Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Texas v. White

46 L. Ed. 2d 209

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1975-12-01
Topic
general

noting that search was invalid under state constitution, but that the argument was waived | holding that probable cause to search that existed at roadside still existed when car was transported to station house, where car was searched, despite dissenting Justice’s contention that nothing showed that it would have been impractical or unsafe to search car at roadside | holding that probable cause to search that existed at roadside still existed when car was transported to station house, where car was searched, despite dissenting Justice’s contention that nothing showed that it would have been impractical or unsafe to search car at roadside | emphasizing that Chambers held “that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant.” | discussing Chambers and concluding that the probable cause factor still existed when the vehicle was relocated to the station house | reversing suppression order when search was conducted on probable cause at. station house | evidence seized after warrantless search of automobile at police station properly admitted since trial judge properly determined probable cause existed | officers had reason to believe suitcase held a loaded weapon — under these circumstances, immediate search permitted | officers had reason to believe suitcase held a loaded weapon — under these circumstances, immediate search permitted | probable cause to search the vehicle created at the scene of the stop not annulled by delay in searching the vehicle until arrival at the police station | “police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant” | "police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant" | “[Pjolice officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant.” | no requirement that warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure | upheld warrantless search of defendant’s car at police station after he was arrested while attempting to pass fraudulent checks at the drive-in window of a bank | police officers, with probable cause at scene could constitutionally search car later at station house without a warrant | “police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant” | justification to conduct warrantless search of car did not vanish once car was immobilized | “police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant” | "[P]olice officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped [may] constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant." | “[P]olice officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant.” | seizure of checks similar to those defendant had attempted to pass | dissenting opinion of Justice (then Judge) Sullivan | dissenting opinion of Justice (then Judge) Sullivan

Citator

Cited by
197 opinions
Per Curiam.

Respondent was arrested at 1:30 p. m. by Amarillo, Tex., police officers while attempting to pass fraudulent checks at a drive-in window of the First National Bank of Amarillo. Only 10 minutes earlier, the officers had been informed by another bank that a man answering respondent’s description and driving an automobile exactly matching that of respondent had tried to negotiate four checks drawn on a nonexistent account. Upon arrival at the First National Bank pursuant to a telephone call from that bank, the officers obtained from the drive-in teller other checks that respondent had attempted to pass there. The officers directed respondent to park his automobile at the curb. While parking the car, respondent was observed by a bank employee and one of the officers attempting to “stuff” something between the seats. Respondent was arrested and one officer drove him to the station house while the other drove respondent’s car there. At the station house, the *68 officers questioned respondent for 30 to 45 minutes and, pursuant to their normal procedure, requested consent to search the automobile. Respondent refused to consent to the search. The officers then proceeded to search the automobile anyway. During the search, an officer discovered four wrinkled checks that corresponded to those respondent had attempted to pass at the first bank. The trial judge, relying on Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), admitted over respondent’s objection the four checks seized during the search of respondent’s automobile at the station house. The judge expressly found probable cause both for the arrest and for the search of the vehicle, either at the scene or at the station house. Respondent was convicted after a jury trial of knowingly attempting to pass a forged instrument. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in a 3-2 decision, reversed respondent’s conviction on the ground that the four wrinkled checks used in evidence were obtained without a warrant in violation of respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights. 521 S. W. 2d 255 (1975). We reverse.

In Chambers v. Maroney we held that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. There, as here, “[t]he probable-cause factor” that developed at the scene “still obtained at the station house.” 399 U. S., at 52. The Court of Criminal Appeals erroneously excluded the evidence seized from the search at the station house in fight of the trial judge’s finding, undisturbed by the appellate court, that there was probable cause to search respondent’s car.

The petition for certiorari and the motion of respondent to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and *69 the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.