Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Carll
United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 (1882)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1882-04-24
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- holding that an indictment is generally sufficient when the statutory terms “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished”
- stating that the indictment must allege “all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent"
- noting that the indictment should "set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished"
- finding an indictment defective when it “omitt[ed] the allegation ... that the defendant knew the instrument which he uttered to be false” when this was a necessary element of the crime
- indictment that failed to allege that the defendant knew an uttered document was forged failed to charge a crime although statute did not make the knowledge element explicit
- indictment that tracked statutory language fatally defective, because language omitted scienter requirement that had been read into the statutory offense based on its common-law history
- “The validity of alleging the elements of an offense in the language of the statute is, of course, well established.”
- reversal of a bank fraud conviction based upon the indictment’s omission to include language to the effect that “the defendant knew the false and counterfeit nature of the forged instrument”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States v. Carll. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 452 opinions
Headnotes
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Indictment In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offense in the words of the statute unless those words themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished. The fact that the statute, read in light of the common law and other statutes on the like matter, enables the court to infer the legislative intent does not dispense with the necessity of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Uttering a Forged Instrument — Knowledge Where an indictment is founded on a statute prohibiting the uttering of a forged obligation of the United States with intent to defraud, and the offense is similar to the common-law offense of uttering a forged or counterfeit bill, knowledge that the instrument is forged and counterfeited is essential to constitute the crime. An uttering, with intent to defraud, of an instrument in fact counterfeit but supposed by the defendant to be genuine, though within the words of the statute, is not within its meaning and object.
- Criminal Law & Procedure — Indictment An indictment that omits the allegation that the defendant knew the instrument he uttered to be false, forged, and counterfeit—an allegation contained in approved precedents—fails to charge the defendant with any crime. The omission is of matter of substance, and not a defect or imperfection in matter of form only.
after stating the ease, delivered the opinion of the court.
In an indictment upon a statute, it is not, sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be-punished; and the fact that the statute in question, read in the light of the common law, and of other statutes on the like matter, enables the court *613 to infer the intent of the legislature, does not dispense with the necessity of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; United States v. Simmons, 96 id. 360; Commonwealth v. Clifford, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 215; Commonwealth v. Bean, 11 id. 414; Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray (Mass.), 52; Commonwealth v. Filburn, 119 Mass. 297.
The language of the statute on which this indictment is founded includes the'case of every person, who, with intent to defraud, utters any forged'obligation -of the United States. But the offence at which it is aimed is similar to the common-law offence of uttering a forged or counterfeit bill. In this case, as in that, knowledge that the instrument is forged and counterfeited is essential to make out the crime; and an uttering, with intent to defraud, of an instrument in fact counterfeit, but supposed by the defendant to be genuine, though within the words of the statute, would not be within its meaning and object. v
This indictment, by omitting the allegation contained in the indictment in United States v. Howell (11 Wall. 432), and in all approved precedents, that the defendant knew the instrument which he uttered to be false, forged, and counterfeit, fails to charge Jiim with any crime. The omission is of matter of substance, and not a “ defect or imperfection in matter of form only,” within the meaning of sect. 1025 of the Revised Statutes By the settled rules of criminal pleading, and the authorities above cited, therefore, the question of the sufficiency of the indictment must be
Answered in the negative.