Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich
510 U.S. 200
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1994-01-19
- Topic
- bankruptcy
holding that Congress did not intend "to allow mine operators to evade the statutory review process” | holding that the existence of constitutional claims did not exempt petitioner from judicial review procedure mandated by statute | holding that, where reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent commission, it may address constitutional questions | holding that Congress shows its intent to preclude judicial review where it creates a scheme permitting judicial review only for certain actions | holding that Congress shows its intent to preclude judicial review where it creates a scheme permitting judicial review for only certain actions | holding that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a pre-enforcement due process challenge | holding that a statutory provision that places temporal restrictions on a party’s ability to bring an action in federal court still provides adequate opportunity for review and therefore satisfies due process | holding that the comprehensive review process set forth in the Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act (“MSH Act” | holding that the existence of constitutional claims did not exempt petitioner from judicial review procedure mandated by statute | holding that the Mine Act’s “detailed structure for reviewing violations” of regulations promulgated under the statute jurisdictionally precluded otherwise-available pre-enforcement challenges | ruling that a “detailed structure for re- viewing violations” of a statutory provision or regulation precluded a “pre-enforcement challenge” | holding that Congress shows its intent to preclude judicial review where it creates a. scheme permitting "judicial review only for certain actions | concluding that, where administrative Commission’s expertise “could be brought to bear” on appeal, Commission’s exclusive review of alleged statutory violation was appropriate despite its lack of expertise in interpreting a particular statute (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) | holding that statutory provisions creating right to judicial review for one party do not create a corresponding right for another party that the statute did not mention | holding that a statutory provision that claims to the circumstances outlined in § 252(e)(6 | holding that petitioner’s constitutional claims could first be brought before the agency | holding that petitioner’s constitutional claims could first be brought before the agency | holding that “[w]hether a statute is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute’s language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review” | holding that petitioner’s constitutional claims could first be brought before the agency | noting that Congress intended the Commission to use its expertise to "develop a uniform and comprehensive interpretation of the Mine Act" | noting that Congress intended the Commission to use its expertise to “develop a uniform and comprehensive intei’pretation of the Mine Act” | holding that administrative review scheme of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, under which challenges are reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and then by appropriate court of appeal, precluded district court jurisdiction | noting that Congress can “delay[] judicial review of final agency actions” by “allocating] initial review to an administrative body” | explaining that claims arising under the Mine Act “fall squarely within the Commission’s expertise” | distinguishing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) | precluding initial judicial review where Congress intends an administrative body be the original arbiter of a controversy | considering "whether petitioner's claims are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within this statutory structure" | identifying three questions whose answers could signal that Congress did not in
Citator
- Cited by
- 235 opinions
1. The Mine Act's statutory review scheme precludes a district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to the Act. Pp. 207-218.
(a) In cases involving delayed judicial review of final agency actions, this Court finds that Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative body where such intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme. Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute's language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review. Pp. 207.
(b) Although the Mine Act is facially silent about pre-enforcement claims, its comprehensive enforcement structure demonstrates that Congress intended to preclude challenges such as the present one. ThePage 201statutory-review process does not distinguish between pre-enforcement and post-enforcement challenges, but applies to all violations of the Act and its regulations. The Act expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction in only two provisions, which respectively empower theSecretaryto enjoin habitual violations of health and safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penalties. Mine operators enjoy no corresponding right, but must complain to the Commission and then to the court of appeals. Pp. 207-209.
(c) The Mine Act's legislative history confirms the foregoing interpretation by demonstrating that Congress intended to channel and streamline enforcement, directing ordinary challenges to a single review process.Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,387 U.S. 136,142-144,155-156, distinguished. Pp. 209-212.
