Is Wheless v. St. Louis still good law?

Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Wheless v. St. Louis

180 U.S. 379

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1901-03-05
Topic: general

How later courts describe this case

several owners of land suing to enjoin assessment for street improvments found to have separate and distinct claims

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Wheless v. St. Louis. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 68 opinions

WHELESSv. ST. LOUISET AL.,,180 U.S. 379(1901)

21 S.Ct. 402

WHELESSv. ST. LOUISet al.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF MISSOURI.

No. 161.

Argued and submitted January 31, February 1, 1901.

Decided February 25, 1901.

When owners of lots in a city file a bill to restrain the assessment against them of the costs and expenses of improving a public street, on which the lots abut, the matter in dispute is the amount of the assessment levied, or which may be levied, against the lot or lots of each of the complainants respectively. And in such circumstances no distinction can be recognized between a case where the assessment has not in fact been made, and a case where it has already been made. As neither one of these complainants will be required to pay two thousand dollars in respect of lots involved, the decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction is affirmed.

IN this case the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was in

issue, and the question of jurisdiction was certified.

The question was whether the matter in dispute exceeded,

exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of two thousand dollars.

The Circuit Court held that jurisdiction did not exist, and

dismissed the bill. 96 F. 865.

The suit was brought by Joseph Wheless and others against the

city of St. Louis, the president of the Board of Public

Improvements

Page 380

of that city, and the Gilsonite Roofing and Paving Company, to

restrain the city and the board from levying or assessing the

costs and expenses of improving a public street whereon

complainants' property abutted, against the property, and to

enjoin the paving company from demanding or receiving from the

city any special tax bills issued therefor. The certificate of

the Circuit Court states the facts thus;

"That the above entitled cause came on to be heard by the

court at, to wit, the September, 1899, term of the court, upon

the application for a temporary injunction, as prayed in the

bill, it being alleged in said bill that complainants are

severally the owners of certain and nearly all the lots of land

abutting on Whittier street, between Washington boulevard and

Finney avenue, in the city St. Louis; that the defendant city,

acting under the provisions of its charter and ordinances, had

entered into a contract with the defendant paving company to

improve said street in front of complainants' property, and said

company was engaged in doing the work, which was a public

improvement; that the cost of making said improvement is,

according to the terms of said charter, ordinance, and contract,

a charge upon complainants' abutting property, and is about to be

levied and assessed against it as a special tax, according to the

frontage of said lots on said street, and special tax bills are

about to be issued separately against each lot of complainants,

which would be liens upon their said property and subject the

same to being sold to satisfy said special assessment; which

assessment and levy, it is averred, are in violation of

complainants' rights under the Federal Constitution. Wherefore an

injunction was prayed to restrain said city from levying and

assessing the cost of said public improvement against

complainants' property and from issuing special tax bills against

them for the same, and for a decree declaring said charter,

ordinance, and contract provisions void; that the cost of said

improvement, which was about to be assessed and levied against

all the abutting property, is largely in excess of the sum of

$10,000.

"Defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court,

supported by an affidavit showing that the amount of special tax

which would be assessed and levied against the property of any

Page 381

one of the complainants severally would not exceed $1400, and

would not be an amount equal to $2000, and that hence the matter

in dispute between the parties was not of the sum or value

necessary to give jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of the United

States, and that the bill should be dismissed for want of

jurisdiction.

"Complainants demurred to the said plea and submitted the

question of jurisdiction thus raised to the determination of the

court, and thereupon the court, after due hearing and

consideration, did overrule said demurrer, the court being of the

opinion, as set out in the written opinion filed in said cause

and accompanying this appeal, that the court was without

jurisdiction of said cause in respect of the sum or value in

dispute, and upon complainants confessing the matter of the plea

in point of fact and refusing to plead further, their said bill

was by the court dismissed for want of jurisdiction."

Mr. Joseph Whelessfor appellants.Mr. Minor Meriwetherwas on his brief.Mr. B. SchnurmacherandMr. Charles Claflin Allenon behalf of St. Louis and the President of its Board of Public Improvements, andMr. Edward C. Kehr, on behalf of the Gilsonite Roofing and Paving Company, appellees, filed a brief; but the court declined to hear counsel for appellees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill alleged that defendants were about, under the charter of the city of St. Louis, and the ordinance authorizing and directing the improvement in question, to impose the cost thereof upon the several lots of ground adjoining the improvement, in the proportion that the frontage of each lot bore to the total frontage thereon. And it was admitted that the various lots of land threatened with assessment were owned in severalty; that no one complainant was interested in the lot of any other; and that the assessment against no one lot would amount toPage 382two thousand dollars. We think that the Circuit Court rightly held that it was without jurisdiction under the circumstances. The general rule was thus stated by Mr. Justice Bradley inClayv.Field,138 U.S. 464,479: "The general principle observed in all is, that if several persons be joined in a suit in equity or admiralty, and have a common and undivided interest, though separable as between themselves, the amount of their joint claim or liability will be the test of jurisdiction; but where their interests are distinct, and they are joined for the sake of convenience only, and because they form a class of parties whose rights or liabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have relation to a common fund or mass of property action, or have relation to a common fund or mass of property sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities cannot be aggregated together for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction by appeal, but each must stand or fall by itself alone."

Accordingly it has often been held that the distinct and separate interests of complainants in a suit for relief against assessments cannot be united for the purpose of making up the amount necessary to give this court or the Circuit Court jurisdiction.Ogden Cityv.Armstrong,168 U.S. 224;Russellv.Stansell,105 U.S. 303;Walterv.NortheasternRailroad Company,147 U.S. 370.

The "matter in dispute" within the meaning of the statute is not the principle involved, but the pecuniary consequence to the individual party, dependent on the litigation, as, for instance, in this suit the amount of the assessment levied, or which may be levied, as against each of the complainants separately. The rules of law which might subject complainants to or relieve them from assessment would be applicable alike to all, but each would be so subjected, or relieved, in a certain sum, and not in the whole amount of the assessment. If a decision on the merits were adverse to the assessment, each of the complainants would be relieved from payment of less than two thousand dollars. If the assessment were sustained, neither of them would be compelled to pay so much as that.

It is true that the assessment has not been made, but the charge is that it is threatened to be made, and the purpose ofPage 383the bill is to enjoin proceedings about to be taken to that end. We agree with the Circuit Court that in these circumstances there is no force to the suggested distinction between a case where the assessment has not in fact been made and a case where it has already been made. When made, neither one of these complainants will be called upon to pay a sum equal to the amount of two thousand dollars, nor will any one of the lots be assessed to that amount.Decree affirmed.