Opinion · Texas Supreme Court

Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C.

63 S.W.3d 795

Type
Opinion
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
Texas
Date
2002-01-31
Topic
general

holding that severance order stating that separate action should "proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in this Court [under a new style and cause number]" was not subject to appeal | holding severance of interlocutory judgment into a separate cause of action makes interlocutory judgment final | holding severance of interlocutory judgment into a separate cause of action makes interlocutory judgment final | severance order stating severed claims would “proceed as such to final judgment 8 or other disposition in this Court” precluded final judgment in severed action | “As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.” | “As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final” | "As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final." | “As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.” | “As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.” | “As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.” | severed action remained interlocutory where severance order stated action would “proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition”

Citator

Cited by
32 opinions
DIVERSIFIED FIN. SYS. v. HILL,63 S.W.3d 795(Tex. 2001)
Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. and Diversified Financial Southeast,
Inc., Petitioners v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap Goetz, P.C. a/k/a
Hill, Gilstrap, Moorhead, White, Bodoin Webster, a professional
corporation, Dwight A. Heard and Frank Hill, Respondents
No. 00-0040
Supreme Court of Texas.
Opinion Delivered: September 20, 2001
Rehearing Overruled January 31, 2002
On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
J. Allen Smith, Scott James Conrad, Ralph Eugene Roberts, Settle Pou, Dallas, Levon G. Hovnatania, Martin Disiere Jefferson, Houston, for Petitioner.

Frank Gilstrap, Hill Gilstrap, Arlington, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Petitioners sued respondents on promissory notes and guarantees. The trial court rendered an interlocutory summary judgment for respondents on certain claims and issued an order severing those claims into a separate cause. The order stated that the separate action should "proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in this Court [under a new style and cause number]." Six weeks later, the trial court signed a final judgment in the severed cause. Petitioners timely appealed from this judgment, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that the interlocutory summary judgment became final the instant it was severed from the main cause.3 S.W.3d 616.

As a rule, the severance of an interlocutory judgment into a separate cause makes it final.Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co.,907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). But here, the severance order expressly contemplated that the severed claims would "proceed as such to final judgment or other disposition in this Court." Thus, the severance order clearly precluded a final judgment in the severed action until the later judgment was signed, and petitioners' appeal was timely.Page 796

Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, Tex.R.App.P. 59.1, the Court reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands the case to that court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.