United States v. United States Steel Corporation

Headnotes

1. Antitrust & Competition Law — Monopoly — Combination Distinguished from Monopoly The formation of an industrial combination with the expectation of achieving a monopoly does not, by itself, make the combination a monopoly within the meaning of the antitrust laws; the statute is directed against the realization of monopoly, not against an expectation of it. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920)
2. Antitrust & Competition Law — Monopoly — Requisite Degree of Power Possession of power greater than that of any single competitor, but not greater than that possessed by all competitors combined, does not constitute a monopoly. 251 U.S. at 444
3. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade An industrial combination that falls short of monopoly is not objectionable merely because of its size — its capital and productive capacity — or merely because it possesses the power to restrain competition, where that power is not exerted; the acquisition of a preponderant position in a trade, whether by size or power, without unlawful intent and without excluding practices, does not amount to restraint of trade or monopoly at common law or under the antitrust laws where no actual monopoly or actual restraint results. 251 U.S. at 447, 450 et seq.
4. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The antitrust statute prohibits overt acts and trusts to their repression and punishment, and a criminal statute does not equate the mere acquisition of the power to violate it with actual violation; power to do wrong cannot be confounded with wrongdoing itself. 251 U.S. at 451
5. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade That competitors of a combination voluntarily follow its prices does not establish an unlawful restraint, since the antitrust laws do not compel competition, and acceptance of a corporation's prices is not submission to irresistible power absent confederated action or other evidence of illegal influence. 251 U.S. at 449–451
6. Antitrust & Competition Law — Equitable Relief — Discretion to Adapt Remedies to Existing Conditions In commanding courts to prevent and restrain violations of the antitrust laws, the statute has regard to conditions as they exist when relief is invoked and to the usual powers of a court of equity to adapt its remedies to those conditions; courts are not expected to enforce abstractions to the subversion of the statute's own purposes but must determine, in each instance, the relief appropriate to execution of its policy. 251 U.S. at 452
7. Antitrust & Competition Law — Equitable Relief — Transient and Abandoned Practices A corporation alleged to be an illegal combination is not subject to present relief on the basis of past efforts to fix and maintain prices where those practices were transient in purpose and effect, were abandoned before suit was brought because of their futility, have not been resumed, and no intention or dangerous probability of resumption is shown. 251 U.S. at 444 et seq.; cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396
8. Antitrust & Competition Law — Equitable Relief — Form of Decree Even assuming a corporation was in origin a combination of competing companies actuated by an unlawful purpose, where that purpose and the illegal practices following the combination were abandoned as futile months before suit was brought and the combination as viewed at the time of decision is neither in itself nor by its conduct offensive to the statute, the policy of the law — which respects the public interest as paramount — would be defeated rather than served by dissolving the combination or separating its parts for retrospective reasons alone. 251 U.S. at 444 et seq.
9. Antitrust & Competition Law — Evidence — Weight of Testimony on Absence of Restraint On the question whether possessed power operated per se as an illegal restraint, testimony of officers, competitors, and customers that competition was not restrained and that prices varied or remained constant according to natural conditions must be accepted as clearly outweighing a government expert's generalization that constancy of prices during certain periods evidenced artificial interference. 251 U.S. at 447
10. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade Competition affects prices, but it is only one among other influences and does not register itself in more definite and legible effect than they do; a finding of illegal restraint cannot rest on speculation or equivocal deductions, but requires surer grounds for judgment. 251 U.S. at 447, 450 et seq.
11. Antitrust & Competition Law — Monopolization A violation of the antitrust statute may consist either of acts done in violation of the statute or of a condition brought about which, in and of itself, is not only a continued attempt to monopolize but also a monopolization; where such a condition has been brought about, the duty to enforce the statute requires the application of broader and more controlling remedies than in the case of acts done in violation of the statute. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77
12. Antitrust & Competition Law — Equitable Relief — Consideration of Lapse of Time and Reliance In determining relief for a violation of the antitrust laws, it is a matter for consideration that no legal attack was made on the corporation until ten years after its formation and the commencement of its career; the significance of the delay is not merely its duration or any estoppel arising from it, but what was done during that time — the sums expended, the development undertaken, the enterprises launched, and the public investments invited, which are not to be ignored. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 et seq. (1920)
13. Antitrust & Competition Law — Monopolization Complete monopolization of a business need not be attained for the antitrust laws to apply; to require such a result would exceed the requirements of the statute and in most cases be practically impossible. 251 U.S. at 444 et seq.
