Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Young v. Ragen

Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1949-06-06
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • requiring the state to provide a "clearly defined method by which [state prisoners] may raise claims of denial of federal rights"
  • “[T]he Oregon legislature adopted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act * * * to provide an effective procedure for people convicted of crimes to obtain relief against constitutionally flawed convictions.”

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Cited by
135 opinions
YOUNGv. RAGEN,337 U.S. 235(1949)
69 S.Ct. 1073
YOUNGv. RAGEN, WARDEN.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANDOLPH COUNTY, ILLINOIS.fn*
No. 50.
Argued November 17, 1948.
Decided June 6, 1949.
1. Convicted in an Illinois circuit court and sentenced to prison, petitioner applied to the same court for habeas corpus, claiming denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. His petition was denied without a hearing on the ground that it was "insufficient in law and substance." On review here, the State Attorney General conceded that the petition raised substantial federal questions; argued that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy under state law when the petition was denied; but admitted that it probably is an appropriate remedy under "announcements" contained in subsequent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, though other Illinois trial courts have continued to deny habeas corpus on procedural grounds.Held:The order denying habeas corpus is vacated and the cause is remanded for consideration of the present applicability of that remedy in the light of the State Supreme Court's "announcement" inPeoplev.Loftus,400 Ill. 432,81 N.E.2d 495, and other relevant Illinois decisions. Pp. 236-240. (a) More than a question of state procedure is involved when a state court of last resort closes the door toanyconsideration of a claim of denial of a federal right. P. 238. (b) The doctrine that federal courts will not grant habeas corpus to prisoners under judgments of state courts until all state remedies have been exhausted,Ex parte Hawk,321 U.S. 114,28 U.S.C. § 2254, presupposes the existence of some adequate remedy under state law. Pp. 238-239.Page 2362. The orders in seven other cases in which Illinois courts had denied habeas corpus without hearings are likewise vacated and remanded for similar consideration. P. 240 Orders vacated and causes remanded
In No. 50, an Illinois trial court denied without a hearing a
petition for habeas corpus raising substantial questions under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
granted certiorari.334 U.S. 810. It also granted certiorari in
No. 760 (336 U.S. 966), and now grants certiorari in the six
other cases.Orders vacated and causes remanded, p. 240.
Edward H. Leviargued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 50.William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent in No. 50. With him on the brief wereGeorge F. Barrett, then Attorney General,Raymond S.SarnowandJames C. Murray, Assistant Attorneys General.

Petitionerspro sein Misc. Nos. 47, 106, 109, 184, 372 and 374.Herbert A. Friedlich, by appointment of the Court, for petitioner in No. 760.Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General of Illinois, andWilliamC. Wines, Assistant Attorney General, were on the briefs for respondent in Misc. Nos. 106, 109 and 184, and No. 760. With them on the brief in No. 760 wereJames C. MurrayandRaymond S.Sarnow.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are once again faced with the recurring problem of determining what, if any, is the appropriate post-trial procedure in Illinois by which claims of infringement of federal rights may be raised. SeeWoodsv.Nierstheimer,Page 237328 U.S. 211;Marinov.Ragen,332 U.S. 561;Loftusv.Illinois,334 U.S. 804. In 1946, petitioner pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with having committed burglary and larceny and was sentenced to five to seven years imprisonment. A year later he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Illinois, the sentencing court, containing allegations which, if true, raise substantial questions under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Attorney General of Illinois concedes that petitioner is entitled to a hearing into the truth or falsity of the charges. The court to which the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was directed denied the petition without holding a hearing, however, for the reason that it "is insufficient in law and substance." We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari,334 U.S. 810, to consider the question thus presented.

The Attorney General explains the circuit court's denial of the petition for the writ as based upon state procedural grounds: that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy for the relief of denials of due process. He contends, however, that while the circuit court was correct in its interpretation of Illinois law when it denied the petition, certain statements in the Illinois Supreme Court's opinions inPeoplev.Loftus,400 Ill. 432,81 N.E.2d 495;Peoplev.Shoffner,400 Ill. 174, N.E.2d 200; andPeoplev.Wilson,399 Ill. 437,78 N.E.2d 514, all of which were handed down subsequent to the circuit court's denial of relief, strongly indicate that habeas corpus would now be the appropriate Illinois procedure in a case such as the one before us. His contention is, in other words, that while the petition for habeas corpus was properly denied when acted upon below, the decisions just cited probably broaden the scope of habeas corpus in Illinois, so that a denial of a hearing would be erroneous if the petition were again presented to the circuit court.Page 238

The situation is further complicated, however, by the fact that many circuit courts, whose decisions upon habeas corpus are unreviewable by the state supreme court under Illinois law, have continued to deny petitions for habeas corpus on procedural grounds since the supreme court's "announcement" inPeoplev.Loftus, supra. The Attorney General's position concerning these denials, as we understand it, is that these decisions may be wrong, depending upon whether his interpretation of theLoftus"announcement" is the correct one, but that whether right or wrong, they are decisions solely upon a question of Illinois procedural law and thus do not warrant invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court.

