Traynor v. Turnage

Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases arise from the Veterans’ Administration’s refusal to grant two recovered alcoholics extensions of time in which to use their veterans’ educational benefits. We must decide whether the Veterans’ Administration’s decision is subject to judicial review and, if so, whether that decision violates § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U. S. C. § 794, which requires that federal programs not discriminate against handicapped individuals solely because of their handicap.1

*538 I

Veterans who have been honorably discharged from the United States Armed Forces are entitled to receive educational assistance benefits under the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefit Act of 1966 (“GI Bill”) to facilitate their readjustment to civilian life. See 38 U. S. C. § 1661. These benefits generally must be used within 10 years following discharge or release from active duty. § 1662(a)(1). Veterans may obtain an extension of the 10-year delimiting period, however, if they were prevented from using their benefits earlier by “a physical or mental disability which was not the result of [their] own willful misconduct.” Ibid.

Petitioners are honorably discharged veterans who did not exhaust their educational benefits during the decade following their military service. They sought to continue to receive benefits after the expiration of the 10-year delimiting period on the ground that they had been disabled by alcoholism during much of that period. The Veterans’ Administration determined that petitioners’ alcoholism constituted “willful misconduct” under 38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987),2 and accordingly denied the requested extensions.

*539 Petitioner Traynor sought review of the Veterans’ Administration’s decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court held that it was not foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction over the case by 38 U. S. C. § 211(a), which bars judicial review of “the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans,”3 because the complaint “requires us to examine constitutional and statutory questions and not merely issues of VA policy.” Traynor v. Walters, 606 F. Supp. 391, 396 (1985). The court rejected Traynor’s claim that the Veterans’ Administration’s refusal to extend his delimiting period violated the Due Process Clause and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.4 However, the court concluded that alcoholism is a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and that the Veterans’ Administration therefore had engaged in the sort of discrimination on the basis of handicap that is forbidden by that Act.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the ground that § 211(a) barred judicial re *540 view of the Rehabilitation Act claim. Traynor v. Walters, 791 F. 2d 226 (1986). The court reasoned that, while “many veterans have in the service of our country suffered injuries that qualify them as ‘handicapped individuals]’ for purposes of [the Rehabilitation Act],” Congress evinced no intent in enacting that statute “to grant to ‘handicapped’ veterans the judicial review traditionally denied all other veterans” under §211(a). Id., at 229.5

Meanwhile, petitioner McKelvey sought review of the Veterans’ Administration’s decision in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court exercised jurisdiction over McKelvey’s claims on the ground that §211 (a) permits judicial review of decisions rejecting claims that Veterans’ Administration regulations of general applicability violate a federal statute that is “completely independent of the complex statutory and regulatory scheme for dispersing veterans’ benefits.” McKelvey v. Walters, 596 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (1984). The court then invalidated 38 CFR § 3.301(c) (2) (1987) as contrary to the Rehabilitation Act. The court ordered the Veterans’ Administration to determine without resort to the regulation whether McKelvey had suffered a disability attributable to his own misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that judicial review was not foreclosed by § 211(a), which was held to apply only to claims “resolved by an actual ‘decision of the Administrator.’” 253 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 130, 792 F. 2d 194, 198 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 367 (1974)). The court found that no such decision had been rendered by the Veterans’ Administration as to the validity of 38 CFR *541 §3.301(c)(2) (1987) under the Rehabilitation Act.6 On the merits, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Veterans’ Administration could consistently with the Rehabilitation Act distinguish between veterans who are at least to some extent responsible for their disabilities and veterans who are not.7 With respect to alcoholism, this distinction could be effected by means of § 3.301(c)(2), said the court, because the Veterans’ Administration could reasonably conclude that alcoholism is a “willfully caused handicap” unless attributable to an underlying psychiatric disorder. 253 U. S. App. D. C., at 132-133, 792 F. 2d, at 200-201. The court expressed disagreement with Tinch v. Walters, 765 F. 2d 599 (CA6 1985), which had invalidated the regulation in light of the Rehabilitation Act. See 253 U. S. App. D. C., at 133, n. 4, 792 F. 2d, at 201, n. 4.

We granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts between the Courts of Appeals as to whether Veterans’ Administration decisions challenged under the Rehabilitation Act are subject to judicial review and, if so, whether that Act bars the Veterans’ Administration from characterizing petitioners’ alcoholism as “willful misconduct” for purposes of 38 U. S. C. § 1662(a)(1). 480 U. S. 916 (1987).

II

We must first consider whether §211(a)’s bar against judicial review of “the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans” ex *542 tends to petitioners’ claim that the Veterans’ Administration regulation defining primary alcoholism as “willful misconduct” discriminates against handicapped persons in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

We have repeatedly acknowledged “the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986); see also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567 (1975); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, 166-167 (1970). The presumption in favor of judicial review may be overcome “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967) (citations omitted). We look to such evidence as “‘specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent,’ or a specific congressional intent to preclude judicial review that is ‘fairly discernible in the detail of the legislative scheme.’” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, supra, at 673 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349, 351 (1984)).

In Johnson v. Robison, supra, we held that the federal courts could entertain constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. We determined that “neither the text nor the scant legislative history of § 211(a)” provided the requisite “clear and convincing” evidence of congressional intent to foreclose judicial review of challenges to the constitutionality of a law administered by the Veterans’ Administration., 415 U. S., at 373-374. In that case, the Veterans’ Administration, acting under 38 U. S. C. §§ 101(21), 1652(a)(1), and 1661(a), denied educational benefits to a conscientious objector who had completed the required alternative civilian service. The claimant brought suit in the District Court, challenging those statutory sections on First and Fifth Amendment grounds. The District Court denied a motion to dismiss based on § 211(a) and gave judgment to the plaintiff. *543 Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848 (Mass. 1973). We agreed that § 211(a) did not bar the suit, but reversed the judgment on the merits. On the § 211(a) issue, we reasoned that “[t]he prohibitions [of § 211(a)] would appear to be aimed at review only of those decisions of law or fact that arise in the administration by the Veterans’ Administration of a statute providing benefits for veterans.” 415 U. S., at 367. The'questions of law presented in that case, however, arose under the Constitution rather than under the veterans’ benefits statute and concerned whether there was a valid law on the subject for the Veterans’ Administration to execute. We went on to conclude that the principal purposes of § 211(a)— “(1) to insure that veterans’ benefits claims will not burden the courts and the Veterans’ Administration with expensive and time-consuming litigation, and (2) to insure that the technical and complex determinations and applications of Veterans’ Administration policy connected with veterans’ benefits decisions will be adequately and uniformly made,” id., at 370 — would not be frustrated if federal courts were permitted to exercise jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the very statute that was sought to be enforced. We noted that such challenges “cannot be expected to burden the courts by their volume, nor do they involve technical consideration of Veterans’ Administration policy.” Id., at 373.

The text and legislative history of § 211(a) likewise provide no clear and convincing evidence of any congressional intent to preclude a suit claiming that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a statute applicable to all federal agencies, has invalidated an otherwise valid regulation issued by the Veterans’ Administration and purporting to have the force of law. Section 211(a) insulates from review decisions of law and fact “under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration,” that is, decisions made in interpreting or applying a particular provision of that statute to a particular set of facts. Id., at 367. But the cases now before us involve the issue whether the law sought to be administered is valid in light of *544 a subsequent statute whose enforcement is not the exclusive domain of the Veterans’ Administration.8 There is no claim that the regulation at issue is inconsistent with the statute under which it was issued; and there is no challenge to the Veterans’ Administration’s construction of any statute dealing with veterans’ benefits, except to the extent that its construction may be affected by the Rehabilitation Act. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Veterans’ Administration has any special expertise in assessing the validity of its regulations construing veterans’ benefits statutes under a later passed statute of general application. Permitting these cases to go forward will not undermine the purposes of § 211(a) any more than did the result in Johnson. It cannot be assumed that the availability of the federal courts to decide whether there is some fundamental inconsistency between the Veterans’ Administration’s construction of veterans’ benefits statutes, as reflected in the regulation at issue here, and the admonitions of the Rehabilitation Act will enmesh the courts in “the technical and complex determinations and applications of Veterans’ Administration policy connected with veterans’ benefits decisions” or “burden the courts and the Veterans’ Administration with expensive and time-consuming litigation.” Id., at 370.9 Of course, if *545 experience proves otherwise, the Veterans’ Administration is fully capable of seeking appropriate relief from Congress.