(d) Petitioner's claims are of the type that Congress intended to be addressed through the statutory review process, and can be meaningfully reviewed under the Mine Act. The NLRA claims, at root, require interpretation of the parties' rights and duties under § 813(f) and30 C.F.R. pt. 40, and, as such, arise under the Act and fall squarely within the expertise of the Commission, which recently has addressed the precise NLRA claims presented here. As for petitioner's due process claim, the general rule disfavoring constitutional adjudication by agencies is not mandatory, and is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body is not the agency itself, but an independent commission established exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes. The Commission has addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement proceedings and, even if it had not, petitioner's claims could be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals. Pp. 212-216.
2. The Court need not consider petitioner's contention that, because the absence of pre-enforcement declaratory relief before the Commission will subject petitioner to serious and irreparable harm, due process requires district court review. The record contains no evidence that petitioner will be subject to a serious prehearing deprivation if it complies with § 813(f) and30 C.F.R. pt. 40by posting the designations. The potential for abuse of the miners' representative position appears limited, and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any such abuse could not be remedied on an individual basis under the Mine Act. Nor will petitioner face any serious prehearing deprivation if it refuses to post the designations while challenging MSHA's interpretation. Although the Act's civil penalties unquestionably may become onerous if petitioner chooses not to comply, full judicial review is available before any penalty must be paid. Under the Act, petitioner is neither barred as a practical matter from all access to the courts nor put to a constitutionallyPage 202intolerable choice between compliance and potent coercive penalties. Pp. 216-218.969 F.2d 970, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined except for Parts III-B, IV, and V. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 219.
"[A] representative of the operator and a representative authorized by his miners shall be given an opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized representative during the physical inspection of any coal or other mine . . . for the purpose of aiding such inspection and to participate in pre- or post-inspection conferences held at the mine."
Regulations promulgated under this section define a miners' representative as "[a]ny person or organization which represents two or more miners at a coal or other mine for the purposes of the Act."30 C.F.R. § 40.1(b)(1) (1993).
In addition to exercising these "walk-around" inspection rights under § 813(f), persons designated as representatives of the miners may obtain certain health and safety information2and promote health and safety enforcement.3Once the mine employees designate one or more persons as theirPage 204representatives, the employer must post at the mine information regarding these designees.30 C.F.R. § 40.4.
The Secretary has broad authority to compel immediate compliance with Mine Act provisions through the use of mandatory civil penalties, discretionary daily civil penalties, and other sanctions.4Challenges to enforcement are reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission,30 U.S.C. § 815and823, which is independent of the Department of Labor, and by the appropriate United States court of appeals, § 816.
Rather than post the designations and before receiving the MSHA letter, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming for pre-enforcement injunctive relief.Id., at 6. Petitioner contended that the designation of nonemployee UMWA "representatives" violated the principles of collective-bargaining representation under the NLRA as well as the company's NLRA rights to exclude union organizers from its property.Id., at 9-10. Petitioner argued then, as it does here, that deprivation of these rights would harm the company irreparably by "giv[ing] the union organizing advantages in terms of access, personal contact and knowledge that would not be available under the labor laws, as well as enhanced credibility flowing from the appearance of government imprimatur." Reply Brief for Petitioner 14.
Petitioner additionally alleged that requiring it to challenge the MSHA's interpretation of30 U.S.C. § 813(f) and30C.F.R. pt. 40 through the statutory review process would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since the company would be forced to choose between violating the Act and incurring possible escalating daily penalties,6or, on the other hand, complying with the designations and suffering irreparable harm. The District Court enjoined respondents from enforcing30 C.F.R. pt. 40, finding thatPage 206petitioner had raised serious questions going to the merits and that it might face irreparable harm.7
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Mine Act's comprehensive enforcement and administrative review scheme precluded district court jurisdiction over petitioner's claims.969 F.2d 970(1992). The court stated:
"[T]he gravamen of Thunder Basin's case is a dispute over an anticipated citation and penalty . . . . Operators may not avoid the Mine Act's administrative review process simply by filing in a district court before actually receiving an anticipated citation, order, or assessment of penalty."Id., at 975.
