Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Woolsey v. Best

57 S. Ct. 2

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1936-10-12
Topic: general

"[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." | “[W]e find ourselves unable to assent to the suggestion that before proceedings in one suit may be stayed to abide the 4 proceedings in another, the parties must be shown to be the same and the issues identical.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” | “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3 | court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4 | itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”

Citator

Cited by: 50 opinions

WOOLSEYv. BEST, WARDEN,299 U.S. 1(1936)

57 S.Ct. 2

WOOLSEYv. BEST, WARDEN.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO.

No. 256.

Jurisdictional statement distributed September 10, 1936.

Decided October 12, 1936.

1. Where there has been a trial for a statutory offense in a state court having jurisdiction, and conviction has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, the party convicted has no federal right to attack the judgment collaterally in the state courts by raising inhabeascorpusa federal question concerning the validity of the statute defining the offense, which was not raised, but could have been raised, in the earlier proceedings. P. 2. 2. An appeal from a state court will be dismissed if it does not appear that the decision complained of was not based upon an adequate non-federal ground.Id. Appeal dismissed.

Mr. Thomas H. Gibsonwas on the brief for appellant.Mr. Byron Rogers, Attorney General of Colorado, andMessrs.Charles Roach, Walter F. Scherer, andPierpont Fuller, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, were on the brief for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant brought this proceeding in the Supreme Court of Colorado to obtain a writ ofhabeas corpus. His petition was denied without opinion. It appears that appellant was held pursuant to conviction for violationPage 2of § 2676 C.L. 1921, being § 40, c. 44, Session Laws 1913, of the laws of Colorado (see also § 2740 C.L. 1921, being § 85, c. 44 of Session Laws of 1913), the judgment of conviction having been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.Woolseyv.People,98 Colo. 62;53 P.2d 596.

It is well established that the writ ofhabeas corpuscannot be used as a writ of error. This is the rule in Colorado as well as in this Court. The judgment of conviction was not subject to collateral attack.People ex rel. Burchinellv.DistrictCourt,22 Colo. 422;45 P. 402;Martinv.District Court,37 Colo. 110,115;86 P. 82;Chemgasv.Tynan,51 Colo. 35;116 P. 1045;In re Arakawa,78 Colo. 193,196;240 P. 940;In re Nottingham,84 Colo. 123,128;268 P. 587. CompareHarlanv.McGourin,218 U.S. 442;Riddlev.Dyche,262 U.S. 333;Craigv.Hecht,263 U.S. 255,277;Knewelv.Egan,268 U.S. 442,445,446;Coxv.Colorado,282 U.S. 807. It is apparent from the record submitted that the state court had jurisdiction to try the appellant for violation of the statute in question and that any federal question properly raised as to the validity of the statute could have been heard and determined on appeal to this Court from the final judgment in that action. The Supreme Court of the State was not required by the Federal Constitution to entertain such questions on the subsequent petition forhabeas corpus, and it does not appear that its denial of the petition did not rest upon an adequate non-federal ground.Lynchv.New York,293 U.S. 52, and cases there cited. The appeal is dismissed for the want for jurisdiction.Dismissed.Page 3