Accordingly, we conclude that the question whether a Veterans’ Administration regulation violates the Rehabilitation Act is not foreclosed from judicial review by § 211(a). We therefore turn to the merits of petitioners’ Rehabilitation Act claim.

Ill

Congress historically has imposed time limitations on the use of “GI Bill” educational benefits. Veterans of World War II were required to use their benefits within nine years after their discharge from military service, while Korean Conflict veterans had eight years in which to use their benefits. See S. Rep. No. 93-977, p. 13 (1974) (letter to Hon. Vance Hartke from Veterans’ Administrator Johnson). The delimiting period under the current “GI Bill” was raised from 8 years to 10 years in 1974. Pub. L. 93-337, § 2(1), 88 Stat. 292, 38 U. S. C. §§ 1712(b)(1), (2). In 1977, Congress created an exception to this 10-year delimiting period for veterans who delayed their education because of “a physical or mental disability which was not the result of [their] own willful misconduct.” Pub. L. 95-202, Tit. II, § 203(a)(1), 91 Stat. 1429, 38 U. S. C. § 1662(a)(1).

Congress did not use the term “willful misconduct” inadvertently in § 1662(a)(1). The same term had long been used in other veterans’ benefits statutes. For example, veterans are denied compensation for service-connected disabilities that are “the result of the veteran’s own willful misconduct.” 38 U. S. C. § 310. See also § 521 (compensation for disabilities not connected with military service). The Veterans’ Administration had long construed the term “willful misconduct” for purposes of these statutes as encompassing primary alcoholism (i. e., alcoholism that is not “secondary to and a manifestation of an acquired psychiatric disorder”). See n. 2, supra.

*546 “It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979). Hence, we must assume that Congress was aware of the Veterans’ Administration’s interpretation of “willful misconduct” at the time that it enacted § 1662(a)(1), and that Congress intended that the term receive the same meaning for purposes of that statute as it had received for purposes of other veterans’ benefits statutes. See Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 489 (1985); Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 461 U. S. 624, 633 (1983); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 586-587, and n. 10 (1983). In these cases, however, we need not rely only on such assumptions. The legislative history confirms that Congress intended that the Veterans’ Administration apply the same test of “willful misconduct” in granting extensions of time under § 1662(a)(1) as the agency already was applying in granting disability compensation under § 310 and § 521. Specifically, the Report of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee on the 1977 legislation states:

“In determining whether the disability sustained was a result of the veteran’s own ‘willful misconduct,’ the Committee intends that the same standards be applied as are utilized in determining eligibility for other VA programs under title 38. In this connection, see 38 CFR, part III, paragraphs 3.1(n) and 3.301, and VA Manual M21-1, section 1404.” S. Rep. No. 95-468, pp. 69-70 (1977).

The cited regulations include 38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987), the regulation that characterizes primary alcoholism as “willful misconduct.” The Veterans’ Administration Manual provision states, inter alia, that “[b]asic principles for application in deciding cases involving alcoholism are stated in Administrator’s Decision No. 988,” the decision on which § 3.301(c)(2) is based. VA Manual M21-1, change 132, subch. I, § 14.04c (Jan. 29, 1976). See n. 2, supra. These sources set forth *547 the criteria for determining whether a veteran’s alcoholism is the result of “willful misconduct.” These criteria therefore are among the “standards” that, according to the Senate Report, Congress intended to be utilized in determining eligibilty for extended educational benefits.

