Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Dunnigan
113 S. Ct. 1111
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1993-02-23
- Topic
- general
holding that, for an obstruction ofjustice adjustment for perjury under 3C1.1, the district court must find the testimony was false, material, and willful | holding that the enhancement does not violate a defendant’s right to testify and is properly applied where the defendant commits perjury | holding that the enhancement does not violate a defendant's right to testify and is properly applied where the defendant commits perjury | holding that obstruction enhancement is justified if the district court finds that the defendant falsely testified about a material matter with the intent to do so | holding that district court must find that defendant willfully testified falsely about a material matter before making adjustment based on perjury | holding that potential enhancement of sentence for testifying falsely is not violation of defendant’s right to testify | holding that a statement is material if it related to matters that “substantially affect the outcome of the case” | holding that the enhancement does not violate a defendant's right to testify and is properly applied where the defendant commits perjury | holding that § 3C1.1 requires the sentencing court to make “independent findings” that the defendant’s inaccurate testimony was motivated by a purpose to obstruct justice rather than by “confusion, mistake, or faulty memory” | holding that section 3C1.1 does not undermine the constitutional right to testify because "a defendant's right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury" | holding that court applying adjustment for obstruction over objection of the defendant “must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish ... obstruction of justice” | holding that where a defendant committed perjury at trial, application of the obstruction guideline did not violate the defendant’s right to testify because the right to testify “does not include a right to commit perjury.” | holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice, the court “must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice.... ” | holding that the enhancement is triggered by a defendant’s perjury during his criminal trial | holding that instruction regarding obstruction of justice enhancement was a"non-coercive explanation of the law" | holding that defendant who commits perjury qualifies for an obstruction of justice enhancement | holding that a witness commits perjury if she “gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory” | holding that where a defendant committed perjury at trial, application of the obstruction guideline did not violate the defendant's right to testify because the right to testify "does not include a right to commit perjury." | concluding there was “ample support” for the district court’s finding given contradicting testimony by numerous witnesses | holding that defendant who commits perjury qualifies for obstruction of justice enhancement | stating that a witness does not commit perjury if inconsistencies in testimony are not intentional but rather the "result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory" | stating that a witness does not commit perjury if inconsistencies in testimony are not intentional but rather the “result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory” | noting that to defeat a perjury charge a defendant can establish that he gave “inaccurate testimony due to confusion, mistake, or faulty memory” | holding that a witness testifying under oath commits perjury if he gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory | holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice, the court "must review the evidence and make independent findings ne
Citator
- Cited by
- 843 opinions
UNITED STATES v. DUNNIGAN,507 U.S. 87(1993)
113 S.Ct. 1111
UNITED STATESv. DUNNIGAN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-1300
Argued December 2, 1992
Decided February 23, 1993
(a) The parties agree, and the commentary to §3C1.1is explicit, that the phrase "impede or obstruct the administration of justice" includes perjury. Perjury is committed when a witness testifying under oath or affirmation gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony. Because a defendant can testify at trial and be convicted, yet not have committed perjury — for example, the accused may give inaccurate testimony as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory or give truthful testimony that a jury finds insufficient to excuse criminal liability or prove lack of intent — not every testifying defendant who is convicted qualifies for a §3C1.1Page 88enhancement. If a defendant objects to such an enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish that the defendant committed perjury. While a court should address each element of the alleged perjury in a clear and distinct finding, its enhancement decision is sufficient where, as here, it makes a determination of an obstruction or impediment of justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a perjury finding. Pp. 92-96.
(b) An enhanced sentence for the willful presentation of false testimony does not undermine the right to testify. The concern that a court will enhance a sentence as a matter of course whenever the accused takes the stand and is found guilty is dispelled by the requirement that a district court make findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation in a specific case. Any risk from a district court's incorrect perjury findings is inherent in a system which insists on the value of testimony under oath. A §3C1.1enhancement is also more than a mere surrogate for a separate and subsequent perjury prosecution. It furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal crime, including retribution and incapacitation. The enhancement may not serve the additional goal of rehabilitation, which was the justification for enhancement inGrayson, but rehabilitation is not the only permissible justification for increasing a sentence based on perjury. Finally, the enhancement under §3C1.1is far from automatic — when contested, the elements of perjury must be found by the district court with specificity — and the fact that the enhancement stems from a congressional mandate, rather than from a court's discretionary judgment, cannot be grounds for its invalidation. Pp. 96-98.944 F.2d 178(CA4 1991), reversed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
I
Respondent, Sharon Dunnigan, was charged in a single count indictment with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of21 U.S.C. § 846. After entering a plea of not guilty, she stood trial.
