LIMEWR FYRE OU v. FYREFESTIVAL.COM, an Internet Domain Name

             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                            
          FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA                       
                    Alexandria Division                              
LIMEWR FYRE OU,                 )                                         
                           )                                         
     Plaintiff,            )                                         
                           )                                         
          v.               )   Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-1629 (MSN/WEF) 
                           )                                         
FYREFESTIVAL.COM,               )                                         
an Internet Domain Name,        )                                         
                           )                                         
     Defendant.            )                                         
______________________________________ )                                  
             REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION                               
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff LIMEWR FYRE OU’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for 
default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 55(b)(2).  (Dkt. 
12.).  In this in rem action, Plaintiff seeks entry of default judgment against the internet domain 
name fyrefestival.com (“Defendant Domain Name”).  Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C), the 
undersigned  magistrate  judge  is  filing  with  the  Court  these proposed  findings  of  fact  and 
recommendations, a copy of which will be provided to all interested parties.  For the reasons set 
forth below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be granted 
and that the Court order the transfer of the Defendant Domain Name to Plaintiff.1  
1    Relevant filings before the Court include the Complaint (Dkt. 1) (“Compl.”); Motion for 
Service by Publication (Dkt. 3); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Service by Publication 
(Dkt. 4); Declaration Regarding Motion for Service by Publication (Dkt. 7); Court’s Order 
Granting Motion for Service by Publication (Dkt. 6); Plaintiff’s Request for Entry of Default (Dkt. 
10); Clerk’s Entry of Default (Dkt. 11); Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 12) (“Mot. 
Default J.”); Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 
13)(“Mem. Supp.”); and all attachments and exhibits submitted with those filings.
                   Procedural Background                             
On September 29, 2025, Plaintiff, an Estonian limited liability company, filed this in rem 
action  against  fyrefestival.com  alleging  a  violation  of  the  Anti-Cybersquatting  Consumer 
Protection Act (“ACPA”), 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d) (Count 1), and trademark infringement in violation 

of the Lanham Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1114

(1) (Count 2).  Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5.  The Complaint states that the 
Fyre Festival was a “luxury music festival” that took place in 2017 and was promoted through a 
global social media campaign that reached hundreds of millions of people. 

Id. ¶¶ 12,13

. Plaintiff 
alleges that it has exclusive right, title, interest, and goodwill for all common law and registered 
trademark rights and intellectual property associated with the name “Fyre Festival” (the “Fyre 
Festival  Mark”).  

Id. ¶ 10

.  Plaintiff  further  alleges  that  the  Defendant  Domain  Name, 
fyrefestival.com,  uses  Plaintiff’s  mark  without  permission  and  redirects  the  consumer  to  a 
commercial  travel  booking  website,  and  thus  constitutes  cybersquatting  and  trademark 
infringement. 

Id. ¶¶ 23, 24, 30-32

.  As relief, Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the domain registry 
for the Defendant Domain Name to change the registrar for the Defendant Domain Name to 

Plaintiff’s registrar of choice and order the registrar to change the registrant to Plaintiff. 

Id.

 Prayer 
for Relief; Mem. Supp., at pg. 15.                                        
On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Service by Publication supported by a 
brief,  declaration  of  Plaintiff’s  counsel,  David  E.  Weslow,  and  exhibits.  Dkts.  3,  4.  The 
undersigned granted Plaintiff’s motion on October 7, 2025, and authorized service by publication 
in either The Washington Times or The Washington Post. Dkt. 6.  The October 7, 2025 Order 
required the Defendant to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint within twenty-one (21) 
days from the date of publication.  

Id.

  The undersigned also required Plaintiff to serve a copy of 
the October 7 Order on the registrant of the Defendant Domain Name through the contact 
information and/or the contact method identified in the domain name registration record for the 
Defendant Domain Name.  

Id.

