Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 71 S. Ct. 104 (1950)

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1950-11-13
Topic: general

holding that vacating a judgment as moot and remanding it with a direction to dismiss “eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance” | holding that an appellate court, to avoid effects of issue preclusion, should vacate judgment below if case becomes moot while appeal was pending | holding that a party can waive its right to vacatur of a lower-court order that becomes moot on appeal | holding that the standard practice in federal courts is to vacate judgments that have become moot pending appeal, unless no motion to vacate is made | holding that an appellate court, to avoid effects of issue preclusion, should vacate judgment below if case becomes moot while appeal was pending | holding that vacatur “is commonly used ... to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences” | holding that a party can waive its right to vacatur 32 of a lower-court order that becomes moot on appeal | holding that the final judgment of a district court retains preclusive effect after appeal when that appeal is dismissed without vacating the judgment below | holding that the standard practice in federal courts is to vacate judgments that have become moot pending appeal, unless no motion to vacate is made | holding that “[t]he established practice ... is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss” and collecting cases | holding that the standard practice in federal courts is to vacate judgments that have become moot pending appeal, unless no motion to vacate is made | holding that when a claim becomes moot while a case is pending on appeal the proper disposition is to vacate the judgment of the lower court and remand with instructions to dismiss | holding that where a civil case has become moot pending appeal, the duty of the appellate court is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with instructions to dismiss. | noting that, when a decision is vacated, the path has been cleared "for future relitigation of the issues" | noting that, when a decision is vacated, the path has been cleared “for future relitigation of the issues” | noting that, although "the appellant has no automatic right to vacatur," in ordinary cases courts liberally grant vacatur | noting that the standard practice in cases that become moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment below | explaining that vacatur “avoids giving preclusive effect to a judgment never reviewed by an appellate court” (internal quotation marks omitted) | explaining that vacatur "avoids giving preclusive effect to a judgment never reviewed by an appellate court" (internal quotation marks omitted) | stating that a judgment does not lose its finality simply because the party lost its opportunity to appeal when the case became moot | observing that, where a case has become moot on appeal, "[t]he established practice... is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to dismiss" | stating that motion to vacate judgment "is commonly utilized ... to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences" | noting that "established practice" is for Supreme Court to vacate lower court judgment in cases that have become moot, but allowing judgment in case before it to stand | holding that the established practice of the Supreme Court in dealing with a civil case which has become moot during the pendency of the appellate process is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with direction to dismiss | holding that vaca- tur of the judgment below in a case that has become moot on appeal “clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance” | observing that, where a case has become moot on appeal, “[t]he established practice ... is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to dismiss” | observing that, where a case has

Citator

Cited by: 1067 opinions

UNITED STATESv. MUNSINGWEAR,340 U.S. 36(1950)

71 S.Ct. 104

UNITED STATESv. MUNSINGWEAR, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

Nos. 23 and 24.

Argued October 18, 1950.

Decided November 13, 1950.

The United States sued respondent for alleged violations of a price-fixing regulation, seeking, in separate counts, (1) an injunction and (2) treble damages. By agreement, the second count was held in abeyance pending trial and final determination of the suit for an injunction. Holding that respondent's prices complied with the regulation, the District Court dismissed the complaint. While an appeal was pending the commodity involved was decontrolled, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for mootness. The United States acquiesced in the dismissal and made no motion to vacate the judgment. The District Court then dismissed the action for treble damages on the ground that the matter wasres judicata.Held:The dismissal is sustained. Pp. 37-41.

(a) The issues and the parties being the same in both suits, the District Court having jurisdiction both over the parties and the subject matter, and its judgment in the injunction suit remaining unmodified, the case falls squarely within the rule ofres judicata.Southern Pacific R. Co. v.United States,168 U.S. 1. Pp. 37-38.

(b) The dismissal of the appeal on the ground of mootness and the deprivation of the United States of any review of the case in the Court of Appeals does not warrant an exception to the established rule, even though the United States had a statutory right to review in the Court of Appeals. Pp. 38-41.

(c) The United States could have protected its rights by moving in the Court of Appeals to vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. Having slept on its rights by failing to do so, it cannot obtain relief in this Court. Pp. 39-41.

178 F.2d 204, affirmed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed an order of the District

Court dismissing asres judicataa suit by the United

States for violation of a price regulation.178 F.2d 204.

This Court granted certiorari.339 U.S. 941.Affirmed,

p. 41.

Page 37

Melvin Richterargued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief wereSolicitor General Perlman,Assistant Attorney General Morison, Stanley M. SilverbergandPaul A. Sweeney.John M. Palmerargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief wasH. C. Mackall.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States filed a complaint on two counts against the respondent, alleging violations of a regulation fixing the maximum price of commodities which respondent sold. The first count prayed for an injunction, the second sought treble damages. By agreement and a pretrial order, the second count was held in abeyance pending trial and final determination of the suit for an injunction. The same procedure was followed as respects another suit for treble damages raising the same issues and covering a later period. The District Court held that respondent's prices complied with the regulation. Accordingly it dismissed the complaint.63 F. Supp. 933. The United States appealed from that judgment to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending the commodity involved was decontrolled. Respondent then moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the case had become moot. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal for mootness.162 F.2d 125.

Respondent then moved in the District Court to dismiss the treble damage actions on the ground that the unreversed judgment of the District Court in the injunction suit wasres judicataof those other actions. This motion was granted, the District Court directing the treble damage actions to be dismissed. On appeal the Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, affirmed.178 F.2d 204.