The case in chief for the United States consisted of five witnesses who took part in, or observed respondent's cocaine trafficking during the summer of 1988. The first witness was Freddie Harris, a cocaine dealer in Charleston, West Virginia. Harris testified that respondent traveled between Charleston and Cleveland, Ohio, numerous times during the summer in question to purchase cocaine for him. He further stated that either he or his associate John Dean accompanied respondent on several of these trips. Dean was the second witness, and he recounted his trips to Cleveland with respondent during the same period to purchase cocaine. He also described meetings with both respondent and Harris for the purpose of delivering cocaine.
Three more Government witnesses followed. Andre Charlton testified that respondent, at her own apartment, delivered several ounces of cocaine to Charlton and Harris. Charlton also attested to receiving cocaine from Dean which Dean said he and respondent had bought in Cleveland. Tammy Moore testified next. She described conversations during which respondent vouched for the high quality of the cocaine in Cleveland and suggested Moore accompany her on a trip to Cleveland. Then came the testimony of Wynema Brown, who repeated respondent's admissions of trips to Cleveland to purchase cocaine for Harris. Brown also stated she saw cocaine powder at respondent's apartment and witnessed respondent and her daughter convert thePage 90powder into crack cocaine for the daughter to sell. This ended the Government's case in chief.
Respondent elected to take the stand, and was the sole witness in her own defense. She denied all criminal acts attributed to her. She admitted going to Cleveland with Harris once, but claimed it was for an innocent purpose, not to buy or sell cocaine. She admitted knowing John Dean, but denied traveling with him to Cleveland. Last, she denied knowing that cocaine was brought into or sold from her apartment. On cross-examination, the Government questioned respondent regarding the testimony of the five prosecution witnesses. Respondent denied their inculpatory statements, and said she had not possessed or distributed cocaine during the summer in question, or at any other time. The Government also asked whether Edward Dickerson had been in her apartment or bought crack cocaine from her. Respondent answered no.
The defense rested, and the Government began its rebuttal with the testimony of Dickerson. He testified to purchasing crack cocaine from respondent on July 12, 1988, in a transaction monitored by law enforcement authorities. The Government also recalled Moore, who claimed respondent sold her crack cocaine about five times and provided cocaine powder to her and respondent's daughter to convert into crack cocaine for resale. According to Moore, the money from the resale was paid over to respondent. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Respondent was sentenced pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1989). Her base offense level was set at 22, and the Government requested that the base be increased by two offense levels under U.S.S.G. §3C1.1, entitled "willfully obstructing or impeding proceedings," because respondent perjured herself at trial. After arguments from both sides, the District Court ruled on the request:Page 91
"The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. The defendant denied her involvement when it is clear from the evidence in the case as the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that she was involved in the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and by virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels." App. 29.
Based upon the enhanced offense level 24 and a criminal history category I, the District Court sentenced respondent to 51 months' incarceration, which was at the low end of the Guidelines range.
Respondent appealed her sentence, and the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision to increase respondent's offense level under U.S.S.G. §3C1.1.944 F.2d 178(CA4 1991). The Court of Appeals did not take issue with the District Court's factual findings or rule that further findings were necessary to support a §3C1.1enhancement. Instead, the court held that a §3C1.1enhancement based on a defendant's alleged perjury at trial would be unconstitutional. The court reasoned that "every defendant who takes the stand and is convicted [would] be given the obstruction of justice enhancement."Id., at 183. Citing some of the incentives for an accused to elect not to testify, including the risk of impeachment by prior convictions, the court ruled that a mechanical sentencing enhancement for testifying was unconstitutional: "With an automatic §3C1.1enhancement added to the ante, the defendant may not think testifying worth the risk."Id., at 184.
Referring toUnited States v. Grayson,438 U.S. 41(1978), where we upheld a sentence increase based on an accused's false testimony at trial, the Court of Appeals found that precedent distinguishable on two grounds. First, inGrayson, we justified the sentence increase as based on thePage 92District Court's assessment of the defendant's greater need for rehabilitation.Id., at 51-53. The Court of Appeals thought this justification was inapplicable, viewing the §3C1.1enhancement as a punishment for obstructing justice without the time and expense of a separate perjury prosecution.944 F.2d, at 184. Second, theGraysonCourt cautioned that "[n]othing we say today requires a sentencing judge to enhance, in some wooden or reflex fashion, the sentences of all defendants whose testimony is deemed false."438 U.S., at 55. According to the Court of Appeals, "[t]he guidelines supply precisely the `wooden or reflex' enhancement disclaimed by the Court,"944 F.2d, at 184, and this rigidity "makes the §3C1.1enhancement for a disbelieved denial of guilt under oath an intolerable burden upon the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf,"id., at 185.
Over a dissent by four of its judges, the Court of Appeals declined to rehear the case en banc.950 F.2d 149(CA4 1991). We granted certiorari.504 U.S. 940(1992).
