Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Oppenheimer

242 U.S. 85

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1916-12-04
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • declaring that, when a criminal matter is adjudicated upon by a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, that adjudication is final as to the matter so adjudicated upon
  • holding that jeopardy does not attach
  • applying collateral estoppel to sudden-passion punishment-mitigation issue under the rubric of double jeopardy in the pretrial habeas setting
  • applying res judicata to statute of limitations dismissal to preclude a criminal action
  • judgment dismissing indictment on ground that prosecution was barred by statute of limitations was res judicata as to second indictment for same offense
  • “It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt.”
  • Court applied res judicata based upon a former pre-judgment acquittal entered on statute of limitations
  • pre- Ashe case applying collateral estoppel to a statute of limitations defense

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States v. Oppenheimer. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Authority status
pending
Cited by
420 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Criminal Law & Procedure — Guilty Pleas A motion to quash an indictment, based upon a former adjudication that a previous indictment for the same offense was barred by the statute of limitations, is in substance a plea in bar. 242 U.S. at 85 (citing United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78)
  2. Criminal Law & Procedure — Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, the right of the United States to seek review of decisions and judgments sustaining special pleas in bar is not limited to cases in which the decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. 242 U.S. at 85 (citing Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246; United States v. Keitel, 211 U.S. 370; United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601)
  3. Criminal Law & Procedure — Statute of Limitations A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the merits. 242 U.S. at 85 (citing United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78)
  4. Criminal Law & Procedure — Res Judicata A judgment for the defendant on the ground that the prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations goes to his liability as a matter of substantive law, and, however the issue was raised in the former case, after judgment upon it, it cannot be reopened in a later prosecution; such a judgment may be interposed as a conclusive bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 242 U.S. at 85–86
  5. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense was not intended to supplant the fundamental principle of res judicata in criminal cases. 242 U.S. at 85, 87
  6. Criminal Law & Procedure — Finality of Adjudication Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, that adjudication, whether it takes the form of an acquittal or a conviction, is final as to the matter so adjudicated upon and may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense; in this respect the criminal law is in unison with the civil law. 242 U.S. at 87 (quoting Hawkins, J., in The Queen v. Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423, 431)
  7. Criminal Law & Procedure — Res Judicata The quashing of a bad indictment is no bar to a prosecution upon a good one, but a judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the prosecution is barred goes to his liability as a matter of substantive law, and one such judgment is as effective as another. 242 U.S. at 87
UNITED STATESv. OPPENHEIMER,242 U.S. 85(1916)
37 S.Ct. 68
UNITED STATESv. OPPENHEIMER ET AL.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK.
No. 412.
Argued October 19, 20, 1916.
Decided December 4, 1916.
A "motion to quash" an indictment, based upon a former adjudication that a previous indictment for the same offence was barred by the statute of limitations,held, in substance, a plea in bar.United Statesv.Barber,219 U.S. 72,78. Under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564,34 Stat. 1246, the right to review decisions and judgments sustaining special pleas in bar is not limited to cases in which the decisions or judgments are based upon the invalidity or construction of the statutes upon which the indictments are founded.United Statesv.Keitel,211 U.S. 370, andUnited Statesv.Kissel,218 U.S. 601, explained and distinguished. A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the merits. A judgment for defendant that the prosecution is barred by limitations goes to his liability in substantive law; and, in whatever form the issue was raised, such a judgment may be interposed as a conclusive bar to another prosecution for the same offence. The Fifth Amendment, in providing that no one should be twice put in jeopardy, was not intended to supplant the fundamental principle ofres judicatain criminal cases.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren, with whomMr. A.J.Cloptonwas on the briefs, for the United States.Mr. Benjamin Slade, with whomMr. L. Laflin KelloggandMr. Abram J. Rosewere on the briefs, for Oppenheimer.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant in error and others were indicted for a conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy.Page 86Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 29;30 Stat. 544, 554. The defendant Oppenheimer set up a previous adjudication upon a former indictment for the same offence that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the bankruptcy act for offences against that act, § 29d; an adjudication since held to be wrong in another case.United Statesv.Rabinowich,238 U.S. 78. This defence was presented in four forms entitled respectively, demurrer, motion to quash, plea in abatement, and plea in bar. After motion by the Government that the defendant be required to elect which of the four he would stand upon he withdrew the last-mentioned two, and subsequently the court granted what was styled the motion to quash, ordered the indictment quashed and discharged the defendant without day. The Government brings this writ of error treating the so-called motion to quash as a plea in bar, which in substance it was.United Statesv.Barber,219 U.S. 72,78.

The defendant objects that the statute giving a writ of error to the United States "From the decision or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy," Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564,34 Stat. 1246, is limited like the earlier clauses to judgments based on the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. But that limitation expressed in each of the two preceding paragraphs of the statute is not repeated here. The language used inUnited Statesv.Keitel,211 U.S. 370,399, had reference only to the construction of the indictment and to its sufficiency upon matters not involving a statute, in cases brought up by the United States under the earlier clauses of the Act. That quoted fromUnited Statesv.Kissel,218 U.S. 601, so far as material also meant that the sufficiency of the indictment would not be considered here upon a writ of error to the allowance of a plea in bar. In view of our opinion upon the meritsPage 87we do not discuss the preliminary objections at greater length.

Upon the merits the proposition of the Government is that the doctrine ofres judicatadoes not exist for criminal cases except in the modified form of the Fifth Amendment that a person shall not be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; and the conclusion is drawn that a decision upon a plea in bar cannot prevent a second trial when the defendant never has been in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offence charged. It seems that the mere statement of the position should be its own answer. It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt. It cannot be that a judgment of acquittal on the ground of the statute of limitations is less a protection against a second trial than a judgment upon the ground of innocence, or that such a judgment is any more effective when entered after a verdict than if entered by the Government's consent before a jury is empaneled; or that it is conclusive if entered upon the general issue,United Statesv.Kissel,218 U.S. 601,610, but if upon a special plea of the statute, permits the defendant to be prosecuted again. We do not suppose that it would be doubted that a judgment upon a demurrer to the merits would be a bar to a second indictment in the same words.Iowav.Fields,106 Iowa 406. Wharton, Crim. Pl. Pr., 9th ed., § 406.

Of course the quashing of a bad indictment is no bar to a prosecution upon a good one, but a judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the prosecution is barred goes to his liability as matter of substantive law and one judgment that he is free as matter of substantive law is as good as another. A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the merits,United Statesv.Barber,219 U.S. 72,78, and however the issue was raised in the former case,Page 88after judgment upon it, it could not be reopened in a later prosecution. We may adopt in its application to this case the statement of a judge of great experience in the criminal law: "Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, that adjudication, whether it takes the form of an acquittal or conviction, is final as to the matter so adjudicated upon, and may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offence. . . . In this respect the criminal law is in unison with that which prevails in civil proceedings." Hawkins, J., inThe Queenv.Miles, 24 Q.B.D. 423, 431. The finality of a previous adjudication as to the matters determined by it, is the ground of decision inCommonwealthv.Evans,101 Mass. 25, the criminal and the civil law agreeing, as Mr. Justice Hawkins says.Commonwealthv.Ellis,160 Mass. 165.Brittainv.Kinnaird, 1 Brod. B. 432. Seemingly the same view was taken inFrankv.Mangum,237 U.S. 309,334, as it was also inCoffeyv.United States,116 U.S. 436,445.

The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to give the impression that when it did not apply in terms, there was no other principle that could. But the Fifth Amendment was not intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice (Jeterv.Hewitt, 22 How. 352, 364), in order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the Government to prosecute him a second time.Judgment affirmed.Page 89