Of course we do not review state decisions which rest upon adequate nonfederal grounds, and of course Illinois may choose the procedure it deems appropriate for the vindication of federal rights.Loftusv.Illinois, supra. But it is not simply a question of state procedure when a state court of last resort closes the door toanyconsideration of a claim of denial of a federal right. And that is the effect of the denials of habeas corpus in a number of cases now before this Court, for in none of the cases does the Attorney General suggest that either of the other two Illinois post-trial remedies, writ of error andcoramnobis, is appropriate. Unless habeas corpus is available, therefore, we are led to believe that Illinois offers no post-trial remedy in cases of this kind. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, to which this Court has required the scrupulous adherence of all federal courts, seeEx parteHawk,321 U.S. 1141and casesPage 239cited, presupposes that some adequate state remedy exists. We recognize the difficulties with which the Illinois Supreme Court is faced in adapting available state procedures to the requirement that prisoners be given some clearly defined method by which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights. Nevertheless, that requirement must be met. If there is now no post-trial procedure by which federal rights may be vindicated in Illinois, we wish to be advised of that fact upon remand of this case.

Seven other petitions for certiorari which raise substantial questions under the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are now before this Court following denials of habeas corpus by Illinois circuit courts or the Criminal Court of Cook County. In none of these cases was a hearing held or the petitioner permitted to submit proof of the truth of his allegations. In three instances, the denial of habeas corpus occurred prior to the supreme court's "announcement" inPeoplev.Loftus, supra, as was true in the case of Young. A similar disposition of these petitions is therefore required.

Four petitions for certiorari involve denials of habeas corpus subsequent to theLoftus"announcement." It may well be that these decisions represent the opinion of four Illinois circuit judges that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy under Illinois law despite theLoftusopinion. Out of an abundance of caution, we have concluded, however, that these cases should also be remandedPage 240to the state courts, since it is possible that theLoftus"announcement" was not brought to their attention or its possible significance pointed out. As in the other cases, we wish to be advised, if a hearing is again denied, whether the court is of the opinion that habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy in Illinois in cases raising questions under the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Accordingly, the order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in No. 50.Youngv.Ragen, is vacated and the cause remanded for consideration of the present availability of habeas corpus in the light of the State Supreme Court's "announcement" inPeoplev.Loftus, supra, and other relevant Illinois decisions. The petitions for certiorari in No. 47, Misc.,Evansv.Nierstheimer;in No. 106, Misc.,Willisv.Ragen;in No. 109, Misc.,Thompsonv.Ragen;in No. 184, Misc.,Lewisv.Ragen;in No. 372, Misc.,Shermanv.Ragenet al.;and in No. 374, Misc.,Banksv.Ragen, are granted. The orders denying petitions for writs of habeas corpus in these cases, together with that in No. 760,Smithv.Ragen,2are vacated and the causes remanded for similar consideration.Orders will be entered accordingly.Page 241
  1. Page 235 Together with No. 47, Misc.,Evansv.Nierstheimer, Warden,on petition for certiorari to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois; No. 106, Misc.,Willisv.Ragen Warden,No. 109, Misc.,Thompsonv.Ragen, Warden,No. 184, Misc.,Lewisv.Ragen, Warden,and No. 372, Misc.,Shermanv.Ragen, Warden, et al.,all on petition for certiorari to the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois; No. 760,Smithv.Ragen, Warden,on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois; and No. 374, Misc.,Banksv.Ragen, Warden,on petition for certiorari to the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois. ↩
  2. Page 238 Existing law as declared byEx parte Hawkwas made a part of the statute by the new Judicial Code,28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides:

    "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies Page 239 available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.

    "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." ↩
  3. Page 240 Certiorari granted,336 U.S. 966. (Docketed as No. 265, Misc.) ↩