To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, "would permit preemptive strikes that could seriously hamper effective enforcement of the Act, disrupting the review scheme Congress intended."Ibid. The court also concluded that the Mine Act's review procedures adequately protected petitioner's due process rights.Ibid.
We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question,507 U.S. 971(1993), to resolve a claimed conflict with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. SeeSouthern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan,774 F.2d 693(1985),amended,781 F.2d 57(1986).Page 207
Mine operators may challenge adverse Commission decisions in the appropriate Court of Appeals, § 816(a)(1), whose jurisdiction "shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final" except for possible Supreme Court review,ibid. The Court of Appeals must uphold findings of the Commission that are substantially supported by the record,ibid., but may grant temporary relief pending final determination of most proceedings, § 816(2).
Although the statute establishes that the Commission and the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to agency enforcement proceedings, the Act is facially silent with respect to pre-enforcement claims. The structure of the Mine Act, however, demonstrates that Congress intended to preclude challenges such as the present one. The Act's comprehensive review process does not distinguish between pre-enforcement and postenforcement challenges,Page 209but applies to all violations of the Act and its regulations. § 814(a). Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, actions before the Commission are initiated not by the Secretary, but by a mine operator who claims to be aggrieved.See§ 815(a). The Act expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction in only two provisions, §§ 818(a) and 820(j), which respectively empower theSecretaryto enjoin habitual violations of health and safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penalties. Mine operators enjoy no corresponding right11but are to complain to the Commission and then to the Court of Appeals.
Congress expressed particular concern that under the previous Coal Act mine operators could contest civil penalty assessmentsde novoin federal district court once the administrative review process was complete, thereby "seriously hamper[ing] the collection of civil penalties."15ConcludingPage 211that "rapid abatement of violations is essential for the protection of miners," Leg.Hist. 618, Congress accordingly made improved penalties and enforcement measures a primary goal of the Act.
The 1977 Mine Act thus strengthened and streamlined health and safety enforcement requirements. The Act authorized the Secretary to compel payment of penalties and to enjoin habitual health and safety violators in federal district court.SeeLeg.Hist. 627;30 U.S.C. § 820(j) and818(a). Assessment of civil penalties was made mandatory for all mines, and Congress expressly eliminated the power of a mine operator to challenge a final penalty assessmentde novoin district court.Cf.Whitney Nat. Bank,379 U.S., at 420(that "Congress rejected a proposal for ade novoreview in the district courts of Board decisions" supports a finding of district court preclusion).16We consider the legislative history and these amendments to be persuasive evidence that Congress intended to direct ordinary challenges under the Mine Act to a single review process.Page 212Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,387 U.S. 136(1967), is not to the contrary. In that case, this Court held that statutory review of certain provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,52 Stat. 1040, as amended by the Drug Amendments of 1962,76 Stat. 780,21 U.S.C. § 301et seq., did not preclude district court jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to regulations promulgated under separate provisions of that Act. In so holding, the Court found that the presence of a statutory saving clause, see387 U.S., at 144, and the statute's legislative history demonstrated "rather conclusively that the specific review provisions were designed to give an additional remedy and not to cut down more traditional channels of review,"id., at 142. It concluded that Congress' primary concern in adopting the administrative review procedures was to supplement review of specific agency determinations over which traditional forms of review might be inadequate.Id., at 142-144. Contrary to petitioner's contentions, no comparable statutory language or legislative intent is present here. Indeed, as discussed above, the Mine Act's text and legislative history suggest precisely the opposite. The prospect that federal jurisdiction might thwart effective enforcement of the statute also was less immediate inAbbott Laboratories, since theAbbottpetitioners did not attempt to stay enforcement of the challenged regulation pending judicial review, as petitioner did here.Id., at 155-156.