  On October 16, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Weslow, filed a 
declaration confirming that Plaintiff had published the October 7 Order in The Washington Times 
on October 10, 2025, and that it had served a copy of the Order on the registrant of the Defendant 

Domain Name through the contact information and/or the contact method identified in the domain 
name registration record for the Defendant Domain Name.  Dkt. 7. As a result, the Defendant was 
required to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint by October 31, 2025.  Dkts. 6, 7. No one 
on behalf of the Defendant Domain Name filed an answer or otherwise responded to the Complaint 
by October 31, 2025, or any time thereafter.                              
On November 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), supported by a declaration from its counsel, Mr. Weslow. Dkt. 10, 10-1. The 
Clerk entered default as to the Defendant Domain Name on November 5, 2025. Dkt. 11.   
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Default Judgment as to the Defendant 
Domain Name pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) and accompanying memorandum of law and 

exhibits. Dkts. 12, 13. Plaintiff noticed the Motion for Default Judgment for a hearing before the 
undersigned for December 12, 2025.  Dkt. 14.  Plaintiff also filed certificates of service indicating 
that the Motion for Default Judgment, memorandum in support of its motion, and notice of hearing 
date were properly served on the registrant of the Defendant Domain Name through the contact 
information and/or the contact method identified in the domain name registration record for the 
Defendant Domain Name. 

Id.

  On December 12, 2025, counsel for Plaintiff appeared and presented 
argument in support of its motion, and no one appeared on behalf of the Defendant Domain Name.  
Dkt. 15.  In fact, to date, no party with an interest in the Defendant Domain Name has appeared or 
otherwise participated in these proceedings.                              
Finding  the  allegations  in  the  Complaint  to  be  well-pleaded  and  uncontested,  the 
undersigned took the matter under advisement to issue this Report and Recommendation.   
        Facts Alleged in the Complaint and Deemed Admitted           
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 provides for the entry of a default judgment when “a party against whom 

a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.”  Based on the 
failure of the Defendant to file an answer or other responsive pleading in a timely manner, the 
Clerk entered default as to the Defendant Domain Name.  Dkt. 11.  A defendant in default admits 
the factual allegations in the complaint.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation – other than 
one relating to the amount of damages – is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the 
allegation is not denied.”); see also JTH Tax, Inc. v. Grabert, 

8 F. Supp. 3d 731, 736

 (E.D. Va. 
2014) (stating that when a defendant has defaulted, the well-pleaded allegations of facts set forth 
in the plaintiff’s complaint are deemed admitted) (citing Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 

253 F.3d 778, 780

 (4th Cir. 2001)).  In this case, the following facts alleged in the Complaint are 
deemed admitted.                                                          

The Parties                                                          
Plaintiff is an Estonian limited liability company with its principal place of business at F.J. 
Wiedemanni tn 6-5a, Kesklinna linnaosa, 10126 Tallinn, Estonia. Compl. ¶ 3.  
Defendant Domain Name, fyrefestival.com, is an Internet domain name registered to a 
person named Liam Spencer who is a resident of England. Compl. ¶ 4, Exhibit A.  
The Fyre Festival Mark                                               
As noted above, the Fyre Festival was a “luxury music festival” that was held in 2017 and 
was promoted through a global social media campaign that reached hundreds of millions of people. 
Compl. ¶¶ 12, 13.2 Fyre Holdings, Inc. was the original creator and owner of the Fyre Festival and 
its trademark. Id. ¶ 2.  Fyre Holdings, Inc. registered the term “Fyre Festival” as a U.S. federal 
trademark on June 14, 2020 (

Registration No. 5962393

) and on March 5, 2024 (

Registration No. 7322932

). 

Id. ¶ 20

, Exhibit C.  In June 2025, Fyre Holdings, Inc. placed the brand for sale via 

auction and Plaintiff succeeded in acquiring the Fyre Festival Mark.  

Id. ¶ 15

. On or about July 23, 
2025, Plaintiff and Fyre Holdings, Inc. executed a purchase agreement through which, among other 
things, Plaintiff acquired all rights, title, interest, and goodwill for all common law and registered 
trademark rights and intellectual property associated with the Fyre Festival Mark. 

Id. ¶ 10

. As part 
of the transaction, Fyre Holdings Inc.3 completed trademark assignments to Plaintiff transferring 
all rights, title, and interest in the Fyre Festival Mark to Plaintiff, which was recorded by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office on September 23, 2025. 