It is thus clear that the 1977 legislation precluded an extension of time to a veteran who had not pursued his education because of primary alcoholism. If Congress had intended instead that primary alcoholism not be deemed “willful misconduct” for purposes of § 1662(a)(1), as it had been deemed for purposes of other veterans’ benefits statutes, Congress most certainly would have said so.

It was the same Congress that one year later extended §504’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of handicap to “any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency.” Pub. L. 95-602, Tit. IV, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987, 29 U. S. C. § 794. Yet, in enacting the 1978 Rehabilitation Act amendments, Congress did not affirmatively evince any intent to repeal or amend the “willful misconduct” provision of § 1662(a)(1). Nor did Congress anywhere in the language or legislative history of the 1978 amendments expressly disavow its 1977 determination that primary alcoholism is not the sort of disability that warrants an exemption from the time constraints of § 1662(a)(1).

Accordingly, petitioners can prevail under their Rehabilitation Act claim only if the 1978 legislation can be deemed to have implicitly repealed the “willful misconduct” provision of the 1977 legislation or forbade the Veterans’ Administration to classify primary alcoholism as willful misconduct. They must thereby overcome the “ ‘cardinal rule . . . that repeals by implication are not favored.’” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 549-550 (1974) (quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936); Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842); Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n, 393 U. S. 186, 193 (1968)). “It is a basic principle of statutory con *548 struction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum,” Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976), unless the later statute “‘expressly contradices] the original act’” or unless such a construction “‘is absolutely necessary ... in order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning at all.’” Ibid, (quoting T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874)). “The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, supra, at 551.

As we have noted, the 1978 legislation did not expressly contradict the more “narrow, precise, and specific” 1977 legislation. Moreover, the 1978 legislation is not rendered meaningless, even with respect to those who claim to have been handicapped as a result of alcoholism, if the “willful misconduct” provision of § 1662(a)(1) is allowed to retain the import originally intended by Congress.

First, the “willful misconduct” provision does not undermine the central purpose of §504, which is to assure that handicapped individuals receive “evenhanded treatment” in relation to nonhandicapped individuals. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 304 (1985); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 410 (1979). This litigation does not involve a program or activity that is alleged to treat handicapped persons less favorably than nonhandicapped persons. Cf. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273 (1987); Southeastern Community College, supra. Rather, petitioners challenge a statutory provision that treats disabled veterans more favorably than able-bodied veterans: The former may obtain extensions of time in which to use their educational benefits so long as they did not become *549 disabled as a result of their own “willful misconduct”; the latter are absolutely precluded from obtaining such extensions regardless of how compelling their reasons for having delayed their schooling might be. In other words, § 1662(a)(1) merely provides a special benefit to disabled veterans who bear no responsibility for their disabilities that is not provided to other disabled veterans or to any able-bodied veterans.

There is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other categories of handicapped persons. Hence, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1977 with regard to the application of §504 to federally funded programs provide that “exclusion of a specific class of handicapped persons from a program limited by Federal statute or executive order to a different class of handicapped persons” is not prohibited. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22679 (1977), promulgating 45 CFR § 84.4(c) (1986).10 It is therefore not inconsistent with the Rehabilitation Act for only those veterans whose disabilities are not attributable to their own “willful misconduct” to be granted extensions of the 10-year delimiting period applicable to all other veterans. Congress is entitled to establish priorities for the allocation of the limited resources available for veterans’ benefits, cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802, 809 (1969), and thereby to conclude that veterans who bear some responsibility for their disabilities have no stronger claim to an extended eligibility period than do able-bodied veterans. Those veterans are not, in the words of § 504, denied benefits *550 “solely by reason of [their] handicap,” but because they engaged with some degree of willfulness in the conduct that caused them to become disabled.