An analogous situation is not presented here. Petitioner pressed two primary claims below: that the UMWA designation under § 813(f) violates the principles of collective bargainingPage 214under the NLRA and petitioner's right "to exclude nonemployee union organizers from [its] property,"Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,502 U.S. 527,532(1992), and that adjudication of petitioner's claims through the statutory review provisions will violate due process by depriving petitioner of meaningful review. Petitioner's statutory claims, at root, require interpretation of the parties' rights and duties under § 813(f) and30 C.F.R. pt. 40, and, as such, arise under the Mine Act and fall squarely within the Commission's expertise. The Commission, which was established as an independent review body to "develop a uniform and comprehensive interpretation" of the Mine Act, Hearing on the Nomination of Members of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission before the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1978), has extensive experience interpreting the walk-around rights17and recently addressed the precise NLRA claims presented here.18AlthoughPage 215the Commission has no particular expertise in construing statutes other than the Mine Act, we conclude that exclusive review before the Commission is appropriate, since "agency expertise [could] be brought to bear on" the statutory questions presented here.Whitney Nat. Bank,379 U.S., at 420.
As for petitioner's constitutional claim, we agree that "[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies,"Johnson v. Robison,415 U.S., at 368, quotingOestereich v.Selective Serv. Bd. System Local, No. 11,393 U.S. at 242(Harlan, J., concurring in result); accord,Califanov. Sanders,430 U.S. 99,109(1977). This rule is not mandatory, however, and is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body is not the agency itself, but an independent Commission established exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes. SeeSecretary v. Richardson, 3 F. M. S. H.R. C. 8, 18-20 (1981). The Commission has addressed constitutional questions in previous enforcement proceedings.19Even if this were not the case, however, petitioner's statutory and constitutional claims here can be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals.20Page 216
We conclude that the Mine Act's comprehensive enforcement structure, combined with the legislative history's clear concern with channeling and streamlining the enforcement process, establishes a "fairly discernible" intent to preclude district court review in the present case.See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,467 U.S., at 351. Petitioner's claims are "pre-enforcement" only because the company sued before a citation was issued, and its claims turn on a question of statutory interpretation that can be meaningfully reviewed under the Mine Act. Had petitioner persisted in its refusal to post the designation, the Secretary would have been required to issue a citation and commence enforcement proceedings.See30 U.S.C. § 815(a) and820(1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Nothing in the language and structure of the Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to allow mine operators to evade the statutory-review process by enjoining the Secretary from commencing enforcement proceedings, as petitioner sought to do here. To uphold the District Court's jurisdiction in these circumstances would be inimical to the structure and the purposes of the Mine Act.
The record before us contains no evidence that petitioner will be subject to serious harm if it complies with30 U.S.C. § 813(f) and30C.F.R. pt. 40 by posting the designations, and the potential for abuse of the miners' representative position appears limited. As the district manager of the MSHA stated to petitioner, designation as a miners' representativePage 217does not convey "an uncontrolled access right to the mine property to engage in any activity that the miners' representative wants." App. 49. Statutory inspections of petitioner's mine need occur only twice annually and are conducted with representatives of the Secretary and the operator. Because the miners' representative cannot receive advance notice of an inspection, the ability of the nonemployee UMWA designees to exercise these limited walk-around rights is speculative.SeeTr. of Oral Arg. 31; Brief for International Union, UMWA, asAmicus Curiae11, n. 2. Although it is possible that a miners' representative could abuse his privileges, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that such abuse, entirely hypothetical on the record before us, cannot be remedied on an individual basis under the Mine Act. See969 F.2d, at 976-977, and n. 6;Utah Power Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor,897 F.2d 447,452(CA10 1990);Kerr-McGeeCoal Corp. v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H.R. C. 352, 361-362 (1993).21
Nor will petitioner face any serious prehearing deprivation if it refuses to post the designations while challengingPage 218the Secretary's interpretation.22Although the Act's civil penalties unquestionably may become onerous if petitioner chooses not to comply, the Secretary's penalty assessments become final and payable only after full review by both the Commission and the appropriate Court of Appeals.30 U.S.C. § 820(i) and816. A mine operator may request that the Commission expedite its proceedings, § 815(d), and temporary relief of certain orders is available from the Commission and the Court of Appeals. §§ 815(b)(2) and 816(a)(2). Thus, this case does not present the situation confronted inEx parte Young,209 U.S. 123,148(1908), in which the practical effect of coercive penalties for noncompliance was to foreclose all access to the courts. Nor does this approach a situation in which compliance is sufficiently onerous and coercive penalties sufficiently potent that a constitutionally intolerable choice might be presented.