Id. ¶ 11

, Exhibit B.  As a result, Plaintiff is 
the owner of the U.S. federal trademark registrations using the term “Fyre Festival.” 

Id. ¶ 20

. 
The Fyre Festival Marketing Campaign                                 
The Fyre Festival was created and marketed as an opulent Bahamas getaway, with yachts 

and luxury cabanas, celebrity-chef catering, and live music entertainment. Compl. ¶ 14. The Fyre 
Festival was first publicly promoted in December 2016. 

Id. ¶ 12

. Since then, the Fyre Festival 
Mark has been exclusively associated with the music festival. 

Id.

  In 2016, global influencers 
employed a carefully coordinated global social media campaign to promote the Fyre Festival. 

Id.

 


2    Although advertised as a luxury music festival, the festival itself was an artistic and 
financial failure, and, more strikingly, marked by poor planning and grossly inadequate resources 
that resulted in disastrous conditions. See Netflix Documentary, The Greatest Party That Never 
Happened (2019) cited in the Complaint at ¶ 14.                           

3    Paragraph 11 of the Complaint refers to Fyre Holdings LLC but elsewhere in the Complaint 
and attachments Fyre Holdings is referred to as Fyre Holdings, Inc.  The precise corporate structure 
of Fyre Holdings is immaterial for purposes of this Motion.               
¶ 13. The media campaign to promote the Fyre Festival reached hundreds of millions of people 
within a span of days. 

Id. ¶ 12

.  The campaign involved a video featuring the Fyre Festival logo, 
promising “an immersive musical festival.” 

Id. ¶ 13

. Details from Fyre Media’s investor pitch deck 
(https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/fyre=festival-pitch-deck) claimed that Fyre recruited 

400 influencers to post an orange tile on Instagram at 5:00 p.m. on December 12, 2016, and that 
the  result  was  the  post  reached  300  million  people  in  24  hours, 
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/184. 

Id.

 
During  and  since  the  original  festival,  the  owners  of  the  Fyre  Festival  Mark  sold 
merchandise, shirts and other Fyre Festival branded items. 

Id. ¶ 15

. The Fyre Festival was the 
subject of two documentaries, including a Netflix documentary released in 2019. 

Id.

 In 2025, Fyre 
Holdings, Inc. worked to launch a second festival, and a Broadway musical is currently in 
production. 

Id. ¶ 15

. On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff publicly announced its acquisition of the 
Fyre Festival and its plan to relaunch the brand. 

Id. ¶ 16

.4 Additionally, Plaintiff announced its 
collaboration with VISA and Ryan Renyolds on a new VISA advertisement and slogan featuring 
the Fyre Festival Mark. 

Id. ¶ 17

.5                                        

Unlawful Registration and Use of the Defendant Domain Name           
The Defendant Domain Name was most recently re-registered on or around July 21, 2025. 
Compl. ¶ 22. The current registrant of the Defendant Domain Name uses the Defendant Domain 
to redirect consumers to greaterantillieshotels.com, which is a travel booking website for which 
the domain registrant receives compensation. 

Id. ¶ 23

. In the body of the greaterantillieshotels.com 


4    See  LimeWire  buys  Fyre  Festival,  asking  “What  Could  Possibly  Go  Wrong,” 
https://ccc.cnbc.com/2025/09/16.                                          

5    See https://www.fastcompany.com/91404189.                            
website there is text that identifies in whole the Fyre Festival Mark. 

Id. ¶ 24

.6  The use of Plaintiff’s 
mark in the Defendant Domain Name has continued through at least July 17, 2025. 

Id. ¶ 25

.    
The current registrant of the Defendant Domian Name has never used the domain to resolve 
to a website with substantive content. 

Id. ¶ 27

.  It has been used, however, by the registrant to 

obtain compensation from travel booking links. 

Id.

 The registrant receives financial compensation 
when visitors navigate to fyrefestival.com and click on one of the travel website links. 

Id. ¶ 28

.  
The registrant has had actual notice of the Fyre Festival Mark since prior to registering or 
re-registering the Defendant Domain Name. 

