Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Totten v. United States
Totten v. United States, 23 L. Ed. 605 (1876)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1876-04-10
- Topic
- general
stating that "suits cannot be maintained which would require the disclosure of [inter alia the confidences of the confessional” | recognizing the President’s power to conduct intelligence operations and to employ secret agents | precluding suits arising from a secret espionage agreement between the plaintiff and the United States | precluding suits arising from a secret espionage agreement between the plaintiff and the United States | precluding suits arising from a secret espionage agreement between the plaintiff and the United States | explaining how common-law courts developed lawyer-client privilege and spousal privilege between the 16th and 19th centuries | refusing to examine payments from this fund lest the publicity make a “secret service” “impossible” | explaining how common-law courts developed lawyer-client privilege and spousal privilege between the 16th and 19th centuries | prohibiting suits against the government based upon covert espionage No. 08-3499 9 agreements | barring suit by Civil War spy against the United States for alleged failure to pay for espionage services because the case was predicated on the existence of an undisclosed contract for secret services with the government | recognizing President’s authority to hire spies | dismissal required in case alleging breach of contract to perform espionage because the very subject matter of the litigation was a state secret | "The secrecy which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement" (emphasis added) | “The secrecy which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement” (emphasis added) | action on contract for wartime spying was dismissed because its maintenance would endanger the secrecy of such employments | action by former spy, after the Civil War, for his services during war under contract with President; held, action denied since it would endanger secrecy of such arrangements | "suits cannot be maintained which would require of the confidences of the confessional . . . ." | dismissal required in case alleging breach of contract to perform espionage because the very subject matter of the litigation was a state secret | suit against CIA director for failure to provide financial compensation for Cold War services | suit against CIA director for failure to provide financial compensation for Cold War services | prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements | suit against CIA director for failure to provide financial compensation for Cold War services | President “was undoubtedly authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief . . . to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information respecting the strength, resources, and movements of the enemy” | prohibiting suits against the government based upon covert espionage agreements | "[P]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated." | “[P]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.” | “[P]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and .respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.” | "[P]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.” | "[P]ublic policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which wo
Citator
- Cited by
- 109 opinions
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes before us on appeal from the Court of Claims. The action was brought to recover compensation for services alleged to have been rendered by the claimant’s intestate, William A. Lloyd, under a contract with President Lincoln, made in July, 1861, by which he was to proceed South and ascertain the number of troops stationed at different points in the insurrectionary States, procure plans of forts and fortifications, and gain such other information as might be beneficial *106 to the government of the United States, and report the facts to the President; for which services he was to be paid $200 a month.
The Court of Claims finds that Lloyd proceeded, under the contract, within the rebel lines, and remained there during the entire period of the war, collecting, and from time to time transmitting, information to the President; and that, upon the close of the war, he was only reimbursed his expenses. But the court, being equally divided in opinion as to the authority of the President to bind the United States by the contract in question, decided, for the purposes of an appeal, against the claim, and dismissed the' petition.
We have no difficulty as to the authority of the President in the matter. He was undoubtedly authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information respecting the strength, resources, and movements of the enemy; and contracts to compensate such agents are so far binding upon the government as to render it lawful for the President to direct payment of the amount stipulated out of the contingent fund under his control. Our objection is not to the contract, but to the action upon it in the Court of Claims. The service stipulated by the contract was a secret service; the information sought was to be obtained clandestinely, and was to be communicated privately; the employment and the service were to be equally concealed. Both employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This condition of the engagement was implied from the nature of the employment, and is implied in all secret employments of the government in time of war, or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service might compromise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger the person or injure the character of the agent. If upon contracts of such a nature an action against the government could be maintained in the Court of Claims, whenever an agent should deem himself entitled to greater or different compensation than that awarded to him, the whole service in any case, and the manner of its discharge, with the details of deal *107 ings Avitb individuals and officers, might be exposed, to the serious detriment of the public. A secret service, with liability to publicity in this way, would be impossible; and, as such services are sometimes indispensable to the government, its agents in those services must look for their compensation to the contingent fund of the department employing them, and to such allowance from it as those Avho dispense that fund may aAVard. The secrecy Avhich such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement. The publicity produced by an action Avould itself be a breach of a contract of that kind, and thus defeat a recovery.
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in -a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the laAv itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated. On this principle, suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of communications by a client to his counsel for professional advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose. Much greater reason exists for the application of the principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government, as the existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.
Judgment affirmed.