holding that the federal Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the reprosecution of a defendant for a mistried offense when the jury is unable to reach a verdict | holding that the federal Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the reprosecution of a defendant for a mistried offense when the jury is unable to reach a verdict | holding that a jury’s inability to reach a verdict constitutes a “manifest necessity” for a mistrial | holding that a trial court may discharge a jury without the defendant’s consent whenever ‘taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act’ | holding that a defendant in a capital case might be retried after the trial judge had, without the defendant's consent, discharged a jury that reported itself unable to agree | holding that the authority to discharge a jury "ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes” | holding that a trial court may discharge a jury without the defendant’s consent whenever “taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act” | holding that a mistrial based on a hung jury did not bar retrial | holding that if the jury is unable to agree on a verdict and the trial court discharges the jury for “manifest necessity,” double jeopardy does not bar retrial of the defendant for the “same offence” | explaining that trial court possesses discretion to discharge jury for manifest necessity or when ends of justice would otherwise be defeated | recognizing that trial courts "are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject" of whether "to discharge a jury from giving any verdict [because] there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated" | recognizing that trial courts “are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject” of whether “to discharge a jury from giving any verdict [because] there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated” | holding discharge of hung jury without consent of defendant and without acquittal does not bar retrial | holding discharge of hung jury without consent of defendant and without acquittal does not bar retrial | noting that trial judge should declare a mistrial over the defendant’s objection “under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes” | stating that there must be "manifest necessity for the act" of declaring a mistrial (emphasis supplied) | establishing that trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether a manifest necessity exists due to jury deadlock | stating that such an exception would exist only in a case involving an error so grave that there existed a "`manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated'" | stating that such an exception would exist only in a case involving an error so grave that there existed a “ ‘manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated’ ” | noting that trial judges must “tak[e] all the circumstances into consideration,” “exercise a sound discretion,” and use the power to declare a mistrial “with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances” | requiring “manifest necessity” for a retrial if the defendant either did not move for or did not join in a motion for mistrial | finding no double jeopardy bar where the existence of a deadlocked jury made a mistrial manifestly necessary | stating that such an exception would exist only in a case involving an error so grave that there existed a “ ‘manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated’ ” | finding no double jeopardy bar where the existence of a deadlocked jury made a mistrial manifestly necessary | establishing the principle that, where the trial court grants a mistrial on its own motion or that of the prosecution, retrial is permitted only where there is a