Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Atkinson
56 S. Ct. 391
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1936-02-03
- Topic
- general
recognizing that a court of appeals may, sua sponte, raise and correct a plain error in sentencing, but declining to do so | holding that errors which “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” may be raised for the first time on appeal | explaining that courts should Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 3 THOMAS, J., dissenting provide relief under plain-error review only in “exceptional circumstances” | stating that “[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,” appellate courts could “notice errors to which no exception has been taken” | noting that such “exceptional circumstances” arise “especially in criminal cases” | noting that such “exceptional circumstances” arise “especially in criminal cases” | observing that the practice of not correcting unpreserved errors is in part “founded upon considerations . . . of the public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair opportunity has been afforded to present all issues of law and fact” | refusing to address legal theory not advanced below 18 in a pre-Olano civil case, because the new theory did not result in "`plain'" error or a "`miscarriage of justice.'" | finding no plain error where government' failed to object to jury instructions in civil case, while noting that in “exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases,” appellate courts may act in public interest to correct plain errors | stating courts of appeals should “correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation No. 23AP-582 48 of judicial proceedings’ ” | plain errors are restricted to those which “are obvious, or ... seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” | plain errors are restricted to those which “are obvious, or ... seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” | plain errors are restricted to those which “are obvious, or ... seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” | "In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been tak-en_” | appellate courts correct a plain error “if the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” | “In exceptional circumstances, ... appellate courts, in the public interest, may ... notice er rors to which no exception has been taken[.]” | “Where plain error is apparent, the issue may be raised sua sponte by this court even though it is not assigned or specified.” | “in the public interest,” appellate court may address issues not preserved | plaintiff could not maintain action for public disclosure of private facts when information of his hit-and-run conviction obtained from a probation report which was a public record was printed in a news story 20 years later | "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" | “seriously affectfs] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” | “In exceptional circumstances ... appellate courts ... may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” | “The government failed to question the correctness of [the] instructions either by exception or request to charge.... The verdict of a jury will not ordinarily be set aside for error not brought to the attention of the trial court.” | “In exceptional circumstances, . . . appellate courts, in the 25 Case: 11-50482 Document: 00512279158 Page: 26 Date Filed: 06/18/2013 No. 11-50482 cons. w/ 11-50484 public interest, may . . . notice errors to which no exception has been taken[.]” | pre-federal rules case codified in Rule
Citator
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- 770 opinions
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was brought here on certiorari to review a determination of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, said to be inconsistent with our decision in-Miller v. United States, 294 U. S. 435. The challenged holding is that there is statutory authority for including in contracts of United States government insurance (converted war' risk insurance) covering death or total permanent disability a provision that “the permanent loss of hearing of. both ears . . . shali be deemed'to be total disability.” The case was tried in the district court to a jury which rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, respondent here. Judgment in his favor was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 76 F. (2d) 564, which held that the insertion in the policy of the quoted definition of total disability, pursuant to Veterans’ Administration Regulation, § 3122, was authorized by 43 Stat. 624, 1309, 38 U. S. C., § 512. 1
The government, by its assignment of errors here, assails, as it did in the court below, the correctness of *159 this ruling, but examination of the record discloses that no such objection was presented to the trial court. In consequence the government is precluded from raising the question on appeal.
The trial judge instructed the jury that respondent might recover either on the theory that his loss of hearing constituted in fact a permanent disability preventing his pursuit of any substantially gainful occupation, or that his loss of hearing of both ears, if permanent, was a permanent disability as defined by the policy. The jury was thus left free to return a verdict for respondent if it found that he had suffered permanent loss of hearing of both ears, regardless of its effect upon his ability to earn his livelihood. The government failed to question the correctness of these instructions either by exception or request to charge, and its motion for a directed verdict was upon other grounds not now material.
The verdict of a jury .will not ordinarily be set aside for error not brought to.the attention of the trial court. This practice is founded upon considerations of fairness to the court and to the parties and of the public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair opportunity has been afforded to present all issues of law and fact. Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U. S. 46; Allis v. United States, 155 U. S. 117, 122, 123; United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 512, 529; Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin Construction Co., 248 U. S. 334, 348; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minds, 250 U. S. 368, 375; Burns v. United States, 274 U. S. 328, 336; see Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Refining Co., 51 F. (2d) 878, 880. It is substantially that adopted by Rule 10, Subdivision 1, of the rules of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which requires the party excepting to the charge “to state distinctly the several mattérs of law” to which he excepts, and directs that “those matters of law, and those only, shall .be inserted in the bill of exceptions.”
*160 In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their, own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See New York Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 310, 318; Brasfield v. United States, 272 U. S. 448, 450. But no such case is presented here. The judgment must be affirmed for the reason that the error assigned was not made the subject of appropriate exception or request to charge upon the trial.
Affirmed. •
“§ 512. Not later than July 2, 1926, all term insurance held by persons who were in the military service after April 6, 19Í7, shah be converted, without medical examination, into such form or forms of insurance as may be prescribed by regulations and as the insured may request. Regulations shall provide for the right to convert into ordinary life, twenty-payment life, endowment maturing at age sixty-two, and into other usual forms of insurance, . . . Provisions for maturity at certain ages, for continuous installments during the life of the insured or beneficiaries, or both, for cash, loan, paid up and extended values, dividends from gains and savings, and such other provisions for the protection and advantage of and for alternative benefits to the insured and the beneficiaries as may be found to be reasonable and practicable, may be provided for in the contract of insurance, or from time to time by regulations. . . .”