Furthermore, § 1662(a)(1) does not deny extensions of the delimiting period to all alcoholics but only to those whose drinking was not attributable to an underlying psychiatric disorder. It is estimated by some authorities that mental illness is responsible for 20% to 30% of all alcoholism cases. Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 7. Each veteran who claims to have been disabled by alcoholism is entitled under § 1662(a)(1) to an individualized assessment of whether his condition was the result of a mental illness.

Petitioners, however, perceive an inconsistency between § 504 and the conclusive presumption that alcoholism not motivated by mental illness is necessarily “willful.” They contend that § 504 mandates an individualized determination of “willfulness” with respect to each veteran who claims to have been disabled by alcoholism. It would arguably be inconsistent with § 504 for Congress to distinguish between categories of disabled veterans according to generalized determinations that lack any substantial basis. If primary alcoholism is not always “willful,” as that term has been defined by Congress and the Veterans’ Administration, some veterans denied benefits may well be excluded solely on the basis of their disability. We are unable to conclude that Congress failed to act in accordance with § 504 in this instance, however, given what the District of Columbia Circuit accurately characterized as “a substantial body of medical literature that even contests the proposition that alcoholism is a disease, much less that it is a disease for which the victim bears no responsibility.” 253 U. S. App. D. C., at 132-133, 792 F. 2d, at 200-201. Indeed, even among many who consider alcoholism a “disease” to which its victims are genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not regarded as wholly involuntary. See Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the “Disease Concept of *551 Alcoholism,” 83 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 802-808 (1970). As we see it, §504 does not demand inquiry into whether factors other than mental illness rendered an individual veteran’s drinking so entirely beyond his control as to negate any degree of “willfulness” where Congress and the Veterans’ Administration have reasonably determined for purposes of the veterans’ benefits statutes that no such factors exist.11

In sum, we hold that a construction of § 1662(a)(1) that reflects the original congressional intent that primary alcoholics not be excused from the 10-year delimiting period for utilizing “GI Bill” benefits is not inconsistent with the prohibition on discrimination against the handicapped contained in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.12 Accordingly, since we “are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments . . . when two statutes are capable of co-existence,” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S., at 551, we must conclude that the earlier, more specific provisions of § 1662(a)(1) were neither expressly nor implicitly repealed by the later, more general provisions of § 504.

*552 IV

This litigation does not require the Court to decide whether alcoholism is a disease whose course its victims cannot control. It is not our-role to resolve this medical issue on which the authorities remain sharply divided. Our task is to decide whether Congress intended, in enacting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, to reject the position taken on the issue by the Veterans’ Administration and by Congress itself only one year earlier. In our view, it is by no means clear that § 504 and the characterization of primary alcoholism as a willfully incurred disability are in irreconcilable conflict. If petitioners and their proponents continue to believe that this position is erroneous, their arguments are better presented to Congress than to the courts.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in No. 86-737 is affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in No. 86-622 is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Section 504, 29 U. S. C. § 794, provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv *538 ing Federal financial assistance or under any program'1 or activity conducted by any Executive agency.”

The applicable regulation, 38 CFR § 3.301(c)(2) (1987), provides:

“Alcoholism: The simple drinking of alcoholic beverage is not of itself willful misconduct. The deliberate drinking of a known poisonous substance or under conditions which would raise a presumption to that effect will be considered willful misconduct. If, in the drinking of a beverage to enjoy its intoxicating effects, intoxication results proximately and immediately in disability or death, the disability or death will be considered the result of the person’s willful misconduct. Organic diseases and disabilities which are a secondary result of the chronic use of alcohol as a beverage, whether out of compulsion or otherwise, will not be considered of willful misconduct origin.”

