The Labor Relations Toolkit

Labor and Employment > Labor Relations | Published 4 October 2024 - Updated 2 August 2026 | UpLaw - uplaw.us

In brief. The National Labor Relations Act protects concerted activity, not unions — which is why the employer most likely to violate it is one that has never seen a union card and believes the statute does not apply to it. And because Board law turns over with the Board's composition, the operative rule on work rules, joint employment, and recognition may be different from the one in the last memo you read.

Keywords: § 7, § 8(a)(1), Stericycle, supervisor, Cemex, Gissel, Wright Line, mandatory subjects, Katz, information requests, Mackay, § 8(b)(4), Steelworkers Trilogy, successorship, Weingarten

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How This Toolkit Is Organized

Ten pillars, each giving the doctrine, the anchors, the trap and its second order consequence, and where to go deeper. Then the authority shelf, then two appendices: a mandatory-versus-permissive subject matrix and an unfair labor practice exposure triage sheet.

The narrative entry point is Section 7 Rights in a Non-Union Workplace: Why Ordinary Handbook Rules Get Struck Down. The doctrinal treatment is Labor Relations Under the NLRA: A Comprehensive Guide to Organizing, Bargaining, and Unfair Labor Practices. The operational sequence is Responding to a Union Organizing Campaign: A Practical Checklist.

A standing caution. More than most fields, this one moves with the composition of the agency. Cemex, Stericycle, American Steel Construction, the captive-audience rule, and the joint-employer standard have each reversed prior precedent recently, and several remain in litigation. Verify the current rule before advising.

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Pillar 1 — Coverage: Employee, Supervisor, Independent Contractor

Doctrine. The Act protects employees, excludes supervisors, managerial and confidential employees, independent contractors, agricultural laborers, domestic workers, and those covered by the Railway Labor Act — and the classification decides whether conduct is protected or whether a statement binds the employer.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 152 — § 152(3) (employee), § 152(11) (supervisor: authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, discipline, responsibly direct, or adjust grievances, using independent judgment). NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (burden of proving supervisory status is on the party asserting it). NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994). NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (managerial exclusion). NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). Common-law agency test for independent contractors.

Trap. Treating job title as the supervisory test. Leads, coordinators, and working foremen are analyzed on function and independent judgment, and the misclassification cuts both ways — a genuine supervisor left in the unit is a voter who should not be there, and a non-supervisor treated as management makes statements that become employer unfair labor practices.

Trap, second order. The joint employer standard, which determines whether a company bargains with, and is liable for the conduct toward, workers on another entity's payroll. It has been revised repeatedly and is in active litigation. Staffing, franchise, and contractor arrangements should be structured against the current standard and re-examined when it changes — because the exposure attaches to control the company may already have and never priced.

Go deeper: Guide Part I

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Pillar 2 — Section 7 and Protected Concerted Activity

Doctrine. Employees have the right to self-organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection — and to refrain from all of it. The right belongs to employees in union and non-union workplaces alike.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 157. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (unorganized employees walking out over cold conditions were protected; no union required). Meyers Industries (individual action is concerted where undertaken with or on the authority of other employees, or where it seeks to initiate or induce group action). Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (mutual aid or protection reaches matters beyond the immediate employment relationship). NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (Interboro doctrine — invoking a collective agreement right is concerted).

Trap. The belief that a non-union employer is outside the Act. It is not, and the most common violations — an overbroad confidentiality rule, a pay-secrecy policy, discipline for a group complaint about scheduling — occur in workplaces that have never seen an organizer.

Trap, second order. Loss of protection. Concerted activity loses protection if it is unlawful, violent, in breach of a no-strike clause, disloyal in the Jefferson Standard sense, or so opprobrious as to forfeit the Act's shield. The standard for evaluating employee outbursts has shifted between a setting-specific approach and the Wright Line framework depending on Board composition — which means the same profane outburst at a picket line may or may not be protected depending on when it happened. Verify the current standard before disciplining.