II
A
Sentencing Guideline §3C1.1states in full: "If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, increase the [defendant's] offense level by 2 levels." U.S.S.G. §3C1.1(Nov. 1989). See also U.S.S.G. §3C1.1(Nov. 1992). Both parties assume the phrase "impede or obstruct the administration of justice" includes perjury, and the commentary to §3C1.1is explicit in so providing. In pertinent part, the commentary states:
"This section provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant who engages in conduct calculated to mislead or deceive authorities or those involved in a judicial proceeding, or otherwise to willfully interfere with the dispositionPage 93of criminal charges, in respect to the instant offense.
. . . . . .
"1. The following conduct, while not exclusive, may provide a basis for applying this adjustment:
. . . . . .
"(c) testifying untruthfully or suborning untruthful testimony concerning a material fact, . . . during a preliminary or grand jury proceeding, trial, sentencing proceeding, or any other judicial proceeding." U.S.S.G. §3C1.1, comment., n. 1(c) (Nov. 1989).
See also U.S.S.G. §3C1.1, comment., n. 3(b) (Nov. 1992) ("The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which this enhancement applies: . . . (b) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury").
Were we to have the question before us without reference to this commentary, we would have to acknowledge that some of our precedents do not interpret perjury to constitute an obstruction of justice unless the perjury is part of some greater design to interfere with judicial proceedings.In re Michael,326 U.S. 224,228(1945);Ex parte Hudgings,249 U.S. 378,383(1919). Those cases arose in the context of interpreting early versions of the federal criminal contempt statute, which defined contempt, in part, as "misbehavior of any person . . . as to obstruct the administration of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1940 ed.) (Judicial Code § 268), derived from the Act of Mar. 2, 1831, Rev. Stat. § 725. See also18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (same).
InHudgingsandMichael, we indicated that the ordinary task of trial courts is to sift true from false testimony, so the problem caused by simple perjury was not so much an obstruction of justice as an expected part of its administration.See Michael,326 U.S., at 227-228. Those cases, however, were decided against the background rule that the contempt power was to be confined to "`the least possible power adequate'" to protect "the administration of justicePage 94against immediate interruption of its business."Id., at 227 (quotingAnderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821)). In the present context, on the other hand, the enhancement provision is part of a sentencing scheme designed to determine the appropriate type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been resolved. The commission of perjury is of obvious relevance in this regard, because it reflects on a defendant's criminal history, on her willingness to accept the commands of the law and the authority of the court, and on her character in general. Even on the assumption that we could construe a sentencing guideline in a manner inconsistent with its accompanying commentary, the fact that the meaning ascribed to the phrase "obstruction of justice" differs in the contempt and sentencing contexts would not be a reason for rejecting the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of that phrase. In all events, the Commission's interpretation is contested by neither party to this case.
In determining what constitutes perjury, we rely upon the definition that has gained general acceptance and common understanding under the federal criminal perjury statute,18 U.S.C. § 1621. A witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates this statute if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. See § 1621(1);United States v. Debrow,346 U.S. 374,376(1953);United States v. Norris,300 U.S. 564,574,576(1937). This federal definition of perjury by a witness has remained unchanged in its material respects for over a century. SeeUnited States v. Smull,236 U.S. 405,408, and n. 1 (1915) (tracing history of § 1621's predecessor, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 125,35 Stat. 1111). It parallels typical state law definitions of perjury,seeAmerican Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 241.1 (1985); 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 601 (14th ed. 1981), and has roots in the law dating back to at least the Perjury Statute of 1563, 5 Eliz. I, ch. 9, see Gordon, The Invention of a Common LawPage 95Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan Courts, 24 Am. J. Legal Hist. 145 (1980). See also 1 Colonial Laws of New York, 1664-1719, ch. 8, pp. 129-130 (reprinting "An Act to prevent wilfull Perjury," enacted Nov. 1, 1683).
Of course, not every accused who testifies at trial and is convicted will incur an enhanced sentence under §3C1.1for committing perjury. As we have just observed, an accused may give inaccurate testimony due to confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. In other instances, an accused may testify to matters such as lack of capacity, insanity, duress, or self-defense. Her testimony may be truthful, but the jury may nonetheless find the testimony insufficient to excuse criminal liability or prove lack of intent. For these reasons, if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out. See U.S.S.G. §6A1.3(Nov. 1989); Fed. Rule Crim.Proc.32(c)(3)(D). See alsoBurns v. United States,501 U.S. 129,134(1991). When doing so, it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding. The district court's determination that enhancement is required is sufficient, however, if, as was the case here, the court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury. See App. 29 ("The court finds thatthe defendantwas untruthful at trial with respect to material mattersin this case. [B]y virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material mattersthat were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels" (emphasis added)). Given the numerous witnesses who contradicted respondent regarding so many facts on which she could notPage 96have been mistaken, there is ample support for the District Court's finding.
