Opinion · Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Hardeman v. State

Hardeman v. State, No. 1949-98, UP1788472 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1999)

Type
Opinion
Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Jurisdiction
Texas
Date
1999-09-15
Topic
general

holding that the right to a separate punishment hearing after adjudication of guilt is forfeitable | holding that Issa requires only that the defendant have the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if not afforded same during adjudication | concluding that defendant failed to preserve error when he was given opportunity to object when sentence was pronounced but did not | holding that Issa requires only that the defendant have the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if not afforded same during adjudication | holding that Issa requires only that the defendant have the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if not afforded same during adjudication | holding that defendant does not have absolute right to separate punishment hearing but must have opportunity to present mitigating evidence if that right was not afforded during adjudication | holding that defendant does not have absolute right to separate punishment hearing but must have opportunity to present mitigating evidence if that right was not afforded during adjudication | holding that defendant does not have absolute right to separate punishment hearing but must have opportunity to present mitigating evidence if that right was not afforded during adjudication | holding that defendant does not have absolute right to separate punishment hearing but must have opportunity to present mitigating evidence if that right was not afforded during adjudication | holding that appellant must have opportunity to present evidence of mitigation, but it is “immaterial that the presentation of the evidence [of mitigation] occurred before the actual words of adjudication.” | holding that defendant does not have absolute right to a separate punishment hearing but must have opportunity to present mitigating evidence if that right was not afforded during the adjudication | holding that defendant does not have absolute right to a separate punishment hearing but must have opportunity to present mitigating evidence if that right was not afforded during the adjudication | holding that motion for a new trial can be used to raise point of error for first time only when party did not have opportunity to object at time objectionable action was taken | concluding that appellant had opportunity to object and present evidence, but did not do so, when asked, after being adjudged guilty, whether he had anything to say before pronouncement of sentence and he did not respond | reasoning that appellant did not allege that he did not have an opportunity to object when sentence was pronounced and so failed to preserve error | noting that if opportunity to object was afforded appellant and he failed to object, he cannot use later motion for new trial to preserve error | noting that if opportunity to object was afforded appellant and he failed to object, he cannot use later motion for new trial to preserve error | holding appellant failed to preserve error where given an opportunity to object after guilt was adjudicated and before judge pronounced the sentence | noting that if opportunity to object was afforded appellant and he failed to object, he cannot use a later motion for new trial to preserve the error | noting that if opportunity to object was afforded appellant and he failed to object, he cannot use a later motion for new trial to preserve the error | explaining that defendant must have opportunity to present evidence during adjudication proceeding but that “it is immaterial that the presentation of this evidence occurred before the actual words of adjudication” | finding that defendant has no absolute right to separate punishment hearing, but instead must have opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if such opportunity was not afforded during adjudication | stating that Issa does not require a separate sentencing hearing after a defendant's guilt has been adjudicated if the defendant was provided an opportunity during

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111 opinions

OPINION

KEASLER, J.,

delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Terry Wayne Hardeman pleaded guilty to delivering less than 28 grams of cocaine and stipulated that two enhancement paragraphs were true. The trial court deferred adjudication and placed him on probation. The State later moved to adjudicate, alleging that Hardeman used cocaine and failed to pay fines while on probation. The trial court adjudicated guilt on Hardeman’s original cocaine charge and sentenced him to life in prison. Harde-man appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

SEPARATE PUNISHMENT HEARING

Hardeman first argues that the trial court erred by not conducting a separate punishment hearing after the adjudication of guilt and before sentencing. He complains that the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that he failed to preserve error on this claim. We agree with the Court of Appeals.

Generally, to preserve error, the complaining party must make a timely objection. Hardeman contends that, pursuant to Issa v. State, 1 he preserved error by filing a timely motion for new trial. In Issa, when the trial judge denied the appellant a separate punishment hearing, we permitted the preservation of error in this manner only because the appellant did not have the opportunity to object. 2 The trial judge found the appellant guilty and immediately sentenced him. 3

Hardeman does not allege such a lack of opportunity to object. In fact, the record indicates that he was given the chance to do so. After adjudicating guilt, the trial judge asked Hardeman whether he had anything to say before he pronounced sentence. There was no response. Harde-man was given an opportunity to object and to present evidence, but he did neither. As a result, he failed to preserve error. This ground for review is overruled.

Hardeman also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court imposed sentence without a separate punishment hearing. Contrary to Hardeman’s argument, Issa does not stand for the absolute right to a separate punishment hearing. Instead, it requires *691 the defendant to have the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if not afforded during adjudication. 4

The record reflects that Hardeman was given such an opportunity during adjudication, and he took advantage of it. He testified regarding his work at a halfway house, his level of responsibility there, his achievement during training, his skills, and his sense of duty. These matters have nothing to do with whether he used cocaine or paid his fines during probation.

As we explained in Pearson, it is immaterial that the presentation of this evidence occurred before the actual words of adjudication. 5 Hardeman had the opportunity to present evidence during the proceedings, and that is all that is required. Therefore, Hardeman cannot show that counsel erred by failing to object, nor can he show he was harmed by counsel’s failure to object.

ENHANCEMENT PARAGRAPHS

Hardeman next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to address the merits of his claims regarding the enhancement paragraphs. He argued below that there was insufficient evidence to support the two habitual offender enhancement paragraphs and that the trial court erred in failing to arraign him on the enhancement paragraphs. The Court of Appeals declined to review these complaints, holding that it did not have the authority to do so because the claims dealt with the trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt. 6 We agree with Hardeman that these claims do not involve the trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt. Nevertheless, Hardeman waived these complaints by not raising them in an appeal after the trial court imposed deferred adjudication. 7 As a result, the Court of Appeals was correct in refusing to address the claims on their merits, albeit for different reasons.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

1

. 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

2

. Id. at 161; see also Pearson v. State, 994 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

3

.Ibid.

4

. Pearson, at 178-79.

6

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 5(b) (Vernon 1999).

7

. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).