14. Antitrust & Competition Law — Attempt to Monopolize — Intent and Dangerous Probability Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result the law seeks to prevent, such as monopoly, but require further acts beyond the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it about is necessary to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen; when that intent and consequent dangerous probability exist, the antitrust law, like other statutes and the common law, directs itself against the dangerous probability as well as against the completed result. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396; Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272
15. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade Combinations of formerly competitive units that together occupy an overwhelmingly preponderant position in a distinct branch of trade, and that are organized for the purpose of suppressing competition and increasing prices, are combinations in restraint of trade. Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 394
16. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The fact that a combination in restraint of trade is created in corporate form rather than by loose agreement is immaterial where its purpose and effect are to restrain trade; where corporations exchange their plants and businesses for stock in a consolidated corporation, the resulting combination is in principle no different from a combination in the form of a trust that the statute specifically prohibits. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 176, 181; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 326–327
17. Antitrust & Competition Law — Holding Companies — Centralized Control of Competitors The legal situation is not changed by substituting a holding company as the instrument of combination; vesting in a holding company the capital stock of a group of able competitors for the purpose of centralizing control is no more lawful, and no more a normal method of business development, than the similar centralization of control in common trustees under the old form of trust. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324
18. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade A combination of able competitors occupying an overwhelmingly preponderant position in a given trade unduly restricts competition by its necessary effect and is therefore unlawful regardless of purpose; a wrongful purpose may be shown only as a matter of aggravation. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 447, 450 et seq. (1920)
19. Antitrust & Competition Law — Purpose — Proof by Inference The purposes of illegal combinations are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony and must be inferred from the circumstances. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612
20. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade A sharp distinction is drawn between the mere purchase of a competing business and a combination of competing businesses clothed in the form of purchases; if the corporations combined through a holding company are either competitors themselves or illegal combinations of competitive businesses, the idea of integration is excluded. Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423
21. Antitrust & Competition Law — Integration — Supplements vs. Competitors Integration consists in combining supplementary, non-competitive trade units; it does not include the centralization of control of an entire industry by first separately combining competitors in the various branches thereof and then uniting them in one super-combination. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217
22. Antitrust & Competition Law — Mental Intent — Immateriality of Other Intent Where Act Prohibited The intent to violate the law implied from doing what the law prohibits renders immaterial every other intent, purpose, or motive; the contention that a combination of great size and power was a necessary means to attain efficiency and promote foreign trade is but another way of saying that good intentions can save the combination from illegality. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 341; Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 234, 243; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396
23. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade A contract or combination may, by its own inherent nature or effect and without more, restrain trade within the purview of the statute. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 46
24. Antitrust & Competition Law — Statutory Construction — Legislative Rather Than Judicial Policy A construction of the antitrust laws that would require courts to decide not only whether a given combination prevents effective competition or constitutes a virtual monopoly, but also whether monopoly would on the whole be a better policy than competition, would compel courts to act on legislative grounds. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 46
25. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade Even if it would have been lawful for many independent businesses combined through a holding company to unite to some extent to develop foreign trade, that cannot justify the complete and permanent suppression of competition between them in domestic trade. United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 F. 964, 1016; United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 93
26. Antitrust & Competition Law — Continuing Violation — Effect of Relative Decline in Trade Proportion A relative decline in a combination's proportion of the trade does not curtail the power of the combination, and where the decline still leaves the combination in an overwhelmingly preponderant position it is of no legal consequence whatever; the original vice persists and the combination remains a continually operating force restraining trade under the first section of the act and a perennial violation of the second section prohibiting monopoly. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 96; United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601
27. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade Where a combination suppresses competition between the parties to the combination themselves, the only question is whether the combination embraces competitors in sufficient number and of sufficient importance to make the resulting restriction of competition a substantial or undue restriction; whether the combination also attempts to hinder the competition of outsiders is of no weight except as a matter of aggravation. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 96
28. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The contention that a combination is not unlawful because its power, though great, is not great enough to enable it alone to fix and maintain prices would require a combination of competitors to amount to a monopoly to fall within the prohibition — a theory rejected from the first case under the antitrust act. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16; Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 F. 610, 624
29. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The test of the legality of a combination is not its present effect upon prices, wages, or the quality of products, nor its present conduct toward remaining competitors, but its effect upon competition; if the effect is unduly to restrict competition, it is immaterial that for the time being the combination may exercise its power benevolently. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 447, 450 et seq. (1920)
30. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade Forbearance by a combination from the exercise of its power to drive remaining competitors from the field or to prevent new ones from entering is on no different footing from good conduct of any other sort; where a combination takes in so large a proportion of the competitors or competitive units that effective competition no longer exists, it is no defense to say that the combination is doing nothing to prevent the restoration of competitive conditions. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 447, 450 et seq. (1920)
31. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade For private trading and manufacturing companies, as distinguished from railroads, the antitrust act distinguishes between restraint of competition and restraint of trade, such that restraint of competition must be undue or unreasonable to amount to restraint of trade; whether it does so must be determined upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106; United States v. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 188 F. 127, 150
32. Antitrust & Competition Law — Railroads vs. Private Companies — Duty to Compete In cases involving combinations of railroad corporations, the combining corporations were under a duty to compete, so any substantial suppression of competition between them was illegal and the scope of the combination alone determined its illegality; no such rule has ever been applied to private trading or manufacturing companies, because such companies are under no duty to compete. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 334; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 373; United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 88; Meredith v. N.J. Zinc & Iron Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 212, 221
33. Antitrust & Competition Law — Unreasonable Restraint — Factors Determining Undueness Whether a restraint is unreasonable, and therefore undue, depends upon three things: the extent of the control acquired, the method by which the control was brought about, and the manner in which the control has been exercised. United States v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 224 U.S. 383
34. Antitrust & Competition Law — Equitable Jurisdiction — Injunction Against Existing or Threatened Violations Equity jurisdiction under the statute authorizes the Attorney General to institute proceedings to prevent or restrain violations, but injunctive power is never exercised to redress wrongs already committed; it applies only to restrain existing or threatened violations. High on Injunctions, § 23; Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies, vol. I, § 262
35. Antitrust & Competition Law — Combinations — Abandonment of Illegal Practices Before Suit Where an alleged illegal combination's price-fixing practices were transient in purpose and effect, were abandoned before suit was brought because of their futility rather than fear of prosecution, have not been resumed, and no intention or dangerous probability of resumption is shown, the combination is not subject to present relief on the basis of those past practices, and a court is not justified in dissolving the corporation on that basis. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 et seq. (1920)
36. Antitrust & Competition Law — Monopoly — Power Attributable to Combination Versus Productive Capacity A corporation's greater size and productive power than any competitor, equal or nearly equal to them all, does not render its power over prices commensurate with its power to produce. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
37. Antitrust & Competition Law — Dissolution — Twofold Character of Relief Where organizations are found within the condemnation of the antitrust laws, the relief granted must be twofold: it must forbid the future doing of acts like those found to have been done in the past that would violate the statute, and it must exert such measure of relief as will effectually dissolve the combination found to exist in violation of the statute so as to neutralize the extension and continually operating force which the possession of unlawfully obtained power has brought about and will continue to bring about. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78
38. Antitrust & Competition Law — Dissolution — Remedy and Remand In an antitrust case the only effectual remedy is to dissolve the combination and the companies comprising it, and for that purpose the cause is remanded to the district court to hear the parties and determine a method of dissolution and of recreating from the composing elements a new condition honestly in harmony with, and not repugnant to, the law. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
