United States v. Texas

holding that the Attorney General did not satisfy Ex parte Young exception because he did not possess “any enforcement authority” for Texas Senate Bill 8 | holding that while private parties bringing suits under a state statute “may be litigants adverse to the petitioners,” the “state-court judges who decide them generally are not” | finding that no law suggests allowing injunctive relief against state-court clerks while holding the judges they serve immune from suit | finding that no law suggests allowing injunctive relief against state-court clerks while holding the judges they serve immune from suit | finding that no law suggests allowing injunctive relief against state-court clerks while holding the judges they serve immune from suit | stating that “nothing … supports the[] novel suggestion that we should allow … relief against state-court clerks, all while simultaneously holding the judges they serve immune” | explaining that Ex parte Young “allows certain private parties to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive offi- cials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law” | “Accordingly, on the record before us the petitioners cannot establish ‘personal injury fairly traceable to [Mr. Dickson’s] allegedly unlawful conduct.’” | considering whether the pendent-appellate-jurisdiction exception was met in the context of an interlocutory appeal in a criminal case | rejecting a pre-enforcement challenge to a Texas law providing for civil enforcement of abortion ban | reasoning an Article III case or controversy typically does not exist in actions against state court clerks | noting the “traditional remedy” when a state court errs is “some form of appeal” | ordering lower court to dismiss injunctive-relief case against a defendant for lack of standing | noting the “traditional remedy” when a state court errs is “some form of appeal” | unanimously rejecting the Ex Parte Young relief against state-court judges, and with majority reaching the same conclusion with respect to state-court clerks | “Generally, States are 24 immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign l immunity.” | “[U]nder traditional equitable principles, no court may enjoin the world at large, or purport to enjoin challenged laws themselves.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) | “the ‘chilling effect’ associated with a potentially unconstitutional law being ‘on the books’ is insufficient to ‘justify federal intervention’ in a pre-enforcement suit” | Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgement in part and dissenting in part, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. | “[U]nder traditional equitable principles, no court may lawfully enjoin the world at large, or purport to enjoin challenged laws themselves.” | “To read S[enate] B[ill] 8 as barring any collateral enforcement mechanisms without a specific exclusion would thus threaten to render this statutory language superfluous.” | “To read S[enate] B[ill] 8 as barring any collateral enforcement mechanisms without a specific exclusion would thus threaten to render this statutory language superfluous.” | “Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” | “[T]he petitioners do not direct this Court to any enforcement authority the attorney general possesses in connection with S. B. 8 that a federal court might enjoin him from exercising.” | “In this preliminary posture, the ultimate merits question—whether S. B. 8 is consistent with the Federal Constitution—is not before the Court. Nor is the wisdom of S. B. 8 as a matter of public policy.” | referring to Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 526 (1984)

(Slip Opinion)            Cite as: 

 (2021)                                 1

                                      Per Curiam

       NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
       preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
       notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
       ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
       corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                      _________________

                                 No. 21–588 (21A85)
                                      _________________


     UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. TEXAS, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                                 [December 10, 2021]

  PER CURIAM.
  The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted. The application to vacate stay presented to
JUSTICE ALITO and by him referred to the Court is denied.

                                                                     It is so ordered.

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would grant the application to va-
cate stay in No. 21A85 and dissents from the dismissal of
No. 21–588 as improvidently granted.