B
We turn next to the contention that an enhanced sentence for the willful presentation of false testimony undermines the right to testify. The right to testify on one's own behalf in a criminal proceeding is made explicit by federal statute,18 U.S.C. § 3481, and, we have said, it is also a right implicit in the Constitution, seeRock v. Arkansas,483 U.S. 44,51-53(1987);Nix v. Whiteside,475 U.S. 157,164(1986).
Respondent cannot contend that increasing her sentence because of her perjury interferes with her right to testify, for we have held on a number of occasions that a defendant's right to testify does not include a right to commit perjury.Id., at 173;United States v. Havens,446 U.S. 620,626(1980);Grayson,438 U.S., at 54. Nor can respondent contend §3C1.1is unconstitutional on the simple basis that it distorts her decision whether to testify or remain silent. Our authorities do not impose a categorical ban on every governmental action affecting the strategic decisions of an accused, including decisions whether or not to exercise constitutional rights. SeeBordenkircher v. Hayes,434 U.S. 357,365(1978);McGautha v.California,402 U.S. 183,216-217(1971);UnitedStates v. Knox,396 U.S. 77,82-83(1969).
No doubt to avoid these difficulties, respondent's argument comes to us in a different form. It is that §3C1.1carries a risk that a district court will order enhancement even when a defendant's testimony is truthful, either because the court acts without regard to the truth or makes an erroneous finding of falsity. That §3C1.1creates such a risk, respondent claims, makes the enhancement unconstitutional. This argument does not survive scrutiny.
The concern that courts will enhance sentences as a matter of course whenever the accused takes the stand and is found guilty is dispelled by our earlier explanation that, if an accused challenges a sentence increase based on perjured testimony,Page 97the trial court must make findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation in the specific case. And as to the risk of incorrect findings of perjury by district courts, that risk is inherent in a system which insists on the value of testimony under oath. To uphold the integrity of our trial system, we have said that the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned.Grayson, supra,438 U.S., at 54. See alsoNix, supra, at 173-174;Havens, supra, at 626-627. The requirement of sworn testimony, backed by punishment for perjury, is as much a protection for the accused as it is a threat. All testimony, from third-party witnesses and the accused, has greater value because of the witness' oath and the obligations or penalties attendant to it. Cf. G. Neilson, Trial By Combat 5 (1891) ("A means of ensuring the truth in human testimony has been a thing desired in every age").
Neither can we accept respondent's argument that the §3C1.1sentence enhancement advances only "the impermissible sentencing practice of incarcerating for the purpose of saving the Government the burden of bringing a separate and subsequent perjury prosecution."Grayson,supra, at 53. A sentence enhancement based on perjury does deter false testimony in much the same way as a separate prosecution for perjury. But the enhancement is more than a mere surrogate for a perjury prosecution. It furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal crime, including the goals of retribution and incapacitation. See18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2);Mistretta v. United States,488 U.S. 361,367(1989). It is rational for a sentencing authority to conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then perjures herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more threatening to society and less deserving of leniency than a defendant who does not so defy the trial process. The perjuring defendant's willingness to frustrate judicial proceedings to avoid criminal liability suggests that the need for incapacitation and retribution is heightened as comparedPage 98with the defendant charged with the same crime who allows judicial proceedings to progress without resorting to perjury.
Weighed against these considerations, the arguments made by the Court of Appeals to distinguishGraysonare wide of the mark. The court is correct that rehabilitation is no longer a goal of sentencing under the Guidelines.28 U.S.C. § 994(k);Mistretta, supra, at 367. Our lengthy discussion inGraysonof how a defendant's perjury was relevant to the potential for rehabilitation, however, was not meant to imply that rehabilitation was the only permissible justification for an increased sentence based on perjury. As we have said, the §3C1.1enhancement serves other legitimate sentencing goals. Neither does our cautionary remark that the enhancement inGraysonneed not be imposed "in some wooden or reflex fashion" compel invalidation of §3C1.1, as the Court of Appeals believed. When contested, the elements of perjury must be found by the district court with the specificity we have stated, so the enhancement is far from automatic. And that the enhancement stems from a congressional mandate, rather than from a court's discretionary judgment, cannot be grounds, in these circumstances, for its invalidation. SeeChapman v. United States,500 U.S. 453,467(1991);McMillan v. Pennsylvania,477 U.S. 79,92(1986).
Upon a proper determination that the accused has committed perjury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is required by the Sentencing Guidelines. That requirement is consistent with our precedents, and is not in contravention of the privilege of an accused to testify in her own behalf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.It is so ordered.Page 99