Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Bass

United States v. Bass, 122 S. Ct. 2389 (2002)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
2002-06-28
Topic
general

holding that “raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants.” (italics in original) | concluding that “nationwide statistics demonstrating that the United States charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites” were insufficient for the purpose of satisfying the Armstrong standard | concluding that “nationwide statistics demonstrating that the United States charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites” were insufficient for the purpose of satisfying the Armstrong standard | noting that “raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants” | concluding nationwide statistics demonstrating that (1) the United States charged blacks with death-eligible offenses more than twice as often as it charged whites and (2 | stating that “a nationwide showing” of “raw statistics regarding overall charges [of death-eligible offenses] say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants” | approving of "a showing regarding the record of the decisionmakers in respondent's case" | approving of "a showing regarding the record of the decisionmakers in respondent's case" | approving of “a showing regarding the record of the deci-sionmakers in respondent’s case” | approving of “a showing regarding the record of the deci-sionmakers in respondent’s case” | approving of statistical evidence that assesses whether simi- larly situated individuals were treated differently | “Under Armstrong, therefore, because respondent failed to submit relevant evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently, he was not entitled to discovery.” | “[A] defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.” | "raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants ” | district court erred in allowing discovery on race-disparity capital punishment issues when defendant “failed to submit relevant evidence that similarly situated individuals were treated differently” | “[R]aw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants.” (emphasis added) | “We need go no further in the present case than consideration of the evidence supporting discriminatory effect.” | “[A] defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution ... must make a credible showing that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.” | “raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants” | approv- ing of “a showing regarding the record of the decisionmakers in respondent’s case” | “raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants.” | “[R]aw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants.” | “raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants”

Citator

Cited by
34 opinions
UNITED STATES v. BASS,536 U.S. 862(2002)
122 S.Ct. 2389
UNITED STATESv. JOHN BASS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-1471.
Decided June 28, 2002
Claiming that the United States filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty in respondent's capital murder case because of his race, respondent moved to dismiss the notice and, in the alternative, for discovery of information relating to the Government's capital charging practices. The District Court granted his discovery motion and dismissed the notice after the Government said that it would not comply with the discovery order, The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The Sixth Circuit's decision is contrary to United States v. Armstrong,517 U.S. 456,465, in which this Court held that a defendant seeking discovery on a selective prosecution claim must show some evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. As to evidence of discriminatory effect, a defendant must make a credible showing that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. Id., at 465, 470. The Sixth Circuit concluded that respondent had made such a showing based on nationwide statistics demonstrating that the Government charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites and that it enters into plea bargains more frequently with whites than with blacks. Even assuming that a nationwide showing can satisfy the Armstrong requirement, raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants. And the plea bargain statistics are even less relevant, since respondent declined the plea bargain offered him.

Certiorari granted;266 F.3d 532, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
A federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Michigan returned a second superseding indictment charging respondent with,interalia, the intentional firearm killings of two individuals. The United States filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Respondent, who is black, alleged that the Government had determined to seek the death penalty against him because of his race. He moved to dismissPage 863the death penalty notice and, in the alternative, for discovery of information relating to the Government's capital charging practices. The District Court granted the motion for discovery, and after the Government informed the court that it would not comply with the discovery order, the court dismissed the death penalty notice. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's discovery order.266 F.3d 532(2001). We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and now summarily reverse.

InUnited Statesv.Armstrong,517 U.S. 456,465(1996), we held that a defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. We need go no further in the present case than consideration of the evidence supporting discriminatory effect. As to that,Armstrongsays that the defendant must make a "credible showing" that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."Id., at 465, 470. The Sixth Circuit concluded that respondent had made such a showing based on nationwide statistics demonstrating that "[t]he United States charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites" and that the United States enters into plea bargains more frequently with whites than it does with blacks.266 F.3d, at 538-539(citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-2000), p. 2 (Sept. 12, 2000).fn*Even assuming that theArmstrongrequirement can be satisfiedPage 864by a nationwide showing (as opposed to a showing regarding the record of the decisionmakers in respondent's case), raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought againstsimilarly situateddefendants. And the statistics regarding plea bargains are even less relevant, since respondentwasoffered a plea bargain but declined it. See Pet. for Cert. 16. UnderArmstrong, therefore, because respondent failed to submit relevant evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently, he was not entitled to discovery.

The Sixth Circuit's decision is contrary toArmstrongand threatens the "performance of a core executive constitutional function."Armstrong,supra, at 465. For that reason, we reverse.

It is so ordered.Page 901
  1. In January 1995, the Department of Justice (DOJ) instituted a policy, known as the death penalty protocol, that required the Attorney General to make the decision whether to seek the death penalty once a defendant had been charged with a capital-eligible offense. See Pet. for Cert. 3 (citing DOJ, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-10.010etseq. (Sept. 1997)). The charging decision continued to be made by one of the 93 United States Attorneys throughout the country, but the protocol required that the United States Attorneys submit for review all cases in which they had charged a defendant with a capital-eligible offense.Ibid. ↩