As to Part V: the only additional analysis introduced in that brief section is the proposition that "the parties' arguments concerning final agency action, a cause of action, ripeness, and exhaustion" need not be reached "[b]ecause we have resolved this dispute on statutory preclusion grounds."Ante, at 218, n. 23. That is true enough as to the claims disposed of in Part III, but quite obviously not true as to the constitutional claim disposed of in Part IV, which is rejected not on preclusion grounds, but on the merits.fn*The alleged impediments to entertaining that claim must be considered. It suffices here to say that I do not consider them valid.Page 220
And finally, as to Part IV: the Court holds that the preclusion of review is constitutional "because neither compliance with, nor continued violation of, the statute will subject petitioner to a serious prehearing deprivation."Ante, at 216. I presume this means that any such deprivation will bede minimis(since I know of no doctrine which lets stand unconstitutional injury that is more thandeminimisbut short of some other criterion of gravity). It seems to me, however, that compliance with the inspection regulationswillcause petitioner more thande minimisharm (assuming, as we must in evaluating the harm resulting from compliance, that petitioner is correct on the merits of his claims). Compliance will compel the company to allow union officials to enter its premises (and in a position of apparent authority, at that), notwithstanding its common law right to exclude them,cf. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,502 U.S. 527,534-535(1992). And compliance will provide at least some confidential business information to officers of the union. (The UMWA's contention, on which the Court relies, that it is "speculative" whether a nonemployee miners' representative will be able to accompany the walk-arounds means only that such a representative may notalwaysbe able to do so. He will surelyoftenbe able to do so, since the statuterequiresthat he "be given an opportunity to accompany" the inspector.30 U.S.C. § 813(f).)
In my view, however, the preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review is constitutionalwhether or notcompliance produces irreparable harm — at least if a summary penalty does not cause irreparable harm (e.g., if it is a recoverable summary fine) or if judicial reviewisprovided before a penalty fornoncompliance can be imposed. (The latter condition exists here, as it does in most cases, because the penalty for noncompliance can only be imposed in court.) Were it otherwise, the availability of pre-enforcement challenges would have to be the rule, rather than the exception, since complying with a regulation later held invalid almostalwaysPage 221produces the irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs. Petitioner's claim is that the imposition of a choice between (1) complying with what the government says to be the law, and (2) risking potential penalties (without a prior opportunity to challenge the law in district court) denies due process. This is similar to the constitutional challenge brought in the line of cases beginning withEx parte Young,209 U.S. 123(1908), but with one crucial difference. As the Court notes, seeante, at 217-218, petitioner, unlike the plaintiff inYoung, had the option of complyingand thenbringing a judicial challenge. The constitutional defect inYoungwas that the dilemma of either obeying the law, and thereby forgoing any possibility of judicial review, or risking "enormous" and "severe" penalties, effectively cut off all access to the courts.See209 U.S., at 146-148. That constitutional problem does not exist here, nor does any other of which I am aware.Cf. Bailey v. George,259 U.S. 16,19(1922). I would decide the second constitutional challenge (Part IV) on the simple grounds that the company can obtain judicial review if it complies with the agency's request, and can obtain presanction judicial review if it does not.Page 222
- Page 202Timothy M. BiddleandJ. Michael Klisefiled a brief for the American Mining Congress et al. asamici curiaeurging reversal.Patrick K. Nakamura, George N. Davies, Robert H. Stroop, Jr., andMary Lu Jordanfiled a brief for the International Union United Mine Workers of America, asamicus curiaeurging affirmance. ↩
- Page 203 Underground mines must be inspected at least four times a year, and surface mines must be inspected at least twice annually.30 U.S.C. § 813(a). ↩
