Opinion · Texas Supreme Court
Middleton v. Murff
Middleton v. Murff, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 396 (Tex. 1985)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Texas Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- Texas
- Date
- 1985-05-01
- Topic
- general
holding that when party failed to establish that court lacked jurisdictional power to render judgment, bill of review is exclusive remedy to set aside judgment | recognizing that if trial court lacks jurisdictional power, bill of review not required to challenge void judgment | recognizing that if trial court lacks jurisdictional power, bill of review not required to challenge void judgment | recognizing that if trial court lacks jurisdictional power, bill of review not required to challenge void judgment | holding that when party failed to establish that court lacked jurisdictional power to render judgment, bill of review is exclusive remedy to set aside judgment | holding that when party failed to establish that court lacked jurisdictional power to render judgment, bill of review is exclusive remedy to set aside judgment | stating that, even if trial court rendered a “consent judgment,”, to which some of the parties had not consented, the trial court still had subject-matter jurisdiction to render the judgment | stating that, notwithstanding the language of Rule 329b(f), a trial court may declare a prior judgment void and set it aside, after expiration of plenary power and without using the bill-of-review procedure, if the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render the prior judgment | noting exception to Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f)’s bill of review requirement for cases in which court rendering judgment had “no jurisdictional power” to do so | noting exception to Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f)'s bill of review requirement for cases in which court rendering judgment had "no jurisdictional power" to do so | finding it unnecessary to decide whether a consent judgment was void or merely voidable because in either instance, a bill of review is the exclusive remedy since the time for an appeal from the consent judgment has expired | explicitly disapproving the proposition that “if a judgment rendered by a trial court is void it may be set aside by that court at any time” | explicitly disapproving the proposition that "if a judgment rendered by a trial court is void it may be set aside by that court at any time" | explicitly disapproving the proposition that "if a judgment rendered by a trial court is void it may be set aside by that court at any time" | "After the time for an appeal expires, a bill of review is the exclusive remedy to vacate the judgment or a provision thereof, even if it could be shown to be void." | trial court has no “jurisdictional power” to vacate judgment under Tex. R. Civ. P. 329(b) after expiration of time within which it has plenary power unless judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction | trial court has no “jurisdictional power” to vacate judgment under Tex. R. Civ. P. 329(b) after expiration of time within which it has plenary power unless judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction | trial court has no A jurisdictional power @ to vacate judgment under Tex. R. Civ. P. 329(b) after expiration of time within which it has plenary power unless judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction | op. on reh = g
Citator
- Cited by
- 54 opinions
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.This is an appeal from a direct attack on a “consent judgment” rendered by the district court after receiving notice that certain parties, petitioners herein, no longer consented. The consent judgment was not appealed to the court of appeals. This direct attack, brought in the district court, is a motion to vacate the consent judgment and does not conform to the requirements of a bill of review. The trial court refused to set the consent judgment aside. The court of appeals affirmed this refusal by holding that the consent judgment was not void, and that therefore the requirements of a bill of review must be met to set it aside. 682 S.W.2d 672. We refused the petitioners’ application for writ of error, no reversible error, and we now overrule their motion for rehearing. We find it necessary to do so with an opinion to correct certain misconceptions created or perpetuated by the court of appeals opinion.
On rehearing, the petitioners strongly contend that the consent judgment was void and that their motion to vacate should have been granted. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the consent judgment was void or merely voidable. In either instance, a bill of review is the exclusive remedy since the time for an appeal from the consent judgment has expired. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(f); Deen v. Kirk, 508 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex.1974); McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706, 710 (1961).
The court of appeals cites Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433 (1959) and Glenn W. Casey Constr. v. Citizen’s Nat’l Bank, 611 S.W.2d 695, 701 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1980, no writ) for the proposition that “[i]f a judgment rendered by a trial court is void it may be set aside by that court at any time.” 682 S.W.2d at 673. We disapprove of this statement. In McEwen and Been, this court has twice ordered a trial court to reinstate a judgment, even presuming the judgment could be shown to be void, because the direct attack against it did not qualify as a bill of review. In McEwen, this court recognized its conflict with the statement in Freeman, but stated that “[i]n Freeman, exclusiveness of remedy by bill of review as provided in Rule 329b was not presented or decided.” 345 S.W.2d at 711. Therefore, the reliance of the court of appeals on Freeman is erroneous.
In McEwen and Deen, we recognized an exception to the Rule 329b(f) requirement of a bill of review in cases where the court rendering the judgment had no “jurisdictional power” to do so. We have defined “jurisdictional power” in this sense to mean “jurisdiction over the subject matter, the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular one belongs.” Deen, 508 S.W.2d at 72. The consent judgment was rendered in a suit to partition real estate, a matter within the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the exception does not *214 apply, and a bill of review is required in order to set the consent judgment aside.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.