Frew v. Gilbert

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Table of Contents

PART ONE: FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING VIOLATIONS OF CONSENT DECREE

Background and Procedural History

Issue I: Outreach

A. Overview

B. Findings of Fact: Outreach

1. Knowledge and Understanding

2. Transportation

3. Receipt of Services after Oral Outreach

4. Low Participation Rates

5. Insufficient Staffing

C. Violations of Decree: Outreach

D. Providers’ Requests for Outreach: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

E. Outreach Reports: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Issue II: Medical and Dental Checkups

A. Overview

B. Findings of Fact: Checkups

1. Medical Checkups

2. Dental Checkups

a. Services

b. Provider Recruitment

*586 3. Teens

4. Abused and Neglected Class Members

C.Violations of Decree: Checkups

1. Principles of Statutory Interpretation

a. Structure and Context

b. Legislative Intent

2. Waiver

3. The Cases

Issue IV: Managed Care

A. Defendants’ Managed Care Programs

B. Findings of Fact: Receipt of Services by Class Members Enrolled in Managed Care

1. Overview

2. Inaccurate and Inttated Data

3. THQA Focus Studies

4. Comparing Managed Care and Fee-for-service Systems

5. Incomplete Checkups

6. Problems with the Medical Home and Primary Care Provider Models

a. ThePCP

b. Crowded Clinics and Emergency Rooms

7. Access to Specialists

8. Access to Pediatric Care and Mental Health Services

9. THQA Provider and Consumer Studies

10.Self-Reporting by Class Members

a. B.M. and Samantha

b. C.H. and Sons

c. C.O.

C. Violations of Decree: Receipt of Services by Class Members Enrolled in Managed Care

D. Children of Migrant Farmworker Families

1. The Problem

2. Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

E. Training of Health Care Providers in the Managed Care System: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

F. Data Collection in the Managed Care System: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Issue V: Toll-Free Numbers

A. Overview

B. Findings of Fact: Prompt Answering of All Calls

C. Violations of Decree: Prompt Answering of All Calls

1. Abandonment Rates

2. Waits in Queue

3. Unit of Measurement

D. Knowledgeable, Helpful, and Polite: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Issue VI: Case Management

A. Role and Importance of Case Management

B. Findings of Fact

1. The Need

2. Utilization

3. Sufficient Staffing 4. The Safety Net

5. Recruitment

C. Violations of Decree

Issue VII: Outcome Measures

A. Overview

B. Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

1. Joint Notice Measures

2. Unilateral Substitution of Measures

3. Corrective Action Plans

*587 4. Timing

Issue VIII: Training for Health Care Professionals

A.Findings of Fact B» Violations of Dgcvcg

PART TWO: DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT OF CONSENT DECREE

Issue I: Enforcement of the Medicaid Statute

A. Law of the Case

B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Enforceable Rights

C. The EPSDT Provisions of the Medicaid Act

Issue II: Eleventh Amendment Objection

A. Defendants’Objection

B. Lelsz v. Kavanagh

1. Overview

2. The Holding: A Closer Look

3. The Nairowing of Lelsz

4. An Untenable Distinction?

C. Application

1. Enforcement of Provisions Guaranteeing Services

a. Outreach

b. Services

c. Managed Care

2. Enforcement of Provisions Requiring Reporting of Data and Information

a. Reporting

b. Outcome Measures and Corrective Action Plans

3. Enforcement of Training and Toll-Free Line Provisions

CONCLUSION

PART ONE: FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING VIOLATIONS OF DECREE

Background and Procedural History

This civil action, filed on September 1, 1993, concerns the alleged failure of the State of Texas to implement a Medicaid program that assures that indigent children and youth receive timely, comprehensive health care. The case was brought by a class of more than one and .one-half million indigent children in Texas who are entitled to health benefits through the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment program (“EPSDT”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43) 1 ; 1396d(r). 2 In *588 Texas, the program is referred to as the “Texas Health Steps” program, which is administered jointly by the federal government and the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. EPSDT is intended to be “the nation’s largest preventive health program for children.” H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 4213 (1989). It is “among the most important programs that the Texas Department of Health runs.” Order Concerning Fairness of Consent Decree at 8 (filed January 25, 1996)(hereinafter “Fairness Order ”)(internal quotes omitted).

The purpose of the EPSDT program is to ensure that poor children receive comprehensive health care at an early age, so that they will develop fewer health problems as they grow older. EPSDT is designed to provide health education, preventive care, and effective follow-up care for conditions identified during check-ups. Preventive health care identifies health problems that may respond to early treatment but, if left untreated, may instead lead to serious health conditions. For example, a heart murmur detected during an EPSDT screening, if untreated, could lead to heart failure. Severe anemia, if untreated, could result in behavioral problems and reduced mental capacity. Other important components of the EPSDT program include immunizations, parental education, assistance with scheduling appointments and transportation assistance, and coordination of EPSDT and other programs serving Medicaid-eligible children.

After two years of extensive negotiation following the filing of this case, the parties proposed a partial consent decree to this court in July of 1995. During a fairness hearing held in December of that year, the parties urged the court to approve the proposed decree. The court approved the decree as fair, reasonable, and adequate on February 16, 1996. Per the agreement of both parties, the decree expressly retains the court’s jurisdiction to rectify violations of its terms, and provides a mechanism to invoke this jurisdiction. Consent Decree, ¶ 303. 3

The Plaintiffs’ Claims

Currently pending before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to enforce multiple provisions of the consent decree with which defendants allegedly have not complied. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants have failed to: 1) implement properly the outreach program and deliver required outreach reports; 2) assure that all class members receive medical and dental checkups; 3) develop and implement annual corrective action plans both for counties that lag behind the statewide average for checkups and for the state’s medical transportation system; 4) operate the state’s managed care system consistently with the mandates of the decree; 5) operate toll-free numbers so as to ensure that all calls are answered promptly by a knowledgeable and helpful staff member; 6) provide case management to all class members who need it, statewide; 7) develop methods to study each agreed health outcome measure; and 8) provide EPSDT training for health care providers.

The Defendants’ Responses

Defendants deny that plaintiffs are entitled to any relief sought, and maintain that they are in full compliance with the decree. In addition, they argue that in interpreting *589 the consent decree to require certain specific actions by defendants, plaintiffs seek to modify the decree, and not merely to enforce it. In the alternative, defendants argue that a federal court’s jurisdiction over a state official is limited by the Eleventh Amendment to requiring compliance with federal law. Therefore, defendants argue that the decree itself may not be enforced against them to the extent that it goes beyond the scope of simple compliance with federal law.

The Hearing and Memorandum Opinion

A hearing was held from March 13— Marchl7, 2000, on plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the decree, and evidence was heard on each of the above-listed issues. Following the hearing, the court invited the parties to submit briefs on several of the legal issues involved in this case. Additionally, plaintiffs submitted proposed orders of enforcement, to which defendants responded. The following is a memorandum opinion that grants plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the decree in part. Part One of the opinion details the court’s findings of fact regarding defendants’ specific violations of the consent decree, as interpreted by the court. Part Two addresses defendants’ objections to the enforcement of various provisions of the decree. The court’s Order of Enforcement accompanies these findings of fact and conclusions of law as a separately issued order.

I. Issue One: Outreach

A. Overview

The decree elaborates in detail the defendants’ obligations to conduct outreach efforts aimed at increasing participation and the receipt of needed services. For example, it requires defendants to inform all class members about checkups and other services, and to assist them in arranging for checkups and needed care. ¶¶ 10-74. These decree paragraphs stem from the federal requirement that a state plan for medical assistance that details the state’s obligations pursuant to their participation in the federal Medicaid program must “provide for” the “informing” of all eligible recipients of EPSDT services of the availability of those services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A). The decree also requires defendants to provide outreach to “encourage EPSDT recipients to fully use services” and “assist recipients to overcome common barriers that prevent them from using EPSDT services.” ¶ 50. 4 These barriers include the “lack of a health care provider,” “communication problems,” “transportation problems,” and “lack of knowledge” about the program. ¶ 51. As was explained to the court:

[I]f poor parents understood the concept of prevention and understood the value of having their child seen early and on a regular basis and they understood the outcome they could expect, which is a child with no decay and pretty white teeth and a pretty smile, of course they would [seek services].

TR 252, line 23 to 253, line 14; see also TR 308, lines 13-15. (Testimony of Nancy Seale, D.D.S., M.S.D. 5 ).

B. Findings of Fact: Outreach

At issue is defendants’ compliance with decree provisions requiring that they *590 maintain sufficient staffing and other resources to conduct outreach “effectively” (¶ 32) and that they “effectively inform” class members about EPSDT services to which they are entitled (¶¶ 11, 52). 6

Abundant evidence that defendants have violated the decree’s outreach provisions was presented to the court. The evidence may be sorted into five categories: 1) evidence of class members’ lack of knowledge of defendants’ services, 2) evidence related to defendants’ transportation system, 3) evidence that plaintiffs do not often obtain services after having received outreach contacts, 4) evidence of plaintiffs’ low participation in defendants’ programs, and 5) evidence of defendants’ insufficient staffing of their outreach programs. 7

Knowledge and Understanding

Overwhelming evidence was presented — both statistical and anecdotal — demonstrating that large numbers of class members do not know about Texas Health Steps, or do not understand the breadth of services to which they are entitled.

Numerous witnesses testified to the lack of understanding about defendants’ services among class members. For instance, one witness testified about parents who are “overwhelmed with [ ] confusion” about the program. TR 163, lines 8-13. (Testimony of Carolynn Singleton, M.P.H., R.N. 8 ). She explained that class members view Medicaid as a program to use only if they become sick. She stated that class members are not aware of the preventive dental services to which they have access, and the transportation services they could use to gain access to such care. TR 162, lines 1-15.

Another witness testified that most class members “do not seem to be familiar with all the services Medicaid provides,” noting that class members often do not know how many prescriptions they may receive, have not heard of the medical transportation program, and do not know about eyeglass coverage or dental coverage. TR 19, line 22 to 20, line 8. (Testimony of Jane McHan, M.S.W. 9 ). A third witness also testified that a common problem for class members is that they do not understand their benefits under Medicaid. TR 760, *591 line 20. (Testimony of Carol Tillman 10 ). See also P.Ex. M-17.

Echoing the testimony of these experts, a fourth witness explained that

[t]he families are under-informed about the Medicaid program. They do not understand all the concepts about preventive care. Most of the families do not know what coverage their children have and do not have through Medicaid.... Most of them do not understand what a checkup is; they think this means any contact with a medical provider’s office.

P.Ex. A-8 at 5 (Deposition of Deborah Skaggs 11 ). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that class members do not understand preventive dental care or Medicaid dental benefits:

[T]he families of the poor children work under the assumption [that] you go to the dentist when you have a toothache, and you go to the dentist when you have a problem, otherwise you don’t go. And I think they need to be taught.... [T]he ones who haven’t been taught don’t know what they can expect. They simply don’t know, and I think a large percent of [class members’] parents don’t know.... [0]ne of the single greatest reasons that they don’t seek [dental care] is they simply don’t know.

TR 253, line 19 to 254, line 11. (Testimony of Dr. Seale).

Furthermore, defendants’ August, 1998 Outreach and Marketing Report notes that class members “were consistently surprised to learn that Texas Health Steps offers dental and vision care, free transportation and eligibility until age 21.” P.Ex. O-l, at 2. This report also indicates that 60% of participating EPSDT clients knew “very little” (12%) or “nothing at all” (48%) about the program. Id. at 8. Potential clients knew even less: 70% of those eligible but not enrolled reported knowing very little or nothing at all about Texas Health Steps. Id. at 7. The study also revealed that parental confusion about which services they have or have not obtained for their children may operate as a barrier to plaintiffs’ receipt of care. For example, class members’ families often confuse EPSDT services with other services they may have received, such as services from the Women’s Infants’ and Children’s program (WIC). Id. at 8.

Moreover, class members’ parents sometimes do not understand what a dental visit is or think their child has had a dental visit when in fact the child has not. TR 274, lines 23-25. (Testimony of Dr. Seale). Parents frequently believe that class members are up to date on checkups and immunizations, when in fact they are not. TR 165, line 10 to 166, line 25. (Testimony of Ms. Singleton). As Dr. Seale noted, when “a parent thinks a child has already had a visit, ... [but the child is actually overdue for a checkup] ... they may not follow *592 through ... because they think the child has already had one.” TR 275, lines 10-18. 12

Transportation

The class members’ lack of knowledge of the free medical transportation system is perhaps the clearest example of a failed outreach program. Many of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses quoted in the above section testified to this lack of knowledge. The Texas Legislature’s Sunset Advisory Commission Health and Human Services Staff Report for 1998 states that “the lack of information about available client transportation services ... [is] ... a major barrier to accessing needed transportation.” P.Ex. — 3 at 115. Furthermore, according to a Texas A & M University study of defendants’ transportation program, “[o]n average, recipients who do not use MTP report fewer medical and dental appointments than MTP users.” P.Ex. T-43 at 54. However, despite the importance of the transportation program, it is severely underutilized. 13 This underutili-zation, stems from the failure of the defendants’ outreach program to make class members aware that MTP exists:

Recipients who did not use MTP simply did not know about the program or the services it provided.... [SJlightly more than a third of non-users reported any knowledge of MTP. Of those who had heard of the program, only a small fraction had actually heard of any of the specific MTP funded services.

P.Ex. T-43 at 55. 14

Receipt of Services after Oral Outreach

The effectiveness of defendants’ outreach program may also be measured by the number of class members who opt to receive services after having been contacted by defendants. Because written information and contacts with eligibility workers are not, by themselves, likely to inform all class members about EPSDT services, the decree provides for the creation of “oral outreach units” designed to provide outreach services to those recipients who request additional information, those who miss check ups, and those whose health care provider requests outreach. ¶ 33.

The evidence produced at the hearing suggests that defendants’ outreach efforts do not generate particularly high levels of participation among eligible EPSDT recipients. Approximately 25% of class members actually receive medical checkups after having received oral outreach services. 15 P.Ex. 0-3; see also TR 943, lines 19-25. From the start of fiscal year 1999 through June of 1999, the percentage of newly-certified and re-certified class members who received checkups after receiving oral outreach services ranged from about 26% to 38%. The percentage of class members who were overdue for checkups and who received ehec- *593 kups after oral outreach ranged from about 12% to 38%. P.Ex. 0-4.

Low Participation Rates

The low participation rates among class members, discussed in Section 11(B) of this opinion, also demonstrate that defendants’ outreach efforts are ineffective. The fact that participation rates have declined is stark evidence of the ineffectiveness of defendants’ outreach program. 16

Insufficient Staffing

Finally, the evidence demonstrates that defendants’ failure to conduct appropriate outreach, at least in part, may be attributed to inadequate outreach staffing. Although defendants’ outreach obligations to the large number of plaintiffs who had missed appointments should have increased steadily every year from fiscal year 1997 through 1999, there was no concomitant increase in defendants’ staffing. P.Ex. 0-5. In 1996, one outreach unit staff member served 3,500 class members. P.Ex. 0-8.

C. Violations of Decree: Outreach

The evidence weighing against a finding that defendants are in violation of the outreach provisions consists primarily of improvements made after the entry of the decree. 17 The drop in the number of class members overdue for checkups, from 690,-868 in 1998 to 629,600 in 1999, could be interpreted as evidence of an effective outreach program. D.Ex. D-101. However, the large number of class members overdue for checkups is more appropriately viewed as evidence of an ineffective outreach program, especially considering that over one million class members did not receive any dental checkups in fiscal year 1998. P.Ex. D-3 at 5. The decline thus says very little, if anything, about the overall effectiveness of the outreach program.

The evidence also reveals that the number of outreach contacts increased from 2.3 per class member in fiscal year 1997 to 2.5 per class member in fiscal year 1998, and that the number of outreach contacts has increased each year from fiscal year 1997 to 1999. D.Ex. D-100, D-102. However, roughly two-thirds of these reported contacts were written, not oral, contacts. Despite the effectiveness of home visits, 18 defendants rarely conduct them. P.Ex. 0-3. Although the decree does not mandate that a certain proportion of defendants’ outreach contacts be home visits, it is found that defendants are not adequately availing themselves of the opportunity to use one of the most effective means of outreach. For example, defendants conducted only 53 home visits in the entire state for the month of March 1999. More importantly, given the strikingly large number of missed checkups — especially dental checkups — defendants’ reported increase in the number of contacts would be expected due to the requirement in paragraph 33 that those who miss checkups subsequently receive outreach. In sum, it *594 is found that much of the evidence of improvement is severely undermined by the low levels of success that have characterized defendants’ outreach program. 19

Furthermore, it is by no means clear that defendants’ progress is at issue, as the decree does not require progress in these areas. In enforcing the consent decree, the court is bound solely by its language. As the Supreme Court emphasized in United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971), “the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners,” not by reference to what either party hoped to achieve by the decree, or to what they might have achieved through the litigation of their claims. Under the logic of Armour, as derived from the law of contracts, an interpretation of the decree must be based strictly on the language of the decree, and not on the legal requirements of the Medicaid Act, except to the extent that those requirements are clearly imported by the language of the decree.

There are two major exceptions to the general rule in Armour. First, extrinsic evidence may be consulted in interpreting the language of a consent decree:

Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other contract. Such aids include the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any other doeu-ments expressly incorporated in the decree. Such reliance does not in any way depart from the “four corners” rule of Armour.

United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975) (footnote omitted). Relying upon general contract principles, courts have interpreted this to mean that “[e]xtrinsic evidence ... may generally be considered only if the terms of the judgment, or of documents incorporated in it, are ambiguous.” See, e.g., SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1179 (2nd Cir.1989). A contract is ambiguous “when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, in light of surrounding circumstances and established rules of construction.” North Shore Laboratories Corp. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 519 (5th Cir.1983). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Paragon Resources, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 695 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1983). Once a court determines that a contract is ambiguous, it may look to extrinsic evidence to support its terms. Eaton v. Courtaulds of North America, Inc., 578 F.2d 87, 91 (5th Cir.1978). Although the determination of a contract’s ambiguity is a question of law, determination of the party’s intent through extrinsic evidence is a question of fact. Paragon Resources, 695 F.2d at 995.

Second, if a statement of purpose is contained in the decree itself, as the product of arm’s-length negotiations, and that purpose may be discerned without reference to the extrinsic aims of the parties, Armour should not be read to prohibit consideration of that purpose. See Unit *595 ed States v. Local 1804-1, 44 F.3d 1091, 1098 (2nd Cir.1995). In the instant case, the various introductory paragraphs interspersed throughout the decree form the relevant backdrop for its interpretation. For example, the overall purpose of the decree is recited in paragraph 6. 20

Thus, the decree will be interpreted within its “four corners,” and its interpretation will be supplemented by extrinsic evidence where ambiguities so require. Consideration will also be given to the purposes incorporated into the decree itself. Therefore, attention must first be given to the language of the decree’s outreach provisions put in question by plaintiffs’ evidence:

11. The parties agree to and the Court orders the following changes to the Texas EPSDT program, policies and procedures to effectively inform recipients about the EPSDT program:

32. All outreach units will have sufficient staff and other reasonably necessary resources to handle their workload promptly and effectively.

52. Oral outreach efforts will effectively inform recipients about EPSDT, including the schedule for medical and dental checkups as well as the full range of covered services. Oral outreach will also effectively inform recipients about the benefits of preventive health care, that services are free of charge, how to locate a provider who is willing to provide services to EPSDT recipients, how to schedule appointments and how to schedule transportation assistance.

The court must determine which of these provisions create binding obligations on the state that, based on the evidence presented, have not been met. Paragraph 11 highlights the fact that the parties bound themselves to the outreach provisions that follow. Paragraph 32 states that all outreach units “will have sufficient staff ... to handle their workload promptly and effectively.” This language is unequivocally mandatory and clearly binds defendants. The only question is, what level of staffing is “sufficient,” and what level of resources “reasonably necessary”? While these terms may at first seem vague and difficult to enforce, their meaning is clarified in part by the remainder of paragraph 32. “Sufficient” staffing and “reasonably necessary” resources are those inputs that will permit the “prompt” and “effective” handling of the workload. Paragraph 52, which states that oral outreach efforts will “effectively inform” recipients about EPSDT, echoes this emphasis on effectiveness. See also ¶ 11 (“effectively inform”); ¶ 30 (“Outreach units will work cooperatively with others who serve EPSDT recipients to serve recipients effectively and efficiently”). Thus, paragraphs 32 and 52 state explicitly what the State must do: it must hire enough staff members to permit the effective handling of the workload, and it must effectively inform class members about the program through oral outreach. 21

What, then, amounts to “effective” informing or serving, or the “effective” handling of a workload? Under Armour and its importation of contract law into the interpretation of consent decrees, extrinsic *596 evidence of the parties’ intent is to be considered by a court in giving meaning to ambiguous phrases. Defendants appear to suggest that the use of the phrase “effectively inform” in 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a) should inform the court as to the parties’ intended meaning of the phrase in the decree. 22 Specifically, defendants appear to argue that the phrase “designed to,” significantly limits their more general duty to “effectively inform.” However, defendants’ proposed interpretation of this phrase must be rejected as inconsistent with the parties’ use of “effective” in the decree. In particular, paragraph 52 does not include the phrase “designed to,” and instead states unequivocally that defendants’ outreach efforts “will effectively inform” (emphasis added). The omission of the phrase “designed to” suggests, if anything, that the parties intended to require the defendants to do more than merely plan or design to inform effectively. Therefore, defendants’ proposed extrinsic evidence is found to have little bearing on the meaning of “effective” as used in these paragraphs. 23

The meaning of “effective” can be more clearly discerned by looking at the entire context of the decree, thereby locating and examining possible goals or criteria under which “informing” or the “handling” of a workload might be deemed “effective.” See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir.1997)(noting that “four corners” inquiry requires a focus on the entire decree, not just a single provision). For example, under one reading of the decree, one might consider informing to be “effective” if it is simply well-communicated to those plaintiffs who are contacted. This reading would place defendants under an obligation, in the course of their outreach, to be “effective” in instilling understanding or knowledge among those contacted. See, e.g., ¶ 14 (“Information about EPSDT must be relevant to recipients’ needs. Information must also be reasonably interesting and presented in a manner that is sensitive to EPSDT recipients’ many different cultural backgrounds.... Finally, information must be presented in a manner that is convenient to recipients.”); ¶ 17 (“Defendants will use letters that are effective and appropriate. They will be printed in English and Spanish.”); ¶ 51 (“Common barriers may include!:] ... misunderstandings/lack of knowledge about Medicaid and/or EPSDT.”); ¶ 52 (“Oral outreach efforts will effectively inform recipients about EPSDT, including the schedule for medical and dental check ups as well as the full range of covered services. Oral outreach will also effectively inform recipients about the benefits of preventive health care, that services are free of charge, how to located a provider who is willing to provide services to EPSDT recipients, how to schedule appointments and how to schedule transportation assistance.”); ¶ 54 (“Oral outreach will use examples that are tailored to the recipient’s age and needs so that information is relevant and interesting to the recipient. When a household includes several recipients of different ages, outreach will provide age appropriate information about each recipient when possible.”); ¶ 56 (“Oral outreach will be provided in a manner that is sensitive to recipients’ ability to *597 understand and process information. Appropriate language will be used. Sessions will be long enough to meet recipients’ needs for information but not so long that they are overwhelming or confusing. The length of sessions will necessarily vary from recipient to recipient.”)

Alternatively, other decree provisions suggest that outreach that succeeds in reaching the maximum possible number of people could be termed “effective.” See, e.g., ¶ 20 (“Eligibility workers will now be required to discuss EPSDT with applicants who apply for benefits on behalf of an EPSDT eligible person.”); ¶25 (“But, information about EPSDT provided by TDHS eligibility workers will not be effective for all EPSDT recipients. Oral outreach units will provide outreach services when required.”); ¶ 31 (“Defendants will provide outreach services in all areas of the state.”); ¶ 49 (“Outreach units will keep current so that they can [] provide prompt outreach upon receipt of new Outreach Lists ... ”); ¶ 50 (“The purpose of oral outreach is to encourage EPSDT recipients to fully use EPSDT services; and [to] assist recipients to overcome common barriers that prevent them from using EPSDT services.”); ¶ 59 (“Over time, the groups of recipients who require oral outreach should change.... The groups of recipients who require oral outreach will increasingly be [ ] newly eligible recipients who have never received oral outreach ... ”); ¶ 73 (“Defendants will arrange for and implement a marketing plan that encourages providers and recipients to participate in the EPSDT program.”); see also ¶¶ 175-213 (regarding “special groups [that] require special attention so that they can receive the full benefits of the Texas EPSDT program.”); ¶ 264 (“The [case management] plan will make sufficient case management available in every county or cluster of counties where few recipients reside.”); ¶ 271 (“Medicaid services, including EPSDT services, must be available ‘in every political subdivision of the state.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l).”); ¶273 (“The parties agree to implement a process to meet the statewideness requirement.”).

