Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Brown
75 S. Ct. 141
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1954-12-06
- Topic
- general
holding that Feres did not apply to a veteran suing for negligent treatment at a military hospital “after his discharge” | holding that Feres barred claim even though serviceman had been denied veteran's benefits | distinguishing servicemen who are on active duty and subject to military discipline from discharged servicemen who have civilian status | allowing an action to proceed concerning post-discharge malpractice, even where such malpractice was preformed on an injury suffered while in service | adhering “to the line drawn . between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course of military duty” | allowing an action to 8 proceed concerning post-discharge malpractice, even where such malpractice was preformed on an injury suffered while in service | finding that plaintiff’s injury, permanent nerve damage as a result of a defective tourniquet applied in a veteran’s hospital while on active duty, exempt from the Feres Doctrine because the injury itself occurred after discharge when the individual was on civilian status | receipt of disability payments under the Veterans Act does not bar recovery under the Tort Claims Act | Brooks held controlling where veteran sued Veter an’s Administration hospital for malpractice in treating an injury sustained while plaintiff was in military service | Feres doctrine did not apply to veteran’s negligence claim based on Army’s negligence after vet- eran’s discharge | "[T]he effect of the Tort Claims Act is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action. " | “We adhere ... to the line drawn in the Feres ease between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course of military duty” | claim allowed for injury sustained after army discharge and during treatment at Veterans Administration hospital | Brooks held controlling where veteran sued Veteran's Administration hospital for malpractice in treating an injury sustained while plaintiff was in military service | Brooks held controlling where veteran sued Veteran’s Administration hospital for malpractice in treating an injury sustained while plaintiff was in military service | "We adhere . . . to the line drawn in the Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course of military duty" | Feres applies where injury occurred while plaintiff “on active duty or subject to military discipline” | Discharged veteran could maintain malpractice action against VA hospital because the injuries resulting from the malpractice were not received incident to military service. | Discharged veteran could maintain malpractice action against VA hospital because the injuries resulting from the malpractice were not received incident to military service. | FTCA and disability benefits are both available for veterans injured by VA hospital treatment | Feres did not apply to claim by civilian for negligent treatment received at Veteran’s Hospital for treatment of service-connected injury | VA disability payments did not preclude recovery, “but only reduced the amount of any judgment under the [FTCA].” | due to effect on discipline, etc., Tort Claims Act does not cover servicemen’s injuries arising out of or incident to service | action based on negligent treatment in V.A. hospital to serviceman who was discharged at the time of treatment was not barred by the Feres doctrine | “[T]he effect of the Tort Claims Act is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action.” | “[T]he effect of the Tort Claims Act is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action.” | a veteran may maintain an action under the FTCA for negligent treatment at a VA medical center even if his benefits have already been increased because of such injury | veteran may bring lawsuit for injuries suffered during surgery in a Veterans Administration hospital | FTCA and disability benefits are both available for veterans injured by VA hospital treatment | “Indeed, the Supreme Court and several circuit cou
Citator
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- 217 opinions
The Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1935,48 Stat. 526, 38 U.S.C. § 501a, allows compensation both where the veteran suffers injury during hospitalization and where an existing injury is aggravated during the treatment. Each is considered as though it were "service connected." Respondent received a compensation award for his knee injury when he was honorably discharged; and that award was increased after the 1951 operation.
The District Court agreed with the contention of petitioner that respondent's sole relief was under the Veterans Act and dismissed his complaint under the Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed.209 F.2d 463. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted,347 U.S. 951, because of doubts as to whetherBrooksv.United States,337 U.S. 49, orFeresv.UnitedStates,340 U.S. 135, controlled this case.
TheBrookscase held that servicemen were covered by the Tort Claims Act where the injury was not incident to or caused by their military service.337 U.S. 49,52. In that case, servicemen on leave were negligently injured on a public highway by a government employee driving a truck of the United States. The fact that compensation was sought and paid under the Veterans Actfn*was held not to bar recovery under the Tort Claims Act. We refused to "pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not done so."Id., at 53.
TheFeresdecision involved three cases, in each of which the injury, for which compensation was sought under the Tort Claims Act, occurred while the serviceman was on active duty and not on furlough; and thePage 112negligence alleged in each case was on the part of other members of the Armed Forces. TheFeresdecision did not disapprove of theBrookscase. It merely distinguished it, holding that the Tort Claims Act does not cover "injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service."340 U.S. 135,146. The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character.Id., at 141-143.
The present case is, in our view, governed byBrooks, not byFeres. The injury for which suit was brought was not incurred while respondent was on active duty or subject to military discipline. The injury occurred after his discharge, while he enjoyed a civilian status. The damages resulted from a defective tourniquet applied in a veterans' hospital. Respondent was there, of course, because he had been in the service and because he had received an injury in the service. And the causal relation of the injury to the service was sufficient to bring the claim under the Veterans Act. But, unlike the claims in theFerescase, this one is not foreign to the broad pattern of liability which the United States undertook by the Tort Claims Act.
That Act provides that, "The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . ."28 U.S.C. § 2674. TheFerescase emphasized how sharp would be the break in tradition if the claims there asserted were allowed against the United States, the Court noting that the effect of the Tort Claims Act is "to waive immunity from recognized causes of action," "not to visitPage 113the Government with novel and unprecedented liabilities."340 U.S. 135,142. But that cannot be said here. Certainly this claim is one which might be cognizable under local law, if the defendant were a private party. Responsibility of hospitals to patients for negligence may not be as notorious as the liability of the owners of automobiles. But the doctrine is not novel or without support. See, for example,Sheehanv.North CountryCommunity Hosp.,273 N.Y. 163,7 N.E.2d 28, and the cases collected in 25 A. L. R.2d 29.
Congress could, of course, make the compensation system the exclusive remedy. The Court held inJohansenv.United States,343 U.S. 427, that Congress had done so in the case of the Federal Employees Compensation Act, with the result that a civilian employee could not sue the United States under the Public Vessels Act. We noted in theBrookscase,337 U.S. 49,53, that the usual workmen's compensation statute was in this respect different from those governing veterans, that Congress had given no indication that it made the right to compensation the veteran's exclusive remedy, that the receipt of disability payments under the Veterans Act was not an election of remedies and did not preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act but only reduced the amount of any judgment under the latter Act. We adhere to that result. We adhere also to the line drawn in theFerescase between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the course of military duty. Since the negligent act giving rise to the injury in the present case was not incident to the military service, theBrookscase governs and the judgment must beAffirmed.
For a hospital injury a veteran is entitled to precisely the same disability benefits as if the injury had been inflicted while he was a soldier.fn*We have previously held, I think correctly, that a soldier injured in a hospital cannot also sue for damages under the Tort Claims Act.Feresv.United States,340 U.S. 135. But the Court now holds that a veteran can. To permit a veteran to recover damages from the Government in circumstances under which a soldier on active duty cannot recover seems like an unjustifiable discrimination which the Act does not require.Page 115
- Page 111 We indicated that recovery under the Tort Claims Act should be reduced by the amounts paid by the United States as disability payments under the Veterans Act.337 U.S. 52,53-54. See the case on remand,United Statesv.Brooks,176 F.2d 482,484. ↩
- Page 114 "Where any veteran suffers . . . an injury, or an aggravation of any existing injury, as the result of hospitalization or medical or surgical treatment . . . benefits . . . shall be awarded in the same manner as if such disability, aggravation, or death were service connected . . . ."48 Stat. 526, 38 U.S.C. § 501a. ↩