Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Burns

79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1871-11-18
Topic
general

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. Upon the facts found by the Court of Claims, we are of opinion that the contract entered into on behalf of the United States with Major Sibley, by which the government was authorized to make and procure as many of the Sibley tents as it might require, by paying the sum of five dollars for each tent, was a valid contract, and not within the prohibitions of the arm}' regulation, number 1002. That regulation does not apply to. contracts on behalf of the United States, which require for their validity the approval of the Secretary of War. Though contracts of that character are usually negotiated by subordinate officers or agents of the government, they are in fact and in law the acts of the secretary, *252 whose sanction, is essential to bind the Uuited States.

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Headnotes

  1. Contracts Law — Validity of Government Contracts A contract made on behalf of the United States that requires the approval of the Secretary of War for its validity is not within a military regulation governing contracts by officers in the military service; though such contracts are usually negotiated by subordinate officers or agents, they are in fact and law the acts of the secretary, whose sanction is essential to bind the United States, and the secretary, as head of the War Department, is a civil officer performing civil duties rather than an officer in the military service within the meaning of the regulation.
  2. Patent Law — Rights of Military Officers in Inventions An officer in the military service who, though not specially employed to make experiments with a view to suggest improvements, devises a new and valuable improvement in arms, tents, or other war material is entitled to the benefit of it and to letters-patent from the United States equally with any other citizen not engaged in such service; and after the patent issues the government cannot make use of the improvement, any more than a private individual, without the license of the inventor or compensation to him.
  3. Patent Law — License to the Government A contract by which the government is authorized to manufacture or procure a patented article and use it upon payment of a stipulated sum is in substance a license from the patentee to the government, and where the United States continues to make and use the patented article under such a license, a mere direction by the secretary to withhold the stipulated payments does not terminate the contract or repudiate the government's liability for articles previously procured or thereafter made, something more being required to effect a termination while the government continues to manufacture and use the article.
  4. Patent Law — Assignment of Interest in Invention An assignment by a patentee of a one-half interest in all the benefits and net profits arising from and belonging to an invention, made before the issue of the patent, passes to the assignee a half interest in the patentee's contract with the government and the right to a moiety of the royalty stipulated by that contract, whether or not it transfers legal title to one-half of the patent itself.
  5. General — Claims Against the United States — Disloyalty of Co-Claimant The rights of a loyal claimant under a contract with the government, and to the compensation stipulated, are not forfeited or impaired by the disloyalty of his associate in the contract, and the claim of the loyal claimant may be presented and considered by the Court of Claims under the Act of March 3, 1863, which at the same time bars the disloyal associate from prosecuting the claim there, whether jointly or severally, thereby severing the two claims.
  6. Civil Procedure — Court of Claims The technical common-law rule of pleading requiring a contract with two persons to be prosecuted in their joint names, if both are living, has no application where a statute permits one claimant to prosecute while barring the other by reason of disloyalty, and the Court of Claims, in deciding upon the rights of claimants, is not bound by any special rules of pleading.
Mr. Justice FIELD

delivered the opinion of the court.

Upon the facts found by the Court of Claims, we are of opinion that the contract entered into on behalf of the United States with Major Sibley, by which the government was authorized to make and procure as many of the Sibley tents as it might require, by paying the sum of five dollars for each tent, was a valid contract, and not within the prohibitions of the arm}' regulation, number 1002. That regulation does not apply to. contracts on behalf of the United States, which require for their validity the approval of the Secretary of War. Though contracts of that character are usually negotiated by subordinate officers or agents of the government, they are in fact and in law the acts of the secretary, *252 whose sanction, is essential to bind the Uuited States. The secretary, though the head of the War Department, is not in the military service in the sense of the regulation, but, on the contrary, is á civil officer with civil duties to perform, as much so as the head of any other of the executive departments. '

. It would be carrying the regulation to' an absurd extent to hold it was intended to preclude the War Department from availing itself, by purchase or any other contract, of any property which an officer in the military service might acquire, if its possession or use were deemed important to the government. If an officer in the military, service, not specially employed to make experiments with a view to suggest improvements, devises a new and valuable improvement in arms, tents, or any other kind of war material, he is entitled to the benefit of it, and to letters-patent for the improvement from the United States, equally with any other citizen not engaged in such service; and the government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual, without license of the inventor or making compensation to him.

In the present case there is no question of the right of Sibley to the improved conical tent. He received a patent for the improvement in April, 1856, and, by the contract with him, the United States recognized his right to it, and to compensation for its use.

The contract was nothing more, in fact, than a license from him to the government to manufacture or procure the tent, and use it, upon payment of a stipulated sum. By its terms the license extended until the 1st of January, 1859, and longer unless the United States were notified to the contrary. The power of determining this license thus remained with the patentee after that period, but the United States could also at any time have determined their liability by ceasing to make-the tents. It does .not appear that either party ever desired the termination of the license. Neither Sibley, nor Burns, who had become, as hereafter stated, equally interested with Sibley in the contract, ever expressed *253 any intention to withdraw the license; and the United States continued to make and use the tents until the whole number •were obtained, for which'the present claim is asserted. The order of the secretary in December, 1861, declaring that no further payments should .be made to Burns on account of the royalty on the tent, was not intended, in our judgment, either as a repudiation of the liability of the United States to him for the tents previously procured, amounting to over thirty-eight thousand, or of their, liability to him for any tents that might be subsequently made, but only to leave the rights of Burns, connected as they were with a patent issued to one who had resigned his commission in the National army and entered the Confederate service, to be determined by the properjudicial tribunals. If the secretary had intended to terminate the1 contract something more would have been required on his part, whilst the United S'tates continued to manufacture and use the tents, than a mere direction to withhold the payments stipulated for such manufacture and use.

Burns, as we have said, had become equally 'interested with Sibley in the contract with the United States. In April, 1858, Sibley had executed to him an assignment of “the one-half interest in all the benefits-and net profits arising from and belonging to the invention,” from and after the 22d of February, 1856, a period anterior to the issue of the patent. Whether this assignment be held to have transferred a legal title to one-half of the patent itself is not, in our judgment, important. It passed a half interest in the contract of Sibley with the government, and the right to a moiety of the royalty stipulated by that contract.

The War Department recognized this half interest of Burns, and, until the order of the secretary in December, 1861, paid a moiety of the royalty to him. It thus severed his claim under the contract from that of Sibley. But independent of this fact the rights of Burns in the contract and the compensation stipulated could not be forfeited nor impaired by the disloyalty of his associate. He was true in his allegiance to the government and served in the army of the Union. His claim could, therefore, be presented and con *254 sidered iu the Court of Claims by the act of March 3d, 1863. Ilis associate, Sibley, is at the same time barred by that act of any action there, either joint or several, by reason of his disloyalty. The act does thus, iu fact, sever their claims, allowing the claim of one to be prosecuted and barring that of the other. The technical rule of pleading in an action in a common law court, by which a contract with two must be prosecuted in their joint names, if both are living, has no application to a case thus situated. And the Court of Claims, in deciding upon the rights of claimants, is not bound by any special rules of pleading.

We see no error in the ruling of that court, and therefore its judgment is Aepirmed.