The controversy in each of the suits concerned the proper pricing formula applicable to respondent's commoditiesPage 38under the maximum price regulation. That question was in issue and determined in the injunction suit. The parties were the same both in that suit and in the suits for treble damages. There is no question but that the District Court in the injunction suit had jurisdiction both over the parties and the subject matter. And its judgment remains unmodified. We start then with a case which falls squarely within the classic statement of the rule ofres judicatainSouthern Pacific R. Co. v.United States,168 U.S. 1,48-49:

"The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified."

And seeCromwellv.County of Sac,94 U.S. 351,352;Commissionerv.Sunnen,333 U.S. 591,597-598. The question whether the respondent had sold the commodities in violation of the federal regulation, having been determined in the first suit, is therefore laid at rest by a principle which seeks to bring litigation to an end and promote certainty in legal relations.

That is the result unless the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of mootness and the deprivation of the United States of any review of the case in the Court of Appeals warrant an exception to the established rule.

The absence of a right to appeal was held inJohnsonCo. v.Wharton,152 U.S. 252, to make no difference, the determination in the first suit being binding in a secondPage 39suit on a different claim. Petitioner argues that that case is distinguishable because here Congress provided an appeal. It contends that if the right to appeal is to be protected, the rigors ofres judicatamust be alleviated. Concededly the judgment in the first suit would be binding in the subsequent ones if an appeal, though available, had not been taken or perfected.Wilson's Executorv.Deen,121 U.S. 525;Hubbellv.United States,171 U.S. 203. But it is said that those who have been prevented from obtaining the review to which they are entitled should not be treated as if there had been a review. That is the argument. The hardship of a contrary rule is presented. Estoppel is urged. And authorities are advanced to support the view thatres judicatashould not apply in this situation.¹

But we see no reason for creating the exception. If there is hardship in this case, it was preventable. The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.²That was said inDuke Power Co. v.Greenwood County,299 U.S. 259,267,Page 40to be "the duty of the appellate court." That procedure clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance. When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only preliminary.

In this case the United States made no motion to vacate the judgment. It acquiesced in the dismissal. It did not avail itself of the remedy it had to preserve its rights. Denial of a motion to vacate could bring the case here. Our supervisory power over the judgments of the lower federal courts is a broad one. See28 U.S.C. § 2106, 62 Stat. 963;United Statesv.Hamburg-American Co.,Page 41239 U.S. 466,478;Wallingv.Reuter Co.,321 U.S. 671,676-677. As already indicated, it is commonly utilized in precisely this situation to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences.

The case is therefore one where the United States, having slept on its rights, now asks us to do what by orderly procedure it could have done for itself. The case illustrates not the hardship ofres judicatabut the need for it in providing terminal points for litigation.Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK is of the opinion thatres judicatashould not be applied under the circumstances here shown.Page 42

Page 39 SeeGelpiv.Tugwell,123 F.2d 377;Allegheny Countyv.MarylandCasualty Co.,146 F.2d 633; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Restatement, Judgments, § 69(2) reads as follows: "Where a party to a judgment cannot obtain the decision of an appellate court because the matter determined against him is immaterial or moot, the judgment is not conclusive against him in a subsequent action on a different cause of action." ↩
Page 39 This has become the standard disposition in federal civil cases:New Orleans Flour Inspectorsv.Glover,161 U.S. 101,103, modifying160 U.S. 170;United Statesv.Hamburg-American Co.,239 U.S. 466;Berryv.Davis,242 U.S. 468;United Statesv.American-AsiaticSteamship Co.,242 U.S. 537;Board of Public Utility Commissionersv.Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas,249 U.S. 425;CommercialCable Co. v.Burleson,250 U.S. 360;United Statesv.AlaskaPage 40Steamship Co.,253 U.S. 113;Heitmullerv.Stokes,256 U.S. 359;Atherton Millsv.Johnston,259 U.S. 13;Brownlowv.Schwartz,261 U.S. 216;Alejandrinov.Quezon,271 U.S. 528;Norwegian NitrogenCo., v.Tariff Commission,274 U.S. 106;United Statesv.Anchor CoalCo.,279 U.S. 812;Sprunt Sonv.United States,281 U.S. 249;Hargisv.Bradford,283 U.S. 781;Mahanv.Hume,287 U.S. 575;Railroad Commission of Texasv.Macmillan,287 U.S. 576;Coynev.Prouty,289 U.S. 704;First Union Trust Savings Bankv.Consumers Co.,290 U.S. 585;Danciger Oil Refining Co. v.Smith,290 U.S. 599;O'Ryanv.Mills Novelty Co.,292 U.S. 609;Hammond Clock Co. v.Schiff,293 U.S. 529;Brackenv.S.E. C.,299 U.S. 504;Leaderv.Apex Hosiery Co.,302 U.S. 656;Woodringv.Clarksburg-Columbus Short Route Bridge Co.,302 U.S. 658;RetailFood Clerks Managers Unionv.Union Premier Food Stores,308 U.S. 526;S.E. C. v.Long Island Lighting Co.,325 U.S. 833;MontgomeryWard Co. v.United States,326 U.S. 690;Brotherhood ofLocomotive Firemen Enginemenv.Toledo, P. W. R. Co.,332 U.S. 748;S.E. C. v.Engineers Public Service Co.,332 U.S. 788;Hodgev.Tulsa County Election Board,335 U.S. 889;S.E. C. v.Philadelphia Co.,337 U.S. 901.

So far as federal civil cases are concerned, there are but few exceptions to this practice in recent years. SeeCantosv.Styer,329 U.S. 686;Uyekiv.Styer,329 U.S. 689;Pan American Airways Corp. v.Grace Co.,332 U.S. 827;Schenley Distilling Corp. v.Anderson,333 U.S. 878. ↩