Go deeper: Guide Part II · Article

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Pillar 3 — Section 8(a)(1) and Work Rules

Doctrine. It is an unfair labor practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights — assessed objectively, without regard to employer motive or actual effect.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); § 158(c) (employer free speech: views, argument, or opinion containing no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit). Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023) — a facially neutral rule is presumptively unlawful if a reasonable employee economically dependent on the employer could interpret it to restrict § 7 activity; the employer may rebut only by proving a legitimate and substantial business interest that cannot be advanced by a more narrowly tailored rule. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (predictions must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact). NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964) (conferral of benefits during a campaign — "the fist inside the velvet glove").

Trap. Stericycle reads rules from the perspective of an employee who needs the job, and it discounts the employer's contrary reasonable reading. Rules on civility, confidentiality, recording, media contact, social media, and non-disparagement written under the prior standard are now presumptively unlawful, and maintaining them is itself a violation — no discipline required.

Trap, second order. Exchange Parts in reverse. An employer that withholds a scheduled increase or benefit because of a campaign violates the Act just as surely as one that grants a new one to discourage support. The only safe course is to proceed exactly as planned and to be able to document that the plan predated the campaign — which is a reason to memorialize compensation decisions with dates as a matter of routine.

Go deeper: Guide Part III · Checklist Phases 1, 3–4

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Pillar 4 — Organizing, Elections, and Recognition

Doctrine. Representation is established by Board election or by recognition; a union with majority support may demand recognition, and the employer must recognize or promptly petition.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 159; 29 C.F.R. Part 102 Subpart C (election procedures). Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC, 372 NLRB No. 130 (2023) — on a demand for recognition, the employer must recognize or promptly file an RM petition; if it commits an unfair labor practice requiring the election to be set aside, the Board may dismiss the petition and issue a bargaining order. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) (bargaining orders for pervasive misconduct). American Steel Construction, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 23 (2022) (overwhelming community of interest required to enlarge a petitioned-for unit). Excelsior Underwear Inc. and the modern voter-list requirements. Tri-County Medical Center (off-duty access). Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (non-employee organizer access).

Trap. Ignoring a recognition demand. Under Cemex, doing neither — not recognizing and not petitioning — is itself unlawful, and a serious violation during the critical period can produce an order to bargain with a union that never won an election. The old strategy of committing violations to buy a rerun has inverted.

Trap, second order. The Statement of Position. Under the current election rules the pre-election period is compressed, and contentions on unit scope, supervisory status, and eligibility not raised in the Statement of Position are generally waived. An employer that identifies its misclassified leads three weeks later has no remedy.

Go deeper: Guide Part IV · Checklist Phases 6–8

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Pillar 5 — Section 8(a)(3) and Motive

Doctrine. Discrimination in regard to hire, tenure, or terms of employment to encourage or discourage union membership is unlawful, and mixed-motive cases run through a burden-shifting framework.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) — the General Counsel shows protected activity, employer knowledge, and animus; the burden then shifts to the employer to prove it would have taken the same action regardless. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) (inherently destructive conduct; motive may be inferred). Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (an employer may close entirely, but a partial closing to chill unionism elsewhere is unlawful).

Trap. The employer's affirmative defense is not "we had a good reason." It is that the employer would have taken the identical action absent the protected activity — proved by consistent prior practice with comparators. An employer that has tolerated the same conduct from other employees for years cannot meet it.

Trap, second order. Timing and shifting explanations. Discipline that follows protected activity closely, and an explanation that changes between the termination meeting, the position statement, and the hearing, supply animus and pretext without any direct evidence. The defense is built by documenting the decision and its reasons contemporaneously — before anyone knows a charge is coming.

Go deeper: Guide Part V

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Pillar 6 — The Duty to Bargain

Doctrine. Both parties must meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment — without any obligation to agree or to make a concession.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), § 158(b)(3), and § 158(d) (definition of the obligation). NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (unilateral change to a mandatory subject is a per se violation). NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (mandatory, permissive, and illegal subjects; insistence to impasse on a permissive subject is unlawful). First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (a decision to close part of a business for economic reasons is not a mandatory subject; effects bargaining is required). Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (subcontracting unit work). Dubuque Packing (relocation framework).

