Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Wong Doo v. United States
Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1924-05-26
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- concluding that the petitioner’s second habeas petition was an abuse of the writ where the petitioner had a “full opportunity to offer proof” of the same claim in his first habeas application
- holding that while “the inflexible doctrine of res judica-ta” did not then apply in habeas proceedings, a petitioner “make[s] an abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus” when he attempts to use a second federal proceeding to revisit grounds raised in a first proceeding
- holding that while "the inflexible doctrine of res judicata" did not then apply in habeas proceedings, a petitioner "make[s] an abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus" when he attempts to use a second federal proceeding to revisit grounds raised in a first proceeding
- second applica tion barred where petitioner had a “full opportunity to offer proof” of the same claim in his first habeas applica tion
- second application barred where petitioner had a “full opportunity to offer proof” of the same claim in his first habeas application
- petitioner’s attempt to reassert a claim on which no evidence had been offered in a prior proceeding constituted an abuse of the writ
- successive petitions for writ of habeas corpus do not turn on the "inflexible doctrine of res judicata," but rather on whether the successive petition constitutes an abuse of the writ
- “To reserve the proof for use in attempting to support a later petition, if the first failed, was to make an abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Wong Doo v. United States. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 194 opinions
Headnotes
- Habeas Corpus — Res Judicata The strict doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a refusal to discharge a prisoner on habeas corpus; instead, the weight to be given a prior refusal is determined by a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the subject. 265 U.S. at 240-241
- Habeas Corpus — Successive Petitions A court may, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, dismiss a second habeas corpus petition because of a prior refusal where the ground asserted in the second petition was set up, together with another, in the first petition, and the evidence offered to support it was withheld without excuse for use in a second attempt if the first failed. 265 U.S. at 241
- Habeas Corpus — Abuse of the Writ Where a petitioner had full opportunity to offer proof of the ground on which he relied at the hearing on his first habeas corpus petition, good faith requires that he produce the proof at that time; reserving it for use in a later petition in the event the first fails is an abusive use of the writ of habeas corpus. 265 U.S. at 241
- Habeas Corpus — Appellate Procedure A judgment may be affirmed although a wrong reason was given for it, and where unreasonable delays have been caused by resort to habeas corpus proceedings, the mandate of the Court will issue forthwith. 265 U.S. at 242
WONG DOOv. UNITED STATES,265 U.S. 239(1924)
44 S.Ct. 524
WONG DOOv. UNITED STATES.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
No. 736.
Argued April 10, 1924.
Decided May 26, 1924.
CERTIORARI to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirming a decision dismissing a petition forhabeas corpus.
In the first petition the validity of the order was assailed on two grounds: one that the Secretary of LaborPage 240issued it without lawful jurisdiction, and the other that the administrative hearing on which it rested was not adequate or fair but essentially arbitrary. The return, besides answering the first ground, denied there was in fact any basis for the second. At the hearing in the District Court on these issues the petitioner offered no proof in support of the second ground. The court ruled that the first was not good in law, remanded the petitioner and dismissed his petition. He appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and it affirmed the decision.
Later the second petition was presented to the same District Court. In it the petitioner relied entirely on the second ground set forth before. There was some elaboration in stating it, but no enlargement of the substance. The petitioner sought to distinguish the two petitions by alleging in the second that the earlier one was "based solely" on the jurisdictional objection; but that allegation was not true. The return in the second case fully denied the charge that the administrative hearing was inadequate, unfair and arbitrary; set up the prior petition and the proceedings thereon, and prayed a dismissal of the second petition.
After a hearing, the District Court ruled that the doctrine ofres judicataapplied; held the decision in the first case was conclusive in the second; remanded the petitioner, and dismissed the petition. 283 F. 989. On an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals that decision was affirmed. 293 F. 273.
InSalingerv.Loisel, just decided,ante, 224, we held that in the federal courts the doctrine ofres judicatadoes not apply to a refusal to discharge a prisoner onhabeascorpus;but that in those courts, where the prisoner presents a second petition, the weight to be given to the prior refusal is to be determined according to a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the subject.Page 241
It therefore must be held that in this case the courts below erred in applying the inflexible doctrine ofres judicata. But it does not follow that the judgment should be reversed; for it plainly appears that the situation was one where, according to a sound judicial discretion, controlling weight must have been given to the prior refusal. The only ground on which the order for deportation was assailed in the second petition had been set up in the first petition. The petitioner had full opportunity to offer proof of it at the hearing on the first petition; and, if he was intending to rely on that ground, good faith required that he produce the proof then. To reserve the proof for use in attempting to support a later petition, if the first failed, was to make an abusive use of the writ ofhabeas corpus. No reason for not presenting the proof at the outset is offered. It has not been embodied in the record, but what is said of it there and in the briefs shows that it was accessible all the time. If an alien whose deportation has been ordered can do what was attempted here, it is easy to see that he can postpone the execution of the order indefinitely. Here the execution already has been postponed almost four years.
We conclude that the judgment was right, although a wrong reason was given for it. The delay resulting from the course pursued by the petitioner has been unreasonable; so the mandate from this Court will issue forthwith.Judgment affirmed.Page 242