Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1994-01-19
Topic
bankruptcy

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that Congress did not intend "to allow mine operators to evade the statutory review process”
  • holding that the existence of constitutional claims did not exempt petitioner from judicial review procedure mandated by statute
  • holding that, where reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent commission, it may address constitutional questions
  • holding that Congress shows its intent to preclude judicial review where it creates a scheme permitting judicial review only for certain actions
  • holding that Congress shows its intent to preclude judicial review where it creates a scheme permitting judicial review for only certain actions
  • holding that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a pre-enforcement due process challenge
  • holding that a statutory provision that places temporal restrictions on a party’s ability to bring an action in federal court still provides adequate opportunity for review and therefore satisfies due process
  • holding that the comprehensive review process set forth in the Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act (“MSH Act”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
531 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Administrative Law — Statutory Review Schemes — Preclusion of District Court Jurisdiction Where a case involves delayed judicial review of final agency action, a court will find that Congress allocated initial review to an administrative body if that intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme; whether a statute precludes initial judicial review is determined from its language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review. 510 U.S. at 207
  2. Administrative Law — Statutory Review Schemes — Statutory Structure Although a statute is facially silent about pre-enforcement claims, its comprehensive review process demonstrates an intent to preclude such challenges where the process applies to all violations of the Act and its regulations without distinguishing between pre-enforcement and post-enforcement challenges, and where the statute expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction only in narrow provisions favoring the Secretary, leaving regulated parties to pursue administrative review and then court of appeals review. 510 U.S. at 207-209
  3. Administrative Law — Statutory Review Schemes — Legislative History Legislative history showing that Congress intended to channel and streamline enforcement and to direct ordinary challenges to a single review process confirms an interpretation that a statute's review scheme precludes district court jurisdiction over pre-enforcement challenges. 510 U.S. at 209-212
  4. Administrative Law — Statutory Review Schemes — Meaningful Review A claim falls within a statutory review scheme, rather than being wholly collateral to it, where the claim at root requires interpretation of the parties' rights and duties under the Act and its regulations and thus arises under the Act and falls squarely within the reviewing commission's expertise. 510 U.S. at 212-214
  5. Administrative Law — Agency Adjudication The general rule disfavoring adjudication of constitutional questions by administrative agencies is not mandatory and is of less consequence where the reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent commission established exclusively to adjudicate disputes under the statute, particularly where constitutional questions have been addressed in prior enforcement proceedings and the claims can be meaningfully addressed in the court of appeals. 510 U.S. at 215
  6. Administrative Law — Due Process — Pre-Enforcement Review Preclusion of pre-enforcement district court review does not violate due process where the regulated party faces no serious prehearing deprivation: compliance imposes no serious harm, any abuse of the arrangement can be remedied on an individual basis under the Act, and if the party instead refuses to comply, full judicial review is available before any penalty must be paid, so the party is neither barred as a practical matter from all access to the courts nor put to a constitutionally intolerable choice between compliance and potent coercive penalties. 510 U.S. at 216-218