Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Wainwright v. Torna

455 U.S. 586

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1982-03-22
Topic
bankruptcy

holding that where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | holding that where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | holding that failure to timely file for writ of certiorari to Florida’s highest court does not amount to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel | holding that where there is no constitutional right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | holding that where there is no constitutional right to counsel for a discretionary appeal there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek discretionary review | holding that defendant in state criminal case did not have a constitutional right to counsel in pursuing discretionary review in the state supreme court | holding that where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | ruling that there can be no ineffective assistance claim where no right to counsel | holding that “[s]ince respondent had no constitutional right to counsel [to pursue a discretionary state appeal], he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.” | holding that the defendant "could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel" due to counsel's "failure to file the application timely" because the defendant "had no constitutional right to counsel" | ruling that there can be no ineffective assistance claim where no right to counsel | holding that in the context of a discretionary appeal before a state’s highest court, “[sjince [the defendant] had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ... ” | stating that because there is no constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals, there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in such appeals | holding that because the defendant had no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in pursuit of state supreme court certiorari, “he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure to file the [certiorari] application timely” | holding that because the defendant had no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in pursuit of state supreme court certiorari, "he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file the [certiorari] application timely" | holding that since, under Ross the appellant had no constitutional right to counsel on a discretionary appeal, he was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to timely file an application for certiorari in the Supreme Court of Florida | noting that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals | reaffirming that “a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or applications for review in this Court.” | explaining that where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | holding where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance | holding where there is no constitutional right to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel | reiterating that “a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or applications for review in this Court” | holding that because the defendant had no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in pursuit of state supreme court certiorari, “he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure to file the [certiorari] application timely” | finding that since the petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel, he was not deprived of effective assistance based on his attorney’s fai

Citator

Cited by
226 opinions
Per Curiam.

Respondent is in custody pursuant to several felony convictions that were affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida. Torna v. State, 358 So. 2d 1109 (1978). The Florida Supreme Court dismissed an application for a writ of certiorari, on the ground that the application was not filed timely.1 362 So. 2d 1057 (1978). A petition for rehearing and clarification was later denied. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-15.

Respondent thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, contending that he had been denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel by the failure of his retained *587 counsel to file the application for certiorari timely. The District Court denied the petition on the ground that the failure to file a timely application for certiorari did not render counsel’s actions “so grossly deficient as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair.” Id., at A-22. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court noted that review by the Florida Supreme Court was discretionary; “[fjailure of counsel to .timely petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, therefore, only prevented [respondent] from applying for further discretionary review.” Id., at A-28. The Court of Appeals reversed. 649 F. 2d 290 (CA5 1981).2

In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), this Court held that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or applications for review in this Court. Respondent does not contest the finding of the District Court that he had no absolute right to appeal his convictions to the Florida Supreme Court.3 Since respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he *588 could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel’s failure to file the application timely.4 The District Court was correct in dismissing the petition.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed informa pauperis is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan would set the case for oral argument.

“It appearing to the Court that the notice was not timely filed, it is ordered that the cause is hereby dismissed sua sponte, subject to reinstatement if timeliness is established on proper motion filed within fifteen days from the date of this order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.120.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-13.

Citing its decision in Pressley v. Wainwright, 540 F. 2d 818 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 987 (1977), the court first noted that “the failure of court-appointed counsel to file a timely notice of certiorari in the Florida Supreme Court has been held to constitute ineffective assistance.” 649 F. 2d, at 291. On the basis of the recent decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), the court then stated that “there is no distinction between court-appointed and privately retained counsel in the evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance.” 649 F. 2d, at 292. Finally, the court quoted its recent decision in Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F. 2d 596, 598 (1981), for the proposition that “‘when a lawyer . . . does not perform his promise to his client that an appeal will be taken, fairness requires that the deceived defendant be granted an out-of-time appeal.’ ” 649 F. 2d, at 292. On the basis of these statements, the court reversed “the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus,” ibid., and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Like this Court, the Florida Supreme Court has a limited mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See Fla. Const., Art. V, §3. Respondent has never contended, however, that he had a right of review under that jurisdiction. Thus, we need not determine the extent of the right to counsel in such a case.

Respondent was not denied due process of law by the fact that counsel deprived him of his right to petition the Florida Supreme Court for review. Such deprivation — even if implicating a due process interest — was caused by his counsel, and not by the State. Certainly, the actions of the Florida Supreme Court in dismissing an application for review that was not filed timely did not deprive respondent of due process of law.