39. Antitrust & Competition Law — Dissolution — Lapse of Time No Objection That dissolved corporations had long been in existence, and that the offending companies were organized years before suit was brought and before the decree of dissolution was finally made, is no valid objection to dissolving powerful organizations as the only effective means of enforcing the purposes of the antitrust act. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
40. Antitrust & Competition Law — Immunity No public policy sanctions a violation of the law; inconvenience to domestic or foreign trade, or the assumed disastrous effect of dissolution upon foreign trade, does not entitle a combination organized in defiance of the antitrust laws to immunity from the enforcement of those laws. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 et seq. (1920)
41. Antitrust & Competition Law — Statutory Purpose — Congressional Limitation of Combination Power Congress intended the antitrust act to limit and control the effective power of organizations to restrain competition and the freedom of trade, and a combination is not beyond the authority of the act merely because its power to control competition may be withheld or exercised with forbearing benevolence; the statute was intended to prohibit the formation of such combinations and, once formed, to deprive them of the power unlawfully attained. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
42. Antitrust & Competition Law — Statutory Purpose — Prevention of Evils Before They Occur The broader policy of the antitrust act is not to wait until increased prices, limited production, degraded product quality, decreased wages, or oppression of competitors are already upon us, but to prevent their occurrence by striking at their underlying cause — the undue concentration of commercial power through the process of combination. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
43. Antitrust & Competition Law — Judicial Construction — Congress as Source of Change The interpretation of the antitrust statute by the courts has become a part of the law itself, and if changes are to be made in its construction or operation, that authority rests with Congress and not with the courts. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 (1920)
44. Antitrust & Competition Law — Purpose and Effect of Acquisition — Consideration of Presidential Approval The purpose and effect of a corporation's acquisition of control of another company are considered in the light of prior presidential approval of the transaction and the President's testimony concerning it. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 446 (1920)
45. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restriction of Competition — Undueness and Preponderant Position Whether a restriction of competition through voluntary combinations is undue depends primarily upon the extent of the restriction, and the restriction is certainly undue where the combination embraces units that together occupy a preponderant position in a given industry; what constitutes a preponderant position must be determined in light of conditions in the particular branch of trade affected, considering the portion of the trade engrossed by the combination as compared with that of each competitor and with the whole, and the extent of any control acquired over raw materials, the agencies of transportation and distribution, or the reserve supply where the article's supply is limited by nature. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 447, 450 et seq. (1920)
46. Antitrust & Competition Law — Normal Growth Versus Combination The antitrust act was not intended to set a limit to the enlargement of a business by normal growth, the competitive system being in no danger from that quarter; the purpose of the parties is important in determining whether growth is normal, and once normal growth is out of the way it is of no further consequence how the combination was created, whether through simple agreement, the old form of trust, a holding company, or actual purchase and consolidation of plants. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444, 447 (1920)
47. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The antitrust act denounces combinations whose purpose and effect are to restrain trade, and the fact that a challenged corporation did not increase profits by reducing employee wages, lowering product quality, creating artificial scarcity, oppressing or coercing competitors, securing freight rebates, or requiring customers to enter restrictive purchase or resale contracts does not immunize an otherwise unlawful combination. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
48. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restraint of Trade The defense of good conduct — that a combination did not abuse its power, resorted to no brutalities or tyrannies, and competed fairly — is not a valid defense to a combination whose effect is unduly to restrict competition. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
49. Antitrust & Competition Law — Combinations — Statutorily Denounced Conduct The antitrust law denounces monopolies and directs the courts of the Nation to prevent and restrain violations of the act; the command to prevent and restrain violations is necessarily submissive to the conditions that may exist and to the usual powers of a court of equity to adapt its remedies to those conditions, and the appropriate relief in each instance is remitted to a court of equity to determine in submission to the law and its policy. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 (1920)
50. Antitrust & Competition Law — Equitable Discretion — Flexibility and Law The flexibility of discretion of a court of equity is an essential function and the source of its value in our jurisprudence, but the law is its own measure and cannot be disregarded; a court of equity is not expected to enforce abstractions and thereby do injury, possibly, to the purpose of the law. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 (1920)