Still another alternative would be to measure the effectiveness of outreach by its success in persuading listeners to gain access to services. 24 See, e.g., ¶ 10 (“Information about the EPSDT program is important so that recipients can fully utilize EPSDT services, including medical and dental checkups.”); ¶ 14 (informing efforts must encourage “recipients to understand and use services fully”); ¶ 17 (written materials must be provided “to explain the EPSDT program and to encourage its use.... The reason to include age appropriate information is to provide information that is relevant and interesting to encourage the recipient to fully use EPSDT services.”); ¶ 50 (“The purpose of oral outreach is to encourage EPSDT recipients to fully use EPSDT services and assist recipients to overcome common barriers that prevent them from using EPSDT services.”); ¶ 64 (defendants may conduct other outreach efforts to “encourage recipients to use EPSDT services”); ¶ 66 (other agencies can help class members to use services); ¶ 73 (media marketing plan must “encourage ... recipients to participate in the EPSDT program”); see also ¶ 178 (“The purpose of outreach to recipients who are children of migrant farmworkers will be to help them to receive as many needed EPSDT services as possible.... ”); ¶ 183 (“Outreach information will encourage [migrant farmworker] recipients to receive as many needed services as possible .... ”); ¶ 193 (managed care companies must “cooperate with outreach units so that recipients who miss medical and/or dental checkups receive prompt services”); ¶ 265 (defendants must “encourage the acceptance of case management by recipients.”)

Thus, whether “informing” has been done “effectively,” or an outreach workload *598 handled “effectively,” wholly depends on the goals one hopes to effect. All three of the above-listed outreach goals — facilitating clear knowledge or understanding, reaching the maximum number of eligible class members, and persuading or encouraging class members to obtain care — are present to a large extent in the decree, and were at the heart of the parties’ agreement. These are the purposes that appear repeatedly within the “four corners” of the nearly one hundred pages of the decree.

The testimony of several witnesses supports this view of what constitutes “effective” outreach. While these witnesses’ individual definitions of “effective” cannot be used as evidence of the parties’ intended meaning of the term, they do paint a picture of a commonsense understanding of what it means to conduct outreach effectively that bolsters the court’s above analysis and parsing of the decree. For example, one witness testified that defendants’ outreach efforts are not effective, based on “the numbers of clients that we see in our program that still have very little, if any knowledge about Medicaid services and how to access them.” TR 25, lines 17-24 (Testimony of Ms. McHan) (emphasis added). Another witness agreed, noting that while “[t]he efforts have been put into place,” that she did not “see that they have been effective,” since a “large number of [class members] still don’t understand ... the need for repeated [ ] visits.” TR 174, lines 18-24; 235, lines 10-19 (Testimony of Ms. Singleton)(emphasis added). A third witness testified that the defendants’ outreach program

is not accomplishing everything that it’s intended to.... [I]f it were accomplishing what it was intended to do, it would be educating the parents about the value of early checkups, about the value of keeping appointments on a regular basis and getting care for their children when there was not a problem.

TR 329, lines 8-25 (Testimony of Dr. Sea-le)(emphasis added). Again, while these comments are not evidence in themselves of what the parties meant by “effective,” the witnesses’ collective emphasis on the numbers of class members with little knowledge, on the superficiality of their understanding, and on the failure of outreach to result in a significant number of requests for treatment lends further support to the court’s assessment of the meaning of the term “effective.”

With these background provisions in mind, the precise meaning of “effective” need not be determined. Whether the parties intended it to mean that outreach effectuate the goals of understanding, of reaching maximum numbers of eligibles, or of persuading them to use services, the evidence clearly demonstrates defendants’ ineffectiveness in all three senses of the word. First, if the defendants’ duty to effectively inform and serve were interpreted to require defendants to effectuate understanding in the minds of those class members subjected to outreach, defendants’ August, 1998, “Outreach and Marketing Report” clearly demonstrates their widespread failure to bring about understanding of the program, or even awareness of its existence, among the plaintiff class. P.Ex. 0-1, see also Section 11(B)(1). 25 If, instead, “effectiveness” is measured by defendant’s success in reaching large numbers of the plaintiff class entitled to various forms of outreach, the Outreach and Marketing Report, P.Ex. 0-1, is similarly damning. 26 That report *599 clearly demonstrates that defendants have been ineffective in contacting large numbers of class members entitled to oral outreach in an overall effort to inform the population of the program’s existence. Specifically, 60% of respondents reported knowing only “very little” or “nothing at all” about the program.

Were the term “effective” read to require some measure of success in encouraging or facilitating recipient participation, defendants’ failure would be most dramatic. As noted above, only about 25% of class members who are informed of the program by defendants actually receive medical checkups after having received outreach. These figures are a far cry from “effective informing” if the goal to be “effected” is the actual receipt of care. So, too, are the startlingly low participation rates among class members in key health components in Texas Health Steps, related in Section 11(B) of this memorandum opinion. 27

In conclusion, plaintiffs’ evidence aptly demonstrates that defendants have failed to maintain sufficient staff and other reasonably necessary resources to handle their workload promptly and “effectively,” and to “effectively” inform recipients about Texas Health Steps. Therefore, it is found that defendants are in violation of paragraphs 32 and 52 of the decree.

D. Providers’ Requests for Outreach: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Plaintiffs’ concerns about defendants’ outreach program include a complaint that defendants have not provided adequate outreach for the recipients whose health care providers request outreach, as mandated by paragraphs 33 and 96 of the decree. They note that under paragraphs 32 and 52, discussed at length above, this outreach must be “effective.” However, plaintiffs rely solely on the experience of Ms. Singleton, who requested outreach assistance on behalf of five patients. Defendants responded by sending letters, and then closed the cases. TR 172, line 23 to 173, line 24. While the court finds Ms. Singleton to be a credible witness, her lone account of her experience involving the defendants’ arguably inadequate outreach does not establish by a preponderance that defendants have failed to effectively inform this particular subcategory of class members entitled to oral outreach under paragraph 33. Plaintiffs also rely on the fact that in August of 1999, defendants’ outreach units answered only 243 providers’ requests for outreach. P.Ex. 0-3. In certain regions of the state, defendants responded to no requests at all during that time. Id. However, the court has not been provided with any benchmark for the number of provider requests to which defendants should have responded. The evidence also revealed that provider requests decreased from well over 2,000 per month during 1998 and 1999 to under 700 in December of 1999. Defendants proffer this decline as evidence that their outreach to providers has had educative effects, while plaintiffs argue that providers are unaware of their ability to request aid and information. D.Ex. 94.

Based on the above evidence, it is found that plaintiffs have not met their burden with respect to this particular group, and did not, therefore, establish a violation above and beyond the violation detailed *600 above, in Section 1(C). It is noted that this finding does not in any way affect the above finding that defendants are in violation of paragraphs 32 and 52 with respect to the larger group entitled to oral outreach under paragraph 33.

E. Outreach Reports: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Finally, plaintiffs seek to enforce the outreach reporting requirements at paragraphs 60 and

61 of the decree. Specifically, plaintiffs complain that defendants fail to report separately on outreach efforts made to distinct groups of class members. The court is unaware of any decree provision requiring defendants to deliver the data required under paragraph 60 in a format that distinguishes among subgroups in the plaintiff class. Therefore plaintiffs’ invitation to impose the structure of paragraph 33 onto paragraph 60, which sets forth clear and unambiguous reporting requirements, will be declined.

Plaintiffs also maintain that they are entitled to reports about the receipt of checkups after oral outreach that separate medical from dental checkups. Paragraph 61 28 does not, on its face, require defendants to distinguish those class members who receive dental checkups from those who receive medical checkups following outreach, although this would appear to make sense in light of both parties’ desire to monitor effectively the outreach program and target specific areas for improvement. Despite the sound logic behind plaintiffs’ request, under Armour, the court cannot go beyond the language of the decree. Hence, defendants will not be held to have violated paragraph 61.

Issue II: Medical and Dental Checkups A. Overview

Plaintiffs claim, next, that defendants have not complied with paragraphs 2, 35, 37, and 143 of the consent decree, which outline plaintiffs’ entitlements to medical and dental checkups under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43). 29 These paragraphs provide that class members “are entitled to both medical and dental checkups on a regular schedule,” ¶ 2, and “to all needed follow up health care services that are permitted by federal Medicaid law.” ¶ 3. Paragraph 143 states that “[djefendants must provide periodic dental checkups and needed dental services to relieve pain, restore teeth and maintain dental health for EPSDT recipients.... ” Paragraph 35 describes the schedule for medical checkups as required by the decree; 30 the schedule for dental checkups is governed by paragraph 37. Defendants are required by federal law to set these schedules. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(r). 31 Paragraphs 35 and *601 37 incorporate by reference these “periodicity schedules” created by the state and impose an additional obligation upon defendants to provide oral outreach to recipients who miss a medical or dental checkup “due” or required under such a periodicity schedule. Based on these paragraphs, plaintiffs claim that defendants have failed to provide plaintiffs with needed medical and dental checkups. Plaintiffs claim, additionally, that defendants have failed to provide plaintiffs with adequate reports on the checkups performed on all class members.

The evidence relating to whether defendants have violated these decree provisions is presented below. First, findings of fact relating to the provision of medical checkups are recited. Second, findings of fact relating to the provision of dental services, including those concerning defendants’ recruitment of dental providers, are made. Third, defendants’ provision of medical and dental checkups to teens is reviewed. Fourth, defendants’ provision of checkups to abused and neglected class members is examined. These sections report the court’s findings of fact. Section 11(C) sets out defendants’ violations of the decree in relation to all of these matters. Section 11(D) deals with defendants’ reporting of data relating to the provision of checkups to class members.

Findings of Fact: Checkups Medical Checkups B.

The evidence at the hearing clearly demonstrated defendants’ noncompliance with decree provisions requiring the provision of medical checkups to the plaintiff class. As evidence that class members are not receiving checkups, 32 plaintiffs. first point to the defendants’ reported medical checkup “participation ratio” for fiscal year 1998, which was .66. D.Ex. D-97. The participation ratio is a “ratio derived by looking at the number of [class members] who have received at least one [checkup] over the expected number of [class members] that should receive a [checkup] during that year.” TR 446, lines 6-11. (Testimony of Rick Allgeyer, Ph.D. 33 ). The number of class members who should have received a checkup during the year is adjusted to account for the average period of Medicaid eligibility (about .7 years, or slightly more than eight months) during the year and for the schedule for medical checkups. TR 450, line 18 to 451, line 22. Defendants report this figure annually to the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), the federal agency responsible for oversight of the Medicaid program, in a “HCFA 416” report detailing participation in the program. P.Ex. M-39.

Not surprisingly, defendants maintain that actual participation by the plaintiff class in the dental and medical checkup *602 program is higher than the reported statistic. D.Ex. D-96. Plaintiffs maintain that actual participation is lower than reported. More specifically, plaintiffs contend that the participation ratio, computed by defendants in accordance with instructions from HCFA, represents an inflated measure of the actual receipt of services because it is adjusted for the average length of time that class members receive Medicaid during the reporting period. 34 After reviewing the evidence presented, the court is in agreement with plaintiffs that the reported participation ratios are inflated indicators of the actual participation rates among the plaintiff class. 35

In addition, plaintiffs note that defendants report a shortage of health care providers enrolled in the Texas Health Steps Program. Specifically, in sixty-five of Texas’ 254 counties, class members’ need for doctors “dramatically exceeds provider to client ratios,” while in nineteen additional counties, defendants report “limited provider support for the existing client population.” P.Ex. D-13.

Dental Checkups

Services

Abundant evidence was presented that clearly demonstrated that class members do not receive adequate dental care. They crowd emergency rooms in hospitals, suffering from acute forms of dental disease that, while easily preventable, often lead to such health complications as serious oral infections, dehydration, fever, and malnourishment stemming from the inability to eat. 36 In 1998, only 19% of class members received at least one dental checkup. P.Ex. D-3 at 5. This figure declined from 21% in 1997, and rose again to 21% in 1999. P.Ex. D-14. 37 Even fewer class members receive all of the checkups required by defendants’ dental periodicity schedule, which entitles class members *603 over age one to a dental checkup every six months. ¶ 37. Although the average period of Medicaid eligibility for class members was slightly more than eight months in 1998, only 3.7% of class members received the required two dental checkups in 1999. 38 P.Ex. D-14. Particularly disturbing is the statistic reported in defendants’ 1998 “State-Wideness Report” that roughly one million Texas Health Steps eligibles had received no dental services for that year. P.Ex. D-3. Furthermore, the number of class members overdue for dental checkups has steadily increased every year between fiscal years 1997 and 1999. P.Ex. 0-5.

In 1998, 38% of the class received some form of dental treatment. 39 P.Ex. D-3 at 5. However, the fact that 38% of Texas Health Steps eligibles received at least one dental “service,” as opposed to a checkup, is consistent with the program enrollees’ tendency to seek dental services only in emergencies. TR 263, line 23 to TR 265, line 7 (Testimony of Dr. Seale). Viewed in conjunction with the insufficient number of children receiving full checkups, the “services” statistic indicates that while class members may be receiving some form of “dental service,” they are most likely receiving such services in emergency settings, and are not receiving the preventive services to which they are specifically entitled under the EPSDT program. Id.

Defendants emphasize that in 1998, approximately 20% of children enrolled nationally in EPSDT utilized dental services, as compared with 32% of enrolled children who utilized the dental services provided in Texas, a figure which steadily increased during the years 1996 through 1998. D.Ex. D-81. Defendants cite the fact that Texas Health Steps has produced better results than the national average as evidence that defendants have complied with the decree by exceeding any minimum goals contemplated by the parties when they entered into it. However, because Texas provides dental services beginning at age one, whereas many other states begin providing dental services at age three, Texas’ higher utilization rates may simply reflect a larger number of eligibles instead of a higher participation rate among eligibles relative to other states. 40 TR 271, lines 1-11; TR 313, line 18 (Testimony of Dr. Seale).

Provider Recruitment

Both parties presented statistics relating to the availability of dentists accepting Texas Health Steps enrollees. Defendants emphasized that while the ratio of dentists to the general population in the state of Texas in 1999 was roughly 1: 2,600, the ratio of participating dentists to the Medicaid population was 1: 584. D.Ex. D-104. However, plaintiffs introduced evidence that of the Medicaid providers identified by defendants, only one-third were “high volume” providers, or providers likely to be able to accept a new enrollee in need of *604 a checkup. TR 268, line 21-25 (Testimony of Dr. Seale); P.Ex. D-12. Defendants’ Director of Oral Health, Jerry Felkner, D.D.A., M.P.H., 41 agreed with this assessment, noting that an enrolled dentist “could see one [class member] a year and still be classified as an active dentist.” TR 809, lines 16-25.

In addition, multiple witnesses testified concerning the severe shortage of dentists in various regions of the state. For example, the director of a case management program for children with special health care needs in a large area surrounding Abiliene, Texas, testified that many families are having difficulty finding a dentist who will accept Medicaid. TR at 20, lines 7-9. (Testimony of Ms. McHan), A witness from the Texas Migrant Council in Lubbock related that “[a] lot of towns [in the Panhandle] don’t have Medicaid providers, either medical or dental. A lot of the time, we ... have to bus these young children an hour to the dentist.” P.Ex. A-4 at 12-13 (Deposition of Nancy Lloyd). The shortage of dentists in the Arlington-Dallas area was also detailed, including the fact that “the dentists are so limited - that the referrals that we make need to be for kids that got [sic] abscesses and rotten teeth ... those are the ones that generally get in.” TR 205, lines 4-18 (Testimony of Ms. Singleton).

This shortage of dentists who are willing to see class members is statewide. 42 TR 24, lines 10-12 (Testimony of Ms. Singleton). Defendants themselves agreed in October of 1999 that there were at that time 136 counties in which “the needs of a client population ... dramatically exceeded] provider to client ratios.” 43 P.Ex. D-13. Statewide, although about 2,900 dentists are enrolled, only roughly 1,700 actively serve class members. TR 825, lines 4-19. If all class members over the age of one year were to receive the dental care to which they are entitled, it would be necessary that these active dentists each care for 876 class members. This load is not currently being borne by the active dentists. TR 826, line 23 to 827, line 6 (Testimony of Dr. Felkner). 44

Worse, the number of dentists enrolled in the program is currently decreasing in Texas due to low reimbursement rates and frustration with the defendants’ failure to change those rates. TR 330, lines 11-21. (Testimony of Dr. Seale). Low reimbursement rates for dental services from the state makes the recruitment of additional dentists extremely challenging. 45 TR 824, lines 5-12 TR 823, line 24 to 824, line 4 (Testimony of Dr. Felkner); P.Ex. D-12. Even though defendants admit a severe shortage of dentists exists in 136 counties, defendants propose to recruit only seventy-five additional Texas Health Steps providers (doctors and dentists) during the *605 year 2000. TR 833, line 24 to 834, line 2 (Testimony of Dr. Felkner); P.Ex. D-13 at 1.

Teens

Defendants’ failure to provide checkups has a particularly severe impact on teenage class members, for whom the 1998 participation ratio for medical checkups or special adolescent visits was .64. D.Ex. D-9 (11- to 18-year-olds.) Again, such ratios are inflationary because they rest on the assumption that class members receive checkups randomly throughout the year, and do not, therefore, account for the reality that many class members need checkups immediately upon enrollment because they are “overdue.” 46 Specifically, in fiscal year 1999, only 24% of six- to fourteen-year-old class members received a checkup or adolescent preventive checkup, while only 12.4% of those aged fifteen to twenty years received such a checkup. P.Ex. CH-26. Additionally, because of the expected growth in the number of fifteen- to eighteen-year-old enrollees resulting from the implementation of the new State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), defendants’ failure to provide services to the teenage population is a particularly grave aspect of defendant’s extensive failure to serve the class. 47 P.Ex. CH-26.

Abused and Neglected Class Members

Substantial evidence was introduced that demonstrated defendants’ failure to address the needs of the roughly 13,200 abused and neglected class members supervised by the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. The receipt of checkups by this particular population is governed not only by paragraphs 2, 3, 35, and 37, but also by paragraph 212. This paragraph required the parties to submit a Memorandum of Understanding to the Court which would, among other things, “assure that all EPSDT recipients under the supervision of TDPRS receive all medical and dental checkups when due.” ¶ 212. The defendants’ reports on various subgroups within the larger class of abused and neglected children 48 reveal that this at-risk group does not receive all medical and dental checkups when due. 49 P.Ex. R-ll, R-14.

C. Violations of Decree: Checkups

With the above evidence in mind, the court now considers plaintiffs’ claims that defendants have violated specific decree provisions. Plaintiffs’ primary argument appears to be that, since participation rates in the dental and medical checkup programs are extremely low, defendants have failed to provide the services to which plaintiffs are entitled, and have therefore violated the decree. As noted above, in enforcing the consent decree, the court is bound solely by its language. With this in mind, the court turns to the decree. The *606 paragraphs sought to be enforced by plaintiffs in relation to medical and dental checkups are:

2. EPSDT is intended to provide comprehensive, timely and cost effective health services to indigent children and teenagers who qualify for Medicaid benefits. Checkups are the cornerstone of the program. They assess recipients’ health, provide preventive care and counseling (anticipatory guidance) and make referrals for other needed diagnosis and treatment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43); 1396d(r). Recipients are entitled to both medical and dental checkups on a regular schedule. About 48% of recipients received at least one medical checkup in fiscal year 1994 (FY94), according to reports Defendants filed with the United States Department of Health and Human Services.

3. Recipients are also entitled to all needed follow up health care services that are permitted by federal Medicaid law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r).

35. Beginning on September 1, 1995, outreach units will provide oral outreach to all recipients who miss a medical checkup that is due on or after July 1, 1995. “Due” means a medical checkup that is due according to the current Texas EPSDT periodicity schedule, i.e., newborn, 1-2 weeks, 2 months, 4 months, 6 months, 9 months, 12 months, 15 months, 18 months, 24 months, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6 years, 8 years, 10 years, and annually thereafter through and including 20 years of age. 50

37. Beginning no later than June, 1997, outreach units will provide oral outreach to all recipients who miss a dental checkup that is due on or after April 1, 1997. “Due” means a dental checkup that is due according to the Texas EPSDT periodicity schedule, i.e., starting at 1 year and continuing every 6 months.

143. Defendants must provide periodic dental checkups and needed dental services to relieve pain, restore teeth and maintain dental health for EPSDT recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(3)....

212. TDH and TDPRS will present a Memorandum of Understanding [that] will ... assure that all EPSDT recipients under the supervision of TDPRS receive all medical and dental checkups when due.

What obligations do these six paragraphs impose upon defendants? First, it is noted as a preliminary matter that paragraphs 35 and 37 are unavailing for the plaintiffs. While these paragraphs do make reference to the state’s schedules for medical and dental checkups, they do so solely for the purpose of establishing when the outreach duties are to be triggered, and do not support plaintiffs’ claims for timely medical and dental checkups.

Next, paragraph 2 emphasizes the importance of checkups to the overall success of the EPSDT program. The only obligatory language in this paragraph, however, appears in its fourth sentence, where it is stated that “Recipients are entitled to both medical and dental checkups on a regular schedule.” Similarly, paragraph 3 states that “recipients are also entitled to all needed follow up health care services that are permitted by federal Medicaid law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r).” The argument between the parties stems from a dispute over the meaning of the word “entitled” as used in these sentences.

Defendants’ understanding is that class members are “entitled” to services, but that they must first ask for them. Under this common-sense understanding of the term, argue defendants, plaintiffs must *607 have requested services and have been denied them for defendants to be out of compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3. Plaintiffs presented no evidence of having requested and having been denied services, nor did they argue that the participation data is evidence that some requested services were actually refused by defendants. 51 Under this understanding of the word “entitled,” then, plaintiffs have not met their burden in showing a violation by defendants.

Defendants maintain that this “request defense” is strongly buttressed by the language of the EPSDT statute itself, which requires that state Medicaid plans provide for the delivery of services “in all cases where they are requested.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(B). It is noted that the requirements of federal law would be irrelevant to this court’s construal of the decree under Armour but for the fact that the parties elected to incorporate by reference these statutes in the many paragraphs that detail defendants’ obligations to plaintiffs, including paragraphs 2 and 3. Therefore, federal law must inform the court’s interpretation of these provisions.

Principles of Statutory Interpretation

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) provides, in pertinent part:

A State plan for medical assistance must—

(43) provide for -

(A)informing all persons in the State who are under the age of 21 and who have been determined to be eligible for medical assistance including services described in section 1396(a)(4)(B) of this title, of the availability of early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services as described in section 1396d(r) or this title and the need for age-appropriate immunizations against vaccine-preventable diseases,

(B) providing or arranging for the provision of such screening services in all cases where they are requested,

(C) arranging for (directly or through referral to appropriate agencies, organizations, or individuals) corrective treatment the need for which is disclosed by such child health screening services, and

(D) reporting to the Secretary ... the following information relating to early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services provided under the plan during each fiscal year ...

Congress has enacted a statute that requires, first, the informing of all people eligible for EPSDT of the benefits to which they are entitled, § 1396a(a)(43)(A); second, the provision of those services wherever requested, § 1396a(a)(43)(B); third, the subsequent provision of followup or corrective treatment for health problems identified, § 1396a(a)(43)(C); and, fourth, the reporting of data relating to the provision of those services and treatments, § 1396a(a)(43)(D). Plaintiffs’ response to defendant’s reliance on the “request” language of part B of § 1396a(a)(43) may be summarized as follows: Why should defendants be released from the duty to provide services simply because they have not been formally “requested,” when they have violated part (A) by failing to inform members that such services exist?

Structure and Context

The court declines defendants’ invitation to read part B of § 1396a(a)(43) in isolation from the rest of paragraph 43 is rejected in favor of the approach dictated by the “Whole Act Rule.” Under this rule, a legislature passes judgment upon an act or amendment as an “entity, not giving one *608 portion of the act any greater authority than another. Thus any attempt to segregate any portion or exclude any other portion from consideration is almost certain to distort the legislative intent.” N. Singer, Sutherland, on Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47.02, p. 139, quoted in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (2d ed.1995) 643. The Supreme Court has expressed agreement with this canon of interpretation: “When ‘interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute ... and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature.’ ” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 41 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974) (citation omitted).

In light of this principle, interpreting the directive to screen upon request in isolation of the context of the entire paragraph would likely result in the significant distortion or misinterpretation of part B. Therefore, the entire paragraph and its structure will be considered. As noted above, the “request” language appears in a four-part directive to the states, which might be rephrased in the following manner: you must inform, you must screen, you must treat, and you must report. This directive is, notably, chronological: it sets out a series of steps in which the population is first told about the program, then screened for health problems, and then given follow-up treatment. As a final step, data is sent back to Washington about the states’ performance. In light of this chronological structure, it is presumed that Congress intended for eligible participants in the program to be informed of it before requesting services. That is, although eligible participants’ rights to screenings were limited by Congress by the phrase, “in all cases where they are requested,” that phrase was intended to refer to those cases where, having first been informed, eligible participants requested services. The meaning and scope of the limiting language are cabined by its location in the structure of the paragraph’s chronology.

