Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Schooner Peggy

United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1801-12-21
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that a treaty calling for restoration of vessels “not yet definitively condemned,” which became effective while the condemnation order was on appeal, applied to the proceeding and required reversal of the trial court’s judgment
  • vacating the condemnation of a vessel which was hostile when seized, because a United States- French treaty ended hostilities before the condemnation became final
  • basing holding on fact that new treaty expressly applied to property that was not "definitively condemned" at the time the treaty was signed
  • applying terms of convention coming into force while case pending before Supreme Court because convention explicitly applied to pending cases
  • distinguishing between a trial court’s judgment and an appellate court’s decision and holding that an intervening change in the governing legal “rule” must be applied in an ongoing appellate review of the judgment
  • reversing a decree in response to a treaty that issued while the appeal was pending and that provided for the retroactive reassignment of rights to a French vessel as between its French owners and the U.S. government
  • “[I]f ... before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed.”
  • “[I]f, subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed.”

Citator

United States v. Schooner Peggy is good law as far as the corpus records: followed by 1 later decision, and nothing recorded condemns it.

Authority status
positive
Cited by
812 opinions
Followed
1 times

Headnotes

  1. International Law — Supremacy as Law of the Land A treaty is the supreme law of the land under the Constitution, and its obligations bind the courts of the United States; where a treaty as law affects the rights of parties litigating in court, it binds those rights and must be regarded by the court as much as an act of Congress. To condemn a vessel whose restoration is directed by a law of the land would be a direct infraction of that law and is therefore improper.
  2. International Law — Interpretation — Meaning of "Definitively Condemned" A decree or sentence is interlocutory or final according to the power of the particular court that pronounces it, and the last decree of an inferior court is final only in relation to that court's power, not in relation to the property itself unless acquiesced under. A vessel whose condemnation has been appealed from, and which might therefore be reversed, is not "definitively condemned" within the meaning of a treaty provision directing restoration of vessels not yet definitively condemned; construing the term otherwise would render the word "definitive" useless and inoperative.
  3. Civil Procedure — Effect of Supervening Law Although the province of an appellate court is generally only to inquire whether a judgment was erroneous when rendered, if a law intervenes subsequent to the judgment and before the appellate court's decision and positively changes the governing rule, the law must be obeyed or its obligation denied; where a judgment was rightful when rendered but cannot be affirmed except in violation of the law, the judgment must be set aside.
  4. International Law — Retrospective Operation — National Concerns In mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction with a retrospective operation that would affect the rights of parties; but in great national concerns, where individual rights acquired by war are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract making the sacrifice ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import, and it is for the government, not the court, to consider whether compensation is proper where the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens.
The Chief Justice

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this case the court is of opinion that the schooner Peggy is within the provisions of the treaty entered into with France and ought to be restored. This vessel is not considered as being definitively condemned. The argument at the bar which contends that because the sentence of the circuit court is denominated a final sentence, therefore its condemnation is definitive in the sense in which that term is used in the treaty, is not deemed a correct argument. A decree or sentence may be interlocutory or final in the court which pronounces it, and receives its *109 appellation from its determining the power of that particular court over the subject to which it applies, or being only an intermediate order subject to the future control of the same court. The last decree of an inferior court is final in relation to the power of that court, but not in relation to the property itself, unless it be acquiesced under. The terms used in the treaty seem to apply to the actual condition of the property and to direct a restoration of that which is still in controversy between the parties. On any other construction the word definitive would be rendered useless and inoperative. Vessels are seldom if ever condemned but by a final sentence. An interlocutary order for a sale is not a condemnation. A stipulation then for the restoration of vessels not yet condemned, would on this construction comprehend as many cases as a stipulation for the restoration of such as are not yet definitively condemned. Every condemnation is final as to the court which pronounces it, and no other difference is perceived between a condemnation and a final condemnation, than that the one terminates definitively the controversy between the parties and the other leaves that controversy still depending. In this case the sentence of condemnation was appealed from, it might have been reversed, and therefore was not such a sentence as in the contemplation of the contracting parties, on a fair and honest construction of the contract, was designated as a definitive condemnation.

It has been urged that the court can take no notice of the stipulation for the restoration of property not yet definitively condemned, that the judges can only enquire whether the sentence was erroneous when delivered, and that if the judgment was correct it cannot be made otherwise by any thing subsequent to its rendition.

The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United States must be admitted. It is certainly true that the execution of a contract between nations is to be demanded from, and, in the general, superintended by the executive of each nation, and therefore, whatever the decision of this court may be relative to the rights of parties litigating before it, the claim upon the nation if unsatisfied, may still be asserted. *110 But yet where a treaty is the law of the land, and as such affects the rights of parties litigating in court, that treaty as much binds those rights and is as much to be regarded by the court as an act of congress; and although restoration may be an executive, when viewed as a substantive, act independent of, and unconnected with, other circumstances, yet to condemn a vessel, the restoration of which is directed by a law of the land, would be a direct infraction of that law, and of consequence, improper.

It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to enquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied. If the law be constitutional, and of that no doubt in the present case has been expressed, I know of no court which can contest its obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract, making the sacrifice, ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import; and if the nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether it be a case proper for compensation. In such a case the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set aside.