- Page 203 Miners' representatives are entitled to receive "a copy of any order, citation, notice, or decision" issued by the Secretary to the mine operator,30 U.S.C. § 819(b), as well as copies of certain mine health and safety records available to the Secretary regarding employee exposure to toxic or other harmful agents, § 813(c), daily mine inspections,30 C.F.R. § 77.1713, and plans for mine evacuation, § 77.1101, roof control, § 75.220, and employee training, §§ 48.3 and 48.23. ↩
- Page 203 Miners' representatives, among other things, may inform the Secretary of mine hazards,30 U.S.C. § 813(g)(2), request immediate additional inspections of the mine when a violation or imminent danger exists, § 813(g)(1), and participate in proceedings before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, § 815(d). Representatives may request or challenge certain enforcement actions against a mine operator, §§ 815(d) and 817(e)(1), contest the time an operator is given to abate a Mine Act violation, § 815(d), and initiate proceedings to modify the application of health and safety standards,30 C.F.R. § 44.3. ↩
- Page 204 The Secretary must issue a citation and recommend assessment of a civil penalty of up to $50,000 against any mine operator believed to have violated the Act.30 U.S.C. § 814(a),815(a), and820(a). If an operator fails to abate the violation within the time allotted, the Secretary may assess additional daily civil penalties of up to $5,000 per day pending abatement. § 820(b). The Secretary's representative also may issue a "withdrawal order," directing all individuals to withdraw from the affected mine area, §§ 814(b) and (d), or pursue criminal penalties, § 820(d). ↩
- Page 204 The MSHA is established within the Department of Labor and represents the Secretary in enforcing the Mine Act.91 Stat. 1319,29 U.S.C. § 557a. ↩
- Page 205 Petitioner relied for this proposition on a similar case in which a mine operator refused to post the designation of a UMWA employee, a citation was issued, and the MSHA ordered abatement within 24 hours and threatened to impose daily civil penalties.See Kerr-McGee Coal Corp.v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H.R. C. 352 (1993), appeal pending, No. 93-1250 (CADC). Kerr-McGee complied, but contested the citation. An administrative law judge rejected the operator's claim, and the Commission affirmed, holding that § 813(f) did not violate the NLRA. 5 at F.M.S.H.R.C., 362-363. The Commission eventually fined Kerr-McGee a total of $300 for its noncompliance. ↩
- Page 206 App. to Pet. for Cert. A-24. Before the Court of Appeals ruled on the appeal from the preliminary injunction, the District Court held a trial and entered a permanent injunction in favor of petitioner.SeeThunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, No. 91-CV-0050-B (D. Wyo. Mar. 13, 1992). The Court of Appeals subsequently denied petitioner's motion to stay appeal of the preliminary injunction and to consolidate the two cases, finding conclusive its holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction.969 F.2d 970,973, n. 3 (CA10 1992). ↩
- Page 207 Because court of appeals review is available, this case does not implicate "`the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review.'"Bowen v. Michigan Academy of FamilyPhysicians,476 U.S. 667,672(1986), quotingDunlop v. Bachowski,421 U.S. 560,567(1975). ↩
- Page 20830 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2). The Commission exercises discretionary review over any case involving, among others, a "substantial question of law, policy or discretion," § 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV), and may review on its own initiative any decision "contrary to law or Commission policy" or in which "a novel question of policy has been presented," § 823(d)(2)(B). Any ALJ decision not granted review by the Commission within 40 days becomes a "final decision of the Commission." § 823(d)(1). ↩
- Page 208 The statutory criteria are "the operator's history of previous violations, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect on the operator's ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of the person charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance."30 U.S.C. § 820(i). ↩