A parallel phrase appears in part C, which deals with corrective treatment. In that part, states are directed to provide corrective or follow-up treatment, “the need for which is disclosed” in the screenings performed pursuant to part B. This choice of language leads to two conclusions. First, it adds support to the structural interpretation given above, wherein eligible participants are first informed, are given services in all cases where requests are made after having been informed, and are given corrective treatment in all cases where the need is disclosed after they have been screened. It supports the structure of “A, then B (for which A is a condition precedent), then C (for which B is a condition precedent).” Put simply, the informing was to lead to requests based on information, just as the screenings were to result in treatments based on screenings. Parts B and C are read in this parallel fashion because of their similar grammatical structure and use of sequencing.

A second conclusion may be drawn from the fact that Congress did not choose to limit the provision of corrective treatment in part C by the “request” defense, but instead chose to make corrective treatment available wherever the need was demonstrated through screening. If the “request” language had been genuinely designed to limit defendants’ duty to provide screenings even in cases where states had failed to inform eligible participants of the services, why then did Congress choose not to include such a limit on the provision of follow-up services? Why, if the request language was truly meant to limit the states’ provision of checkups even where eligible participants had no knowledge of their right to receive regular checkups, did not Congress similarly limit the states’ duty to provide follow-ups? Under the statutory principle of “expressio unius,” *609 which holds that words omitted, or the decision to omit language, may be just as significant as the decision to use particular words, the omission of the “request” defense in part C should inform the court’s understanding of the “request” language in part B. Rather, its disappearance in part C suggests that the phrase was not meant to limit the states’ duty to provide screenings in cases where requests were not made due to the states’ failure to inform; otherwise, one would expect a similar limitation on follow-up services. This adds further support for the above-explained structure of “A, then B (for which A is a condition precedent), then C (for which B is a condition precedent).”

Legislative Intent

A brief history of the program will aid the court’s interpretation of this section. In 1967, Congress amended the Medicaid Act to provide for the mandatory provision of EPSDT services to needy children under the age of 21. § 1396d(a)(xi)(4)(B). 52 The “request” language was first injected into the statute in 1972, when Congress, as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, enacted a penalty provision to punish participating states for failing to provide child health screening services under Medicaid. 53 In 1981, this penalty was repealed, and the language requiring the informing, provision of screening services, and provision of follow-up treatment was incorporated into a new paragraph, § 1396a(a)(44), which in 1984 became § 1396a(a)(43). The legislative history of the EPSDT program, while scant, clearly indicates that the 1967 amendment was the result of a growing need for health care among poor children. See Comment, Child Health Care: Unresolved Dilemma of Section 1905(a)(1)(B) of the 1967 Social Security Act Amendments, 59 Geo.L.J. 965 (1971). Early in 1967, in response to this growing need, President Johnson recommended that Congress pass a comprehensive program providing early diagnosis and treatment of poor children with special health care needs. President Johnson, Welfare of Children, H.R.Doc.No.54 (1967).

Whatever might be discerned about the goals of the founders of EPSDT, one may fairly assume that they did not intend to create a means by which states that fail to inform poor and unhealthy children about the program might turn around and use this as a defense to their failure to provide services. To the contrary, the “request” limitation was introduced as part of the penalty scheme injected in 1972, which was aimed at penalizing states whose efforts at compliance were less than commendable. More importantly, the “request” language was introduced in conjunction with the duty to inform — a point which concerns the structure of the 1972 and 1981 amendments, discussed above.

It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a court cannot allow a *610 literal reading of a statute to produce a result “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). Therefore, it is held that the “request” language may not be read to contravene the congressional intent, in 1967, to enact a program that would serve needy children, or Congress’ subsequent intent to strengthen enforcement mechanisms against states that fail to provide those services. Defendants’ reading of the “request” language— that the phrase permits them to avoid the duty to provide services where no services have been requested, even in cases where plaintiffs have not been informed so as to be able to make such requests — is in clear conflict with the legislative intent behind the EPSDT statute.

Waiver

The doctrine of waiver undergirds the court’s reasoning on this issue. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). In the context of criminal law, waiver of the right to counsel and of the right to remain silent must be voluntary and made knowingly and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The principles of waiver extend beyond the criminal context, into the civil context, where waiver is closely linked to the notion of due process. See Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.1983)(plaintiffs did not knowingly relinquish their right to a hearing when they were never aware of that right); Clark v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.1981)(no waiver of statutory right to counsel in hearing before Social Security Administration where Secretary of Health and Human Services failed to notify claimant of right to representation). Whether a particular right is waivable, whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver, whether certain procedures are required for waiver, and whether the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. See, e.g., 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.6 (1984).

The doctrine of waiver is not, strictly speaking, applicable in the context of plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the instant decree; however, its principles form the basis of a useful analogy. In this case, the court is presented with a statutory right to health services, along with a statutory right to be informed of the right to health services. Thus, the right to periodic screenings upon request is unlike most statutory rights, in that Congress has specifically provided a concomitant right to be informed of the right to the services. Thus, this unique statutory right to “services upon request” must be viewed in light of the right to be informed. Because Congress has created the right to know of the right to services, the right to services upon request is, in this sense, akin to the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Defendants in effect argue that plaintiffs have waived their right to services by failing to request them. However, under the logic of waiver, which looks to the parameters of the right at stake, the related statutory right to be informed would require defendants to inform plaintiffs of their rights to services before such “waiver,” or failure to request, could be considered meaningful.

The Cases

The court’s exercise in statutory interpretation supports the commonsense notion that a poor and often isolated population should not be robbed of their rights to services upon request when they have not been informed of those rights. This commonsense notion was first applied to EPSDT in a case in which the defendant State of Indiana defended a remarkably poor record of performance with the contention that “[a]ny of the eligible children in this state can secure all of the requested services merely by requesting them from their local health provider.” Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246, 1250-51 (7th Cir. *611 1974). Though the Seventh Circuit did not specifically address the “request” language, which was at that time located in a different penalty section of the Social Security Act and therefore did not explicitly limit plaintiffs’ rights to services under 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(4)(B), 54 the court made short shrift of defendant’s argument:

It is utterly beyond belief to expect that children of needy parents will volunteer themselves or that their parents will voluntarily deliver them to the providers of health services for early medical screening and diagnosis. By the time an Indiana child is brought for treatment it may too often be on a stretcher. This is hardly the goal of “early and periodic screening and diagnosis.” EPSDT programs must be brought to the recipients; the recipients will not ordinarily go to the programs until it is too late to accomplish the congressional purpose.

Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d at 1251.

Relying on Stanton, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has implicitly held that defendants who fail to inform the EPSDT population may also be held to violate § 1396a(a)(43)(B) where services have not been provided, even in the absence of requests. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F.Supp. 278 (D.D.C.1996). In Salazar, Medicaid applicants and recipients claimed that the District had both failed to inform them of EPSDT services and to provide them with the services. Though it did not specifically address the “request” language in § 1396a(a)(43)(B), which was the same at the time Salazar was decided as it is today, the court held that defendants had violated both § 1396a(a)(43)(A) and § 1396a(a)(43)(B). Id. at 328-331. Of particular interest is the Salazar court’s holding that defendants had failed to provide the lead blood toxicity testing of ESPDT children. Id. at 330. The court recited, as has this court, numerous statistics in support of the finding that the lead poisoning screenings had not been provided. The Salazar court also noted that only one plaintiff with a particularly compelling story had “actually requested” lead blood tests repeatedly and had been denied. Id. at 306. Because this isolated tale of request and denial appears among a sea of statistics supporting the court’s legal conclusion that defendants had failed to provide the services, it may be reasonably inferred that the Salazar court relied primarily on the failure to provide services, regardless of whether or not they had been requested by plaintiffs. It appears unlikely that the court based its finding of a violation on one plaintiffs story of a denied request, without explicitly saying so. It is more probable that the court’s finding that defendant’s outreach had been inadequate led the court to find the defendants in violation of § 1396a(a)(43)(B) without consideration of the “request” issue, based on the commonsense principles discussed above.

The defendants’ logic having been rejected by the court, it is hereby found, based on the evidence recited in Section 11(B)(1) above, that plaintiffs have met their burden in establishing that defendants have violated paragraphs 2 and 3 of the decree. 55 Similarly, it is found, based on the evidence relayed in Section 11(B)(2) regarding defendants’ provision of dental checkups to the plaintiff class, that defendants have violated paragraph 143. It is further found, based on the evidence in Section 11(B)(4), that defendants have violated paragraph 212 56 in failing to provide *612 the required checkups to children in the custody of TDPRS.

D. Checkup Reports: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Plaintiffs also complain of defendants’ failure to report checkup data regularly and accurately. Plaintiffs’ argument is three-fold. First, plaintiffs maintain that defendants are in violation of paragraph 284, which requires that defendants report annually the “number and percent of recipients” who receive all of their scheduled medical checkups. Defendants report only “participation ratios” — the figures required by HCFA — instead of actual percentages. 57 Defendants respond that the participation ratios are “professional, statistically valid, and [in conformity] with reporting requirements established by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).” Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Motion to Enforce the Consent Decree at 11.

The relevant language of the decree is as follows:

283. METHOD TO REPORT CHECKUPS First, Defendants report EPSDT participation statistics to the federal government every year on the HCFA Form 416. The HCFA Form 416 uses calculations to approximate the number of recipients who receive EPSDT medical checkups.

284. Every year from 1996 through 1999, Defendants will also report to Plaintiffs the number and percent of recipients who receive all of their scheduled medical checkups. They will further report the number and percent of recipients who receive all of their scheduled dental checkups. Defendants will provide these reports to Plaintiffs no later than December 31 of each year.

285. For these reports, Defendants will develop a method that records all recipients who receive the full number of scheduled checkups within a year.... The complexities associated with collecting utilization data require the parties’ continued collaboration in the design and implementation of this system.

When read in conjunction with paragraph 283, which mentions defendants’ pre-existing duty to report participation ratios to HCFA, paragraph 284 requires defendánts to provide plaintiffs with more information; namely, “the number and percent of recipients who receive all of their scheduled dental checkups.” Defendants’ argument that HCFA Form 416 data fulfills their obligations under paragraph 284 is therefore rejected. Paragraph 284 makes clear that plaintiffs bargained for a very specific type of data in addition to the “calculations” or “approx-im[ations]” already required by HCFA. The word “also,” in addition to the use of “number and percent” in place of “calculations” makes this plain.

Defendants maintain that plaintiffs have been inflexible in their demands and that the percentages required by paragraph 284 are impossible to obtain. It is true that “[t]he complexities associated with collecting utilization data require the parties’ continued collaboration in the design and implementation of this system.” ¶ 285. Plaintiffs must therefore collaborate with defendants in their pursuit of the required “number and percent.” However, the above-quoted paragraphs make it apparent that plaintiffs bargained for the “number and percent,” and not the Form 416 data referenced in paragraph 283. Because they have not furnished plaintiffs with this data, defendants are held to be in violation of paragraph 284.

Second, plaintiffs complain that defendants report information about class members who have received one medical or *613 dental checkup per year, instead of all medical or dental checkups that are due. P.Ex. MC-20. The text of paragraph 284 makes clear that plaintiffs’ position is correct. It is found that defendants are in violation for their failure to provide the data specifically described in paragraph 284.

Third, plaintiffs argue that defendants have violated paragraph 212 58 by failing to provide complete reports on the receipt of checkups by abused and neglected children in the custody of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (TDPRS). Specifically, defendants’ May 28, 1998 report was incomplete, and no complete report was provided until the fall of 1999. P.Ex. R-2. Plaintiffs correctly note that paragraph 212 mandates the reporting of the number and percent of EPSDT recipients “under the supervision of TDPRS” who receive services. Defendants respond that providing this data has been extremely difficult due to unforeseen difficulties. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Motion to Enforce Consent Decree at 10. However, this does not excuse defendants’ failure to provide the data mandated by the decree. Defendants have failed to cite any decree language that would permit them to exclude certain subsets of those class members “under the supervision of TDPRS.” Therefore, it is found that defendants are not in compliance with paragraph 212. Their partial compliance will, however, inform the court in its formulation of appropriate orders of enforcement.

III. Issue Three: Corrective Action Plans

A. Corrective Action Plans for Lagging Counties: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

As is stated in paragraph 271 of the decree, “Medicaid services, including EPSDT services, must be available in every political subdivision of the state.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l). To prevent regions of the state from lagging behind others in performance, and to ensure that class members throughout Texas receive the checkups to which they are entitled, the parties created the “State-Wideness” section of the decree. ¶¶ 271-81. The decree specifies that by March 30th of each year, defendants must report the number of class members who have received medical checkups and dental checkups, by county or cluster of counties. ¶¶ 277, 280. They must then identify any counties that “lag behind” the rest of the state in the delivery of services to the plaintiff class. ¶ 278. Finally, defendants must develop corrective action plans for any so-called “lagging” counties in an effort to improve participation in those counties. ¶ 281. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have not properly developed annual corrective action plans. Defendants respond that all required corrective action plans for the poorly-performing counties have been completed, and that the issues raised by plaintiffs concerning the particular methodology used by defendants are not governed by the consent decree. Alternatively, defendants assert that their methodology for creating and implementing the plans completely satisfies the standards set out in the decree, were the court to find that such standards exist.

What is “Lagging?”

Plaintiffs are primarily concerned with the methodology used by defendants to identify the so-called “lagging” counties. Plaintiffs contend, first, that defendants label as “lagging” only those counties whose participation rates fall behind the average county participation rate, instead of those counties whose rates fall behind *614 the “state average,” as is required by the decree in paragraph 280. 59 As a result, plaintiffs assert, fewer counties are targeted for corrective action than are required to be targeted by the decree. It appears that plaintiffs understand the term “state average” to mean the participation rate for the state of Texas. Defendants respond that “state average” was used in paragraph 280 as shorthand for the average of the participation rates of each of the counties in the state. It is clear from the text of paragraph 280 that defendants’ reading is correct. The words “state average” unambiguously refer to an average; therefore, the only question is: the average of what? The only logical answer is the one proposed by the defendants: the average of the county participation rates. Plaintiffs suggest no other average, but insist, erroneously, that the term “state average” should be read as synonymous with the participation rate for the entire state of Texas. This is simply not an average. Ideally, it would certainly be preferable to target for corrective action all counties with participation rates below that of the state; however, the court cannot look beyond the clear language of the decree. 60

Counties with Few Class Members

Plaintiffs next complain of defendants’ decision to omit from the analysis all counties where fewer than 100 class members reside. P.Ex. CH-6 at 5, P.Ex. D-3 at 4. Defendants assert that these counties were excluded from the calculus because their sample sizes were too small. However, the parties obviously anticipated this problem, as the decree specifically provides that “counties where few recipients live may be clustered so that statistically valid results can be achieved.” ¶ 276. Nonetheless, defendants insist that “clustering non-adjacent counties” is an “invalid method for developing corrective action plans.” Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Motion to Enforce Consent Decree, at 13. It is unclear why clustering, or grouping the counties with low enrollee counts with adjacent counties with higher counts, would constitute an “invalid” method. Defendants have provided no expert testimony to that effect. Nor is it clear from the court’s reading of the decree that the clustering of non-adjacent counties would be required. Regardless, the fact remains that the defendants agreed to the terms of paragraph 276. There is no provision in the decree for the omission of any county from the calculus. On the contrary, the entire “state-wideness” section is geared toward the inclusion of neglected areas of the state and achieving consistency across the state’s vast territory and numerous counties. ¶¶ 271-274. Even had defendants been able to produce expert testimony that clustering is not “statistically valid,” within the meaning of that phrase as it appears in paragraph 278, 61 they would likely be bound by their own prior sanctioning of clustering in paragraph 276. Therefore, it is found that defendants are in violation of the corrective action provisions of the decree due to their failure to include counties with few class members. ¶¶ 273-81.

*615 Managed Care Counties

Plaintiffs also complain of defendants’ decision to omit all counties (hereafter referred to as the “managed-care counties”) in which defendants require class members to receive services from managed care organizations (hereafter referred to as “MCOs”). P.Ex. CH-6 at 5. Again, as noted above, no provision of the decree permits the omission of certain classes of counties from the analysis. The omission of managed care counties is particularly disquieting, because those counties report lower checkup participation rates than counties in which managed care has not been implemented. See Section IV(B)(4). Defendants concede that they are unable to obtain the reliable data that they need in order to include the managed care counties in the lagging county analysis, 62 citing differences in the reporting mechanisms used by fee-for-service entities and managed care organizations as the source of their difficulties. 63 Perhaps anticipating this response, plaintiffs included in the decree a clear mandate that “TDH will assure by various means that the number and percent of EPSDT patients in each managed care organization who receive all medical and dental checkups when due and information for outcomes research as needed is accurately collected.” ¶ 191 64 . Notably, Dr. Allgeyre, defendants’ Director of Statistics, testified that he was unaware of this provision.

Defendants are under a clear obligation to secure reliable data for the managed care counties and to include them in the lagging county analysis. The decree provides no legal basis for defendants’ excuses, which revolve around the alleged difficulty in obtaining data that they explicitly agreed to furnish to plaintiffs. 65 The decree plainly requires the collection of the data at issue and does not provide for the exclusion of managed care counties. Defendants can cite no language in the decree in support of their failure to collect the data, or of their exclusion of said counties. Rather, as was mentioned in the above discussion concerning the counties with low numbers of eligible participants, the state-wideness section must be construed with an eye toward achieving the express goals of inclusion and statewide consistency. 66 Therefore, it is found that defen *616 dants are in violation of the corrective action provisions of the decree due to their failure to include counties in which class members are enrolled in managed care. ¶¶ 273-81.

Checkups vs. Treatments

Plaintiffs assert that defendants fail to report by county the number of class members who receive one or two dental checkups per year. Defendants have instead reported the number of class members who receive “at least one dental treatment.” P.Ex. D-3 at 6. Plaintiffs suggest that because the percentage of class members who received dental checkups in 1998(19%) is significantly smaller than the percentage of members who received any form of dental service (38%), 67 defendants’ dental services data do not paint an accurate picture of how many class members are receiving the required checkups by county. Paragraph 277 clearly mandates the reporting of the receipt of dental checkups, not “services.” 68 It is therefore found that defendants are in violation of paragraph 277 of the consent decree.

Professionally Acceptable Data Analyses

Finally, plaintiffs assert that the data in defendants’ reports is not “professionally acceptable and valid,” as required by paragraph 281 of the decree. The sole evidence for this assertion consists of correspondence authored by plaintiffs’ counsel. Because these documents are hearsay, they cannot be considered for the truth of what they assert — that defendants’ statistics are unacceptable or invalid. Even were the inconsistencies in defendants’ data to be considered by the court, it is found that plaintiffs have not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants have not met the decree’s “professionally acceptable and valid” standard. Plaintiffs have provided no guidance for the court to ascertain where the boundary between unacceptable and acceptable might lie. Drawing such a line would likely be an onerous task. Such fine-tuning will not be necessary, however, as it is hereby found that the very small discrepancies in defendants’ data of which this court may take note do not amount to a violation of the standard set out in paragraph 281.

B. Corrective Action Plans for Transportation System

Overview

Plaintiffs allege that defendants have not completed the “Medical Transportation Studies” and transportation corrective action plans required by the decree. The aim of defendants’ transportation program is to assist class members, many of whom have no form of transportation, in coordinating transportation to their appointments. 69 To improve the transportation program, defendants must assess the program by March of each year. ¶¶ 223-29. The aim of these annual evaluations is to assess class members’ unmet transportation' needs and their satisfaction with the program. In addition, paragraph 228 requires defendants to “take corrective action wherever the assessment indicates that transportation services are inadequate. ‘Inadequate’ means problem(s) ex *617 ist that Defendants can reasonably be expected to correct.” The decree also orders the parties to determine how to decide where corrective action is needed, how quickly it is needed, and what actions to take. ¶ 229.

Role and Importance of Defendants’ Transportation System

The Texas Legislature’s Sunset Advisory Commission issued the following statement in a 1998 report:

Transportation is among the most frequently cited barriers to service delivery for health and human services clients in Texas. Without transportation, clients are unable to access services for which they are eligible. Transportation is a problem primarily for those who do not own a personal automobile, or are unable to drive for other reasons, and thus considered “transportation disadvantaged.” This can include people with a mental or physical disability ... and low-income individuals.

P.Ex. M-3 (Staff Report, Health and Human Services Commission, 1998) at 115. More than one of defendants’ witnesses testified that transportation problems are one of the most common reasons that class members miss health care appointments. 70 Plaintiffs’ witnesses agreed. 71 A study prepared by Texas A & M University reports that 35% of class members who miss health care appointments give transportation-related problems as the reason for their not having arrived at the scheduled time. P.Ex. T-43 at 27 (Table 5.3).

Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Abundant evidence demonstrated the various problems with defendants’ transportation program, including evidence that class members often cannot gain access to the transportation vouchers to which they are entitled, are not reimbursed until months after transportation expenditures have been made, and often spend whole working days arranging and waiting for transportation to and from brief appointments. Some class members, for example, are forced to take one to two days off from work to accompany their children to medical appointments, because the defendants’ transportation schedules may require an overnight stay. The burden this creates on poor class members can be overwhelming. 72

*618 Under paragraph 223, the first annual assessment of defendants’ MTP was due in March of 1996. However, it was not completed by defendants until January of 2000. Because it appears that defendants have not provided plaintiffs with the required annual assessments for the years 1996 through 1999, the court finds that defendants were in violation of paragraphs 223 through 229 of the decree during that entire three-year period. Because defendants completed their first assessment in January of this year, and their first formal transportation corrective action plan on February 25, 2000, it is found that defendants have come into partial compliance with these paragraphs as of the year 2000. However, it is noted that plaintiffs’ counsel have not received a copy of the plan or had the opportunity to give their input, as required by the decree. ¶ 229.

IV. Issue Four: Managed Care

The vast majority of the testimony produced at the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to enforce concerned defendants’ increased implementation of managed care across the state. A short explanation of what is meant by “managed care” will aid this discussion.

A. Defendants’ Managed Care Programs 73

To implement managed care, defendants have used three main managed care “models”: capitated managed care, partially ca-pitated managed care, and primary care case management. In capitated fee models, managed care organizations (“MCOs”) are paid flat fees by Medicaid to provide services for their patients. TR 99, lines 18-22. The MCO assumes the risk of providing services that are medically necessary. P.Ex. M-2 at 95. The model is based on the theory that when organizations are paid a flat fee to serve their patients, they will provide cost-effective preventive care in an effort to avoid the costs of expensive treatment of acute conditions. P.Ex.' — 2 at 94. Partial capitation refers to the use of caps for some kinds of services within a single health plan. In primary care case management models, individual health care providers are paid a small monthly fee to arrange referrals and other needed services for patients, but providers are still paid a fee for the services that they provide. Other combinations of these three approaches have been used in some counties. Members of the plaintiff class are enrolled in each of these managed care models.

*619 Each of the three types of managed care programs share several characteristics. First, each class member either chooses or is assigned to a primary care provider (PCP). The primary function of the PCP is to provide each class member with a “ ‘medical home,’ including comprehensive preventive and primary care on a 24 hour/7 day a week basis.” P.Ex. — 2 at 95. PCPs are also charged with approving other forms of care that class members may need. For example, without PCP approval, class members may not receive most forms of specialty care. P.Ex. — 2 at 94, 97. In other words, PCPs are supposed to assist class members and coordinate their care, and also to function as gatekeepers who may limit the care that class members receive. TR 556, line 20 to 566, line 17. Second, managed care involves circumscribed networks of providers and therefore limits clients’ choices of providers (with some exceptions) to those under contract with the managed care organization (“MCO”) network. P.Ex. M-2 at 95. Third, managed care programs institute utilization review and management programs to monitor network providers. P.Ex. M-2 at 95.

Plaintiffs’ complaints regarding defendants’ managed care system may be grouped into four areas: 1) the receipt of services by class members enrolled in managed care, 2) the treatment of the children of migrant workers enrolled in managed care, 3) the training of health care providers employed by the managed care system, and 4) the defendants’ failure to obtain required data from managed care organizations.

B. Findings of Fact: The Receipt of Services by Class Members Enrolled in Managed Care

Overview

Plaintiffs seek to enforce the following decree provisions to ensure the receipt of services by class members enrolled in managed care programs:

189. Regardless of their disagreements about the merits of managed care, the parties agree that managed care must be implemented in a manner that benefits EPSDT recipients and does not harm them. For this reason, the parties agree and the Court orders that:

190. EPSDT recipients served by managed care organizations are entitled to timely receipt of the full range of EPSDT services, including but not limited to medical and dental checkups.

192. TDH will assure by various means that managed care organizations provide medical and dental checkups to newly enrolled recipients no later than 90 days after enrollment except when recipients knowingly and voluntarily decline or refuse services. Managed care organizations will also have the capacity to accelerate services to the children of migrant farmworkers to accommodate their special circumstances. TDH will also assure medical and dental checkups in a timely manner to all recipients.