Trap. The unilateral change, which is the most common post-certification violation and almost never intentional. Changing a shift pattern, an attendance policy, a health plan, or a bonus formula — the way the employer always has — violates § 8(a)(5) with a make-whole remedy. Once a union is certified, every change to a mandatory subject runs through bargaining.

Trap, second order. Impasse, which is narrower than employers assume. It requires a genuine deadlock after good-faith bargaining on the whole, and it dissolves on any change in circumstances — a new proposal, new information, the passage of time, or a shift in position. An employer that implements on a mistaken impasse finding has committed the same per se violation with a larger remedy, and the assessment is made in hindsight by the Board.

Go deeper: Guide Part VI · Appendix A below

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Pillar 7 — Information Requests

Doctrine. A party must furnish information relevant and necessary to the other's performance of its bargaining and contract-administration duties.

Anchors. NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (an inability-to-pay claim opens the books). NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) (a discovery-type relevance standard; the duty extends to grievance processing). Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (confidentiality interests must be accommodated, not used as a flat refusal).

Trap. The distinction between presumptively relevant unit information — wages, hours, job classifications, benefits, seniority for bargaining-unit employees, which must simply be produced — and non-unit information, where the union must demonstrate relevance. Employers refuse the first category and produce the second, exactly backward.

Trap, second order. Confidentiality as a refusal. Detroit Edison requires the party asserting confidentiality to bargain over an accommodation — redaction, aggregation, a protective agreement, on-site review. A flat refusal is a violation even where the confidentiality interest is genuine, and the delay in producing is itself remediable.

Go deeper: Guide Part VII

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Pillar 8 — Economic Weapons

Doctrine. Employees may strike and picket; employers may lock out and continue operating; and both are constrained by statute and by the contract.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (right to strike). NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (economic strikers may be permanently replaced). Laidlaw Corp. and NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (reinstatement rights of economic strikers on a preferential recall list). Unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement upon unconditional offer to return, displacing replacements. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (bargaining lockouts lawful). § 158(b)(4) (secondary boycotts); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (1964); DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (peaceful handbilling protected). § 158(b)(7) (recognitional picketing); § 158(g) (health care institution notice). Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (injunction against a strike over an arbitrable dispute).

Trap. The economic versus unfair labor practice strike classification, which determines whether strikers can be permanently replaced. It is not fixed at the outset — an economic strike converts to a ULP strike if the employer's unfair labor practices prolong it, and every replacement hired after conversion becomes a reinstatement obligation. Employers that commit violations during a strike frequently convert it without realizing.

Trap, second order. "Permanent replacement" is a term of art that misleads. Replaced economic strikers remain employees, retain voting rights for a period, and go onto a Laidlaw preferential recall list — so the employer acquires an ongoing obligation to recall them as vacancies arise, enforceable for years. Refusing recall to a former striker is a standard § 8(a)(3) case.

Go deeper: Guide Part VIII

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Pillar 9 — Contract Administration, Arbitration, and Deferral

Doctrine. Collective agreements are enforced primarily through grievance arbitration, which courts and the Board strongly favor.

Anchors. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (§ 301 suits). The Steelworkers Trilogy — United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (arbitrability presumed; the award enforced if it draws its essence from the agreement). AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (arbitrability is for the court unless clearly delegated). Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (duty of fair representation; hybrid § 301/DFR claims). Collyer Insulated Wire and Spielberg Manufacturing (Board deferral to arbitration, pre- and post-award); the deferral standard has been revised repeatedly.

Trap. Assuming the management rights clause answers the question. Broad clauses are read against the drafter in arbitration, past practice can modify express language, and a clause reserving the right to "manage the business" rarely authorizes a unilateral change to a mandatory subject the contract addresses elsewhere.

Trap, second order. The duty of fair representation is the union's exposure and it is the reason grievance handling must be documented. A union that drops a meritorious grievance without a reasoned process faces a hybrid claim in which the employee sues both the employer on the contract and the union on the DFR — and the union's file is the evidence.