Id. ¶ 29

. None of the links or references to the Fyre 
Festival Mark are or have ever been authorized by Plaintiff to be used by the registrant or on the 
defendant domain, and many of the uses of the Fyre Festival Mark on the defendant domain direct 
consumers to service providers that also have no affiliation with Plaintiff and are not authorized to 
use the Fyre Festival Mark. 

Id. ¶ 30

. The registrant has been using the Fyre Festival Mark, without 
Plaintiff’s authorization. 

Id. ¶ 31

. The registrant has been offering and/or promoting services under 
the  Fyre  Festival  Mark  for  his/her/its  own  financial  gain,  through  inter  alia,  pay-per-click 

advertising including advertising that uses the Fyre Festival Mark, and sales of services related to 
the mark. 

Id. ¶ 32

.                                                       
                   Jurisdiction and Venue                            
In this case, the Court must have both subject matter jurisdiction and in rem jurisdiction 
over the Defendant Domain Name and venue in this judicial district must be proper before the 
Court can render a default judgment.                                      




6    See  Archives.org  Original  Capture  July  17,  2025,  Accessed  September  17,  2025, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20250717022913.                               
Subject Matter Jurisdiction                                          
Plaintiff brings this cause of action pursuant to the ACPA (

15 U.S.C. § 1125

 et seq.) and 
the Lanham Act (

15 U.S.C. § 1114

(1)).  Therefore, the undersigned finds that the Court has subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1331

, as the violations of the ACPA and Lanham Act 

raise federal questions.   This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1338

(a) and 

15 U.S.C. § 1121

(a), which grants jurisdiction to federal district courts for civil actions 
arising under federal trademark law.                                      
In Rem Jurisdiction                                                  
In order to establish in rem jurisdiction, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A) requires Plaintiff to 
establish that the Defendant Domain Name violates Plaintiff’s rights as the owner of the Fyre 
Festival Mark and that Plaintiff is unable to assert in personam jurisdiction over the registrant of 
the Defendant Domain Name or through due diligence is not able to find a person who would have 
been a defendant in this civil action.  Specifically, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A) provides, in pertinent 
part:                                                                     

The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the judicial 
district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name 
authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if  – 

     (i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the  
     Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c); and  

     (ii) the court finds that the owner –                           

          (I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would  
          have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or 

          (II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have  
          been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by – 

               (aa) sending notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed  
               under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the  
               postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the    
               registrar; and                                        

               (bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct   
               promptly after filing the action.                     

As set forth in the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) analysis below, the facts alleged in the Complaint 
and deemed admitted for purposes of this motion, properly state a claim for cybersquatting in 
violation of the ACPA and trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, and therefore 
the undersigned finds the first statutory prong needed to establish in rem jurisdiction is satisfied.  
See 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A)(i).                                         
Next, Plaintiff satisfied the second statutory prong needed to establish in rem jurisdiction 
under 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) because the registrant, Liam Spencer, resides outside of the 
United States and therefore Plaintiff cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction over him in this 
cybersquatting and trademark infringement action. Dkts. 1-1, 4-1 Exhibit 1.7  
In addition, Plaintiff complied with the provisions of 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(aa) 
and (bb).8  On September 29, 2025, in accordance with § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(aa), Plaintiff 
provided notice by mail and e-mail to the registrant, Mr. Spencer, of the alleged violation and of 
Plaintiff’s intent to proceed in rem under 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d).  Dkt. 4-1.  The notice also included 
a copy of the Complaint, accompanying exhibits, and summons. 

Id.

 After sending notice to the 
registrant of the Defendant Domain Name at the e-mail addresses provided by the registrant to the 

7    The registrant information for the Defendant Domain Name filed with the registrar 
reflects that Mr. Spencer is the registrant and lives in England. Dkt. 1-1. 