- Page 209 Petitioner points to § 960, which provides that "no justice, judge, or court of the United States shall" enjoin enforcement of interim mandatory health and safety standards, and to § 815(a), which provides that citations not contested in a timely manner are "not subject to review by any court or agency," as evidence that Congress expressly prohibited federal jurisdiction when it so intended. Petitioner misconstrues § 960, which bars a certain form of relief but says nothing about the appropriate forum for a challenge. Section 815(a) similarly provides only that failure timely to challenge a citation precludes review before the Commission and court of appeals; it does not suggest that district court review is otherwise available. In light of the Act's other provisions granting district courts jurisdiction over challenges brought only by the Secretary, §§ 818(a) and 820(j), petitioner's argument based on the maximexpressiounius est exclusio alteriusis unpersuasive. ↩
- Page 210 In February 1972, for example, 125 persons were killed when a mine dam broke at Buffalo Creek in West Virginia. Leg.Hist. 592.SeegenerallyG. Stern, The Buffalo Creek Disaster (1976). Ninety-one miners died of carbon monoxide asphyxiation in May 1972 at the Sunshine Silver Mine in Idaho. In July 1972, nine miners were killed in a mine fire in Blacksville, W. Va., and in March, 1976, 23 miners and 3 federal inspectors died in methane gas explosions at the Scotia coal mine in Kentucky.Ibid.
The House and Senate Committee Reports observed that these accidents resulted from hazards that were remediable, and that, in many cases, already had been the object of repeated enforcement efforts.SeegenerallyLeg.Hist. 362, 371, 592-593, 637. The 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, for example, occurred after the mine had been assessed over $1.5 million in penalties, "not one cent of which had been paid."Id., at 631. Sixty-two ventilation violations were noted in the two years prior to the Scotia gas explosions, but the imposed penalties failed to coerce compliance.Id., at 629-630. ↩ - Page 210 The 1977 Mine Act renamed and amended the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act),91 Stat. 1290, and repealed the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, id., at 1322. ↩
- Page 210 The Senate Report found it "unacceptable that, years after enactment of these mine safety laws . . ., [m]ine operators still find it cheaper to pay minimal civil penalties than to make the capital investments necessary to adequately abate unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and there is still no means by which the government can bring habitual and chronic violators of the law into compliance." Leg.Hist. 592;see alsoid., at 597. ↩
- Page 210Id., at 633. The Senate Report explained:
"The Committee firmly believes that, to effectively induce compliance, the penalty must be paid by the operator in reasonably close time proximity to the occurrence of the underlying violation. A number of problems with the current penalty assessment and collection system interfere with this. Final determinations of penalties are not self-enforcing, and operatorsPage 211have the right to seek judicial review of penalty determinations, and may request ade novotrial on the issues in the U.S. District Courts. This encourages operators who are not predisposed to voluntarily pay assessed penalties to pursue cases through the elaborate administrative procedure and then to seek redress in the Courts. Since the District Courts are still reluctant to schedule trials on these cases, and the Department of Justice has been reluctant to pursue such cases in the courts, the matters generally languish at that stage, and the penalties go uncollected."Id., at 604. ↩ - Page 211 The Senate Report's citation,seeLeg.Hist. 602, ofBituminous CoalOperators' Assn. v. Secretary of Interior,547 F.2d 240(CA4 1977) (holding that pre-enforcement district court challenges were not precluded under the 1969 Coal Act), does not support petitioner's claim that Congress intended to preserve district court jurisdiction over pre-enforcement suits. That case was cited for an unrelated proposition and does not constitute a "settled judicial construction" that Congress presumptively preserved.United States v. Powell,379 U.S. 48,55, n. 13 (1964);see also Keene Corp. v. United States,508 U.S. 202,207-209(1993). ↩
- Page 214See Cyprus Empire Corp. v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H.R. C. 10 (1993) (striking workers' entitlement to walk-around representation);Councilof Southern Mountains, Inc. v. Martin County Coal Corp., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 206 (1984),aff'd sub nom. Council of Southern Mountains,Inc. v. FMSHRC,751 F.2d 1418(CADC 1985) (nonemployee miners' representative entitlement to monitor training courses at the mine);Magma Copper Co. v. Secretary, 1 F. M. S. H.R. C. 1948 (1979),aff'd in part,645 F.2d 694(CA9 1981) (compensation for multiple miners' representatives). ↩