51. Antitrust & Competition Law — Foreign Trade — Consideration in Framing Decree In framing a decree in an antitrust case, the foreign trade that has been developed and exists is a matter for consideration, and under congressional legislation (the Webb Act) the foreign trade of the corporation is reserved to it; a company may be constructed so as to be easily preserved as a medium through which the steel business might reach the balance of the world, and such preservation may be provided in a decree of dissolution. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 et seq. (1920)
52. Antitrust & Competition Law — Combinations — Overcapitalization and Anticipated Fruits of Combination Acquiring competing producing concerns at figures based not upon their physical or business values as independent producers but upon their values in combination, and issuing capital stock vastly in excess of the values of the properties purchased, capitalizes the anticipated fruits of combination; the immediate and normal effect of such combinations is a complete elimination of competition between the concerns absorbed and a corresponding restraint of trade. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
53. Antitrust & Competition Law — Combinations — Prior Illegal Combinations and Succession to Power A corporation that brings under its control large competing companies which were themselves illegal combinations succeeds to their power; where organizers of a corporation were parties to the preceding combinations, participated in their illegality, and by uniting them under a common direction intended to augment and perpetuate their power, the conclusion follows that the great profits to be derived from unified control were the object of the organizations. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
54. Antitrust & Competition Law — Combinations — Rejection of Inevitable Industrial Evolution Defense The contention that a combination was an inevitable evolution of industrial tendencies compelling union of endeavor must be rejected. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
55. Antitrust & Competition Law — Sherman Act — Direct Violation by Combining Previous Combinations The organization of a corporation to combine previous combinations into one great corporation constitutes a direct violation of the purposes and terms of the Sherman Act; an unlawful organization that exerts its power to control and maintain prices by pools, associations, trade meetings, and agreements violates the Act. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
56. Antitrust & Competition Law — Sherman Act — Corporate Power Derived from Unlawful Combinations Under the Sherman Act corporate power may not legally be derived from conspiracies, combinations, or contracts in restraint of trade; to permit power to be so derived would practically annul the Sherman Law by judicial decree. Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 676–677; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 324; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197; Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238; United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 88
57. Antitrust & Competition Law — Sherman Act — Permissible Contracts of Lawful Expansion The Sherman Act does not condemn normal and usual contracts to lawfully expand business and further legitimate trade. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106; United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324; Straus v. American Publishers' Assn., 231 U.S. 222
58. Antitrust & Competition Law — Sherman Act — Effective Reach of All Undue Combinations Congress intended the Sherman Act to effectively reach and control all conspiracies, combinations, or contracts of whatever form that unduly restrain competition and unduly obstruct the natural course of trade, or that by their nature or effect have proved effectual to restrain interstate commerce. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106; United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324; Straus v. American Publishers' Assn., 231 U.S. 222; Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
59. Antitrust & Competition Law — Decree — Undoing Violations for Effective Enforcement Where the facts establish that a corporation was organized and operated in open, notorious, and continued violation of the Sherman Act, there must be a decree undoing so far as possible that which was achieved by the violation if the Act is to be given efficacy; effective enforcement of the Act's purposes requires the relief historically granted in the cases frequently followed by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)
60. Antitrust & Competition Law — Sherman Act — Criminal Formation of Combinations The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was intended to make it criminal to form combinations, enter conspiracies, or make contracts in restraint of interstate trade, and not merely to suppress unfair practices; the remedy by injunction at the instance of the Attorney General was given to enable courts to prohibit conspiracies, combinations, and contracts in restraint of interstate trade. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 452 et seq. (1920)
61. Antitrust & Competition Law — Restoration of Competitive Conditions — Plan of Remand On a finding of a combination in control of one-half of the steel business of the country, a decree may be framed restoring competitive conditions as far as practicable, following the plan of remanding the case to the district court as in the American Tobacco case. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 F. 371
62. Antitrust & Competition Law — Combination Embracing Preponderant Industry Share — Defense of Non-Restoration A combination's control over so large a proportion of competitors or competitive units that effective competition no longer exists cannot be defended on the ground that the combination is doing nothing to prevent the restoration of competitive conditions. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450 et seq. (1920)