8    

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), provide independent grounds 

upon which in rem jurisdiction may be established. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has 
established jurisdiction under § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and therefore need not comply with the 
requirements of § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(aa) and (bb) to establish in rem jurisdiction.  However, the 
fact that Plaintiff chose to do so gives the Court greater certainty that all interested parties were 
given notice of these proceedings and an opportunity to contest the motion.  
registrar, the ACPA’s remaining requirement was “publishing notice of the action as the court may 
direct.”  See 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(bb).  On October 7, 2025, the Court granted 
Plaintiff’s motion for alternative service and permitted service by publication. Dkt. 6. On October 
16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a declaration of publication, demonstrating that Plaintiff had complied 

with the Court’s October 7, 2025 Order by publishing notice of this action and a copy of the Order 
in The Washington Times on October 10, 2025.  Dkt. 7. Plaintiff also served a copy of the Order 
on the Defendant Domain Name via the e-mail address provided in the domain name registration.  

Id.

                                                                       
For  these  reasons,  the  undersigned  finds  that  Plaintiff  properly  established  in  rem 
jurisdiction pursuant to 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A).                       
Venue                                                                
Pursuant to 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(C), for an in rem action, the domain name “shall be 
deemed to have its situs” in the judicial district where the “registrar, registry, or other domain name 
authority” is located.  Here, Plaintiff properly alleges that the principal place of business of the 
registry, Verisign, Inc., is this judicial district.9 Compl. ¶ 9.  Therefore, the undersigned finds venue 

to be proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C.   1391(b) and 15 U.S.C.   1125(d)(2)(C).  
                     Service of Proce§ss         §                   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(n)(1) states that the “court may assert service over property if authorized 
by a federal statute” and notice to claimants of the property is given as provided in the statute.  The 
ACPA explicitly authorizes service of process for in rem actions.   Specifically, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(B) provides that the “actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of 



9    The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Verisign, Inc.’s principal place of business 
is in Reston, Virginia, which is within the Eastern District of Virginia. 
process.”  As noted above, subparagraph (A)(ii) requires the Plaintiff to satisfy either of the two 
following conditions:                                                     
     (I) [Plaintiff] is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would 
     have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or 

     (II) through due diligence [Plaintiff] was not able to find a person who would have 
     been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by –     

          (aa) sending notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed    
          under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the    
          postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the      
          registrar; and                                             

          (bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct     
          promptly after filing the action.                          

Satisfying one of these two conditions is also necessary to establish in rem jurisdiction 
under the ACPA.  When addressing in rem jurisdiction above, the undersigned determined that 
Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of subparagraph (A)(ii)(I).  Specifically, Plaintiff properly 
alleges that the registrant resides outside of the United States and therefore Plaintiff cannot obtain 
in personam jurisdiction over him in this cybersquatting and trademark infringement action. Dkts. 
1-1, 4-1 Exhibit 1. As noted above, Plaintiff also properly effected service of process under § 
1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(aa) and (bb).                                       
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Analysis of Plaintiff’s Cybersquatting Claim 
Before entering default judgment, the Court must evaluate Plaintiff’s Complaint against 
the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to ensure that the Complaint properly states a claim. 
GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. Globalsantafe.com, 

250 F. Supp. 2d 610

, 612 n.3 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
Plaintiff’s first claim alleges cybersquatting in violation of the ACPA, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d).  
(Compl., at 5).  The ACPA allows the owner of a mark to file an in rem action against a domain 
name  if  the  domain  name  violates  “any  right  of  the  owner  of  a  mark.”    See  

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(2)(A).  This encompasses rights against cybersquatting provided for under § 1125(d)(1).  
See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 

302 F.3d 214, 228, 232

 (4th Cir. 2002).  
Therefore, the owner of a mark can be entitled to in rem relief upon proving a violation of 
§ 1125(d)(1).                                                             

Section 1125(d)(1) creates civil liability for registering, trafficking in, or using a domain 
name that is “identical or confusingly similar” to a plaintiff’s mark, with a “bad faith intent to 
profit from that mark.”  

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(1)(A).  Thus, to sufficiently plead an ACPA cause of 
action, a plaintiff must properly plead facts that establish: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership of a valid 
and protectable mark; (2) the plaintiff’s mark is distinctive; (3) the registrant’s use of a domain 
name that is “identical or confusingly similar” to the plaintiff’s mark; and (4) the registrant’s bad 
faith intent to profit from the mark or domain name.  See 

id.

