage of items in [Knapp's] bedroom." (R. 107:22; Def. App. 268).

(7) George and Knapp had an understanding that George would not go into that room without asking Knapp first. (R. 101:23, 32; Def. App. 323, 329; R. 104:10; Def. App. 413).

(8) Knapp moved there specifically because he wanted more privacy than he could expect at his parents' house. (R. 104:154; Def. App. 424).

(9) George tried to respect Knapp's privacy as much as possible. (R. 101:23; Def. App. 323).

(10) George would not have entered the room even to retrieve his belongings while Knapp was not home. (R. 107:22; Def. App. 268).

Q. So in the approximate two years that you were staying there, you were living there before the Defendant came to stay with you, what was the second bedroom used for?

A. Of extra clothes, my hunting, fishing stuff. You know, just items like that.

Q. Was it also the guest room then; say, when your daughter came to visit, that's where she would stay?

A. Yes. And then that's exactly where my daughter would stay, yes.

Q. And the, the bed that's shown in the pictures there, —

Q. And Detective Roets went over this with you before you signed it, correct?

Q. And you read that you agreed to consent to a search of the —

A. There was the — "to take any letters, papers materials or other property which they may desire."

Q. And that includes the room Matt was staying in, correct?

A. There was no conversation about specifically searching that room, no.

A. And when we walked in the front door, he went directly to Matt's bedroom.

Q. When he said "the house," you didn't say, "Yes, but not Matt's bedroom," did you?

Q. And this form doesn't say anything about "the premises except the bedroom where the Defendant was staying," —

Q. And you took them right into Matt's bedroom, and said, "This is his room," didn't you?

Q. It would be fair to say, Mr. Knapp, that that was yours — yours and Helen's house, correct?

The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.

(1) it does not qualify as "other suspect" evidence under Denny;

(2) it was not admissible as a statement of recent perception; and

(3) the court erred in relying on Chambers because it is not "critical evidence" as contemplated in Chambers.

(1) The evidence puts Brunner in Watertown in relative proximity to the homicide at the time of the murder

(2) It also establishes that he lied to investigators about his whereabouts at the time of the murder.

(3) Maas was with Brunner at the time his wife was murdered, and Maas was observed a short time after Resa's murder carrying a paper bag and getting into Brunner's waiting truck.

(1) it does not qualify as "other suspect" evidence under the

Denny

standard;

(2) it was not admissible as a statement of recent perception under Wis. Stat. §908.045(2); and

(3) the court erred in relying on

Chambers

because it is not "critical evidence" as contemplated in the holding of that case.

The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury.