United States v. Shirey

Mr. Justice Frankfurter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On July 23, 1954, an information was filed -in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania charging appellee with a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 214 (originally § 1 of the Act of December 11, 1926, 44 Stat. 918). That statute provides:

“Whoever pays or offers or promises any money or thing of value, to any person, firm, or corporation *256 in consideration of the use or promise to use any influence to procure any appointive office or place under the United States for any person, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”

The information alleged that appellee had offered S. Walter Stauffer, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, to contribute $1,000 a year to the Republican Party in consideration of Stauffer’s use of influence to procure for appellee the postmastership of York, Pennsylvania. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States. 168 F. Supp. 382. The Government appealed directly to this Court, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 358 U.. S. 806, to determine whether the allegations of the information constituted a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 214.1

We turn first to the language of the statute. There are alternative constructions of its language. One sensible reading is to say that even though the Republican Party was to be the ultimate recipient of the money, this was a promise to Stauffer of money (which it plainly was) in consideration of his use of influence. Since Stauffer is a “person,” the statute covers the alleged offense. It may be urged that although a promise was made to

*257 Stauffer it was not a promise of money to him. Since the word “to” immediately follows the words “money or thing of value” and not the word “promises,” it is possible to read the statute as requiring that the recipient of the money or thing of value be the “person, firm, or corporation”, which the statute describes. But either construction of the statute covers the classic three-party case: e. g., A tells X he will give $1,000 to Y if X will use influence to get him a job. . Under the first construction this is a promise of $1,000 to X in consideration of the use of influence. Under the second construction this is a promise ,to give money to Y in consideration of a promise to use influence; a standard third-party beneficiary situation. The only difficulty with this second construction in the context of this ease is the necessity of finding that the Republican Party is a “person, firm, or corporation,” as those .words are used in the statute. The Republican Party is not a legal entity. It is an amorphous group of individuals that acts and only can 'act through persons. Its funds are received and managed by persons. Certainly the word “person” in the statute is broad enough to include the Republican Party, and since the content and manifest purpose of the statute confirm, as we shall see, such a construction, it would unjustifiably contract the law to withdraw gifts to the Republican Party from its scope.2 *258 Thus, no matter how the statute is read, one thing is clear — its terms cover this case. Shirey’s endeavor to purchase himself a postmastership as alleged has been interdicted by the Congress. Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings, each of which is satisfied by the allegations of the information, constitute a want of definiteness.

Not only does the compulsion of language within the statutory , framework seem clear, but the purpose and history of the enactment powerfully reaffirm the meaning *259 yielded by its language. The bill was first introduced in Congress with a Committee Report which stated:

“This bill seeks to punish the purchase and sale of public offices. Certain Members of Congress have brought to the attention of the House both by speeches on the floor and statements before the Judiciary Committee a grave situation, disclosing corruption in connection with postal appointments in Mississippi and South Carolina. It is believed that this bill will prevent corrupt practices in connection with patronage appointments in thé future.” H. R. Rep. No. 1366, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.

The information in this case deals, with the very kind of situation that gave rise to the pro vision, under scrutiny. In the years preceding the enactment of this legislation members of Congress referred to contributions to party treasuries and to campaign funds, as well as direct payments to those in charge of patronage, as among the corrupt methods of obtaining postmasterships.3 See, e. g., 65 Cong. Rec. 1*408-1413. These revelations on the floor of the Congress, as disclosed by the authoritative history of enactment, indicate the aim of Congress to proscribe *260 payments to political. parties in return for influence. Indeed this form of payment was a major concern of Congress. Certainly we. cannot infer that Congress expressed this concern in self-defeating terms.4

Statutes, including penal enactments, are not inert exercises in literary composition. They are instruments of government, and in construing them “the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any *261 rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.” United States v. Whitridge, 197 U. S. 135, 143. This is so because the purpose of an enactment is embedded in its words even though it is not always pedantically expressed in words. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 399. Statutory meaning, it is to be remembered, is more to be felt than demonstrated, see United States v. Johnson, 221 U. S. 488, 496, or, as Judge Learned Hand has put it, the art of interpretation is “the art of proliferating a purpose.” Brooklyn Nat. Corp. v. Comm’r, 157 F. 2d 450, 451. In ascertaining this purpose it is important to remember that no matter how elastic is the use to which the term scientific may be put, it cannot be used to describe the legislative process. That is a crude but practical process of the adaptation by the ordinary citizen of means to an end, except when it concerns technical problems beyond the ken of the average man.

Applying these generalities to the immediate occasion, it is clear that the terms, the history, and the manifest purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 214 coalesce in a construction of that statute which validates the information against Shirey.5 The evil which Congress sought to check and the mischief wrought by what it proscribed are the same when the transaction is triangular as when only two parties are *262 involved.6 It is incredible to suppose that Congress meant to prohibit Shirey from giving $1,000 to Stauffer, to be passed on by the latter to the Party fund, but that Shirey was outside the congressional prohibition for securing the same influence by a promise to deposit $1,000 directly in the Party’s fund. That is not the kind of finessing by which this Court has heretofore allowed penal legislation to be construed. See, e. g., United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, and United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385.

The judgment is

Reversed.

The information charges as follows:

“On or about the 5th day of December 1953, in the City of York, Middle District of Pennsylvania, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, GEORGE DONALD SHIREY, in violation of the Act of Congress, June 25, 1948, c 645, Sec. 1, 62 Stat. 694,18 U. S. C. Sec. •214, did KNOWINGLY, WILFULLY and UNLAWFULLY offer or promise to S. WALTER STAUFFER, a Member of Congress of the 19th Congressional District of Pennsylvania, to donate $1,000 a year to the Republican Party to be used as they see fit, in consideration of the use or the promise to use any influence 'to procure for him the appointive office, under thé United States, of Postmaster of York, Pennsylvania,”..

Whether the word “person” in a particular statute includes a' particular body, a corporation, or association is essentially a matter of construction of that statute, aided, where possible, by general statutory definitions. If the purpose of a statute is such as to dictate the inclusion of a particular body within its scope then the statute is. generally so interpreted: Since 18 U. S. C. § 214 was aimed at prohibiting the purchase of influence, it is difficult to conclude that Congress would prohibit payments to firms and corporations and not proscribe payments to political organizations, since the influence of political parties in securing jobs and their involvement in the patronage process is greater than that of private companies. We must be blind not to know that among the abuses which led to the legislation *258 were gifts to political parties and campaign treasuries, etc. Although these mostly took the form of payments to local chairmen, etc., there is no reason to assume that Congress meant to proscribe the payment to the officer of the Party but if a check were made out to the Party itself, a check which could be cashed and used by the officers of the Party, it was not outlawed.

In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, the Court decided that § 7 of the Sherman Act allowing "any person” to bring a treble damage action, allowed the State of Georgia to bring such an action. This was in the face of an earlier case holding that the same act did not allow the United States to' sue. In reconciling the cases the Court pointed out that the scope of the word “person” depended on its “legislative environment,” and pointed to the differences in considerations which led to the exclusion of the United States and the inclusion of Georgia.

In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, a statute taxed “persons” selling liquor. Person was defined to include “partnership, association, company or corporation, as well as a natural person.” The Court decided this allowed a State to be taxed, saying that the meaning of the word person “depends upon the connection in which the word is found.”

In Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, the Court said that the word “person” in a Texas statute of limitations included the United States, and thus the United States could claim the benefit of the statute. The Court said that “the word ‘person’ in the statute would include them as a body politic and corporate.”

Under these principles the statutory context here clearly calls for including the Republican Party within the term “person.”

The bill was introduced by Congressman Stevenson. 67 Cong. Rec. 6419. Two years before, in describing the “corruption in connection with postal appointments in . . . South Carolina” to which the Committee Report refers, Congressman Stevenson said, in response to the' question “Where did this money finally find its home?”:

“I do not know: As I said here once before, I doubt if much of it gets to thé Republican executive committee, but I do not care where it goes. Either it goes into his pocket and the pockets of his machine or it goés into the coffers of the Republican Party. If it does, it is the most blatant defiance of the civil service law that any party has ever had the hardihood to put over, and it is as disgraceful as the Teapot Dome proposition any day.” 65 Cong. Rec. 1410.

When the bill which became § 1 of the Act of December 11, 1926 (now 18 U. S. C. § 214), was introduced in the House, it was coupled with a bill requiring the filing of an affidavit by certain officers of the United States. (This bill, with changes from its original wording, is now 5 U. S. C. § 21a.) Mr. Graham, introducing both bills, said: “They are correlative. T promised the committee and the gentlemen who are proponents of the bill that I would try to get unanimous consent to consider both bills together.” 67 Cong. Réc. 10840.

The text of this “correlative” bill was as follows:

. “Be it enacted, etc., That each individual hereafter appointed as an officer of the United States by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or by the President alone, or by a court of law, or by the head of a department, shall, within 30 days after the effective date of his appointment, file with the Comptroller General of the United States an affidavit under oath stating that neither , he nor anyone acting in his behalf has given, transferred, or paid any consideration for or in the expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing such appointment.

“Sec. 3. When used in this Act the term ‘consideration’ includes a payment, distribution, gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or anything of value, or a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make such a payment, distribution, gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit.” Ibid.

This Act has been since amended, but the portions here relevant— the last phrases - of § 1 — remain unchanged. ' This is the affidavit Shirey would have-to file were he appointed Postmaster of York. It is blear, that he could not truthfujly file such' an affidavit if the allegations of the information are true.' The fact that the sponsor of both bills expressly declared them to be correlative is persuasive evidence that an act which would make the oath impossible to take fe a violation, of § 214.

This Court reviews judgments, not arguments assailing them or seeking' to sustain them. See Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382, 389. The judgment which the Government brought here for review under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 is that “The information does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United. States.” The correctness of this judgment depends on the construction of 18 U. S. C. §214 and more particularly whether that section supports the allegations of the information. Arguments invoked by the Government do not determine the meaning of a statute nor do they define the scope of our inquiry into its meaning. If §214 brings the allegations of this information within its scope, an offense is charged and the course of the Government’s reasoning is beside the point.

It is claimed that because § 2 of the Act of December 11, 1926, 44 Stat. 918, which deals with the user of influence, is restricted in scope to the-“payee” of the money or thing'of value, a similar restriction must be read into § 1. There is not one shred of evidence in the legislative history or in the statutes themselves to indicate that the two sections are in any way to be read “in pari materia.” In fact, normal principles of statutory construction tell us that the use of the word “payee” in § 2, and its absence.in § 1, is convincing evidence that the provisions are different in scope and not congruent. A look at the other statutes in the bribery and graft section of 18 U. S. C. shows that the wording of other Acts directed to the receipt and offer of bribes, ete., is not identical in the statute directed to offer and that directed to receipt. Whether this would mean a difference in ultimate construction is not now our concern.