             
Plaintiff’s second claim alleges trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1114

(1).  The Lanham Act prohibits the use of a colorable imitation of a registered mark 
in connection with the distribution of goods and services where such use is likely to cause 

confusion or to deceive.  

15 U.S.C. § 1114

(1).  Thus, to sufficiently plead a Lanham Act violation 
a plaintiff must properly plead facts that establish: (1) it has a valid and protectable trademark; and 
(2) the defendant’s use of a colorable imitation of the trademark is likely to cause confusion among 
consumers.  Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 

470 F.3d 162

, 170 (4th Cir. 2006).   
In this case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded facts to establish 
both cybersquatting in violation of the ACPA and trademark infringement in violation of the 
Lanham Act.                                                               
1. Plaintiff Possesses a Valid and Protectable Mark                  
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated protectable rights in the 
Fyre Festival Mark.  The ACPA protects both registered marks as well as unregistered common 
law marks.  See 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(a), (d)(2)(A)(i); B & J Enters., Ltd. v. Giordano, 

329 F. App’x 411, 416

 (4th Cir. 2009).  Since December 12, 2016, when the term Fyre Festival was first publicly 
promoted, the marks have been exclusively associated with the famous/infamous “luxury music 

festival,” the Fyre Festival. Id. ¶ 12.  The record before the Court reflects that the Fyre Festival 
Mark acquired common law trademark rights beginning December 12, 2016. On July 23, 2025, 
Plaintiff acquired all rights, title, interest, and goodwill for all common law and registered 
trademark rights and intellectual property associated with the name Fyre Festival.  Compl. ¶¶ 10, 
11. Moreover, Plaintiff is the owner of U.S. federal trademark registrations using the term “Fyre 
Festival.” Id. ¶ 20, Exhibits 1-2, 1-3.10  Plaintiff’s registration of the term “Fyre Festival” 
constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of, and Plaintiff’s exclusive right to use, the Fyre 
Festival Mark. Therefore, Plaintiff possesses valid and protectable rights in the Fyre Festival Mark 
and is entitled to enforce the provisions of Section 1125(d) against any domain name that violates 
those rights.                                                             

2. Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark is Distinctive                     
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark is distinctive, as required under 
the statute.  

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(1)(A)(ii); see also People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney, 

263 F.3d 359, 367

 (4th Cir. 2001).  Trademarks may be considered “fanciful,” 
“arbitrary,” or “suggestive,” which are all inherently “distinctive.”  Venetian Casino Resort v. 
Venetiangold.Com, 

380 F.Supp.2d 737, 742

 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2005) (citing Sara Lee Corp. v. 
Kayser–Roth Corp., 

81 F.3d 455, 464

 (4th Cir. 1996)).  They may also be considered merely 
“descriptive,” which is not inherently distinctive, but is distinctive if the mark acquires “secondary 


10   

Registration No. 5962393

 and 

Registration No. 7322932

.  

Id. ¶ 20

, Exhibits 1-2, 1-3. 
meaning,” i.e., “if in fact a substantial number of present or prospective customers understand the 
designation” to refer to a particular business enterprise.  

Id.

 (quoting Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., 
Inc., 

915 F.2d 121, 125

 (4th Cir. 1990)).  Registration of a trademark with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) serves as prima facie evidence that a mark has acquired 

distinctiveness.  See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 

243 F.3d 812, 816

 (4th Cir. 2001).  Such 
registered  marks  therefore  “begin[]  with  the  presumption  that  [they],  at  a  minimum,  are 
‘descriptive and have secondary meaning.’”  Venetian Casino Resort, 

380 F.Supp.2d at 742

.    
Here, Plaintiff has obtained two trademark registrations from the United States Patent and 
Trademark  Office  for  the  Fyre  Festival  Mark.  Compl.  ¶  20,  Exhibits  1-2,  1-3.    Thus,  the 
undersigned presumes Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark is, at the very least, descriptive and has 
obtained  secondary  meaning.    See  Venetian  Casino  Resort,  

380 F.Supp.2d at 742

.  That 
presumption is further supported by the full record. Indeed, Plaintiff properly alleges that the Fyre 
Festival Mark was used beginning in December 2016 as part of a successful global social media 
campaign to promote the 2017 Fyre Festival. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. Even after the original festival the marks 

were used to sell merchandise, were the subject of two documentaries and are potentially going to 
be used as part of a VISA advertisement campaign and the basis for a Broadway production.  Id. 
¶¶ 15, 17. The Fyre Festival Mark was created to promote the music festival of the same name and 
is inextricably linked to the festival and therefore the undersigned finds the mark to be inherently 
distinctive.                                                              
3. Defendant Domain Name is Confusingly Similar to Plaintiff’s Mark  
The undersigned finds that the Defendant Domain Name, fyrefestival.com, is confusingly 
similar to Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark. See 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(1)(A)(ii); see also People for 
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 

263 F.3d 359, 367

 (4th Cir. 2001).   
The infringing domain name does not need to be identical to the registered mark, only 
confusingly similar.  See 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I); See also Volvo Trademark Holding AB 
v. Volvospares.com, 

703 F. Supp. 2d 563, 568

 (E.D. Va. 2010).  The confusingly similar standard 
is satisfied where a domain name is similar to a protected mark such that a “reasonable consumer 

‘might think they were used, approved, or permitted by [the plaintiff].’”  Venetian Casino Resort, 

380 F. Supp. 2d at 743

 (quoting Harrods, Ltd., 

157 F.Supp.2d 658, 677

 (E.D. Va. June 27, 2001), 
rev’d on other grounds by 

302 F.3d 214

 (4th Cir. 2002)).  Stated differently, a confusingly similar 
domain name and mark are “so similar in sight, sound and meaning that they could be confused.”  

Id.

 (internal quotations and citation omitted).                           
Here, the Defendant Domain Name, fyrefestival.com, fully incorporates and duplicates 
Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark. The construction of the Defendant Domain Name was clearly 
intended to confuse consumers, and their similarity in sight and meaning could reasonably do so.  
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the “confusing similarity” requirement of the ACPA.  
See Agri-Supply Company, Inc. v. Agrisupply.Com, 

457 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663

 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 

2006) (holding the domain name was confusing similar because it was “virtually identical” to 
Plaintiff’s trademark).                                                   
4.  Registrant Has Acted with a Bad Faith Intent to Profit from Plaintiff’s Mark 
Finally, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated the registrant’s bad faith 
intent to profit from Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark.  The facts properly alleged and deemed 
admitted establish that the registrant uses the fyrefestival.com website to redirect consumers to a 
travel booking website unrelated to Plaintiff or any authorized use of its mark.  Compl. ¶¶ 23-27. 
The registrant then receives financial compensation when consumers then click on one of the travel 
website links. Id. ¶ 28. The record clearly establishes that the registrant is profiting from the 
unauthorized use of the Plaintiff’s mark and doing so in bad faith.       
Under the ACPA, bad faith intent may be considered by weighing nine factors: 
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the 
domain name;                                                         
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person 
or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;   
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona 
fide offering of any goods or services;                              
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site 
accessible under the domain name;                                    
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location 
to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented 
by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage 
the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, 
affiliation, or endorsement of the site;                             
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the 
mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an 
intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, 
or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;  
(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact information 
when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional 
failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person’s prior conduct 
indicating a pattern of such conduct;                                
(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the 
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are 
distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous 
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, 
without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and          
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain name 
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c). 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(1)(B)(i).  The factors are given to courts as a guide and need not be 
exhaustively considered in every case.  Lamparello v. Falwell, 

420 F.3d 309, 319-20

 (4th Cir. 
2005).  Indeed, “the most important grounds for finding bad faith ‘are the unique circumstances of 
th[e] case, which do not fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated by Congress but may 
nevertheless be considered under the statute.’”  Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 