As a preliminary matter, it is noted that paragraph 189, in which the parties agree “that managed care must be implemented in a manner that benefits EPSDT recipients and does not harm them,” does not create any binding obligation on defendants. None of the federal law cited by the parties indicates that the parties meant to refer to a statutory obligation of defendants to the plaintiff class. Rather, paragraph 189 serves as an introduction to the set of obligations that appear in the sentences that follow.

Nonetheless, much of the evidence produced at the hearing focused on the benefits and disadvantages of the managed care approach to healthcare, in Texas and nationally. Defendants emphasized that the principal objectives of managed care are to improve access to health care for Medicaid clients, to enhance the quality of services, to provide a continuum of care and a medical home, to reduce inappropriate utilization, and to enhance long-term cost effectiveness. D.Ex. D-33, D-45, D- *620 46. Plaintiffs countered with familiar arguments about the effects of cost-saving incentives on the quality of and access to healthcare, emphasizing the harm resulting from class members’ inability to understand and navigate defendants’ complex managed care system. 74 Plaintiffs also emphasized the lack of “fit” between the realities faced by the EPSDT population and the theory behind the managed care model. The population’s poverty makes it likely that they will need many visits, making capitated fee arrangements unprofitable for providers. Also, their relatively short enrollment period removes providers’ incentives to provide effective preventive care to keep their patients healthy in the long run. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 130-33.

Both parties have provided numerous studies depicting varying degrees of satisfaction among providers and consumers in managed care. The breadth and difficulty of the public policy questions they have raised is apparent. While it forms the subject of much debate and discussion in the realm of public policy, the viability of managed care is not, and should not be, on trial in this proceeding. Whether or not to continue the rapid expansion of managed care is an issue for the legislature alone.

Relevant to plaintiffs’ motion to enforce are the provisions that create binding obligations on defendants. The evidence at the hearing that demonstrated that class members enrolled in managed care do not receive the checkups to which they are entitled under the decree is presented below.

Inaccurate and Inñated Data

First, plaintiffs’ evidence demonstrates that defendants’ data about checkups in the managed care system is inflated and inaccurate. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants’ managed care data, reported in defendants’ “Annual EPSDT Participation Report” for fiscal year 1998, 75 are inflated because they include “well child” visits that are not true Texas Health Steps medical checkups. The so-called “well child” visit is considerably less comprehensive than the Texas Health Steps checkup. “The Texas Health Steps checkup is much broader and more involved ... [than] ... a well-child exam.” TR 175, lines 6-11. (Testimony of Ms. Singleton). 76 In reporting their managed care data, defendants used data that the Texas Health Quality Alliance (“THQA”) 77 had obtained *621 from defendants’ contractor managed care companies. TR 648, line 20 to 649, line 25. Per defendants’ instructions, TR 650, lines 1-8, THQA included in the data two forms of checkups received by class members in managed care: Texas Health Steps checkups and “well child” checkups.

Defendants have not made clear to the court how many of the checkups counted in their Annual EPSDT Participation Report were well child visits, as opposed to Texas Health Steps medical checkups. However, in a “Medicaid Managed Care Report” written for the Texas Legislature for fiscal year 1998, defendants provide participation rate data for their Medicaid managed care plans that includes only Texas Health Steps checkups, and does not include well child visits. P.Ex. MC-5 at 85. These checkup participation rates varied from .24 in Harris County to .39 in the Lubbock managed care region. The participation rates under the primary care case management pilots were somewhat higher, but none exceeded .60. P.Ex. MC-5 at 35. These low rates demonstrate the substantial inflationary effect caused by the inclusion of well child visits in defendants’ revised 1998 Annual EPSDT Participation Report, which reports participation ratios in managed care ranged from .77 for children of ages 6-14 years, to .46 for those aged fifteen to twenty years. D.Ex. D^12.

THQA Focus Studies

THQA studies reveal that class members have received a startlingly lower number of checkups under managed care than defendants have reported. In addition, THQA Focus Studies 78 find many fewer checkups in managed care than defendants report. 79 Defendants’ schedule entitles class members to nine Texas Health Steps medical checkups before they reach two years of age. P.Ex. M-4 at 2-5. However, fewer than 43% of the class members included in THQA’s sample of the Texas Health Network data received one or two documented preventive visits in the first two years of life, even if data for Texas Health Steps checkups and “well child” visits are combined. Only about 1% received three or four documented visits. P.Ex. MC-7 at 12. In stark contrast, defendants’ “Annual EPSDT Participation Report” states that the participation rate for infants was .82 in fiscal year 1998. D.Ex. D-42. This participation rate purportedly measures the number of infants who received at least one medical checkup for the year. TR 446, lines 4-11. Obviously, the THQA report and defendants’ data differ considerably. 80 Reviewing both *622 sets of data and the evidence presented at the hearing related to the accuracy of both sets, it is found that plaintiffs’ reliance on the THQA studies is not misplaced. It is also found that plaintiffs’ explanations for these disparities — the inflationary effect of the assumptions used in calculating the participation ratio and of the arbitrary inclusion of well child data in defendants’ reports, along with the MCOs’ inaccuracies in data collection and reporting — are highly persuasive. 81

Comparing Managed Care and Fee-for-service Systems

Third, plaintiffs have shown that class members enrolled in managed care receive fewer checkups than those enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service plans.

Plaintiffs argue that, by design, many managed care healthcare systems include incentives that motivate providers to limit healthcare visits. The results of this alleged incentive structure, they claim, may be seen in a comparison of managed care data with fee-for-service data. For exam-pie, in fiscal year 1997, defendants reported lower participation ratios for class members in managed care than for those in fee-for-service Medicaid, with the exception of infants. 82 Similarly, defendants’ most recent data about medical checkup participation rates — the revised “Annual Participation Report” for fiscal year 1998 that includes data from their managed care contractors — shows that with the exception of infants, class members in managed care have lower participation ratios than class members in fee-for-service plans. 83 D.Ex. D-42. A recent internal memorandum authored by defendants reports that “[t]he most recent FY’99 percentages for Texas Health Steps medical exams in the nine pilot Medicaid Managed Care counties of Region 1 remain significantly lower than percentages in these same counties prior to implementation of the pilot.” P.Ex. M-20 (“Region 1 Highlights”).

Incomplete Checkups

Fourth, the “checkups” received by managed care plaintiffs are grossly inade *623 quate and incomplete. As discussed above, the parties agree that some class members receive “well child” visits instead of checkups. These visits are less comprehensive than Texas Health Steps checkups, and do not substitute for the full checkups required by federal law, by decree paragraphs 190 and 192, and by defendants’ own policies.

It takes about one hour to complete an initial Texas Health Steps checkup and about forty-five minutes to complete subsequent checkups. TR 188, line 23 to 189, line 8 (Testimony of Ms. Singleton). It takes about twelve to twenty minutes to perform Texas Health Steps checkups for infants, while “older children [take] longer.” TR 759, lines 17-20 (Testimony of Dr. Beverly Koops 84 ). The evidence also revealed that twelve minutes would be “pretty quick” and that it would be difficult to complete five Texas Health Steps checkups in under one hour. 85 TR 930, line 20 to 931, line 6 (Testimony of Mr. Millwee). However, Medicaid patients in managed care receive only “nine to ten minutes with a primary care provider actually seeing the patient.” TR 114, lines 20-4 (Testimony of Ms. Tillman); see also P.Ex. MC-42, complaint of class member B.C. (dated August 25, 1999, documenting receipt of a ten-minute appointment), complaint of class member D.R. (dated November 11, 1999, complaining of a one- to two-hour wait “every time” and of a five-to ten-minute doctor visit), complaint of class member J.S. (dated November 30, 1999, complaining of a two-hour wait, and only “about 2 minutes” with doctor).

Finally, THQA’s studies demonstrate that class members in managed care receive less immunization and lead testing 86 than they should. 87 Specifically, THQA found that less than 17% of class members in the Texas Health Network were documented as having been fully immunized by the age of two. P.Ex. MC-7 at 12. The HMOs report that less than 50% of enrolled two-year-olds are fully immunized. P.Ex. MC-8 at 65. 88 The THQA study also showed that class members, who are entitled to blood tests for lead poisoning at twelve months and again at twenty-four months, were in large part not receiving this vital service. P.Ex. M-4 at 2-5, 2-21. 89 Only 15.5% of the sampled medical *624 records of the class members enrolled in the Texas Health Network confirmed the receipt of even one blood test for lead poisoning during the first twenty-eight months of life. P.Ex. MC-7 at 12. Less than 2% of class members had medical records that showed two or more tests, as is required for children aged two years. P.Ex. MC-7 at 12. The lead test reports are also unfavorable for those class members enrolled in HMOs. Less than 30% of enrolled class members received a blood test for lead poisoning by the age of two, and only about 9% had received two or more tests. P.Ex. MC-8 at 65. 90

Problems with the Medical Home and Primary Care Provider Models

Fifth, class members’ timely receipt of full EPSDT services is impeded by the failure of the “medical home model,” in which a single primary care provider (PCP) acts as gatekeeper. Defendants claim that their managed care programs improve healthcare for class members through the application of the dual concepts of the “medical home” and the “primary care provider,” or “PCP.” 91 Plaintiffs counter that these concepts fail plaintiffs in their application, and prevent the timely receipt of EPSDT services by class members enrolled in managed care plans. 92 Plaintiffs’ criticisms of the PCP/medical home model are two-fold: first, that class members often have neither a medical home nor any knowledge of their PCP, and second, that PCPs often refuse to treat class members, forcing them to seek care in local emergency rooms.

The PCP

When some class members arrive at various healthcare clinics, they do not know the name of their PCPs. TR 193, line 23 to 194, line 2 (Testimony of Ms. Singleton). The confusion caused by the difficulty in identifying class members’ PCPs leads to delays in the receipt of needed care. 93 One witness relayed that

many families have trouble getting primary care for their children who have Medicaid. Lots of families find out their children’s Primary Care Provider has *625 been changed without their knowledge or permission. Then, sometimes they can’t get care from the Primary Care Provider assigned to them. Sometimes, their children get assigned to providers who don’t see patients their age at all; these providers just refuse to see them or they send them to us even though we’re not the Primary Care Provider. Both Maximus and the HMOs told us these problems would get better after managed care had been here for a while, but they have not gotten better.

P.Ex. A-8 at 7 (Deposition of Ms. Skaggs).

Based on this evidence, it is found that the PCP model is currently functioning as a barrier to the timely receipt of care for many class members. The following section demonstrates that the problem is not merely administrative.

Crowded Clinics and Emergency Rooms

One clinical provider testified that class members visit clinics even though their PCPs practice elsewhere. According to her testimony, “[W]hen they come to us, ... they have called their primary care provider and they can’t get in to see them for an extended period of time.” TR 195, lines 3-5 (Testimony of Ms. Singleton). 94 Clinics are not the only places where class members seek care when the doors to their “medical homes” are locked. It was hoped that managed care would force class members to receive services outside of emergency rooms. TR 752, line 2-6; TR 755, lines 9-19. However, class members enrolled in managed care often seek care in the ER. The Tarrant Regional Advisory Committee on Managed Care has reported ongoing problems with class members who arrive in the emergency room without ever having seen their PCPs. P.Ex. MC-48. Also reported were problems with PCPs who, “despite having received monthly cap payments, do not feel that they should be required to see that client on an urgent care basis.” Id. 95

In October of 1999, the Tarrant committee discussed the problems that occur when the “PCP incorrectly perceives [the] ER as a quicker way to obtain specialist evaluation for stable children.” P.Ex. MC-49. They noted the following:

What many PCPs do not realize, however, is that this does not result in a quicker appointment with [a] specialist unless the child is acute when he appears in the ER.... [T]hese referrals are partly a result of the cumbersome referral process under Managed Care.... [T]he PCP sends the client to the ER out of frustration with the system.

P.Ex. MC-50. The committee discussed problems that arise when the “PCP perceives the ER as a place to send children who are sick when his own office is overloaded — a result of a lack of Medicaid providers.” P.Ex. MC-49. The committee also noted the shortage of specialists in the *626 Tarrant region. “There is a lack of access to outpatient mental healthcare. There are not enough providers for behavioral health and mental health, and the impact is that the members go to the emergency room.” 96 P.Ex. MC-51 at 2-3.

Access to Specialists

Sixth, defendants’ managed care programs impede class members’ access to specialists. HMO provider referral handbooks are often inaccurate, since many specialists listed in the HMOs’ referral books are not taking Medicaid patients. 97 Class members face remarkable difficulties in finding specialists who will accept EPSDT enrollees in managed care plans. For example, Agapé Clinics has reported “major problems” finding specialists to take care of class members. 98

Part of the problem appears to lie with the HMOs’ internal approval processes. For example, Ms. Singleton described a 17-month-old who was assigned Agapé Clinics as his newly-designated PCP. He had recurrent ear infections. “[BJetween the time ... he was three weeks old, which is real early to start ear infections, and when he came in to see us, he had been on regimes of antibiotics ... 17 [times] before we saw him.” TR 202, lines 1-6. After Agapé staff treated the boy three more times without success, they asked the HMO for approval to send him to an ear, nose and throat specialist. The boy was not referred because he had not met the requirements of the HMO that Agapé, as the primary care provider, must have treated him six times within six months. 99 TR 202, lines 7-12. 100

Access to Pediatric Care and Mental Health Services

Seventh, defendants’ managed care system impedes class members’ receipt of pediatric care and mental health services.

The Dallas regional advisory committee on managed care noted in May of 1999, that there were only fifty-three pediatric providers in the entire Dallas managed *627 care area. It also reported a “pediatrician shortage” in which “[t]here are 6 counties which have either 1 or 0 pediatricians.” MC-52 at 5-6. This shortage was reported to have persisted as late as October of 1999. P.Ex. MC-53 at 9. Some pediatricians do not enroll in defendants’ managed care programs because the “rates are too low, the hassle factor is high, and they are afraid the dam would open up,” and they would be swamped with Medicaid patients. Id.

Defendants’ system of managed care is also impeding class members’ access to mental healthcare. One physician and member of the Tarrant regional advisory committee on managed care commented:

[T]hey are losing services that were available three years ago; there are fewer hospital beds for children and adolescents .... [MJental health is the least served area. If there is high demand, then the providers can select their patients. They’re going to select patients where they will get reimbursed appropriately. Taking a system that is weak to start with in its reimbursement and making it more difficult to administer, places further demands on those providers. They are going to drop out of the system.

P.Ex. MC-51 at 6; see also P.Ex. MC-53 at 10. 101

THQA Provider and Consumer Surveys

Eighth, plaintiffs present THQA studies that purport to demonstrate that providers themselves view defendants’ implementation of managed care as having a detrimental effect on plaintiffs’ receipt of timely care. THQA surveys reveal that more healthcare providers are dissatisfied than satisfied with the impact of defendants’ managed care program on class members’ access to care and continuity of care. P.Ex. MC-11 at 7. Surveys do show that physicians’ satisfaction with Medicaid managed care increases the longer they are in the program. 102 However, this increase could be the product of many other variables besides physicians’ increased satisfaction with class members’ access to care. The survey results could indicate that physicians who are dissatisfied with defendants’ managed care program simply drop out. The most that can be said, given the data presented, is that the majority of providers currently believe that defendants’ implementation of managed care has had an adverse impact on class members’ access to services.

Plaintiffs also rely on THQA’s 1999 survey of consumers, which shows that many class members experience difficulty receiving necessary healthcare from defendants’ managed care programs. For example, 32% of respondents said that they had problems “getting the care” they needed from defendants’ STAR HMOs. Similarly, 27% of those enrolled in the Texas Health Network said that they had problems. Of those enrolled in STAR HMOs, 18% said they had “big problems” getting care; in the Texas Health Network, 16% reported “big problems.” P.Ex. MC-9 at 11. However, it is not entirely clear what conclusions may be drawn from this particular study. A simple rephrasing of its findings reveals that 85% of Medicaid patients in managed care have no problems or only “small problems” getting care that they need from the managed care companies. TR 543, lines 19-21; TR 706, lines 1-13; D.Ex. 35.

THQA also asked consumers how often they received care without long waits. More than 50% of STAR HMO respondents reported long waits before they could receive care. Fully 26% responded *628 that they “sometimes or never” got care without long waits. In the Texas Health Network, 49% reported waits for care; 24% reported that they “sometimes or never” received care without long waits. 103 P.Ex. MC-9 at 12. Once again, rephrasing the findings, the study demonstrates that 71% of respondents received care without long waits. One witness opined that these results are “excellent.” TR 707, lines 13-23; D.Ex. D-40 (Testimony of Ms. Milam). Thus, neither the THQA provider surveys nor the survey of consumers are particularly helpful with regard to the issue of whether managed care class members receive timely checkups without problems. It is found that the data is susceptible to varying interpretations.

Self-Reporting by Class Members

Ninth, the accounts of three individual class members who were directly, adversely impacted by the structure of managed care poignantly illustrate the predicament of class members who are denied the timely receipt of services to which they are entitled under the decree. These accounts form the final category of evidence on which the court bases its finding that defendants have failed to provide class members enrolled in managed care with the checkups and other services to which they are entitled.

B.M. and Samantha

Class member Samantha has “developmental delays, cerebral palsy which manifests itself in gross and fíne motor skills problems and speech problems, learning disabilities (predominantly non-verbal), severe Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, asthma and airborne allergies, chronic ear infections, and pituitary dwarfism.” P.Ex. A-5 at 5. B.M., her mother, explained that she has had problems obtaining all of the care that Samantha needs;

Now Samantha is in a Medicaid HMO. It is hard to get medical appointments for her in a timely way. Sometimes when she is sick, the doctor’s office tells me that all the appointments are full and she can’t get one for approximately two weeks. When this happens, we can’t go to another doctor. Also, the HMO representative told me that if I take Samantha to the emergency room, it had better be a true life-threatening emergency. She said if it’s not, I have to pay the bill. That is very scary. I don’t know when her problems can wait and when they can’t, especially when it takes so long to get an appointment.

P.Ex. A-5 at 7. B.M. also has trouble obtaining specialty care for Samantha. Her HMO only contracts with one orthopedist who is qualified to handle Samantha’s problems. However, B.M. sought the help of a second doctor. She “looked and looked but there was no one else. The HMO people would not even answer my questions about trying to find another orthopedist.” P.Ex. A-5 at 7. Furthermore, problems with prior approval of Samantha’s physical and speech -therapy have “caused delays in Samantha getting the therapy she needs,” P.Ex. A-5 at 7, and there is a shortage of physical therapists in Samantha’s HMO. Her mother reported, “I called and called and called before I *629 could find a physical therapy agency signed up with my HMO. Most physical therapy agencies told me Medicaid paid too little to be worth it.” P.Ex. A-5 at 7-8.

C.H. and Sms

C.H. characterizes her experiences with Americaid, one of defendant’s managed care contractors, as a “nightmare.” P.Ex. A-l at 6 (supplemental deposition). C.H. is the mother of three young class members: Jonathon, who has manic depression, oppositional defiant disorder and attention deficit disorder; James, who has mild mental retardation, asthma, oppositional defiant disorder and affective disorder, and is sometimes violent; and Jacob, who suffers from serious kidney disease and asthma.

C.H. has encountered significant difficulty in obtaining healthcare for James and Jacob. First, the psychiatrist who had been treating James “dropped all his Medicaid patients.” P.Ex. A-l at 6 (supplemental deposition). Americaid initially told C.PI. that she did not need a referral code to take James- to a new psychiatrist. Americaid later refused to pay for his care because C.H. “did not follow procedure about getting a referral code.” P.Ex. A-l at 6 (supplemental deposition).

On one occasion, C.H. took James and Jacob in for emergency care because they both were suffering from fevers and diarrhea. “They kept vomiting and they were both getting dehydrated. I was very scared' because they are so young and Jacob just had no weight to lose — he has so many other health problems.” P.Ex. A-l at 6. The hospital refused to see the boys without a referral code from their HMO or payment from C.H. P.Ex. A-l at 6-7. 104 “We then went ... to another emergency room where I was scolded for not getting the children to medical attention sooner. They said each of the children had lost several pounds, and it was dangerous to let this happen. They had to give Jacob intravenous fluids.” P.Ex. A-l at 7.

Shortly before C.H. gave her deposition in March of 2000, James suffered a serious and prolonged asthma attack. C.H. called the doctor’s office repeatedly from about 2:00 p.m. Saturday until 3:00 a.m. Sunday morning, finally reaching a nurse who instructed her to take him to the nearest emergency room. There, it was determined that James’ situation' was critical. Says C.H.:

I feel terrified and helpless when my child is in such bad shape and I have no way to do anything about it. I absolutely couldn’t go to another doctor when that one didn’t call me back, because we are in a Medicaid HMO. I was in fear of being turned away if I took him to the emergency room without a referral code.... The worst thing is I expect it to happen again; my children are still in a Medicaid HMO and they still have chronic illnesses.

P.Ex. A-l at 7.

C.H. has also experienced difficulty obtaining a psychological evaluation for Jacob. “[W]e are trying to get some help but it is really hard to find someone to do it because he is in a Medicaid HMO.” P.Ex. A-l at 8. By the time that C.H. had found someone to perform Jacob’s psychological evaluation, she had changed the boys’ PCP. To C.H.’s surprise, she learned that James and Jacob’s HMOs had also been changed, and that their former doctors would no longer accept them as patients. P.Ex. A-l at 8. C.H. expects further delays because of the amount of time it takes to change Medicaid managed care plans. P.Ex. A-l at 8. See also TR 192, lines 18-25.

*630 C.O.

Plaintiffs also report a serious problem with delays in providing necessary medical equipment in their managed care programs in Harris County. Class member C.O. is a junior high school student with serious disabilities because of cerebral palsy. He was enrolled with HMO Blue in Defendants’ STAR Plus managed care program for people with disabilities. P.Ex. C-21. When C.O. outgrew his wheelchair, he encountered difficulty in trying to get HMO Blue to replace it. According to C.O.’s school therapist,

the chair is desperately needed to promote independence of C.O. and to help him get from classroom to classroom. This is his last year in Junior High, and the High School is much more difficult to maneuver. This is also a safety issue. [C.O.] has no trunk control and he doesn’t have protective responses, so if he falls he has no way of breaking the fall or protecting himself.... At the present time parents are propping chair up with wooden blocks — which is also not safe — he recently fell from his chair at home due to imbalance of chair and the physical reasons stated above. His current chair is three years old — his knees protrude and he has to have extra seat belts. This is particularly difficult for transport. The school bus driver has to double strap him to chair, and has difficulty moving him on and off the school bus.

P.Ex. C-21.

It took more than a year for C.O. to get a replacement wheelchair. P.Ex. C-21 (internal TDH e-mail dated January 13, 1999). Among the causes of C.O.’s untimely receipt of care listed by defendants in the internal memo were the fact that C.O.’s mother did not speak English and the fact that HMO Blue’s policies concerning wheelchairs were stricter than other Medicaid HMOs. Id. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(r)(5), however, C.O. was entitled to receive the full range of services that he needed, including a wheelchair.

Unfortunately, C.O.’s troubles are not unusual. THQA’s 1999 STAR Plus consumer satisfaction survey shows that, on average, 43% of respondents report problems obtaining special medical equipment, and 27% of respondents report having had “a big problem” in obtaining special medical equipment. HMO Blue had the worst record of defendants’ contractors, with one-half of respondent enrollees reporting problems and one-third reporting “big” problems receiving medical equipment. P.Ex. MC-9 at 35.

C. Violations of Decree: Receipt of Services by Class Members Enrolled in Managed Care

In light of the data presented to this court and set out in Section IV(B), it is found that defendants have violated paragraphs 190 and 192 by failing to provide timely checkups to class members enrolled in managed care. 105 While the court applauds defendants’ efforts to encourage the managed care organizations to take steps toward reaching the goals of the decree, 106 *631 and while it is hoped that such new initiatives will be met with success, these efforts do not excuse defendants’ current noncompliance.

D. Children of Migrant Farmworker Families

The Problem

In drafting the decree, the parties took special care to identify certain subsets of the class that have historically been denied adequate healthcare. Paragraph 192, which states that “[mjanaged care organizations will also have the capacity to accelerate services to the children of migrant farmworkers,” is an example of the parties’ early identification of a group that might be adversely affected by the installment of a managed care system. All parties agree that the acceleration, or speedy delivery, of services to this group of class members is crucial to their receiving adequate care, given their frequent migration and high rates of illness. 107

Class members whose parents are migrant farmworkers face many health problems, including serious dental problems and lack of dental care, lice, lack of immunizations, dehydration, pesticide exposure, agricultural accident-related injury, nutritional problems such as anemia and lead poisoning, and health problems commonly associated with severely substandard housing. P.Ex. A-4 (Testimony of Nancy Lloyd). 108

It can be very difficult for class members whose parents are migrant farmwork-ers to receive the healthcare that they need, since farmworkers’ children often need to be transported to doctors or dentists whose offices are an hour or more away. There are hosts of local doctors and dentists in close proximity who do not accept Medicaid clients. P.Ex. A-4. Edu- *632 eating parents about their children’s’ needs is also crucial. For example, Ms. Lloyd arranged appropriate physical and occupational therapy for a two-year-old class member who had cerebral palsy. Prior to this arrangement, the child had been receiving only two sessions per month even though he needed three sessions per week. Before Ms. Lloyd’s intervention, the child

was losing muscle mass .... he couldn’t even hold his head up but after two weeks of therapy he could. Also, you’re fighting a time clock here. If children don’t learn to walk by the time they’re three years old, they probably never will.... If someone had been following this child, this never would have happened. He had been getting two visits per month for a year before he came to our center. He had Medicaid during this whole time. I want to know why no one helped him to get the full therapy that he needed.

