Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Diebold, Inc.

United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1962-05-14
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that, on summary judgment, inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
  • holding that a court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party in determining whether a genuine issue of material act has been raised
  • stating that if “contrary inferences” from the evidence might be permissible, summary judgment is inappropriate
  • noting that material in the record must be examined in “the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion”
  • recognizing on summary judgment, a court must view the facts 26 and draw reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 27 motion”
  • construing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56 , upon which Rule 121 is based
  • reversing summary judgment where material questions of fact existed as to whether defendant “was the only bona fide prospective purchaser for [the acquired firm’s] business”
  • adopting this two-step procedure of reformation under § 1132(a)(3) and an award of benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B)

Citator

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Headnotes

  1. Civil Procedure — Summary Judgment On a motion for summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions submitted to the court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
  2. Antitrust & Competition Law — Clayton Act § 7 — Failing Company Defense Where the materials before the district court raise a genuine issue as to the ultimate facts material to the applicability of the failing company doctrine, it is improper for the district court to decide the applicability of that doctrine on a motion for summary judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 56(c)
Per Curiam.

This is a civil antitrust suit by the Government challenging Diebold’s acquisition of the assets of the Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company as being violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act. On motion of Diebold the District Court entered summary judgment against the Government on the ground that the acquired firm was a “failing company” under the doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 280 U. S. 291 (1930). The case is here on direct appeal. 368 U. S. 894.

*655 In determining that the acquisition of the assets of Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company was not a violation of § 7, the District Court acted upon its findings that “HHM was hopelessly insolvent and faced with imminent receivership” and that “Diebold was the only bona fide prospective purchaser for HHM’s business.” The latter finding represents at least in part the resolution of a head-on factual controversy as revealed by the materials before the District Court of whether other offers for HHM’s assets or business were actually made. In any event both findings represent a choice of inferences to be drawn from the subsidiary facts contained in the affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions submitted below. On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. A study of the record in this light leads us to believe that inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial court might be permissible. The materials before the District Court-having thus raised a genuine issue as to ultimate facts material to the rule of International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, it was improper for the District Court to decide the applicability of the rule on a motion for summary judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 56 (c).

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.