Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Woolsey v. Best
299 U.S. 1
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1936-10-12
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- "[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."
- “[W]e find ourselves unable to assent to the suggestion that before proceedings in one suit may be stayed to abide the 4 proceedings in another, the parties must be shown to be the same and the issues identical.”
- “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 3
- court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 4
- itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Woolsey v. Best. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 74 opinions
Headnotes
- Habeas Corpus — Collateral Attack on State Convictions Where a defendant has been tried and convicted of a statutory offense in a state court having jurisdiction, and the conviction has been affirmed on appeal, the defendant has no federal right to attack the judgment collaterally in state habeas corpus proceedings by raising a federal question as to the validity of the statute defining the offense that was not raised, but could have been raised, in the earlier proceedings; habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error. 299 U.S. at 2
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Adequate and Independent State Grounds An appeal from a state court must be dismissed if it does not appear that the decision complained of was not based upon an adequate non-federal ground. 299 U.S. at 2
WOOLSEYv. BEST, WARDEN,299 U.S. 1(1936)
57 S.Ct. 2
WOOLSEYv. BEST, WARDEN.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO.
No. 256.
Jurisdictional statement distributed September 10, 1936.
Decided October 12, 1936.
It is well established that the writ ofhabeas corpuscannot be used as a writ of error. This is the rule in Colorado as well as in this Court. The judgment of conviction was not subject to collateral attack.People ex rel. Burchinellv.DistrictCourt,22 Colo. 422;45 P. 402;Martinv.District Court,37 Colo. 110,115;86 P. 82;Chemgasv.Tynan,51 Colo. 35;116 P. 1045;In re Arakawa,78 Colo. 193,196;240 P. 940;In re Nottingham,84 Colo. 123,128;268 P. 587. CompareHarlanv.McGourin,218 U.S. 442;Riddlev.Dyche,262 U.S. 333;Craigv.Hecht,263 U.S. 255,277;Knewelv.Egan,268 U.S. 442,445,446;Coxv.Colorado,282 U.S. 807. It is apparent from the record submitted that the state court had jurisdiction to try the appellant for violation of the statute in question and that any federal question properly raised as to the validity of the statute could have been heard and determined on appeal to this Court from the final judgment in that action. The Supreme Court of the State was not required by the Federal Constitution to entertain such questions on the subsequent petition forhabeas corpus, and it does not appear that its denial of the petition did not rest upon an adequate non-federal ground.Lynchv.New York,293 U.S. 52, and cases there cited. The appeal is dismissed for the want for jurisdiction.Dismissed.Page 3