Go deeper: Guide Part IX

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Pillar 10 — Successorship, Withdrawal, and Remedies

Doctrine. A purchaser may inherit a bargaining obligation without inheriting the contract; recognition may be withdrawn only on a showing of actual loss of majority; and Board remedies have expanded.

Anchors. NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (a successor hiring a majority of its workforce from the predecessor's employees must bargain, but is not bound by the predecessor's contract and may generally set initial terms). Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (substantial continuity; the successor bar; the continuing demand doctrine). Levitz Furniture (withdrawal of recognition requires actual loss of majority, not good-faith doubt). NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) (representation at an investigatory interview). Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (objectors' dues limited to representational activities). Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022) (consequential damages as part of make-whole relief).

Trap. The perfectly clear successor. A buyer who tells the predecessor's employees they will be retained on existing terms, or otherwise makes it perfectly clear it plans to retain them, loses the Burns right to set initial terms unilaterally and must bargain before changing them. The statement that forfeits it is usually made by an executive at a town hall during diligence.

Trap, second order. The remedial landscape. Thryv extended make-whole relief to direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms beyond backpay, and the Board has expanded default-language, notice-reading, and other remedies. Combined with Cemex bargaining orders, the cost of an unfair labor practice is materially higher than the historical "post a notice and reinstate" assumption on which many employers still budget.

Go deeper: Guide Parts X–XI

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The Authority Shelf

Statute and regulations

• National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 — § 152 (definitions); § 157 (§ 7 rights); § 158 (unfair labor practices; § 8(c) free speech; § 8(d) duty to bargain); § 159 (representatives and elections); § 160 (prevention of unfair labor practices; § 10(j) and § 10(l) injunctions); § 163 (right to strike); § 164 (§ 14(b) right-to-work)
• Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (§ 301); § 186 (§ 302 payments to labor organizations)
• Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (union democracy; LM reporting; employer persuader reporting)
• 29 C.F.R. Parts 101–103 (Board procedures and rules); Part 102 Subpart C (representation case procedures)

Leading cases — coverage and § 7

• NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) · NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) · NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) · Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) · NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) · NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) · NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) · NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001)

Leading cases — interference, discrimination, organizing

• NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964) · Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) · NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967) · NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) · Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980) · NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) · Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) · American Steel Constr., Inc., 372 NLRB No. 23 (2022) · Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023) · Cemex Constr. Materials Pac., LLC, 372 NLRB No. 130 (2023)

Leading cases — bargaining, weapons, administration

• NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) · NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) · NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) · Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564, 574, 593 (1960) · NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) · Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) · American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) · NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) · Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) · NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) · Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) · NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) · NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975) · Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) · First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) · AT&T Techs. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) · Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) · Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) · DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) · Thryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22 (2022)

Official materials

• NLRB Casehandling Manual (Parts One, Two, and Three) and the Outline of Law and Procedure in Representation Cases — the operative practice documents
• General Counsel memoranda (GC memos) — the fastest signal of enforcement priorities and of positions the agency intends to advance
• NLRB decisions and Regional Director decisions, searchable and free
• Advice Memoranda from the Division of Advice

Secondary sources

• The Developing Labor Law (ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law) — the standard treatise, and the first place to check any Board doctrine
• How to Take a Case Before the NLRB (ABA)
• Archibald Cox, Derek Bok, Robert Gorman & Matthew Finkin, Labor Law: Cases and Materials
• Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, Basic Text on Labor Law
• Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (ABA) — the standard reference for contract administration
• ABA Journal of Labor & Employment Law; Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law; Labor Law Journal
• Bureau of Labor Statistics union membership data; Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service materials

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Appendix A — Mandatory Versus Permissive Subjects

Insistence to impasse is lawful only on mandatory subjects. Unilateral change is a per se violation only as to mandatory subjects.

