Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Santos
128 S. Ct. 2020
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 2008-06-02
- Topic
- general
holding that a § 2241 petition may be used to assert a claim under United States v. Burrage, 571 U.S. 204 (2018 | holding that payouts to lottery winners were not proceeds because they were essential to continuing the scheme | concluding that certain financial transactions may not be separately punishable as money laundering | concluding that the term “proceeds” in the federal money- laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006), means “profits” and not “receipts,” and that its meaning must be uniform across contexts | noting that Santos is inapplicable because the case did not involve an illegal gambling operation | stating that “rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them” | noting that “context gives meaning” with regard to the circumstances under which a statute is ambiguous | recognizing that “knowledge must almost always be proved[ ] by circumstantial evidence” | holding that when the government alleges that the defendant laundered the “proceeds” of an illegal gambling business, the government must prove that the laundering transactions involved the profits of the business, rather than its gross receipts | explaining that the “knowledge element” of the offense “will be provable (as knowledge must almost always be proved) by circumstantial evidence” | stating that a statutory term must be read “as it is used in the federal . . . statute” | stating that a statutory term must be read "as it is used in the federal ... statute" | observing that Congress “sometimes has defined [proceeds] to mean ‘receipts’ and sometimes ‘profits.’ ” | observing that a “merger problem” would allow prosecutors, in their discretion, to seek the higher penalty for the two merged crimes or both penalties | noting that “[i]t would be arbitrary and capricious for HHS to bring varying interpretations of the statute to bear” based “on mere expedience” | explaining that Clark "held that the meaning of words in a statute cannot change with the statute's application" | observing that Congress “some- times has defined [proceeds] to mean ‘receipts’ and some- times ‘profits.’ ” | observing that Congress “some- times has defined [proceeds] to mean ‘receipts’ and some- times ‘profits.’ ” | noting that "context gives meaning" with regard to the circumstances under which a statute is ambiguous | observing that Congress “sometimes has defined [proceeds] to mean ‘receipts’ and sometimes ‘profits.’ ” | stating that "justice STEVENS expresses the view that the rule of lenity applies to this case because there is no legislative history reflecting any legislator’s belief about how the money-laundering statute should apply to lottery operators” | observing that “knowledge must almost always be proved . . . by circumstantial evidence.” | noting that Congress defined “proceeds” in § 981(a)(2)(A) to mean “receipts” | stating that “to establish the proceeds element under the ‘profits’ interpretation, the prosecution needs to show only that a single instance of specified unlawful activity was profitable and gave rise to the money involved in a charged transaction” | concluding that 55 36 Op. O.L.C. 49 (2012 | noting the term "proceeds" can be defined through dictionary definitions as either "receipts" or "profits" | noting the term “proceeds” can be defined through dictionary definitions as either “receipts” or “profits” | reciting the fundamental principle that “no citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain” | finding that “knowledge must almost always be proved” by circumstantial evidence | stating-that “speculations” as to “a case that is not before” the Court are “the purest of dicta” | applying the rule of lenity to adopt the defendant's proposed definition of "proceeds" in a statute as "profits" | applying the rule of lenity to adopt the defendant’s proposed definition of “proceeds” in a statute as “profits” | relying on the Oxford English Dic
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announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, and in which Justice Thomas joins as to all but Part IV.
We consider whether the term “proceeds” in the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(1), means “receipts” or “profits.”
I
From the 1970’s until 1994, respondent Santos operated a lottery in Indiana that was illegal under state law. See Ind. Code § 35-45-5-3 (West 2004). Santos employed a number of helpers to run the lottery. At bars and restaurants, Santos’s runners gathered bets from gamblers, kept a portion of the bets (between 15% and 25%) as their commissions, and delivered the rest to Santos’s collectors. Collectors, one of whom was respondent Diaz, then delivered the money to Santos, who used some of it to pay the salaries of collectors (including Diaz) and to pay the winners.
These payments to runners, collectors, and winners formed the basis of a 10-count indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, naming Santos, Diaz, and 11 others. A jury found Santos guilty of one count of conspiracy to run an illegal gambling business (18 U. S. C. § 371), one count of running an illegal
Thereafter, respondents filed motions under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, collaterally attacking their convictions and sentences. The District Court rejected all of their claims but one, a challenge to their money-laundering convictions based on the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in United States v. Scialabba, 282 F. 3d 475 (2002), which held that the federal money-laundering statute’s prohibition of transactions involving criminal “proceeds” applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, not criminal receipts. Id., at 478. Applying that holding to respondents’ cases, the District Court found no evidence that the transactions on which the money-laundering convictions were based (Santos’s payments to runners, winners, and collectors and Diaz’s receipt of payment for his collection services) involved profits, as opposed to receipts, of the illegal lottery, and accordingly vacated the money-laundering convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the Government’s contention that Scialabba was wrong and should be overruled. 461 F. 3d 886 (CA7 2006). We granted certiorari. 550 U. S. 902 (2007).
II
The federal money-laundering statute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal “proceeds.” Most relevant to this case is 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), which criminalizes
The federal money-laundering statute does not define “proceeds.” When a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995). “Proceeds” can mean either “receipts” or “profits.” Both meanings are accepted, and have long been accepted, in ordinary usage. See, e. g., 12 Oxford English Dictionary 544 (2d ed. 1989); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1542 (2d ed. 1987); Webster’s New International Dictionary 1972 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster’s 2d). The Government contends that dictionaries generally prefer the “receipts” definition over the “profits” definition, but any preference is too slight for us to conclude that “receipts” is the primary meaning of “proceeds.”
“Proceeds,” moreover, has not acquired a common meaning in the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code. Most leave the term undefined. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1963; 21 U. S. C. § 853. Recognizing the word’s inherent ambiguity, Congress
Since context gives meaning, we cannot say the money-laundering statute is truly ambiguous until we consider “proceeds” not in isolation but as it is used in the federal money-laundering statute. See United Sav. Assn, of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). The word appears repeatedly throughout the statute, but all of those appearances leave the ambiguity intact. Section 1956(a)(1) itself, for instance, makes sense under either definition: One can engage in a financial transaction with either receipts or profits of a crime; one can intend to promote the carrying on of a crime with either its receipts or its profits; and one can try to conceal the nature, location, etc., of either receipts or profits. The same is true of all the other provisions of this legislation in which the term “proceeds” is used. They make sense under either definition. See, for example, § 1956(a)(2)(B), which speaks of “proceeds” represented by a “monetary instrument or funds.”
Section 1956(a)(1) reads as follows: “Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity... (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity . . . shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” Respondents were also convicted of conspiring to launder money under § 1956(h). Because the Government has not argued that respondents’ conspiracy convictions could stand if “proceeds” meant “profits,” see 461F. 3d 886, 889 (CA7 2006), we do not address that possibility.