238 F.3d 264, 268

 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 

202 F.3d 489

, 499 (2d Cir. 2000)).                                            
Factors I through IV overwhelmingly support Plaintiff’s allegation of a bad faith intent to 

profit from use of the Fyre Festival Mark.  First, the registrant of the fyrefestival.com website has 
no intellectual property rights in the domain name, or any portion of the domain name.  In fact, the 
fyrefestival.com domain name is identical to the protected Fyre Festival Mark. The registrant has 
no trademark rights in the domain name and clearly has no right to use Plaintiff’s mark.  The 
fyrefestival.com website also does not incorporate or consist of the legal name of “the person” nor 
has it been previously used by the registrant in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods 
or services.  Moreover, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the registrant engaged 
in bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name.  
Quite the opposite, all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the properly alleged facts establish 
that the registrant acted with a nefarious intent to profit by deceiving consumers as to an association 

between Plaintiff and the travel booking websites.                        
Additionally, the undersigned finds that factor V supports Plaintiff’s allegation of bad faith.  
The registrant has duplicated and fully incorporated Plaintiff’s mark into the Defendant Domain 
Name for commercial gain, and without authorization or permission, thereby creating a likelihood 
of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site.    
Applying the statutory factors to the unique facts of this case, Plaintiff has sufficiently 
established a “bad faith intent to profit” by the registrant.  Clearly the registrant is attempting to 
profit from the unauthorized use of Plaintiff’s Fyre Festival Mark.  See Virtual Works, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 

238 F.3d at 268

 (noting the bad faith analysis depends upon “unique 
circumstances” of each case).                                             
                     Requested Relief                                
Plaintiff seeks an Order of the Court that transfers ownership and control of the Defendant 
Domain Name to Plaintiff.  Compl. at Claim for Relief; Mem. Supp. at pg. 15.11  The undersigned 

recommends that the Court grant Plaintiff’s request.                      
Pursuant to 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d)(1)(C), “[i]n any civil action involving the registration, 
trafficking, or use of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture or 
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.”  
Indeed, § 1125(d)(2)(D) limits the remedy for any cause of action brought in rem to “a court order 
for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the 
owner of the mark.”  Plaintiff, having established violations of the ACPA and the Lanham Act in 
this in rem action, is entitled to its requested relief of transfer of the Defendant Domain Name to 
Plaintiff, as permitted by 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125

(d)(1)(C), (2)(D).  See Int’l Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe 
Des Baines De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Etrangers A Monaco, 

192 F. Supp. 2d 467, 490

 (E.D. Va. 

2002).                                                                    
                     Recommendation                                  
For  the  reasons  outlined  above,  the  undersigned  United  States  magistrate  judge 
recommends that the Court grant default judgment against the Defendant Domain Name with 
respect to Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1125

(d), and the Lanham Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 1114

(1).  The undersigned further 


11   In the Complaint, Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Compl. Prayer 
for relief at § 4. Given that this is an in rem action and Plaintiff did not request attorney’s fees and 
costs in its request for Default Judgment, the Court will assume Plaintiff has abandoned this 
request.                                                                  
recommends that the Court grant Plaintiffs requested relief in the form of an Order requiring 
Verisign,  Inc.,  the  operator  of the  .COM  registry,  to  change  the  registrar  of record  for the 
Defendant Domain Name, fyrefestival.com, in the .COM registry to Plaintiff's registrar of choice, 
and for the registrar to take all necessary steps to update the registrant for fyrefestival.com as 
directed by Plaintiff. 
                               Notice 
 Plaintiff is directed to e-mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the registrar 
and registrant, Liam Spencer, at the e-mail address the registrant provided to the registrar. Plaintiff 
is further directed to file a declaration within seven (7) days of the filing of this Report and 
Recommendation via the Court’s electronic filing system certifying e-mail service of this Report 
and Recommendation on the registrar and the registrant.  Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636

 and Rule 
72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties are advised that objections to this Report 
and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days of its service.  Failure to file timely 
objections  waives  appellate  review  of any judgment  or  decision  based  on  this  Report  and 
Recommendation. 

                               UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
March 11, 2026 
Alexandria, Virginia 

                                 19