P.Ex. A-4 at 13-14. He also did not have a standing frame so that he could strengthen his muscles to learn to walk. “The mother wanted help but she didn’t know what options were available or what her child needed. This was one of the saddest cases I’ve seen.” Id.

Ms. Lloyd testified that this subgroup’s pattern of migration made obtaining care through EPSDT managed care extremely difficult:

The HMOs would tell the parents that they would register the children with the [primary care providers], but they never would do it. So, the children would never get a local PCP while they were in our area. They’d be stuck with their PCP from wherever they were before, which would do them no good while they were here, or else they wouldn’t have one at all. Without a PCP, they were locked out of the system, because the PCPs have to provide or approve all of the care. A lot of times, the HMOs would register the children with a PCP just as the family was moving on to a new job out of our area, or after the family had left.... This happened a lot.

P.Ex. A-4 at 19. 109 Defendants’ Chief of the Bureau of Managed Care, Susan Mi-lam, agreed that it is important to accelerate services for class members whose parents are migrant farmworkers:

[T]hey oftentimes will not reside in a particular area for a long period of time, if you are concerned about a child getting the necessary immunizations or series of checkups that they need, that by the time they become eligible, get enrolled, et cetera, that they may only have a chance to have maybe one or two services rendered to them before they move to another location....

TR 732, lines 12-21.

Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Despite the increased health risks faced by class members whose parents are migrant farmworkers, much evidence suggests that defendants have not adequately ensured that their managed care contractors make efforts to accommodate them. The managed care companies in the counties of Lubbock, Crosby, Floyd, Hale, Lamb and Lynn counties lack the capacity to accelerate services for migrant farm-worker class members. P.Ex. A-4 at 15-16. According to Ms. Lloyd, the managed care companies “don’t do anything to accelerate services for our children .... [or] ... for other children of migrant farm-workers ... who have Medicaid.” P.Ex. A-4 at 16. Ms. Lloyd reported that she has tried several times with no success to help the managed care companies accelerate services to TMC students and their *633 siblings. She first asked the managed care companies to be part of TMC’s Health Services Advisory Committee. “They said they would but then they never showed up for any meetings.” P.Ex. A-4 at 16. She then asked them to make presentations to TMC parent groups to “give the families a chance to learn about what the managed care programs do and how they work,” but they have not yet agreed to do so. P.Ex. A-4 at 16.

In short, there seems to be no evidence that defendants’ Panhandle area managed care companies make any efforts to accelerate services to class members whose parents are migrant farmworkers:

If they do, they have never explained them to me or my staff. If they truly wanted to speed things up for migrant farmworkers’ children, you’d think they’d want us to understand how their programs work, and you’d think they’d want to cooperate with us. We’re one of the largest programs for the children of migrant farmworkers in this area, and almost all of our students have Medicaid.

P.Ex. A-4 at 16. (Testimony of Ms. Lloyd).

The problem is statewide. In 1998, ten of the thirteen managed care plans were not in substantial compliance with the requirements relating to the acceleration of services to migrant populations. P.Ex. MC-2, 1998 THQA “MCO On-Site Survey,” at 3. Most plans had difficulty identifying migrants since they were not identified on the plans’ enrollment tapes. Id. Apparently, only three of the thirteen managed care companies with whom the state contracts use assessment tools that specifically identify migrant farmworkers. P.Ex. MC-41. These findings in the THQA report were corroborated by comments made by several of defendants’ managed care contractors about their abilities to accelerate services for children of migrant farmworkers. 110 TR 607, line 21 to 608, line 21. Defense witness Ms. Milam testified that the managed care companies have a great deal of trouble identifying class members whose parents are migrant farm-workers. 111 TR 734, lines 12-15.

Defendants point out that the Medicaid managed care plans do have the “capacity” to accelerate services to class members “when these members are identified.” 112 *634 However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the process of identification is severely flawed, if not completely nonfunctional. Paragraph 192 states unequivocally that the managed care organizations “will ... have the capacity to accelerate services to the children of migrant farm-workers.” It is held that a managed care organization that fails to identify class members whose parents are migrant workers does not have the “capacity” or working ability to accelerate services to them, and that defendants are, therefore, out of compliance with paragraph 192. 113

The court is aware of defendants’ good-faith efforts, and will consider them in its formulation of enforcement orders. Nevertheless, the court may not stray from the task of enforcing the language of the decree. A “capacity” to serve this subset of the class, which the court has found to be all but wholly lacking, must be in place. 114

E. Training of Healthcare Providers in the Managed Care System: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree 115

In drafting the decree, the parties were particularly concerned about training providers within the managed care system:

194. TDH will assure by various means that managed care .organizations arrange appropriate training for all healthcare providers and their staff who serve EPSDT recipients ... All will be trained about program requirements relevant to their responsibilities, including the relevant terms of this settlement.

The rationale behind provider training is that providers are often the people best situated to explain which services are available to their patients. For example, if providers are unaware of class members’ entitlement to free transportation through the Medical Transportation Program, they will not be able to direct their patients to the program when they coordinate appointments and follow-up visits. Or, if providers are not familiar with all elements of the EPSDT checkup, class members will not receive the full preventive care to which they are entitled. In short, “[p]rofessionals cannot provide full services that class members need absent understanding of how EPSDT is supposed to function.” Fairness Order at 31.

Plaintiffs presented evidence suggesting that defendants have failed to assure that the MCOs deliver appropriate training to all healthcare providers serving class members. 116 A survey of providers con *635 ducted by the Texas Health Quality Alliance indicates that roughly half of the respondents were dissatisfied with “training for providers and office staff.” P.Ex. MC-11 at 5. However, defendants have noted that provider surveys do not provide the most accurate data by which to gauge the “appropriateness” of training, as many providers may be dissatisfied with managed care generally. Defendants also note correctly that it is unclear from the survey which aspect of provider training produced the high level of dissatisfaction, because training on EPSDT is not evaluated separately by the survey respondents. Finally, defendants point out that provider satisfaction with managed care generally increases as providers continue to participate in the program. Therefore, the court finds that, on balance, this evidence is only marginally helpful in evaluating the appropriateness of defendants’ training programs.

The 1999 THQA “MCO On-Site Review” reveals more about the adequacy of defendants’ training programs. D.Ex. D-64. It shows, for example, that “[t]hree MCOs have not offered formal training to their physical health specialists.” D.Ex. D-64 at 6. The'report also indicates that “[p]ro-vider training beyond the initial orientation is limited unless requested by the provider or their office staff.” D.Ex. D-64 at 6. Other evidence has shown that HMO staff themselves are not properly advised about the scope of healthcare services that they must provide to class members. P.Ex. MC-14 at 50, 57; TR 601, lines 8-10. The MCO On-Site Review confirms this impression, reporting that when THQA called the HMOs’ member services hotlines, plan representatives from each managed care organization provided inaccurate information. Topics most often misrepresented were home modification, self-referral for behavioral health services, comprehensive care, and medical transportation. D.Ex. D-64 at 13. The evidence also revealed that some HMO staff apparently do not answer callers’ questions, but instead refer callers to their PCP handbooks. P.Ex. MC-12 at 35, 45.

Also relevant in determining whether training is “appropriate” is the evidence proffered at the hearing of the different kinds of training and education currently implemented by the MCOs, which are under explicit contractual obligations to train their providers about EPSDT. D.Ex. D-56 at 44. 117 That evidence suggests that defendants and the MCOs offer an array of training services and pursue education through many avenues of contact with providers. D.Ex. D-41; Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Motion to Enforce Consent Decree at 34-36.

“Appropriate,” like “effective,” is a term difficult to define. The court therefore looks to other relevant provisions in the decree for interpretive guidance. Notably, paragraph 104 expresses the parties’ agreed-upon goal in provider education: *636 “To adequately serve recipients, providers must understand how EPSDT works. They must also understand EPSDT recipients’ needs.” ¶ 104. This paragraph’s emphasis on the providers’ actual understanding, and its lack of focus on the programs offered, leads the court to adopt plaintiffs’ interpretation of “appropriate.” The evidence that MCOs do not understand which services class members may receive and how, and the evidence that providers’ staff relay inaccurate information, strongly suggest that defendants have failed to assure that providers receive appropriate training. The court relies on this evidence in conjunction with the 1999 THQA MCO On-Site Review to arrive at the conclusion that, despite evidence of defendants’ having made some efforts to provide education, defendants have not “assured” the provision of “appropriate” training. Therefore, it is found that plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants are in violation of paragraph 194.

F. Data Collection in the Managed Care System: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

As the United States General Accounting Office has stated,

[t]he continuing trend toward expansion of mandatory, capitated Medicaid managed care programs requires that states have the ability to adequately oversee their contracts with health plans and ensure that states get what they are paying for. However, developing systems to hold plans accountable for ensuring that Medicaid beneficiaries receive the care that they need has been a challenge for states.... [T]o ... [assure] that managed care can effectively and efficiently meet the healthcare needs of Medicaid beneficiaries, more effort is needed.

P.Ex. MC-18 at 24. 118 As noted in Section 111(A), the parties, recognizing the potential problems in data collection in a managed care system, included paragraph 191:

191. TDH will assure by various means that the number and percent of EPSDT patients in each managed care organization who receive all medical and dental checkups when due and information for outcomes research as needed is accurately collected.

The evidence has shown that defendants have violated paragraph 191 in several ways. First, defendants’ federal reports to HCFA about checkups are not accurate or complete. Defendants appear to concede that their reports to HCFA in 1997 and 1998 were incomplete because of their lack of data on class members enrolled in managed care. 119 P.Ex. — 32, M-39.

Studies conducted by the Texas Quality Health Alliance (THQA) corroborate the conclusion that defendants’ managed care reports about checkups are seriously flawed. One of the primary tasks of the THQA is to evaluate managed care “encounter” data to determine its validity. TR 561, lines 4-22. Encounter data is similar to what is called “claims data” in the fee-for-service healthcare environment. In fee-for-service, “claims data” includes information about claims that healthcare providers submit for payment for services rendered to patients. Because managed care frequently does not pay healthcare *637 providers on a per-service basis, claims data is not available. Instead, managed care organizations record “encounters.” TR 561, lines 13-22.

In general, THQA has been unable to validate data provided by defendants’ managed care contractors, as is revealed by the most recent THQA study of managed care encounter data. P.Ex. MC-6 (“Validation Study, 2000”). The Validation Study found significant inaccuracies in the managed care data. THQA was unable to verify the MCOs’ reports'of the number of Texas Health Steps medical checkups conducted on managed care enrollees. P.Ex. MC-6 at 37; TR 620, lines 4-11. In other words, THQA could not confirm that the MCOs had correctly calculated the number of checkups provided to class members. P.Ex. MC-6 at 37. In the words of THQA’s research director, the MCOs’ utilization management data “need[s] to be interpreted with considerable caution.... Overall, I would be cautious in using it.” TR 620, lines 12 — 25 (Testimony of Dr. Jemelka).

There also seems to be a considerable lack of accord between the managed care administrative data sets and class members’ medical records. TR 632, lines 9-11. Moreover, THQA never checked to see if the 1998 managed care administrative databases over-represented checkup encounters found in medical records. This shortcoming in the study is of great consequence because the assumption in the medical community that if an event is not recorded in a patient’s medical record, it did not happen. TR 630, lines 3-19. Furthermore, in a 1997 study, THQA found that about one-quarter of the data reported in the MCOs’ administrative databases was not reflected in any medical records. TR 622, lines 11-16. This suggests that the MCOs’ administrative data reports checkups that have not occurred, or that have not been documented.

Finally, defendants fail to ensure that accurate outcome measures 120 data is collected on class members in managed care. Jimmy Blanton, M.P.A., “principal staff person” 121 for the outcome measures research required by the decree explained that such outcome measures would help to assess whether Texas Health Steps clients’ care is improving, and would be instrumental in correcting problems with the system and improving class members’ care. TR 513, lines 13-21.

However, defendants have not obtained all of the data that they need in order to include managed care enrollees in outreach studies required by the decree. For example, although defendants have agreed to study class members’ length of hospitalization for asthma, they “will not be able to provide [data for] managed care” enrollees regarding this factor. TR 519, lines 13-20. At the time of the hearing, defendants had established managed care programs in all major urban areas in Texas. P.Ex. MC-57. By excluding class members in managed care, Defendants exclude a very large and important group of class members from their database.

To conclude, defendants do not accurately report the number and percentage of class members in each managed care organization who receive medical checkups when due. Their data is neither complete nor accurate, 122 and they are therefore in violation of paragraph 191.

V. Issue Five: Toll-Free Numbers

A. Overview

To help class members acquire knowledge about Texas Health Steps, locate pro *638 viders, set appointments, and arrange transportation to and from appointments, defendants maintain a statewide toll-free telephone number and two toll-free telephone numbers in each geographical region. The purpose of the statewide hotline is to respond to questions about Medicaid. 123 The Regional Texas Health Steps toll-free numbers were instituted to answer questions about EPSDT and to help class members find healthcare providers to serve them. Regional Medical Transportation Program toll-free numbers help class members arrange for transportation to appointments. 124

Before this court’s entry of the decree, class members “had serious trouble even getting through to [defendants’] staff by phone to ask for help.” Fairness Order at 15. After long waits at pay phones, class members with no phones at home were asked to leave home phone numbers for return calls. Id. Also, “[g]etting transportation assistance from toll-free telephone numbers often required long waits.” Id. at 16.

Many class members do not have phones. 125 The lack of a phone makes it difficult, if not impossible, for class members and their families to make repeated calls to defendants’ toll-free numbers, or to wait for defendants to answer their phones. TR 30, lines 8-20;. see also P.Ex. *639 A-2 at 12. According to Terry Hicks, the Director of Medical Transportation for East Texas Support Services in Jasper, Newton County, the problems with phone-call coordination deprive class members of services: 126

If Medicaid recipients call and call and can’t get through to the Medical Transportation system, eventually they give up and stop trying. If they can’t find another way to get to their healthcare appointment, they miss the appointment. Some ETSS clients have missed appointments because they couldn’t get transportation help through the Texas Dept of Health’s Medical Transportation Program toll-free numbers.

P.Ex. A-3 at 7. As a result, many EPSDT recipients have not received the Medicaid services they need. P.Ex. A-3 at 10. 127 Many class members report that they have not used defendants’ transportation program because they were unable to gain access to the program by phone. P.Ex. T-43 at 42^13, Table 7.1. Seventeen percent of class members report that they could not use Defendants’ Medical Transportation Program assistance because the toll-free number was busy. TR 976, lines 21-24. Callers also complain of having missed scheduled healthcare appointments because they cannot get through to defendants’ toll-free numbers. TR 974, lines 8-12. 128

In response to these problems, the parties agreed to the following decree provision:

247. Standards for Toll-free Help Lines (Transportation, Scheduling Assistance and Other) Toll-free numbers for EPSDT recipients will be staffed sufficiently by well trained personnel. Each recipient will receive prompt service by a person who is knowledgeable, helpful and polite. All calls will be answered promptly absent equipment failure. Equipment will be adequate so failure results only from circumstances beyond Defendants’ control, such as bad weather. TDH will make reasonable arrangements to meet the needs of recipients who do not speak English. No calls may be “answered” by a tape recording during working hours except in unusual circumstances.

Plaintiffs complain that class members’ calls are not answered “promptly,” and that class members often are not serviced by a “person who is knowledgeable, helpful and polite.”

B. Findings of Fact: Prompt Answering of All Calls

Abundant evidence suggests that defendants have been less than prompt in answering class members’ calls. Data for the period of September through November of 1999 indicates that the average waits in queue on the Texas Health Steps Toll-free Lines for Regions 4/5 and 9/10 ranged from 94 to 121 seconds, and 142 to 161 seconds, respectively. P.Ex. T-22. The average waits in queue on the Medical Transportation Program Toll-free Line during those months ranged from 124 to 190 seconds in Region 6, and from 46 to 56 *640 seconds in Region 7. D.Ex. D-109. And on the Statewide Toll-free Line, the average wait ranged from 163 to 229 seconds on the English line, and from 96 to 237 seconds on the Spanish line. P.Ex. T-17, T-18.

However, these averages mask the extremely long delays sometimes faced by class members. For example, in December of 1999, the Region 2 (Abilene) Medical Transportation Program toll-free number had an average speed in answering of 30 seconds. However, the longest wait before a call was answered was 13 minutes and 2 seconds. P.Ex. T-25; see also TR 961, line 25 to 963, line 20. Similarly, in December of 1999, the Tyler Medical Transportation Program had an average speed in answering of just 11 seconds. Even so, the longest wait before a call was answered was 9 minutes and 46 seconds. P.Ex. T-26.

Likewise, in November of 1999, the average wait in queue for the South Texas Medical Transportation Program was 16 seconds, D. Ex. D-109, while the longest wait in queue in the Corpus Christi call center was 12 minutes and 13 seconds. P.Ex. T-29. In 1999, the longest wait for calls to be answered by the South Texas number was 17 minutes and 18 seconds. P.Ex. T-29; see also TR 964, lines 5-21; see also TR 967, line 16 to 969, line 10. 540. In Region 6, as recently as the week of November 8, 1999, the maximum delay before a call was answered was 23 minutes and 20 seconds. During the week of August 23, 1999, the longest delay was nearly 29 minutes.

As for the statewide Medicaid hotline, the English-language line had maximum waits of over 22 minutes in each month of 1999, and the longest maximum wait for a call to be answered was 49 minutes and 16 seconds. P.Ex. T-16; see also TR 970, lines 2-5. For the Spanish-language statewide line, the longest maximum wait was 59 minutes and 20 seconds, in June of 1999. P.Ex. T-16; see also TR 970, lines 8-13.

High call “abandonment rates” — percentages of callers who hang up, presumably in frustration — provide additional evidence that calls are hot being answered promptly. 129 For the Texas Health Steps Toll-free Lines, the abandonment rate ranged from 12 to 20% from September through November of 1999 in Region 5. P.Ex. T-22. For the Medical Transportation Program Toll-free Line, three regions had abandonment rates of over 10 percent from June through August of 1999. (Region 6, the worst of the lot, had a rate that ranged, approximately, from 20 to 28 percent.) D.Ex. D-109. For the Statewide Toll-free Line, the abandonment rate for February of 1998 to February of 1999 ranged from 17 to 48%. P.Ex. T-16. 130

Evidence that calls are not answered promptly is not limited to statistics. Several mothers and grandmothers of class members from different parts of the state testified about these delays. One mother of three seriously ill children testified that *641 she called defendants’ statewide Medicaid hotline several times and was put on hold for 15 to 30 minutes. 131 She testified further that she had been on occasion “placed on hold for more than an hour ... Only twice or perhaps three times was I ever able to talk with a live person, even after a long wait.” P.Ex. A-l at 4-5.

Another mother noted:

Most of the time it’s really hard to get the Houston Medical Transportation office on the phone. Their phone is busy, busy, busy.... Sometimes I finally get through and sometimes I don’t. When I don’t get a busy signal, sometimes the phone rings 20 times or even more before anybody answers. Then, I get put on hold_ [ J]ust last month ... [s]omeone answered pretty quickly, but they just said ‘hold’ and then put me on hold again. They didn’t even let me say anything. After that it was about 15 minutes before they got back on the line.

P.Ex. A-5 at 9. 132

Class members were not the only people who testified about calls not answered promptly. Ms. McHan testified that her staff often must help class members make arrangements with defendants’ Medical Transportation Program when family members have difficulty contacting the program. TR 28, lines 6-12. Numerous incidents, as recent as December of 1999, reported by defendants’ own toll-free number staff reveal many problems and delays inconsistent with any commonsense notion of “promptness.” 133

C. Violations of Decree: Prompt Answering of All Calls

Defendants respond with three arguments. First, they claim that the phrases “prompt service” and “answered *642 promptly” are too vague to create binding obligations. Second, defendants assert that the court should adopt a five-minute standard for promptness in interpreting the decree, and that they have met that standard. Third, defendants argue that the statewide average of the regional average waits in queue and abandonment rates, not the regional figures themselves, should form the basis of this court’s judgment regarding their compliance with the decree.

The first of these arguments is rejected. Defendants promised plaintiffs that they would provide “prompt service” and answer calls “promptly” — a promise that may be enforced within the meaning of these phrases as interpreted within the “four corners” of the decree. The court agrees with defendants that these terms are ambiguous, but that does not end the inquiry. A finding that language in a consent decree is ambiguous merely permits the court to consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent in drafting the language. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975). Our task is to understand more fully what the parties meant by the use of the word “prompt.”

Abandonment Rates

Plaintiffs urge the court to consider evidence of an alleged industry-wide standard for the prompt answering of calls, based on average waits in queue and abandonment rates targeted by various corporations in their operation of toll-free telephone lines. However, evidence of performance by corporations such as General Electric, Land’s End, and American Express is simply too far removed from the state’s operation of toll-free numbers for the benefit of its Medicaid population to be considered relevant to the parties’ understanding of the word “prompt.” These pie-in-the-sky targets, characterized within a Kaiser Associates report prepared for defendants as the “rapid, timely” responses of “best-in-class companies” reveal little about the parties’ intent when they agreed to the “prompt” answering of calls. P.Ex. T-ll. Nor does the isolated performance of Community First, one of defendants’ managed care contractors in the Bexar region, paint a clear picture of any industry-wide standard. P.Ex. T-14. 134

However, several documents in evidence have proved useful in arriving at a working definition of “prompt.” First, a final draft of the “Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Standards and Guidelines,” issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Healthcare Financing Administration (HCFA) includes a section entitled “Abandoned Calls/Call Waiting Times.” P.Ex. T-10. In that section, HCFA lists a set of “generally acceptable standards” which “states should require” those who conduct enrollment and information service functions in Medicaid managed care to meet. Among the enumerated standards are an average queue wait time of less than 45 seconds, and an abandonment rate of five to ten percent. Id. Although these standards were promulgated after the signing of the decree, and are non-binding, the frequent citations to and recitations of the federal ESPDT statute throughout the decree suggest that the parties intended to draft a document that would be rooted in the requirements of federal law. It is reasonable to surmise *643 that in agreeing to the word “prompt,” the parties were agreeing to a term that could only derive its meaning from some outside source, or some unmentioned standard of performance. Because the decree draws so heavily on federal law, it is reasonable to examine federal guidelines in construing those provisions the court finds ambiguous.

The court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s mandate in Armour to interpret decrees without reference to the purposes of federal law. See Section 1(C). It is the incorporation of the language of the federal EPSDT statute throughout the decree by the parties themselves, however, that suggests that the ambiguity raised by “prompt” may in part be resolved by consulting the standards of the federal agency charged with the administration of EPSDT. By expressly incorporating the language of federal law throughout the decree, the parties created the backdrop against which an ambiguous phrase like “promptly answered” must be considered.

Nevertheless, because of the above-noted risks of interpretation, other extrinsic evidence will be considered to determine the meaning of “prompt,” in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in ITT Continental Baking Co. An excerpt from defendants’ contract with its MCOs proves helpful in this task. P.Ex. — 34. One purpose of the contract is to ensure that defendants, by requiring various activities by the MCOs, comply with the mandates of the consent decree. See Section IV(C), ¶¶ 190, 192. Section 8.5 of the contract requires the contracting MCO to maintain a toll-free hotline, and to demonstrate “telephone availability” through an “abandonment rate of less than 10%.” P.Ex. M-34 at 84. Obviously, the defendants’ having required the MCOs to maintain an abandonment rate of less than ten percent does not lead directly to the conclusion that the defendants bound themselves to a similar standard in their contract with plaintiffs. However, the fact that many provisions of the MCO contract seek to ensure defendants’ compliance with the decree suggests that the rate may be one component of MCO performance that defendants thought necessary to the adequate servicing of the plaintiff class. While the decree does not specifically state that defendants must assure the “prompt” answering of calls by MCOs, it is logical to conclude that defendants regarded the maintenance of a ten percent or lower abandonment rate as necessary for the facilitation of plaintiffs’ “timely receipt” of services from MCOs. ¶ 190. Therefore, even if paragraph 247 were read to require only minimally adequate “promptness,” defendants’ MCO contract, which sets out standards that MCOs must meet for defendants to meet other decree provisions, suggests that an abandonment rate of ten percent or lower is required by paragraph 247.

