Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

White v. Maryland

10 L. Ed. 2d 193

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1963-04-29
Topic
general

holding that when defendant plead guilty at preliminary hearing in absence of defense counsel, Court did "not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted” | holding that a “preliminary hearing” where the defendant was allowed to enter a plea constitutes a critical stage | holding that any proceeding where a criminal defendant "enter[s] a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel,” is presumed to have prejudiced that defendant | holding that any proceeding where a criminal defendant "enter[s] a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel," is presumed to have prejudiced that defendant | holding that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage because the “petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no coun- sel” | holding that “[w]hatever may be the normal function of the ‘preliminary hearing’ under Maryland law, it was in this case as ‘critical’ a [stage] as arraignment under Alabama law” because “[w]hen arraigned at that preliminary hearing [the unrepresented defendant] pleaded guilty” | noting that a preliminary hearing became a critical stage by virtue of the fact the defendant pleaded guilty | presuming prejudice where defendant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing before he was appointed counsel | presuming prejudice where defendant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing before he was appointed counsel | making same critical stage finding for preliminary hearings held prior to formal arraignment in Maryland | making same critical stage finding for preliminary hearings held prior to formal arraignment in Maryland | vacating conviction, without regard to showing of prejudice, because defendant did not have counsel at preliminary hearing | presuming prejudice where defendant pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing before he was appointed counsel | vacating conviction, without regard to showing of prejudice because defendant did not have counsel at preliminary hearing | absence of counsel from arraignment proceeding that affected entire trial because defenses not asserted were irretrievably lost | absence of counsel from arraignment proceeding that affected entire trial because defenses not asserted were irretrievably lost | “[P]etitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel” | “[P]etitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel” | preliminary hearing was critical stage of the proceedings when guilty plea was made during hearing that was later entered into evidence against defendant | rule requiring defendant to testify first denied him "the guiding hand of counsel" with respect to a "critical element of his defense” | harmless error analysis not applicable to permanent loss of defenses because of lost opportunity to assert them by reason of absence of counsel at arraignment | harmless error analysis not applicable to permanent loss of defenses because of lost opportunity to assert them by reason of absence of counsel at arraignment | cases dealing with furnishing an indigent with counsel at the preliminary hearing or arraignment stage | cases dealing with furnishing an indigent with counsel at the preliminary hearing or arraignment stage | absence of counsel from arraignment hearing that affected entire trial because defenses not asserted were irretrievably lost | since defendant’s non-binding plea could be used at trial even though withdrawn defendant entitled to counsel | absence of counsel from arraignment proceeding that affected entire trial because defenses not asserted were irretrievably lost | see also Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed. 2 d 923 (1965), decided since | absence of counsel from arraignment proceeding that affected entire trial because defenses not asserted were irretrievably lost | preliminary hearing is critical stage where incr

Citator

Cited by
545 opinions
Per Curiam.

Petitioner, who was sentenced to death while his co-defendant was given life, appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. 227 Md. 615, 177 A. 2d 877. We granted certiorari “limited to the point of law raised in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52.” See 371 U. S. 909.

Petitioner was arrested on May 27, 1960, and brought before a magistrate on May 31, 1960, for a preliminary hearing. But that hearing was. postponed and not actually held until August 9,1960. At that time petitioner was not yet represented by a lawyer. When arraigned at that preliminary hearing he pleaded guilty. What Mary *60 land calls the “arraignment” was first held September 8, 1960; but since petitioner was not represented by counsel, his arraignment was postponed and counsel appointed for him on September 9, 1960. He was finally arraigned on November 25,1960, and entered'pleas of “not guilty” and “not guilty by reason of insanity.” At his trial the plea of .guilty made at the preliminary hearing on' August 9, 1960, was introduced in evidence. * Since he did not have counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing, he argued that Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, applied. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that arraignment in Alabama is “a critical stage in a criminal proceeding” where rights' are preserved or lost (368 U. S. 53-54), while.under Maryland law there was “no requirement (nor. any practical possibility under our present criminal procedure) to appoint counsel” for petitioner at the “preliminary hearing . . . nor was it necessary for appellant to enter a plea at that time.” 227 Md., at 625, 177 A. 2d, at 882.

Whatever may be the normal function of the “preliminary hearing” under Maryland law, it was in this case as “critical” a stage as arraignment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel.

Wé repeat what we said in Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 55, that we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: “Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to-plead intelligently.” We therefore hold that Hamilton v. Alabama governs and that the judgment below must be and is.

Reversed.

*

Although petitioner did not object to the introduction of this evidence at the trial (227 Md., at 619-620, 177 A.2d, at 879), the rationale of Hamilton v. Alabama, supra/does not rest, as we shall see, on a showing of prejudice.