- Page 214See Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. v. Secretary, 15 F. M. S. H.R. C. 352 (1993). The Commission concluded that there was "no basis" for limiting the designation of miners' representatives to "member[s] of a union that also represents the miners for collective bargaining purposes under the NLRA,"id., at 361, since the "discrete safety and health purposes of the Mine Act . . . render these NLRA principles inapplicable here,"id., at 362. The Commission noted that the preamble to30 C.F.R. pt. 40expressly disapproves incorporation of the NLRA's majoritarian representation principles, 15 F. M. S. H.R. C., at 359, and n. 8, and rejected petitioner's property rights claim, since "Lechmeredoes not reverse walk-around law as it has developed under the Mine Act."Id., at 362.Cf. Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary, 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 276 (1988),aff'd in part and rev'd inpart sub nom. Utah Power Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor,Page 215897 F.2d 447(CA10 1990) (construing the Mine Act in light of the NLRA and concluding that a miners' representative may be a nonemployee). ↩
- Page 215See Secretary v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 9 F. M. S. H.R. C. 1305, 1306-1307 (1987),aff'd,920 F.2d 738(CA11 1990) (due process);Secretary v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 4 F. M. S. H.R. C. 2128, 2129-2130 (1982) (vagueness);Secretary v.Richardson, 3 F. M. S. H.R. C. 8, 21-28 (1981) (equal protection).Kaiser Coal Corp. v. Secretary, 10 F. M. S. H.R. C. 1165 (1988), does not suggest otherwise, but simply held that declaratory relief from the Commission was unavailable for a question already under consideration in the Court of Appeals. ↩
- Page 215Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi,422 U.S. 749,762(1975). This case thus does not present the "serious constitutional question" that would arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review of a constitutional claim.See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of FamilyPhysicians,476 U.S. 667,681, n. 12 (1986). ↩
- Page 217 Without addressing the merits of petitioner's underlying claim, we note that petitioner appears to misconstrueLechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,502 U.S. 527(1992). The right of employers to exclude union organizers from their private property emanates from state common law, and while this right is not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects it. To the contrary, this Court consistently has maintained that the NLRA may entitle union employees to obtain access to an employer's property under limited circumstances. Seeid., at 537;NLRBv. Babcock Wilcox Co.,351 U.S. 105,112(1956). Moreover, in a related context, the Court has held that Congress' interest in regulating the mining industry may justify limiting the private property interests of mine operators.See Donovan v. Dewey,452 U.S. 594(1981) (unannounced Mine Act inspections do not violate the Fourth Amendment). ↩
- Page 218 We note that petitioner expressly disavows any abstract challenge to the Mine Act's statutory review scheme, but limits its due process claim to the present situation where the Act allegedly requires petitioner to relinquish an independent statutory right.SeeBrief for Petitioner 31, n. 31. ↩
- Page 218 Because we have resolved this dispute on statutory preclusion grounds, we do not reach the parties' arguments concerning final agency action, a cause of action, ripeness, and exhaustion. ↩
- Page 219 I understand Part IV to be dealing with the issue of whether the exclusion of judicial review adjudged in Part III is constitutional. Even though, as Part III has determined, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 precludes judicial review of the agency action that is the subject of the present suit, the district court retains jurisdiction under the grant of general federal question jurisdiction,see28 U.S.C. § 1331, for the limited purpose of determining whether that preclusionitselfis unconstitutional, and hence ineffective.Cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White,259 U.S. 276,282-285(1922) (permitting habeas corpus review of deportation orders);Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,169 F.2d 254,257(CA2 1948). ↩