Even if a different standard of promptness governs the behavior of MCOs than the standard to which this court may hold defendants under paragraph 247, defendants’ internal documents lend further support to a ten percent rule. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit T-13 includes an excerpt from a document entitled “Monitoring and Coaching for Peak Performance,” which was studied by defendants’ toll-free number staff at a training session provided by Jane Finn and the Quality Alert Institute. The document coaches defendants’ employees operating toll-free lines to aim for the “Industry Standard” of five percent or lower abandonment rate. P.Ex. T-13 at 12; TR 971, line 23 — 972, line 8. This document— again, because of the defendants’ likely aim of compliance with the decree — is suggestive of how defendants interpret the word “prompt.” The document is therefore instructive on what the defendants intended when they agreed to answer calls “promptly.”

Perhaps most important, defendants have set their own standards for their Regional Texas Health Steps and MTP lines: on average, they must answer calls within 90 seconds and they must abandon *644 no more than ten percent of calls. TR 891, lines 4-6 (Testimony of Billy Millwee). It is acknowledged that defendants’ behavior after the signing of the decree does not necessarily reveal their understanding of the requirements of paragraph 247. 135 However, the congruence of each of the pieces of evidence discussed above, and the persistent appearance of the five to ten percent abandonment rate in particular, leads this court to conclude that paragraph 247 requires a degree of promptness associated with an abandonment rate approximating ten percent.

Queue Waits

Had defendants produced evidence of short average waits in queue, the abandonment rate would have less weight as a indicator of actual promptness. But the evidence presented suggests that the average waits in queue are sometimes quite lengthy. See Section V(B). Defendants’ goal is for their Texas Health Steps and Medical Transportation Program toll-free numbers to answer calls on average within ninety seconds. TR 892, lines 14-8. (Testimony of Mr. Millwee). Not all regions meet this standard. See Section V(B). Defendants urge the court to accept a “five-minute-standard” for queue waits as characteristic of “prompt answering” as defined by the decree. However, defendants’ reliance on other toll-free number services is rather unhelpful. D.Ex. D-93, D.Ex. D-112; Plaintiffs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. No order of the court requires that these toll-free numbers be answered promptly. Moreover, several of these toll-free number services are run by defendants or their contractors. D.Ex. D-93. It would be letting the fox wátch the chicken coop to allow defendants to use their own performance (or that of their contractors) to help define the standard of promptness required by the decree.

For these reasons, it is found that not enough evidence has been provided for the court to determine what average wait in queue may be deemed “prompt” under paragraph 247. However, evidence about lengthy delays experienced by individual class members is useful here. See Section V(B). This evidence aptly demonstrates that class members’ waits in queue do not comport with a common understanding of what it means to have one’s call answered “promptly.”

Unit of Measurement

Defendants’ primary attempt to rebut plaintiffs’ evidence of noncompliance in this area involves a dispute about the proper unit of measurement. Specifically, they object to the selectively pulling of data from specific regions or clusters of counties in which defendants’ record is particularly abysmal. Defendants assert that the statewide average wait in queue and statewide abandonment rate are more reliable indicators of promptness. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Motion to Enforce Consent Decree, at 38-39. They argue that, on average, regional average waits in queue are not excessive. D.Ex. D-84, D-85, D-89, D-90. Specifically, defendants note that, as of the first quarter of fiscal year 2000, the average wait in queue for the regional Texas Health Steps lines was 43 seconds; for the Medical Transportation Program it was 47 seconds. Defendants also note that statewide average abandonment rates for the Texas Health Steps toll-free lines ranged from 4.6% to 5.7%, and that statewide average abandonment rates for the transportation program line ranged from 9% to 11%. However, one witness admitted that charts about statewide performance do not reveal whether defendants answer “all calls” promptly. TR 961, lines 4-24 (Testimony of Mr. Millwee).

*645 The phrases “each recipient” and “all calls” in paragraph 247 suggest that the paragraph should be read to require promptness for all class members, in all regions of the state. It is true that averages must be used to gauge the “promptness” which defendants afford class members. However, given the paragraph’s inclusive language, and its emphasis on the experience of individual class members, it is concluded that class members, no matter where they live, are entitled to prompt service. The regional averages are thus a superior measure of defendants’ success in ensuring promptness than are statewide averages, which mask defendants’ failures in some regions to ensure promptness. The court’s decision to rely on regional data is also compelled by the parties’ emphasis on “state-wideness” throughout the decree. ¶¶ 271-281. It is therefore found that defendants were out of compliance with paragraph 247 during the periods of time in which calls were not answered promptly in certain regions of the state. 136

D. Knowledgeable, Helpful, and Polite: Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

The decree also entitles class members to “prompt service by a person who is knowledgeable, helpful and polite.” ¶ 247. However, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that defendants’ staff members are often unhelpful or lack knowledge. 137

The mother of one class member testified that “[o]n the two or three occasions that I was able to talk with a live person, the person was not polite or helpful. They told me that they could not answer my questions and that I needed to call somewhere else.” P.Ex. A-l at 5.

Another mother of a class member said that one “problem with the Houston Medical Transportation Program office is that sometimes the person who answers the phone doesn’t know what they should do.” P.Ex. A-5 at 9. Although she herself is disabled by cerebral palsy, the Medical Transportation Program office staff member told her that she and her daughter “had to take the bus to [the class member’s] medical appointments .... [the staff member] just kept saying that if we couldn’t take the bus they couldn’t help us.” P.Ex. A-5 at 5-9. The staff person was unaware of other transportation options, such as cabs or Metrolift. 138 Although she promised to research the issue and call back, she never did. P.Ex. A-5 at 9. The problem remained unresolved until counsel intervened.

A third parent stated that the Medical Transportation Program staff need to be better trained. P.Ex. A-7 at 7. Even though her son had had the same schedule for his rehabilitation appointments for months at a time, the Transportation Program staff still made scheduling errors despite repeated calls. P.Ex. A-7 at 7. She also described how difficult it was to arrange her son’s transportation to rehabilitation after her truck broke down. She requested that a van be sent to pick him up at school and take him to rehabilitation. The staff person at the Transportation office told her that it was impossible because her son was a minor. The problem was rectified only weeks later, after the mother *646 discussed the matter with a supervisor at MTP. P.Ex. A-7 at 8. Moreover, in order to receive mileage reimbursement to which she was entitled, she found it necessary to consult with counsel. P.Ex. A-7 at 8.

Finally, Ms. McHan testified that “some of the staff need to be a little better trained in sensitivity toward the clients they are working with.” Both she and her clients, who are parents of class members, have experienced the staff members’ rudeness over the phone. TR 89, lines 11-6, see also P.Ex. A-2 at 19. She also noted that Medical Transportation Program toll-free number staff are sometimes less than helpful because they lose information that has previously been supplied. Ms. McHan stated that workers sometimes deny that the information has been given to them on prior occasions. TR 40, lines 5-12. 139

Based on the evidence presented above, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants have violated paragraph 247. Plaintiffs have succeeded in demonstrating that class members’ calls are frequently not answered by knowledgeable and helpful staff members.

VI. Issue Six: Case Management

A. Role and Importance of Case Management

“Case management” refers to the service provided by “case managers,” or employees of the state who help families to navigate the often confusing healthcare system. Case management helps indigent families to develop coherent plans to take care of their children’s healthcare and related needs. Case managers also work to help empower families to request healthcare services on their own. Their support can often be crucial for class members and their families, who are largely uneducated and unfamiliar with the state’s healthcare system in general, and with Texas Health Steps in particular. Thus, case management plays a vital role in facilitating recipients’ access to needed medical, social, and educational services.

Before this lawsuit was filed, defendants “only provided case management on a limited basis to several categories of class members.” Fairness Order at 33. In response to the decree, defendants developed a new case management program called Texas Health Steps Medical Case Management (“case management”). The program is aimed at a broad group of class members who have a health condition or risk, have special healthcare needs, or whose physical conditions are medically complex or medically fragile. P.Ex. C-l at 14. The purpose of providing case management to class members who are at risk of health problems is “preventive.” TR 141, lines 6-18. 140

Class members face numerous barriers in gaining access to healthcare, including language barriers, lack of transportation, unemployment, substandard housing, and lack of food, shelter, and clothing. TR 15, lines 5-15. The evidence demonstrated *647 that Texas Health Steps medical case management is needed to overcome barriers to care. • TR 380, line 15 to 381, line 6; TR 405, line 22 to 406, line 3 (Testimony of Margaret Bruch). 141 Case managers often find adequate food and shelter for class members and their families. Without case management, it is extremely difficult for some class members to receive services that they need through defendants’ managed care programs. TR 70, line 23 to 71, line 8 (Testimony of Ms. Tillman). 142 Children who are homeless or who live in shelters are also particularly difficult to serve without case managers. TR 71, lines 17-22. And in situations in which a child’s health problem stems from the poor health of the child’s parents, case managers play a vital role. 143 In each of these situations, case management provides a comprehensive approach that helps overcome families’ multiple obstacles to safe and healthy living. 144

B. Findings of Fact

Acknowledging the importance of medical case management to the families who need it, the parties included in the decree the following provisions:

248. EPSDT programs must provide case management to each recipient if needed. Since case management is a service that Medicaid programs may cover, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(19); 1396n(g), Medicaid programs must cover it for EPSDT recipients if medically necessary. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)....

264. By January 31, 1996, the parties will complete a case management plan for the EPSDT program. Case management includes arrangements for the child and the family which are needed to meet the child’s healthcare needs. The plan will make sufficient case management available in every county or cluster of counties where few recipients reside. It may provide case management by contract with local agencies or on a fee-for-service basis, whichever is more effective in each county.

The Need

At issue is whether defendants have enacted a plan that makes “sufficient case management available in every county or cluster of counties where few recipients reside,” as required by paragraph 264. As *648 a threshold matter, the parties dispute how many class members are in need of the service. Defendants estimate that about 7% of the class (about 90,000 to 107,000) are in need of medical case management. Plaintiffs contend that more than 10% of the class need case management. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Motion to Enforce the Consent Decree, at 37.

Defendants base their 7% estimate on data from the defendants’ High Risk Pregnant Women and Infants case management program (“PWI case management”). TR 397, lines 4 — 12. About 5% of pregnant women and infants with Medicaid use PWI case management. TR 397, line 13 to 398, line 1; P.Ex. C-20. Defendants estimate that the rate of need for Texas Health Steps medical case management (MCM) would exceed this rate by a small percentage, because they expect that more class members will know about MCM. However, reason defendants, the 7% estimate is too high because it does not account for class members’ use of other forms of case management. TR 364, line 23 to 365, line 13. 145 For this reason, defendants estimate that only 5 to 6% of class members need Texas Health Steps case management. TR 434, lines 18-21 (Testimony of Ms. Bruch).

The above reasoning is seriously flawed. First, defendants have shown only that 5% of pregnant and infant Medicaid recipients actually use PWI case management, not that only 5% of these Medicaid recipients need case management. Second, defendants’ reliance on PWI case management data underestimates the need for Texas Health Steps case management, because the PWI case management offers a narrower set of services, thereby reducing the expected population in need of those services. 146 Also, some class members who need Texas Health Steps case management have health problems that are more chronic in nature or are in poorer health than those who need PWI case management. TR 403, line 21 — 404, line 15; see also P.Ex. C-21. Therefore, the need for PWI case management, which offers a different array of services addressing the health needs of a different population, is not, perhaps, the best starting point for measuring the need for Texas Health Steps case management.

In addition, the different case management programs are not mutually exclusive. Class members may need and be entitled to Texas Health Steps case management even if they also use other forms of case management. 147 Other forms of case management may not be as comprehensive as Texas Health Steps case management. TR 81, lines 8-21. 148 While defendants’ *649 regulations prohibit duplication of case management services, P.Ex. C-l, § 33.504(a), they do not prohibit receipt of more than one form of case management if there is no duplication. This reasoning cuts against defendants’ decision to reduce their 7% estimate (already questionable due to their reliance on PWI data) to 5 or 6% based on class members’ access to alternative forms of case management.

Utilization

Even assuming that defendants’ reasoning is correct, and that they have properly calculated that only about 90,000 to 107,000 class members need case management, by defendants’ own estimates, at least 30,000 class members still have unmet case management needs. 149 See also TR 406, line 13 to 407, line 5. Since the means by which defendants arrived at these estimates lacks reliability, the actual need for case management may well exceed these estimates.

There is abundant evidence that members’ use of Texas Health Steps case management is startlingly lower than the population’s true need. From the program’s start, in January of 1998, through January of 2000, defendants provided fewer than 33,000 Texas Health Steps case management services. 150 TR 369, lines 7-21; D.Ex. D-9; see also D.Ex. D-25. Only 0.3% of all Texas class members aged 1 to 20 used Texas Health Steps case management in the first four months of state fiscal year 2000. 151 TR 421, lines 13-9, Case Management Utilization Report, P.Ex. C-20. This is obviously a much smaller group than need case management, even under defendants’ conservative estimates. Furthermore, in more than 120 counties, no class members at all used Texas Health Steps case management in the first four months of fiscal year 2000. P.Ex. C-20.

As noted above, statewide, there are 1,306,455 class members over the age of one year statewide. Only 4,353 — roughly 0.3% — of them received Texas Health Steps case management. TR 421, lines 13-19. The regional data tells an even more deplorable story of a service almost completely inaccessible to class members. In Hale County, where there were 3,820 class members over the age of one year, not one received Texas Health Steps case management during the first four months of fiscal year 2000. TR 416, line 13 to 417, line 5. In Dallas County, which has 100,012 class members over the age of one, only forty-eight received Texas Health Steps case management. TR 417, line 21 to 418, line l. 152 In Region 8, which has the highest percentage of class members who use Texas Health Steps case management, only about 1% of class members use Texas Health Steps case management. TR 419, lines 5 -22; see also TR 88, lines 19-21. And in Region 11, the South Texas region, which is very poor, only 0.2% of class members receive Texas Health Steps case management. TR 421, lines 3-12.

Defendants respond that the gap between the estimated population who need case management and those who receive it can be explained by several factors. First, some class members who need the service may choose not to request it. They may not want case management, may have their management needs met by family or friends, or may receive “targeted” case management from another source, such as the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, Commission for the *650 Blind and Visually Impaired, Texas Department of Health, or Early Childhood Intervention Program. D.Ex. D-6. However, several of these forms of case management address distinct kinds of medical needs. Moreover, the receipt of case management from another source does not preclude class members from being eligible for Texas Health Steps medical case management where medically necessary.

Defendants also emphasize that there is no waiting list for Texas Health Steps Medical Case Management services, and that plaintiffs have identified no class members who, after requesting the service, were not referred to case management providers. Defendants argue that they provide sufficient case management in every county or cluster of counties because there is no waiting list for Texas Health Steps case management assistance. Ms. Bruch stated that “to our knowledge there has not been a child present that has not gotten connected to case management.” TR 373, lines 13-5; see also TR 407, lines 10-2, TR 437, lines 2-7, D.Ex. D-14. This argument appears to rely on the “request” language at 42 § 1396a(a)(43)(B). However, the court dispensed with this defense in Section II of this memorandum opinion. That is, under 42 § 1396a(a)(43)(A), defendants are obligated to inform eligible participants about the services to which they are entitled. Class members cannot be expected to make requests for services where defendants have failed to make them aware of such services. 153

Sufficient Staffing

Plaintiffs argue, next, that defendants have not recruited a sufficient supply of case managers to meet class members’ needs, in violation of the requirement that “sufficient case management” be made “available.” ¶ 264. Multiple witnesses testified to the shortage of case managers across the state. TR 53, lines 9-12. 154

The statistics presented at the hearing support the opinions of these witnesses. At the end of 1999, approved Texas Health Steps case managers could serve 16,707 class members. But, of the 162 approved case managers, 155 41 were inactive. Thus, at the end of 1999, the actual capacity of defendants’ active, enrolled Texas Health Steps case managers was only 13,809. TR 408, line 9 to 410, line 4; P.Ex. C-20. This low capacity is not sufficient to meet even defendants’ estimate of class members’ need for this service.

The Safety Net

No private Texas Health Steps case managers are enrolled in about 130 of Texas’ 254 counties. TR 412, lines 8 — 22; P.Ex. C-20, D.Ex. D-15. Instead, TDH social workers are assigned to these counties; in some counties, only one social worker is assigned. TR 413, lines 5-10.

*651 Two major problems arise when no privately-enrolled case managers serve an area. First, class members have - less choice among case managers. TR 85, lines 9-13. This is especially true in the many counties in which only one privately-enrolled Texas Health Steps case manager participates in the program. P.Ex. C-20. Class members’ ability to choose their own case managers, who form intimate relationships with class members and their families, is important to the success of the service. TR 413, line 20 to 414, line 1 (Testimony of Ms. Bruch). Second, when no privately enrolled case managers serve an area, Texas Department of Health social workers are supposed to assist class members as case managers. 156 TR 400, lines 7-13. However, these Texas Health Steps case managers are available only on a limited basis in those counties. 157 TR 125, lines 5-8.

TDH social workers are overwhelmed in their capacities as “safety net”, ease managers. For example, TDH social workers in Regions 2/3 and 9/10 have caseloads of about 500 to 600 clients. 158 They work in several different programs. In contrast, a full-time case manager at the Parent Case Management Program (PCM) handles twenty-five to fifty children. TR 48, line 23 to 49, line 2. (Testimony of Ms. McHan).

Recruitment

Defendants’ low reimbursement rates for Texas Health Steps case management contribute to the shortage of case managers. 159 According to a 1998 internal TDH memo, the reimbursement rates for Texas Health Steps case management are “woefully inadequate in comparison” with other state agencies’ payment rates for then-case management services. P.Ex. C-21. This evidence is consistent with the fact that PCM cannot afford to hire staff qualified to provide Texas Health Steps case management for the reimbursement that defendants pay. TR 54, line 18 to 55, line 7. (Testimony of Ms. McHan). The rural nature of PCM’s practice — and of many potential providers of case management— exacerbates the problem, because such providers “may be sending staff out to drive several hours, meet with a family for several hours, [and] drive back for several hours, for $54.” 160 TR 55, lines 5-7:

Thesé low reimbursement rates have a tangible effect on enrollment and withdrawal from the case management program. 161 In Bexar County, Texas Health *652 Steps case managers are taking inactive status primarily because they cannot stay in business given the current low rates of reimbursement. 162 TR 87, lines 4-17. Potential case managers do not enroll with Texas Health Steps case management because the low rates make it extremely difficult to pay the salaries required to hire needed social workers and nurses with professional experience. TR 91, line 16 to 92, line l. 163

One of the reasons for the failure of reimbursement rates to meet providers’ costs appears to be that the cost of conducting home visits is not reimbursed. Instead, defendants pay Texas Health Steps case managers a flat fee of $54.58 for initial, comprehensive “assessments.” TR 424, lines 13-15. But $54.58 does not begin to cover the cost of a home visit in many parts of the state. P.Ex. C-21; TR 423, line 25 to 424, line 19; TR 430, lines 1-6. For example, for an assessment to be comprehensive, it must be done in the client’s home. TR 430, lines 7-10. Home visits are more comfortable for the client and make it easier for the case manager to establish a rapport and to receive an accurate picture of the client’s needs. TR 430, lines 11-16. If the family lives in substandard housing, the case manager can assess the level of risk that the home itself imposes. TR 430, lines 17-21. It generally takes about one to three hours to do an-initial, comprehensive Texas Health Steps case management assessment. TR 423, line 25 to 424, line 12.

Although defendants originally based their Texas Health Steps case management payment rates on other programs’ payment structure, Texas Health Steps case managers are not reimbursed for certain services for which case managers in other programs receive reimbursement. For example, unlike PWI case managers, Texas Health Steps case managers are not paid for initial intake sessions. 164 TR 426, line 25 to 426, line 15; P.Ex. C-23. This continuing disparity 165 makes it extremely difficult to attract Texas Health Steps case managers. P.Ex. C-21; see also TR 428, line 24 to 429, line 16.

In addition to low rates of reimbursement, the cumbersome application process itself appears to inhibit many case manag *653 ers from participating in Texas Health Steps case management. 166 For example, in October of 1999, a case management provider applicant still had not received a provider number even though defendants had approved the applicant in December of 1998. P.Ex. C-21. Defendants’ internal memos demonstrate their knowledge of this paperwork problem. P.Ex. C-21; see also TR 431, lines 15-18. Payment delays also cause problems. One witness testified that 10-30% of CORE’S claims are not paid, TR 92, lines 2-7, which forces her staff to tap into personal funds to meet payroll costs. 167 TR 93, lines 4-9 (Testimony of Ms. Tillman). Another testified that payment delays create significant cash flow problems for Texas Health Steps case managers because many case management organizations are small businesses. TR 430, line 22 to 431, line 14 (Testimony of Ms. Bruch).

Finally, Texas Health Steps case management is underutilized because class members do not know that the service is available. TR 90, lines 8-10. Vital referral sources, such as healthcare providers, school staff, and employees of community agencies, frequently do not know about Texas Health Steps case management. 168 TR 90, lines 10-21. However, Texas Health Steps case management is very well-received by referral sources once they are informed about the program. CORE “immediately began getting referrals” once referral sources learned of its services. TR 90, line 22 to 91, line 8.

C. Violations of Decree

Defendants point to the number of medical case management provider recruitment activities that they have conducted. TR 357, line 11 to 360, line 4; TR 367, line 12 to 368, line 3; D.Ex. D-7, D-12, D-13, D-24. They note the steady progress made recently in recruiting providers, TR 369, line 23 to 370, line 12; D.Ex. D-10, and point to a recent increase of the reimbursement rate for face-to-face follow-up activities. D.Ex. D-10, D-14. They report that since January of 1998, the number of medical case management services provided has increased every month, rising from 5,000 services to over 30,000 services in January of 2000. D.Ex. 9. Nevertheless, despite defendants’ recruitment efforts, and despite the gradual increase in the number of approved case managers, there is still a serious shortage of Texas Health Steps case managers. 169

*654 Based on the findings of fact set out above in Section VI(B)(1) through VI(B)(5), defendants are found to be in violation of paragraphs 248 and 264 of the decree. The dramatic underutilization of the service of case management, coupled with a well-demonstrated need for the service, leads the court to conclude that defendants have failed to provide medical case management services to the plaintiff class. Plaintiffs have amply demonstrated defendants’ failure to make case management available in every county or cluster of counties in the state.

VII. Issue Seven: Outcome Measures

A. Overview

In an effort to “measure whether recipients receive the full range of services that they need and are entitled to receive,” ¶ 288, the parties agreed to create “health outcome indicators.” ¶¶ 286-297. The decree states that these indicators should be “chosen wisely” by the parties and should be “diverse enough to gauge the health of the entire EPSDT population,- not merely factions of the population.” ¶289. The parties agreed to develop a list of health outcome indicators by September 1, 1995. ¶ 293. On August 30, 1995, the parties submitted a Joint Notice Concerning Outcome Measures to the court (“Joint Notice”).

The parties also agreed to create “target goals” for each indicator. ¶ 294. Defendants agreed to report the “best available information on each health indicator annually, beginning on September 1, 1996 and continuing through 1999,” through the use of a methodology approved by plaintiffs. ¶ 295. Finally, defendants agreed to develop, by January of each year, corrective action plans to “address all matters within Defendants’ control to improve results for each indicator” for which the target goal was not reached. ¶ 296. The plans are to be presented for plaintiffs’ suggestions, which may not be unreasonably rejected by defendants. Id.

B. Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

Plaintiffs allege that defendants have failed to comply with their obligations under these paragraphs by failing to provide plaintiffs with outcome studies that meet the standards in both the decree and the Joint Notice, failing to obtain the consent of plaintiffs’ counsel regarding three substitute outcome measures introduced by the defendants, failing to create adequate corrective action plans, and failing to abide by the deadlines in the decree. Each contention will be addressed in turn.

Joint Notice Measures

Plaintiffs’ complaints about defendants’ outcome measures as required by the Joint Notice begin with the first indicator, Joint Notice Measure # 1, which measures the rate of immunization among the plaintiff class. P.Ex. OM-9 at 12. Plaintiffs complain, first, that defendants’ data is not compiled annually, but is instead provided biannually. Defendants respond that immunization surveys take significant time to complete, and that the opportunity to evaluate new intervention strategies designed to improve immunization rates has required at least a two-year cycle. Nevertheless, defendants agreed to the term “annually.” Moreover, the immunization indicator appears in the express language of the decree at paragraph 290. Therefore, when defendants agreed to the annual provision of the best available data on each indicator, they specifically included this indicator. For these reasons, it is found that defendants’ biannual compilation of immunization data violates paragraph 295.