Subject	Classification
Wages, incentive pay, bonuses tied to work	Mandatory
Hours, shifts, scheduling, overtime	Mandatory
Health, welfare, and retirement benefits	Mandatory
Seniority, layoff and recall procedures	Mandatory
Discipline and discharge standards; grievance procedure	Mandatory
Safety rules and practices affecting unit employees	Mandatory
Subcontracting unit work where it replaces employees	Mandatory — Fibreboard
Work rules affecting terms and conditions	Mandatory
Drug testing of unit employees	Mandatory
Plant relocation motivated by labor costs	Mandatory — Dubuque Packing framework
Effects of a closing or relocation decision	Mandatory (effects bargaining)
Decision to close part of the business for economic reasons	Permissive — First National Maintenance
Basic scope, direction, and nature of the business	Permissive
Benefits of retirees	Permissive — Allied Chemical v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157 (1971)
Identity of the other side's bargaining representative	Permissive
Interest arbitration; performance bonds	Permissive
Internal union affairs; ratification procedures	Permissive
Closed shop; hot cargo agreements (outside construction and garment provisos)	Illegal — § 8(e)
Union security in a § 14(b) right-to-work state	Illegal as to compulsory membership

How to use it. Before implementing any change, classify the subject. If mandatory, notice and bargain to agreement or genuine impasse. If permissive, the employer may act — but must still bargain effects, and may not insist to impasse on it as a condition of agreement.

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Appendix B — Unfair Labor Practice Exposure Triage

Screen any contemplated action against these, in order.

#	Question	If yes
1	Does the action touch wages, hours, or terms and conditions of represented employees?	Notice and bargain; do not implement unilaterally (Katz)
2	Is the employer claiming impasse?	Test it hard: genuine deadlock after good-faith bargaining on the whole; any change in circumstances dissolves it
3	Does a work rule restrict what employees may say, record, or share?	Apply Stericycle; narrow it or justify why no narrower rule works
4	Would the action follow protected concerted activity?	Apply Wright Line; document that the same action would have been taken regardless, with comparators
5	Is a benefit being granted or withheld during a campaign?	Both are violations; proceed on the documented pre-campaign plan
6	Has a union demanded recognition?	Cemex: recognize or promptly file an RM petition — doing neither is unlawful
7	Is a supervisor speaking to employees about the union?	Their words bind the employer; TIPS training and counsel review
8	Is the employer gathering information about union activity?	Interrogation and surveillance are per se violations, including the impression of surveillance
9	Has the union requested information?	Unit information is presumptively relevant — produce it; assert confidentiality only with an offered accommodation
10	Are strikers being replaced?	Classify the strike; watch for conversion to a ULP strike; Laidlaw recall obligations persist
11	Is the employer acquiring a unionized business?	Burns successorship; avoid statements creating a "perfectly clear" successor before initial terms are set
12	Is the employer withdrawing recognition?	Levitz: actual loss of majority required, not good-faith doubt
13	Is an employee facing an investigatory interview?	Weingarten representation rights on request
14	Could the conduct support a § 10(j) injunction?	Assume the General Counsel will seek one in organizing and discharge cases
15	What is the realistic remedy exposure?	Backpay plus Thryv consequential harms, notice reading, and potentially a Cemex or Gissel bargaining order

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Related Documents

Articles

• Section 7 Rights in a Non-Union Workplace: Why Ordinary Handbook Rules Get Struck Down
• Anatomy of a Lawful Layoff: WARN Notice, Disparate Impact, and the OWBPA Release
• The Non-Compete in Retreat: Blue Pencils, Trade Secrets, and the Employee Who Walks

Guides

• Labor Relations Under the NLRA: A Comprehensive Guide to Organizing, Bargaining, and Unfair Labor Practices
• Reductions in Force and Severance: A Comprehensive Guide to WARN, OWBPA, and Separation Agreements
• Workplace Safety Under the OSH Act: A Comprehensive Guide
• Restrictive Covenants and Employee Mobility: A Comprehensive Guide

Checklists

• Responding to a Union Organizing Campaign: A Practical Checklist
• Executing a Reduction in Force: A Practical Checklist
• Responding to an OSHA Inspection and Citation: A Practical Checklist

Toolkits

• The Employment Litigation Defense Toolkit
• The Workforce Reduction and Separation Toolkit
• The Workplace Safety and OSHA Toolkit
• The Restrictive Covenants and Employee Mobility Toolkit