This regulation was intended by the Veterans’ Administration to incorporate the principles of a 1964 administrative decision. 37 Fed. Reg. 20335, 20336 (1972) (proposed regulation); 37 Fed. Reg. 24662 (1972) (final regulation). The 1964 decision provided that alcoholism that is “secondary to *539 and a manifestation of an acquired psychiatric disorder” would not be characterized as willful misconduct. Administrator’s Decision, Veterans’ Administration No. 988, Interpretation of the Term “Willful Misconduct” as Related to the Residuals of Chronic Alcoholism, Aug. 13, 1964, App. 142-143. The Veterans’ Administration refers to this type of alcoholism as “secondary,” and to alcoholism unrelated to an underlying psychiatric disorder as “primary.” See ibid.; Veterans’ Administration Manual M21-1, change 149, subch. XI, § 50.32 (Dec. 23, 1979) (hereinafter VA Manual). Petitioners were found to have suffered from primary alcoholism.

Title 38 U. S. C. § 211(a) provides, in pertinent part:

“[T]he decision of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.”

Petitioners have not raised constitutional claims before this Court.

The dissent maintained that § 211(a) was inapplicable both because the Rehabilitation Act neither provides benefits to veterans nor is administered by the Veterans’ Administration and because the Administrator had not issued a decision as to whether the challenged regulation violated that Act. 791 F. 2d, at 232. Neither the majority nor the dissent reached the merits of Traynor’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

The court acknowledged that the Veterans’ Administration had decided the Rehabilitation Act issue while the case was on appeal. However, the court held that “Section 211(a)’s application is to be determined firmly and finally as of the date that plaintiff commences litigation.” 253 U. S. App. D. C., at 131, 792 F. 2d, at 199. Otherwise, the court reasoned, “[t]he agency could allow a challenge to its action to proceed in the district court secure in the knowledge that if the VA lost there, it could retroactively shield the action from judicial review.” Ibid.

The panel was divided on both the jurisdictional issue and the merits.

The President has designated the Department of Justice as the federal agency responsible for coordinating and enforcing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Exec. Order No. 12250, 3 CFR 298 (1981).

Indeed, petitioners submit that, in the four Circuits that have held that § 211(a) does not bar judicial review of statutory challenges to Veterans’ Administration regulations, only eight such challenges have been filed. See Brief for Petitioners 46-47, n. 32 (citing American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Nimmo, 711 F. 2d 28 (CA4 1983); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F. Supp. 1295 (Md. 1975); Tinch v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346 (ED Tenn. 1983), aff’d, 765 F. 2d 599 (CA6 1985); Taylor v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 1035 (ND Ill. 1974), vacated and remanded, 528 F. 2d 60 (CA7 1976); Arnolds v. Veterans’ Administration, 507 F. Supp. 128 (ND Ill. 1981); Burns v. Nimmo, 545 F. Supp. 544 (Iowa 1982); Waterman v. Cleland, No. 4-77-Civ. 70 (Minn., Oct. 24, 1978)).

We have previously recognized that the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (later the Department of Health and Human Services) to implement the Rehabilitation Act “were drafted with the oversight and approval of Congress,” School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 279 (1987), and therefore constitute “‘an important source of guidance on the meaning of §504.’” Ibid. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 304, n. 24 (1985)).

Our decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, supra, is not to the contrary. In Arline, we recognized that the district courts should “in most cases” undertake an individualized inquiry into whether a handicapped person has been denied a job for which he is otherwise qualified. 480 U. S., at 287. In contrast to the instant case, Arline did not involve a handicapping condition as to which Congress had specifically determined that no individualized inquiry was necessary. We might well have reached a different conclusion in Arline had the employer relied on a congressional determination supported by substantial medical evidence that all employees suffering from acute tuberculosis pose a serious health threat to others in the workplace.

If the position urged by the dissent were to prevail, the Veterans’ Administration would be hard put to avoid making an individualized determination as to whether a veteran’s alcoholism is sufficiently “willful” to disqualify him from disability compensation under §§ 310 and 521. Such a requirement would saddle the Government with additional administrative and financial burdens that Congress could not have contemplated in extending § 504 to federal programs.