Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Tiffany Industries, Inc. v. Grant

87 L. Ed. 2d 673

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1985-07-02
Topic
general

disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be "personally disadvantaged" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement | disapproving of a prosecutor’s suggestion that he might be “personally disadvantaged” if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement | remanding without opinion for further consideration in light of Bagley where appeals court stated that “[i]n order to be material, evidence suppressed must have been admissible at trial” | “Inadmissible evidence is by definition not material [for Brady purposes], because it never would have reached the jury and therefore could not have affected the trial outcome.” | “Bankers has alleged that it has been deprived of various sums of money by the defendants’ activities. There is no question that this constituted ‘injur[y] in [its] business or property...’” | “Two acts in the same criminal episode may establish a pattern of racketeering” | “plaintiff ... must prove that defendants’ violation caused the injury” | "The requirement that the injury be to the plaintiffs business or property means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage. For example, a person physically injured in a fire whose origin was arson is not given a right to recover for his personal injuries” | in light of the Court’s decision in Bagley, supra | granting certiorari and vacating the judgment below

Citator

Cited by
35 opinions

C. A. 8th Cir. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., ante, p. 479, and American National Bank v. Haroco, Inc., ante, p. 606.

Justice Blackmun would deny the petitions for writs of certiorari.

Reported below: 742 F. 2d 408.