In addition, plaintiffs complain that defendants’ 1998 immunization study sample size was too small to yield adequate data about racial and ethnic subgroups, as required by Joint Notice Measure # 1. De *655 fendants have not furnished any reliable evidence that their 1998 data was the “best available,” as required by paragraph 295. They have not explained, to the satisfaction of the court, why they were unable to create the requisite sample sizes that would have yielded the desired racial data. It is therefore concluded that defendants have not furnished plaintiffs with the best available data on this indicator for the year 1998. Thus, in 1998, 170 defendants failed to comply with paragraph 295. 171

Plaintiffs also object to the exclusion from study of hundreds of thousands of class members who are enrolled in managed care. D.Ex. D-62. 172 To evaluate this objection, the court must examine paragraph 295, which contemplates an ongoing exchange between the parties concerning the specific methodology to be used to report on each indicator:

295. Defendants will report the best available information on each health indicator annually, beginning on September 1, 1996 and continuing through 1999. The EPSDT program will arrange for studies to evaluate the health of the EPSDT population, including each health outcome indicator. Defendants will present their proposed methodology for Plaintiffs’ approval by April 1, 1996. Plaintiffs will not unreasonably withhold approval. If they approve, Plaintiffs may make suggestions. Defendants may accept or reject the suggestions.

This language is interpreted to mean that defendants’ failure to report on an indicator or specifically enumerated sub-indicator^ — such as their failure to provide any data by race as required by Joint Notice Measures # 1 and # 4, above — will nearly always 173 constitute a failure to provide the “best available information.” However, a disagreement over methodology must be treated differently. The court must decide whether defendants have provided the “best available information” or whether plaintiffs have withheld their approval of defendants’ methodological decisions “unreasonably.” The phrase “best available information” is held to be ambiguous. The court must therefore determine, as best it can, what the parties meant by the phrase with regard to each methodological decision challenged by plaintiffs.

Have defendants provided the “best available information” regarding the indicators for which they have excluded managed care data, or have plaintiffs withheld their approval of the exclusion “unreasonably”? Paragraph 191 provides a clear answer: defendants must assure that “information for outcomes research as needed” is collected from “each managed care organization.” ¶ 191. In light of paragraph 191, the phrase “best available information” is not ambiguous in relation to managed care data. Therefore, in failing to collect data on managed care enrollees, defendants violated both paragraph 191 and paragraph 295.

Next, with regard to Joint Notice Measure # 5, plaintiffs complain that defendants have limited their study of lead poisoning in the class to a study of class members whose blood samples have been *656 submitted to the Texas Department of Health laboratory for testing. Does this limitation render defendants’ information less than the “best available”? No other provisions related to lead-poisoning in the decree can guide the court in answering this question. Paragraph 289 at first glance appears promising, with its requirement that indicators be “diverse enough to gauge the health of the entire EPSDT population, not merely factions of the population.” ¶ 289. This paragraph speaks directly to the selection of indicators, not to methodologies used in generating the best available information about those indicators, but it could be used by the court to give meaning to the ambiguous phrase “best available.” However, paragraph 289 appears to be aimed at the exclusion of particular groups (such as young females or teenage males) from consideration. There is no evidence that defendants’ use of the blood registry data unduly excludes a particular “faction” from study. Thus, while defendants are strongly encouraged to expand their studies to include class members whose blood is not currently reported in the registry, they will not be held in violation of the decree for relying solely upon the blood registry.

Plaintiffs also note that although defendants are obligated under Joint Notice Measure # 5 to re-evaluate at the age of 24 months the blood lead levels of EPSDT children who had high lead levels at 12 months, defendants fail to do so because their “registry cannot distinguish a child whose second test was normal from a child who never received a second test.” P.Ex. OM-9 at 9; TR 527, line 11 to 528, line 14. The court agrees that, because they have failed to report an enumerated indicator, defendants have failed to provide the “best available” data regarding that indicator. Defendants insist that they cannot provide the re-evaluation data because of the configuration of their registry. Nevertheless, defendants have plainly failed to meet their obligation to “arrange for studies to evaluate the health of the EPSDT population, including each health outcome indicator.” ¶ 295. 174

Plaintiffs’ complaints concerning Joint Notice Measures # 8 and # 9 will be treated similarly. In both instances, plaintiffs regard defendants’ decision to restrict data collection to certain subsets of the population as in violation of paragraph 295. However, it is found that defendants’ decision to proceed with methodologies based on Women’s Infants’ and Children’s Program (“WIC”) data (# 8) and on data from the previously mentioned blood registry (# 9), do not violate paragraph 295, because defendants have demonstrated the data for each indicator to be the best available. The Joint Notice itself authorizes TDH, not the plaintiffs, to “establish the methodology” for these measures. See Joint Notice at 3. Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence that defendants’ reported data is not the “best available.” 175

Finally, plaintiffs correctly assert that defendants have failed to provide the best available data for Joint Notice Measures 10 and 11. No data has been provided regarding Measure 10, which deals with the mental health of class members. Regarding Measure 11, which deals with asthma, the language of the Joint Notice clearly requires the reporting of the rate of hospitalization or the number of hospitalizations by year, not, as defendants maintain, the average length of stay for a patient hospitalized. It is found that the “best available” data has not been provid *657 ed for either of these Joint Notice Measures.

Unilateral Substitution of Measures

The parties agree that three of the originally agreed-upon outcome measures cannot reasonably be studied by defendants. After discovering this, defendants apparently unilaterally substituted those measures with three new measures, without securing the plaintiffs’ agreement as required by paragraphs 289 and 293. The substitutions, plaintiffs argue, caused defendants’ outcome measurements to be unduly focused on the health of infant/toddler and pregnant teenage class members. They note that there is only one indicator that gauges the health of teenagers who are not pregnant. Hence, argue plaintiffs, defendants’ indicators are not “diverse enough to measure the health of the entire EPSDT population, not merely factions of the population.” ¶ 289. The court need not evaluate the “diversity” of the various outcome measures selected by the parties, for the decree mandates that the parties select such indicators “together.” ¶ 289. Thus, both parties must “agree” to “change, add, or delete indicators.” ¶ 293. It is therefore held that defendants may not fulfill their obligations under the outcome measurements portions of the decree through the study of variables that were not agreed upon by both parties to this action.

CoiTective Action Plans

Having received defendants’ 1999 target goals and corrective action plans, plaintiffs have formulated their commentary and suggestions pursuant to paragraph 296. P.Ex. OM-19, OM-21. Plaintiffs’ primary complaint with many of defendants’ proposed plans is that they “do not aim high enough.” Plaintiffs’ Prehearing Motion to Enforce the Consent Decree. However, the decree gives the court no authority to evaluate the substance of defendants’ target goals and corrective action plans. Plaintiffs are correct in noting that under paragraph 294, “target goals” are to be set together by the parties, and may not be set unilaterally by defendants. Moreover, under paragraph 296, defendants may not “unreasonably reject” plaintiffs’ suggestions in response to defendants’ proposed plans. However, no evidence that defendants have unreasonably rejected plaintiffs’ suggestions was presented to the court. Both parties should recognize that the court will not intervene in the ongoing negotiations between the parties. That these processes were built into the mechanisms of the decree reflects the reality that the parties themselves are in the best position to reach an agreement regarding issues of methodology, and to set and revise target goals.

Timing

Defendants failed to provide their 1999 corrective action plan in January, as required by paragraph 296. More importantly, defendants have provided only one corrective action plan, although the decree mandates that they were to have been provided annually from 1996 through 1999. Defendants have also fallen significantly behind on their annual reports of the outcome data, also required annually, upon which these corrective action plans are to be based. Defendants’ tardiness in preparing their first corrective action plan means that defendants cannot possibly consider plaintiffs’ comments and then revise their plan in time to implement it in 1999, as envisioned by the annual corrective action plan process.

As noted above, reports for some agreed-upon indicators have not been completed, while reports for others are late or incomplete. 176 Therefore, defendants will *658 be held in violation of paragraph 295 for then' untimely furnishing of outcome data to plaintiffs, and in violation of paragraph 296 for their failure to complete annual corrective action plans based on the incomplete data that they possessed. However, it is also noted that defendants have voluntarily taken steps to institutionalize outcomes measurement in the Texas Health Steps Program, and have offered to extend reporting outcome measures beyond the time frames stated in the decree. TR 506, lines 21-24; D.Ex. 71. These ongoing efforts to accommodate the needs of the plaintiff class will be reflected in the order of enforcement issued pursuant to this memorandum opinion.

VIII.. Issue Eight: Training for Healthcare Providers

A. Findings of Fact

“To adequately serve recipients, providers must understand how EPSDT works. They must also understand EPSDT recipients’ needs.” ¶ 104. 177 The decree targets for improvement defendants’ “educational programs for professionals, so that healthcare providers [can] understand how Medicaid and EPSDT work.” Fairness Order at 31.

The evidence demonstrates that many healthcare providers who serve class members do not understand their cultural and economic situations, and that without this understanding, they cannot properly assist class members. 178 Defendants’ expert Mr. Millwee agreed that training about cultural sensitivity is one of the most important components of training for professionals who work with class members. TR 937, line 24 to 938, line 6. See also P.Ex. — 23. Class members’ parents also testified at length about specific instances in which healthcare providers had treated them harshly. In addition, defendants have received complaints about healthcare providers’ improper treatment of class members. P.Ex. CH-24, CH-2.

The evidence also reveals that it is extremely important for healthcare providers to be trained to work with class members and to understand how the Medicaid program functions:

It’s very important because they may be the primary contact that the family has .... [providers and staff] need to know about Medicaid, about the other services that Medicaid offers. Oftentimes from our experience all the physician’s office [knows] is, is Medicaid going to cover the visit? It would be most helpful if *659 there was staff in the office ... who could advise the family.

TR 43, line 14 to 44, line 2 (Testimony of Ms. McHan). Class members do not receive services when providers do not know that they exist, and have difficulty getting to a specialist when referring physicians do not know that transportation assistance is an option. 179 TR 45, lines 19-22.

B. Findings of Fact Regarding Violations of Decree

The decree orders, in clear and mandatory language, the creation of various types of training by defendants. Nonetheless, defendants have yet to complete even their Requests for Proposals (“RFPs”) that would enable them to contract with training groups for training at professional schools, ¶ 107, 180 EPSDT training associated with other “high caliber” training, ¶ 108, 181 training about mental health services, ¶¶ 112-14, 182 training about new issues, ¶ 117, 183 training about cultural sensitivities and the ■ realities of EPSDT recipients’ lives, ¶¶ 118-20, 184 and ongoing training for pharmacists. ¶¶ 124-130. 185 In other words, defendants are still in the beginning stages of projects that should have been fully implemented long ago.

Perhaps anticipating this court’s finding, defendants developed an RFP for healthcare provider training in December of 1999, and are awaiting plaintiffs’ responses. D.Ex. D-105. The Director of Texas Health Steps testified that this RFP would be published in the Texas Register within two months of the hearing, and that a contract would likely be awarded within six months. TR 923, lines 22-25. 186 While *660 defendants’ recent efforts to procure provider training services are applauded by the court, they do not change this court’s finding that because the training has not been adequately provided, defendants are in violation of the training provisions of the decree. 187 Therefore, it is found that defendants are in clear violation of the above-cited training provisions of the decree. PART TWO:

DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE

As is described in Part One, defendants opposed virtually all of plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact. Defendants also argued, in the alternative, that certain-provisions of the decree are unenforceable against them, even were the court to find violations of those provisions. Defendants challenge this court’s authority to enforce the decree on two bases. First, they argue that some of the rights on which decree paragraphs are based are not enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 188 Second, they argue that this court may not enforce certain provisions of the decree consistent with the protection afforded state defendants by the Eleventh Amendment. Each objection will be considered in turn.

Issue I: Enforcement of the Medicaid Statute

A. Law of the Case

Before addressing the merits of defendants’ first argument, the court pauses to note that this is not the first time that the court has addressed the issue of the enforcement of EPSDT provisions via § 1983 during the course of this litigation. In an order issued by this court on August 10, 1994, defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied except as to the state agency defendants. In that order, defendants’ arguments that the EPSDT provisions found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43) and 1396d(r) could not be enforced by plaintiffs in a § 1983 action were explicitly rejected. Specifically, in that order, this court held those provisions to be clearly and unambiguously enforceable through § 1983 under the Supreme Court’s framework first set out in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987), and further developed in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990), and Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992).

Under the “law of the case” doctrine, a court should not reopen issues decided in earlier stages of same litigation. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). However, because defendants re-urge their argument based on Supreme Court case law decided since 1994, the merits of defendant’s objection will be considered in brief. The discussion which follows disposes of defendant’s more recent challenge while fortifying the court’s prior holding that the above-cited provisions may be enforced by plaintiffs via § 1983.

B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Enforceable Rights

The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). However, in order to seek redress through § 1983, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, and not merely a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, *661 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989). Recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the test to determine when federal statutes confer rights that are actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997). Under that test, three distinct factors must be examined by a court when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 766. Second, the right must not be so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Id. at 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 766. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 510-11, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990). 189

Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable. However, the right will be unenforceable if Congress “specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). Congress may do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). 190

C. The EPSDT Provisions of the Medicaid Act

The starting point for determining whether a statute creates an enforceable private right of action is the statute itself. The Medicaid program is a cooperative program between the federal and state governments, providing medical services to qualified recipients. State participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary. If a state chooses to participate, however, it must comply with the requirements outlined in the Medicaid subchapter of the Social Security Act. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502, 110 S.Ct. 2510; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. A participating state must submit a plan for providing medical services to qualified recipients, which is approved and partially subsidized by the federal government. 'See 42 U.S.C. § 1396. The requirements that the state plan for medical assistance must satisfy are provided in § 1396a(a). In this case, plaintiffs seek to enforce provisions in a decree based on rights set *662 forth in the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment sections of the federal Medicaid Act; specifically, the provisions that mandate that a state’s Medicaid plan must provide for:

• “informing all' persons in the State who are under the age of 21 ... [and qualify for Medicaid] of the availability of early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment services as described in [§ 1396d(r)(5) ] and the need for age-appropriate immunizations against vaccine-preventable diseases” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A).

• “providing or arranging for the provision of such screening services in all cases where they are requested” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(B).

• “arranging for (directly or through referral to appropriate agencies, organizations or individuals) corrective treatment the need for which is disclosed by such child health screening services” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(C).

Plaintiffs also seek to enforce their rights to the following:

• medical check ups according to a properly prescribed schedule and at other intervals when needed, “which shall at a minimum include—

(i) a comprehensive health and developmental history (including assessment of both physical and mental health development),

(ii) a comprehensive unclothed physical exam,

(iii) appropriate immunizations according to age and health history,

(iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment appropriate for age and risk factors), and

(v)health education (including anticipatory guidance)” 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(l).

• dental services including check ups according to a properly prescribed schedule and treatment, “which shall at a minimum include relief of pain and infections, restoration of teeth, and maintenance of dental health” 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(3).

• the full range of healthcare services allowed by the federal Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5), including but not limited to case management. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(19); 1396n(g)(2).

The Wilder/Blessing framework may be easily applied to these provisions. First, the statutory sections are clearly intended to benefit plaintiffs and the class. “EPSDT ... is ... the nation’s largest preventive health program for children." H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 4213 (1989) (emphasis added). Congress also noted that as more children qualified for Medicaid because of federal expansions in the Medicaid program, “the EPSDT benefit will become even more important to the health status of children in this country.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that Congress was attempting to increase preventive healthcare services for minor Medicaid recipients. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(43).

The second prong of the Wilder/Blessing test asks whether the language of the statute is mandatory rather than precatory. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512, 110 S.Ct. 2510. In this case, the language is clearly mandatory: a state plan must provide for informing all eligible minors of the availability of the EPSDT services, provide for the providing or arranging of the services, and provide for the arranging for corrective treatment. 191 More concisely, state *663 plans “must ... provide for” informing all class members, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A); providing or arranging of medical and dental cheek ups with appropriate elements for all class members, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(B), 1396d(r)(l)(medical check ups), 1396d(r)(3)(dental check ups); and arranging all required treatment allowed by the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43)(C), 1396d(r)(5), including case management. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)(19), 1396n(g)(2).

Third, the statute is clear and concrete enough for judicial interpretation and enforcement. The EPSDT provisions are not, as defendants argue, vague or amorphous. Defendants base their argument on Blessing, in which plaintiffs sought to enforce a federal child support enforcement statute. 520 U.S. at 333-35, 117 S.Ct. 1353. The Court held that relief under § 1983 was not available, first, because plaintiffs had failed to articulate precisely which rights they sought to enforce: their efforts to enforce the entire child support scheme painted with “too broad a brush.” Id. at 342, 117 S.Ct. 1353. Unlike the plaintiffs in Blessing, plaintiffs in this case have isolated provisions within the Medicaid Act which are quite clear and concrete. Second, the Court in Blessing was reluctant to enforce a statute which required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “look to the aggregate services provided by the state, not to whether the needs of any particular person have been satisfied,” holding instead that a federal provision requiring that states be in “substantial compliance” with the federal child support law only tangentially bene-fitted the plaintiffs. 520 U.S. at 343, 117 S.Ct. 1353. This case, therefore, may be distinguished from Blessing in this key respect. Plaintiffs do not seek to enforce a “yardstick” or provision requiring “substantial compliance.” They seek to enforce decree provisions based on rights Congress has guaranteed to each and every Medicaid recipient under the age of 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43).

As defendants stress, the Blessing Court held that a sufficient staffing requirement could not be enforced via § 1983 because it gave no guidance as to what level of staffing would be sufficient. 502 U.S. at 345, 112 S.Ct. 719. However, contrary to defendants’ characterization of the EPSDT provisions as “standardless promulgation,” the provisions in fact go into great detail regarding the timing of specific services that must be provided. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r). The EPSDT portions of the Medicaid Act are, therefore, clearly more specific than those at issue in Blessing, and certainly more definite than the “reasonable access” provision of the Medicaid Act held enforceable in Wilder.

Moreover, as described below, many courts have already found the statutory *664 provisions at issue in this case to be enforceable via § 1983. In Bond v. Stanton, 655 F.2d 766, 767-69 (1981)(“Bond II”), 192 the State of Indiana did not effectively implement its EPSDT program, failing in particular with regard to its informing and screening components. 193 Section 1983 was available to enjoin this violation of indigent children’s federal rights. Bond II, 655 F.2d at 768; Bond I, 504 F.2d at 1247, 1251. In fact, the court in Bond I emphasized the mandatory nature of the EPSDT provisions at issue: “The mandatory obligation upon each participating state to aggressively notify, seek out and screen persons under 21 in order to detect health problems ... is made unambiguously clear” by the EPSDT statute. Bond I, 504 F.2d at 1250; see also Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F.Supp. 278, 303, 311-12 (D.D.C.1996); Wellington v. District of Columbia, 851 F.Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.1994); 194 Chappell v. Bradley, 834 F.Supp. 1030, 1035 (N.D.Ill.1993).

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Mitchell v. Johnston, 701 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir.1983) allowed a § 1983 challenge to the state’s reductions in EPSDT preventive and treatment dental services. Plaintiffs complained because Texas cut several dental services from its Medicaid program for children. But, since Congress clearly intended to “require participating states to provide eligible children with a comprehensive preventive dental program,” 701 F.2d at 348 (original emphasis), Texas children who qualified for Medicaid benefits could enforce the EPSDT dental provisions of the federal Medicaid Act through § 1983. Id. at 344, 346-51; see also Chappell, 834 F.Supp. at 1033-5.

Finally, numerous courts have held that the states’ duty to provide a broad scope of treatment services available to EPSDT eligible participants is also an enforceable obligation. That is, defendants must provide to class members any healthcare service that is permissible under the federal Medicaid Act, as long as the service is “necessary ... to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services....” 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5). For example, Pittman by Pope v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 998 F.2d 887, 889, 891-92 (11th Cir.1993), holds that 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) grants enforceable rights to Medicaid recipients under the age of 21 to the full, broad range of healthcare treatment prescribed by the statute. See also Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315 (7th Cir.1993)(liver-bowel transplant); Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 724-6 (4th Cir.1993)(heart transplant included in state’s “obligation to provide to children under the age of twenty-one all necessary services”); Hunter v. Chiles, 944 F.Supp. 914 (S.D.Fla.1996)(augmenta-tive communicative devices and services); Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F.Supp. 511 (W.D.Tex.1987)(Texas Medicaid program’s coverage of liver transplants for children and youth). 195

*665 To conclude, the above-cited EPSDT sections of Medicaid Act create specific rights — to information, to various detailed screening services, and to follow-up or corrective treatment — which may be enforced by plaintiffs under § 1983. This conclusion was reached in this court’s 1994 order but is reiterated today in light of the citation of more recent Supreme Court precedent and defendants’ renewed objections. 196 These federal enforceable rights form the bases for the decree provisions which plaintiffs now seek to enforce.

Issue II: Eleventh Amendment Objections

A. Defendants’ Objection

Defendants present a second challenge to the enforcement of various provisions of the decree based on this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In Local Number 93, International Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) (hereinafter Firefighters), the Supreme Court stated that a consent decree possesses a dual character or “hybrid nature” that reflects attributes of both a contract and a judicial decree. Consent decrees parallel contracts since “their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement of the parties.” Id. at 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063. The judicial aspect of a consent decree derives from the imprimatur of the court, which invests the decree with the integrity of the judiciary and signifies the court’s willingness to implement the solution of the parties.

It is a fundamental concept of federal jurisprudence that the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is an explicit jurisdictional limitation on the judicial power of the federal courts. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment so as to provide immunity to a state against suits in federal court by a citizen of that state. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Defendants therefore argue that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the enforcement against the State of Texas by this federal court of any decree provision which goes above and beyond what federal EPSDT law requires. This court’s holding otherwise, defendants argue, would result in an impermissible infringement on the rights of the State of Texas. 197 Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1252 (5th Cir.1987), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 44, 97 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987) (the only legitimate basis for federal court intervention consistent with the Eleventh *666 Amendment is the vindication of federal rights). 198

Notably, defendants do not argue that the decree was invalid as an agreement between the parties or improperly approved by this court. To the contrary, they note, correctly, that to sustain federal court jurisdiction to approve a consent decree against state officials, the remedies in the decree must only serve to: 1) resolve a dispute within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, 2) come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and 3) further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based. Firefighters, at 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063. Notably, a Fifth Circuit panel in Lelsz held that although, under Firefighters, a federal court may enter a consent decree providing broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial, the same court “must fall back on its inherent jurisdiction when it issues its own, different order enforcing ... the decree.” Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252. Thus, defendants rely heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s distinction in Lelsz between that which a federal court may approve in a consent decree and that which the same court may later enforce.

Defendants readily admit that some portions of the decree are directly related to the federal statutory scheme for the EPSDT program and to the rights created by Congress, and are therefore enforceable by this court. However, they argue that, in many instances, the decree creates binding obligations that are ungrounded in a federally protected right. For example, while defendants do not deny that class members have the right to certain health services, they argue that plaintiffs have not shown the relationship between outcome measure studies and the services to which plaintiffs are entitled. Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief at 5. Defendants argue that the court cannot enforce those provisions of the decree unrelated to a federally protected right because the entry of a consent decree does not expand the court’s inherent jurisdiction, which is cabined by the Eleventh Amendment with respect to state defendants. Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252. Plaintiffs respond that each provision of the decree that they seek to enforce meets the requirements in the Fifth Circuit for enforcement consistent with the Eleventh Amendment; each such provision, they argue, vindicates actionable federal rights.

B. Lelsz v. Kavanagh

Overview

Since defendants’ reading of Lelsz threatens to nullify entire sections of the decree to which they consented, a closer look at this cardinal case is warranted. Lelsz began when a class of mentally retarded patients residing in state institutions filed an action against officials of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation seeking treatment and rehabilitation in the “least restrictive” setting. The litigation resulted in a consent decree agreed to by the parties and approved by the district court. The district court then issued an order enforcing the consent decree requiring the state to furlough class members from institutional to *667 “community care” centers. On appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel held that the Eleventh Amendment rendered the district court without jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree because the only source of the right to community-based treatment existed in state law, basing its holding on Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (“Pennhurst II”). Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252-53.

The Holding: A Closer Look

The Lelsz panel summarized its holding as follows: “Whether the district court’s [order of enforcement] springs from legitimate enforcement of the [consent decree] or as a court-created remedy for its violation is ultimately of no moment if the relief ordered, in effect, requires state officials to comply with state law.” Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1247. This statement of the holding makes apparent that the proposition defendants derive from Lelsz — that a court may not enforce decree provisions if those provisions fall outside of the court’s “inherent jurisdiction”' — must be viewed in conjunction with the federalism which permeates Pennhurst II. Defendants rely on one sentence in the Lelsz decision that draws an apparent distinction between the authority of a court to approve a consent decree and its authority to enforce it. By isolating this single sentence, defendants obscure the context of the decision, which targets the enforcement of state laws against state actors in federal courts:

Appellees would draw support from [Firefighters ] for the proposition that “a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial.” This argument founders on several grounds. First, appellees interpret [Firefighters ] far too broadly. For one thing, that case emphasizes that “a consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” If the court has no jurisdiction, as a result of the application of the Eleventh Amendment through Pennhurst II, [.Firefighters ] does not apply. Additionally, [.Firefighters ] addressed the entry of a consent decree and held that the parties’ agreement could result in a decree whose terms would exceed the court’s remedial authority under a governing statute. It does not enlarge the court’s latitude to issue its own, different order enforcing or modifying the decree, for in that case we presume the court must fall back on its inherent jurisdiction. The Court in [Firefighters ] cited Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984) with approval of the proposition that in modifying a consent decree, the court may not act inconsistently with the underlying statute.

Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252 (citations omitted). The sentence in the above passage on which defendants rely, in which the panel holds that Firefighters does not “enlarge the court’s latitude to issue its own, different order enforcing or modifying the decree,” is sandwiched between two important keys to its interpretation. First, the Lelsz panel began its task of distinguishing Firefighters by noting that if a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because of Pennhurst II, the Firefighters standard for the entry of decrees does not apply. From this beginning statement, it is apparent that the Lelsz panel was primarily concerned with the inability of a federal court to enforce state law against state defendants. Next to the panel’s strong emphasis on the Eleventh Amendment implications of enforcing provisions built on state law, the panel’s subsequent distinction between the approval of and the enforcement of a decree appears as little more than an afterthought. The remainder of the decision in Lelsz, and its heavy reliance on Pennhurst II, lend further support to the interpretation that the approval/enforcement distinction is mere dicta— or, at the very least, not at all central to *668 the discussion of the state law issues with which the panel was confronted.

The sentence at the close of this passage similarly cabins the meaning of the words on which defendants rely. The phrase, “in modifying a consent decree, the court may not act inconsistently with the underlying statute,” again suggests that the Lelsz panel was primarily concerned not with the approval/enforcement distinction, but with a district court’s ordering a remedy “inconsistent” with underlying federal law. Like the Lelsz panel’s emphasis on Penn-hurst II and state law, the panel’s intent to limit clearly the scope of the power of the district court is a theme in the opinion which all but eclipses the brief drawing of a distinction between the approval and enforcement of a consent decree: “If, as appellees argue, a federal court may take almost any action against a state to enforce a consent decree so long as it is ‘consistent with’ the ‘spirit’ of the applicable constitutional law and the decree itself, there is no limitation on the scope of the court’s power. Lack of restraint on an organ of government (even the judiciary) is the antithesis of law.” Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1253. Upon closer examination, however, the Lelsz panel’s vision of judicial restraint is nothing more than the rule in Armour that a court may not, in an order enforcing a decree, go further than the “four corners” of the decree; looking to its “spirit” is impermissible. Amour, 402 U.S. at 674, 91 S.Ct. 1752. This principle is neither derived from nor furthered by the panel’s distinction between the approval of and the enforcement of a decree. Throughout the opinion, this theme is intertwined with the court’s focus on Penn-hurst II, without additional comment on the distinction upon which defendants now base their response.

The Narrowing of Lelsz

This court is not the first to view Lelsz in the shadow and wake of Pennhurst II. The dissent from the Fifth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Lelsz makes clear that the primary issue in the case was whether Pennhurst II “addresses [or] changes prior law on the jurisdiction of federal courts to order remedies for federal law violations” or “address[es] federal court jurisdiction to approve an agreed remedy for mixed violations of federal and state law.” Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 815 F.2d 1034, 1036 (5th Cir.1987). Further, in Ibarra v. Texas Employment Commission, 823 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit itself characterized the Lelsz panel as having “applied Pennhurst to vacate a portion of a district court order enforcing a consent decree when the relief provided by that part of the decree was grounded solely in state law.” 823 F.2d at 876-77 (citing Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1255). The Ibarra court held:

Assuming without deciding that Penn-hurst would extend to a federal court order approving a consent decree, we conclude that Pennhurst does not apply to the present case because the consent decree is not based on state law.... The concerns about state sovereignty and the lack of any federal interests that were critical to Pennhurst are not appropriate when, as in this case, the issue is one of interpreting federal law.

Ibarra, 823 F.2d at 877 (citing Lelsz, 815 F.2d at 1036).

Along these same lines, Ibarra has since been interpreted by other courts as limiting Lelsz to the enforcement of consent decrees based on state law. In Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241 (2nd Cir.1989), the Second Circuit noted that “the Fifth Circuit has limited [Lelsz ] to decrees based solely on state law.” 871 F.2d at 244, n. 3 (citing Lelsz, 824 F.2d at 373; Ibarra, 823 F.2d at 876-77). Similarly, in Duran v. Carruthers, 678 F.Supp. 839, 850-51 (D.N.M.1988), it was held that “any implication that the Lelsz holding went beyond an application of Pennhurst to a consent decree based solely on state law is eliminated dispositively by Ibarra.” See also Wyatt v. Rogers, 985 F.Supp. 1356, 1432, n. 342 (N.D.Ala.1997) (rejecting argument based on Lelsz that court had *669 limited jurisdiction to enforce consent decree as inapposite in a case not involving a decree based on state law); United States v. State of Michigan, 62 F.3d 1418, 1995 WL 469430 (6th Cir.1995).

Despite the pronouncements of these courts, defendants rely on Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1995) (per cu-riam), as evidence of the continuing vitality of Lelsz beyond its application to a consent decree based on state law. In Saahir, an inmate filed a motion for civil contempt against state prison officials, alleging that the officials had violated a court-approved consent decree by confiscating and not returning his nonreligious tapes. The language of the decree was broad enough to cover all tapes, though Saahir had brought the suit in an effort to vindicate his First Amendment right to practice religion. The Fifth Circuit panel, citing Lelsz, held that the enforcement of the provision allowing Saahir to possess nonreligious tapes was not required by any federal or constitutional law, and that the federal court therefore had no jurisdiction to enforce the provision. Said the panel:

Here, enforcing the provision that allows Saahir the non-religious tapes would not require the federal court to enforce state law against the State, as there is no state law giving prisoners the right to listen to musical tapes. Thus, Penn-hurst’s central concern of having “a federal court instruct [ ] state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law,” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. at 911, is not implicated here. Nonetheless, enforcing the provision would not be required by any federal or constitutional law, as we fail to discern any First Amendment protections except as to the religious tapes. Because “the only legitimate basis for federal court intervention, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment is the vindication of federal rights,” Lelsz, 807 F.2d at 1252, the federal courts have no jurisdiction to enforce the provision as it relates to the nonreligious tapes. Although the State of Texas has evidently not legislated on this particular issue, whether a prisoner has a right to listen to musical tapes is an issue that falls in the area of state governance and not that of the federal government. “If a federal court remedy unfounded in federal law intrudes into the governance of matters otherwise presided over by the states, no federal right has been vindicated.” Id.

Saahir, 47 F.3d at 761. Despite defendants’ arguments to the contrary, Saahir is easily distinguished from the ease at hand. First, whether plaintiffs are entitled to specific services under the federal EPSDT statute is not an “issue that falls in the area of state governance and not that of the federal government.” Instead, the decree provisions plaintiffs seek to enforce are clearly related to the federal EPSDT program in a way that nonreligious tapes are not linked to the First Amendment right to practice one’s religion. Second, in Saahir, poor drafting led to the inclusion of a decree provision that, under the court’s broad interpretation, bore no relation to federal law. There has been no mistaken inclusion of paragraphs unrelated to the health of the plaintiff class and the goals of the federal EPSDT program in this case. Third, the distinction in Lelsz between what a court may approve and what may be enforced was not, in the view of this court, central to the Saahir court’s decision, because the provision at issue would not have passed the Firefighters test for approval had it been read at the time of entry to include nonreligious tapes. That is, the court might just have easily held, without reliance on Lelsz, that the approval of a provision arguably broad enough to cover non-religious tapes was invalidly entered, for it neither came “within the general scope of the ease made by the pleadings” nor “further[ed] the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525, 106 S.Ct. 3063. These factors suggest that one should read Saahir as somewhat of an outlier case (confined to its *670 rather odd set of facts) and caution against viewing the case as an extension or broadening of Lelsz. For these reasons, it is held that the restrictive language of Lelsz, appropriately narrowed to situations involving the enforcement of state law provisions by the several above-cited authorities, should not apply here, despite its apparent resurgence in Saahir. 199

An Untenable Distinction?

Finally, it is noted that, while the distinction between a federal court’s jurisdiction to approve of terms in a decree and its jurisdiction to enforce those provisions persists in the Fifth Circuit (albeit in rare instances and in narrow form), more than one judicial mind has found the distinction utterly indefensible. For example, the Second Circuit held in Kozlowski, supra, that “the Firefighters opinion is consistent with the dictates of the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and the [Lelsz} distinction is untenable. If a federal court can validly enter a consent decree, it can surely enforce that decree.” 871 F.2d at 244. The Tenth and Seventh Circuits have likewise adopted this standard. Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir.1989); Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955 (7th Cir.1996). Similarly, the dissenters from the Fifth Circuit’s denial of rehearing of Lelsz en banc agreed with the Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuits in this regard:

There can be no doubt that a federal court, to remedy federal violations, may require state officers to adopt programs that, absent the federal violations, were not guaranteed to the plaintiffs by the Constitution or federal statute. The remedial program need only be tailored to cure the condition that offends federal law. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.1974). If the parties do not choose to proceed to trial, the court may, with their agreement, enter a consent decree that provides relief greater than the court might have awarded after trial. Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986). The panel opinion is inconsistent with that clearly established law.

815 F.2d at 1037 (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc by Reavley, Circuit Judge, with whom Clark, Chief Judge, Rubin, Politz, Randall, Johnson, and Williams joined). 200 In addition, it is noted notes that the principles of comity and federalism are furthered when state defendants draft their own documents setting out the means by which they will come into compliance with federal law. To the ex *671 tent such documents are later held unenforceable by federal courts, the incentives for plaintiffs to enter into such voluntary agreements with defendants are lessened if not wholly removed.

Indeed, the positive policy implications of limiting this distinction are obvious: “Having entered into the consent decree rather than bringing the dispute ... to trial, [the defendant] cannot now evade an integral portion of that decree on the ground that it was not directly tied to a federal claim.” Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 245 (quoting Kozlowski, 711 F.Supp. 83, 87 (S.D.N.Y.1988)). Such an outcome would detract from the integrity of the court by allowing state defendants to avoid bargained-for obligations while receiving the benefit of escaping litigation and potential liability. The parties’ intent would also be ignored in such a scheme, and the finality of parties’ voluntary agreements significantly undermined. Obviously, such decree nullification would leave little incentive for future parties to enter into voluntary agreements, which avoid often protracted and time-consuming litigation. 201 The Supreme Court has since reaffirmed this logic in the context of the modification of consent decrees based on constitutional claims:

To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relit-igation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation. [Such a holding] “would necessarily imply that the only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent decree was that of ultimately achieving minimal constitutional prison standards.... Substantively, this would do violence to the obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the state were not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements.”

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389-90, 112 S.Ct. 748 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir.1991)).

In sum, the distinction in Lelsz between the approval of and enforcement of decree provisions has been confined by several authorities to situations involving consent decrees based on state law. Moreover, the distinction as it was originally drawn had little repercussion for the actual holding or logic in Lelsz, and was not necessary to the holding in Saahir. Because of the narrowing of the Lelsz distinction discussed above, defendants’ invitation to extend the distinction to this case, in which the decree provisions at issue bear a clear relationship to federal law is declined. Furthermore, the reasoning of the dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc in Lelsz, the subsequent explicit rejection of the Lelsz distinction by three Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the strong policy-based arguments briefly outlined above, all caution against the extension of the Lelsz distinction to this matter.

C. Application

In accordance with the above analysis, the Firefighters test will be applied to the decree provisions sought to be enforced by plaintiffs. 202 As was held above in Part *672 Two, Section I, plaintiffs possess rights under the EPSDT statute that are enforceable through § 1983. These rights include the right to be informed of the program, the right to the provision of or arrangement for the provision of screening services, and the right to the arrangement for corrective treatment. Plaintiffs also possess rights to regular medical and dental checkups, and rights to the full range of healthcare services allowed by the federal Medicaid statute, including but not limited to case management. After a careful and thorough review of the decree provisions sought to be enforced by plaintiffs, it is found that each provision falls squarely within the parameters outlined in Firefighters, and therefore may be enforced against defendants. Because the provisions sought to be enforced are many, see Part One, supra, the court’s application of the Firefighters standard will not be spelled out in detail with respect to every provision. Instead, each of defendant’s objections to the enforcement of various provisions will be considered individually. 203 Only those objections to paragraphs which defendants were found in Part One to have violated will be given attention below. Paragraphs which defendants are found to have violated in Part One but are not discussed below in relation to defendants’ objections are found by the court to be enforceable under the application of this test.

Enforcement of Provisions Guaranteeing Services

Outreach

Defendants challenge, first, this court’s ability to enforce the outreach pro *673 visions of the decree, discussed at length in Part One, Section I. Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ reliance on the term “effective,” as that term appears in the decree, contradicts HCFA’s definition of the term, therefore materially altering the requirements of federal law. Specifically, defendants point to 42 C.F.R. § 441.56(a), which states that a state agency must provide for a combination of written and oral methods “designed to inform effectively.” Defen-' dants argue that this regulation should guide the court in ascertaining the parameters of the duty to conduct outreach under federal law. “The duty to effectively inform all persons in the state is a much greater burden,” defendants note, “than is the duty to provide a method designed to effectively inform.” Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief at 24. The court is in agreement with defendants that, in fact, the duty to inform all eligible participants for the program is a much greater task than is the duty to design a method to do so. However, the duty under federal law is unequivocally the duty to “inform[] all persons” eligible for EPSDT about their rights to services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(A). However, defendants’ argument fails for two reasons. First, as was explained in Part One, Section I, the isolated use of the word “effective” in a single regulation is not particularly probative of the parties’ intended meaning of the term “effective” as used in the decree. This is made obvious by the parties’ repeated use of the word in conjunction with defendants’ outreach duties without the use of the modifying phrase “designed to.”

Second, the court having interpreted the phrase “effectively inform” within the four corners of the decree in Part One, Section 1(C), the only remaining question is, may the court enforce the provision as it has been interpreted? To answer that question, the court looks not to an isolated regulation involving one aspect of the duty to inform, but instead to the federal statute itself, which unequivocally requires defendants to “inform [ ] all persons” eligible for EPSDT about their rights to services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(48)(A). Decree provisions which obligate defendants to inform “effectively,” as this court has interpreted the term, clearly serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s jurisdiction, come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and further the objectives of this statutory provision. Put simply, if plaintiffs have an enforceable right to be informed, decree provisions requiring defendants to inform them effectively clearly vindicate that right. Therefore, paragraphs 32 204 and 52 of the decree are held to be enforceable.

Services

Defendants next object to the enforcement of the decree’s provisions concerning the provision of medical and dental 205 checkups and case management. With respect to these provisions, defendants argue that federal law merely re *674 quires the provision of these services upon request. This objection is discussed at length in Part One, Section II of this Memorandum Opinion, where it is held that the “request” language appearing in the federal EPSDT statute must be read to require the provision of services only upon requests made by those who have first been informed. It is found that the decree provisions requiring the provision of these services serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s jurisdiction, come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based. Indeed, these provisions are no more than restatements of the requirements of federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43). More specifically, this court’s interpretation of those provisions — namely, that defendants may be held in violation of decree requirements regarding the provision of services upon request where they have failed to provide class members with the information necessary to make such requests— may be enforced as entirely consistent with the history, text, and structure of the federal EPSDT statute. See Part One, Section II, supra. Therefore, paragraphs 2, 3, 212, 206 and 143 are held to be enforceable by this court. Defendants launch a similar objection to the enforcement of the decree’s case management provisions. For the reasons given above, paragraphs 248 and 264 207 are also held to be enforceable by the court.

Managed Care

Defendants object to the enforcement of decree provisions obligating defendants to provide checkups and other services to class members who are enrolled in managed care. Defendants note that 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 gives states the option to use managed care and to require an individual who is eligible for medical assistance under a state plan to enroll with a managed care entity as a condition of receiving assistance. That section also requires managed care organizations (MCOs) to provide assurances to the state and to the Secretary that the appropriate range of services and access to preventive and primary care services for the population enrolled in the service area is being offered. The provision also requires that MCOs maintain a sufficient number, mix and geographic distribution of providers of services. Defendants stress that under § 1396u-2, each MCO is required to “offer” services, and is not expressly required to assure the receipt of such services. Defendants appear to argue that this should affect the court’s ability to enforce the managed care provisions of the decree, discussed at length, supra, at Part One, Section IV.

This argument wholly misses the mark. Section 1396u-2 permits the states to utilize managed care to meet their obligations under the federal EPSDT statute; it does not free them from those obligations, or limit their responsibilities to managed care enrollees. Paragraphs 190 and 192 of the decree merely extend defendants’ obligations under the EPSDT statute to class members enrolled in managed care, giving special emphasis to their entitlements in light of the potential problems posed by the implementation of managed care. 208 *675 Moreover, the findings of fact in relation to this subgroup, see Part One, Section IY(B), clearly demonstrate that special provisions underlining defendants’ obligations to managed care enrollees are necessary to ensure defendant’s compliance with 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(43). In sum, paragraphs 190 and 192 do not “go beyond” § 1396u-2, as defendants argue; they merely dictate that defendants must comply with federal EPSDT law with respect to managed care enrollees. Thus, these paragraphs quite obviously serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s jurisdiction, come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based. Paragraphs 190 and 192 are therefore held to be enforceable by the court.

Along these same lines, defendants argue that because 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(c)(1)(A)(i) requires a state implementing managed care to develop and implement access standards, paragraphs 190 and 192 go beyond the requirements of federal law. However, as stated above, the managed care paragraphs go no further than to assure defendants’ compliance with the EPSDT statute, which requires them to inform and provide services to all members of the EPSDT population, including those in managed care. Additional federal provisions relating to the implementation of managed care do not limit defendants’ duties under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43). Such provisions further regulate the implementation of managed care.

Defendants also maintain that an additional provision of paragraph 192, which requires defendants to assure that managed care organizations have the capacity to accelerate services to the children of migrant farmworkers to accommodate their special circumstances, has no basis in federal law. It is recognized that the words “farmworkers” and “acceleration” do not appear in the federal EPSDT statute or accompanying regulations. However, as Part One, Section IV(D) aptly demonstrates, this subclass of EPSDT eligible participants do not receive the information or services to which they are entitled without such acceleration. Defendants have a duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1396 to inform “all” EPSDT eligible participants about the program and to provide services to those who request them after having been informed. See Part One, Section 11(C). Paragraph 192 requires acceleration because it is a necessary step in fulfilling the duty to inform and serve a population that migrates quickly and is unreachable for long durations of time. See Part One, Section IV(D). This requirement, which clearly vindicates the rights of this subset of the class, serves to resolve a dispute within the court’s jurisdiction, comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and furthers the objectives of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43). Therefore, the farmworker acceleration requirement in paragraph 192 will be enforced by the court.

Enforcement of Provisions Requiring Reporting of Data and Information

Reporting

Defendants make numerous objections to the various decree paragraphs requiring the furnishing of information to plaintiffs.

Defendants first object that the decree’s requirement (in paragraphs 284 and 191) that defendants report the number of eligible participants who have received checkups is unenforceable because the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) does not so require. HCFA Form 416, which is used by HCFA to assess the effectiveness of state EPSDT *676 programs, requires states to report only the number of eligible participants receiving any dental service, the number of eligible participants receiving preventive dental services, and the number of eligible participants receiving dental treatments. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have “made no showing that their claim regarding the reported percentages of dental checkups as compared to medical checkups is at all related to a federally protected right to the receipt of dental services upon request.” Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief at 17. The court is well aware that HCFA does not require the reporting of the receipt of checkups. However, it is held that the decree’s reporting requirements quite clearly served to resolve a dispute within the court’s jurisdiction and come within the general scope of this case. It is further held that the collection of data furthers the objectives of the EPSDT statute, which is to improve the health of poor children. That objective cannot be accomplished without constant and rigorous review of the program’s accomplishments and shortcomings. Therefore, paragraph 284 will be enforced by this court.

A similar conclusion must be reached with regard to defendants’ challenge to the decree’s reporting requirements concerning managed care enrollees. Although HCFA does not require the data required by the decree about the receipt of care by eligible participants enrolled in managed care, it is unquestionable that the Firefighters standard has been met with regard to this reporting provision. Therefore, paragraph 191 will be enforced by this court.

Defendants next object to the reporting requirements for teens and for abused and neglected class members, asserting that neither federal law nor regulations impose any distinct screening performance standards on the state with respect to any sub-groups in the EPSDT population. Again, while HCFA may not require such detailed reporting, reporting on defendants’ compliance with federal law with respect to these at-risk subgroups clearly served to resolve a dispute within the court’s jurisdiction, comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and furthers the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based. Therefore, paragraph 212 will be enforced by the court.

Additionally, the decree requires defendants to provide plaintiffs with the number of class members who get medical or dental checkups in each county or cluster of sparsely populated counties. This requirement also clearly passes the Firefighters test, as 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l) requires that each state’s plan provide that the EPSDT program be in effect in all political subdivisions of the state. Given this provision, the “statewideness” reporting provisions of the decree in paragraphs 273 through 281 are held to be enforceable.

Outcome Measures and Corrective Action Plans

Defendants next object to the decree’s requirement that they provide certain outcome measures. See Part One, Section VIL The agreed-upon outcome measures, which assess the health of the EPSDT population, include immunization rates among subpopulations of the class, lead poisoning levels among class members, asthma hospitalization rates, and the mental health of the population. Again, these are not explicitly required by federal law. However, these indicators of the health of the plaintiff class were created by the parties to gauge the success of the EPSDT program and the widespread receipt of particular services. Therefore, like the other reporting requirements discussed above, the outcome measures clearly fall within the scope of this case, and further the objective of the EPSDT program by informing both parties as to the recipients’ health needs and progress. Paragraphs 289, 293, 295, and 296 are therefore enforceable by the court.

Next, defendants challenge the requirement that they create corrective action *677 plans to address the needs of “lagging” counties. See Part One, Section III. Defendants assert that they need not “have every class member with a need serviced,” as this would be “impossible.” Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief at 20. The court is in agreement with this statement, and has found defendants in violation not for failing to service every child with a health need, but for failing to meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43), based on the overwhelming evidence cited in Part One. The requirement that defendants address the needs of “lagging” counties, however, is supported not only by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43), which requires the informing and subsequent servicing upon request of “all” eligible participants, but also by § 1396a(a)(l), which imposes a “statewideness” requirement upon participating states. It is found that the requirement that defendants create corrective action plans to address their failures in regions where the performance of the EPSDT program is particularly dismal is enforceable by plaintiffs. The provision clearly vindicates the rights of plaintiffs to receive services to which they are entitled and passes the Firefighters test. The corrective action requirements in paragraphs 273 through 281 are therefore enforceable by the court. 209

Enforcement of Training and Toll-free Line Provisions

The decree’s training provisions— both those relating to the training of managed care personnel and those covering the training of providers and others outside of the managed care system — will also be held enforceable by plaintiffs. Training, defendants correctly argue, is not a requirement of federal law. However, both common sense and plaintiffs’ evidence aptly demonstrate the causal connection between the increased knowledge of providers and other personnel and the access to and receipt of services by the plaintiff class. Training personnel clearly vindicates the rights of the plaintiffs to information and services. Only those who are trained can impart correct knowledge, and only with knowledge may plaintiffs make requests. Moreover, the provisions most certainly served to resolve this dispute, and they come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings. Finally, training providers about EPSDT clearly furthers the objectives of the EPSDT statute. For these reasons, the court may enforce paragraphs 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 117-120,124-130, and 194.

Defendants also object to the toll-free line provisions of the decree, noting correctly that no such lines are required by federal law or regulation. However, defendants are under a clear statutory mandate to “provide or arrange for” services upon request. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. For program eligible participants, who are often without home phones or transportation, the toll-free lines are crucial to the coordination of and receipt of healthcare. See Part One, Section V(A). The requirement that defendants answer toll-free lines promptly and helpfully directly vindicates the rights of plaintiffs to information, to receive services “upon requests” (which are most frequently made by class members who cannot afford to pay a toll), and to have services “provided” and “arranged for.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43). It is further found that the requirement serves to resolve this dispute, and comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings. Last, it is found that because the toll-free lines function as the defendants’ primary means of fulfilling their duty to provide or arrange services, para *678 graph 247 unequivocally furthers the objectives of the EPSDT statute. Paragraph 247 will therefore be enforced by the court.

Conclusion

The court compliments both parties in their diligent efforts to present abundant evidence to the court regarding the merits of this motion to enforce the decree, and further compliments the efforts of both parties to meet the health needs of disadvantaged children in this state.

Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, defendants are hereby

FOUND to have violated certain provisions of this court’s decree in this matter, as detailed in Part One of this Memorandum Opinion. It is further

FOUND that the decree is enforceable to the extent outlined above, in Part Two of this Memorandum Opinion.

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