Opinion · Texas Supreme Court

State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Cotner

36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 481

Type
Opinion
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
Texas
Date
1993-01-20
Topic
litigation

holding that the trial court improperly severed the claims of one plaintiff against a defendant when the facts and issues related to liability were the same for both plaintiffs and, to some extent, the extent of the plaintiffs’ alleged damages were related | concluding the trial court erred in severing claim because the severed claim was so interwoven with the remaining action that they involved the same facts and issues | holding the trial court erred in severing claim because the severed claim was so interwoven with the remaining action that they involved the same facts and issues | concluding trial court erred in severing claim of driver in car-accident case from passenger’s case because severed claim and remaining action was too interwoven and involved same facts and issues | holding trial court erred in severing claim where third criterion was not met | reversing severance because facts and issues relating to liability for automobile accident same for multiple plaintiffs | reversing severance because facts and issues relating to liability for automobile accident same for multiple plaintiffs | reversing severance because facts and issues relating to liability for automobile accident same for multiple plaintiffs | reversing severance and concluding severed claim was so interwoven with the remaining action that they involved the same facts and issues because claims were based on same facts and because damages for one claim related to the damages for the other claim | reversing severance and concluding severed claim was so interwoven with the remaining action that they involved the same facts and issues because claims were based on same facts and because damages for one claim related to the damages for the other claim | “The State complains that the severance and partial new trial were improper.” | claims are not properly severable if they “involve the same facts and issues” | husband’s claim against department for failure to warn of dangerous road condition was improperly severed from wife’s claim where wife was in same car, sued upon same event, and each requested damages for injury to wife | husband's claim against department for failure to warn of dangerous road condition was improperly severed from wife's claim where wife was in same car, sued upon same event, and each requested damages for injury to wife | sustaining cross-point on post-judgment interest | discussing when severance is proper

Citator

Cited by
35 opinions
PER CURIAM.

Cherie Cotner was a passenger in a car driven by her husband Stephen when it went out of control on an allegedly iced-over bridge. The Cotners sued the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation claiming, among other things, that the State failed to warn of a dangerous condition. A jury found Stephen and the State both negligent and equally responsible for the accident, and assessed damages of $5,750,000.00 for Cherie, $35,-000.00 for Stephen’s past mental anguish and loss of his wife’s society, companionship, household services and consortium, and “0” for Stephen’s future damages. The trial court rendered judgment for Cherie, awarding her $250,000.00 as the maximum recoverable under the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code § 101.023(a), but severed Stephen’s causes of action and granted him a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed. 826 S.W.2d 692 (1992). The State complains that the severance and partial new trial were improper. We agree.

Parties and actions may be severed “at any stage of the action, before the time of submission to the jury or to the court if trial is without a jury, on such terms as are just.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 41. Rule 41 does not “permit a trial court to sever a case after it has been submitted to the trier of fact.” Coalition of Cities for Affordable Utility Rates v. Public Utility Comm’n, 798 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex.1990). For this reason alone the trial court’s severance of Stephen’s claims was improper under Rule 41. Moreover, “[a] claim is properly severable if (1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues.” Guaranty Federal Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.1990). Stephen’s claims do not meet the third criterion. The facts and issues related to liability for the accident are the same for Stephen as for Cherie, and to some extent Stephen’s damage allegations are related to the extent of damages Cherie suffered. For this additional reason the trial court erred in severing Stephen’s claims.

The trial court may grant a new trial on part of the matters in a case only if “such part is clearly separable without unfairness to the parties”. Tex.R.Civ.P. 320. A partial new trial may be ordered notwithstanding the prohibition in Rule 41 against post-submission severances. Rule 320 is thus an exception to Rule 41. As noted above, however, Stephen’s claims are not separable from Cherie’s without unfairness to the parties. Moreover, Rule 320 prohibits “a separate trial on unliquidated damages alone ... if liability issues are contested.” Although the State contests liability in this case, a final judgment for Cherie would preclude it from relitigating liability in a new trial with Stephen. Thus, the trial court erred in granting only Stephen a new trial.

Accordingly, a majority of this Court grants the State’s application for writ of error and without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case to the district court for further proceedings. Tex. R.App.P. 170. The district court is free to render a final judgment or to grant all parties a new trial, and to take other actions not inconsistent with this opinion.