Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Temple v. Synthes Corp.

Temple v. Synthes Corp., 111 S. Ct. 315 (1991)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1991-01-07
Topic
general

holding that joint tortfeasors were simply permissive parties to an action against one of them | holding that Rule 19(b) inquiry necessary only if party satisfies threshold requirement of Rule 19(a) | holding that a party’s status as a joint tortfeasor does not make them a necessary or indispensable party but simply a permissive party to an action against one of them | holding that a party’s status as a joint tortfeasor does not make them a necessary or indispensable party but simply a permissive party to an action against one of them | holding that a party’s status as a joint tortfeasor does not make them a necessary or indispensable party but simply a permissive party to an action against one of them | establishing that Rule 19(b) inquiry is required only if party satisfies the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) | explaining that “it has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit” | holding that joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties under Rule 19 | explaining that “[i]t has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit” | establishing that Rule 19(b) inquiry is required only if party satisfies the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) | explaining that if “the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a)” are not satisfied, “no inquiry under Rule 19(b) is necessary” | explaining that diversity jurisdiction can only be defeated by a non-joined, non-diverse joint tortfea-sor if that party is indispensable under Rule 19 | establishing that Rule 19(b) inquiry is required only if party satisfies the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) | establishing that Rule 19(b) inquiry is required only if party satisfies the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) | stating that “it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” | agreeing that it is “error to label joint tortfeasors as indispensable parties under Rule 19(b)” | holding that joint tortfeasors are not required parties | explaining that "[i]t has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit" | holding it was “error to label [alleged] joint tortfeasors as indispensable parties under Rule 19(b) and to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice for failure to join those parties” | explaining that under Alabama law governing joint and several liability, a tortfeasor whose negligent act(s) proximately contribute to causing an injury may be held liable for the entire resulting loss | holding that absent joint tortfeasor not necessary party | explaining that joinder of all joint tortfeasors is not necessary | finding doctor who performed an implant surgery was not a necessary party to a products liability action against the medical device’s manufacturer | noting that “ ‘a tortfeasor with the usual “joint-and-several” liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability,’ ” and not a necessary one (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee’s notes to Rule 19(a) (1966 amendment)) | explaining that Rule 19 does not require joining joint tortfeasors | reversing dismissal for failure to join joint tortfeasors in medical malpractice action | ruling in context of joint tortfeasors | explaining that joint tortfeasors are permissive parties | “It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” | "It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” | "It has long been the rule that it is not necessaiy for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” | “It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” | “Here, no inquiry under Rule 19(b) is necessary, because the threshold

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TEMPLE v. SYNTHES CORP.,498 U.S. 5(1990)
111 S.Ct. 315
TEMPLEv. SYNTHES CORPOR., LTD.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 90-295
Decided November 5, 1990
After petitioner Temple, a Mississippi resident, was implanted with a device manufactured by respondent Synthes Corp., Ltd., during surgery in a Louisiana hospital, the device's screws broke off inside his back. He filed a diversity action against Synthes in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and a suit in Louisiana state court against the hospital and the doctor who performed the surgery. Synthes filed a motion to dismiss Temple's federal claim for failure to join necessary parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure19. The court ordered Temple to join the doctor and the hospital within 20 days or risk dismissal, reasoning that joinder was required in the interest of judicial economy. When Temple failed to join the others, the court dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed.Held:THe doctor and the hospital are potential joint tortfeasors and, therefore, are not indispensable parties under Rule 19(b). It is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit. See,e. g., Lawlorv.National ScreenService Corp.,349 U.S. 322,329-330. Nothing in the 1966 revision of Rule 19 changed that principle, seeProvident TradesmensBank Trust Co. v.Patterson,390 U.S. 102,116-117, n. 12, and there is nothing in Louisiana tort law to the contrary. The doctor and the hospital were merely permissive parties, who do not meet the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a). To the extent thatProvidentBankspeaks of the public interest in limiting multiple litigation, it is not controlling here, because it addressed the issue whether a party who met Rule 19(a)'s requirements was, in fact, indispensable under Rule 19(b).

Certiorari granted; 898 F.2d 152, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Temple, a Mississippi resident, underwent surgery in October, 1986, in which a "plate and screw device" was implanted in his lower spine. The device was manufactured by respondent Synthes, Ltd. (U.S.A.) (Synthes), a Pennsylvania corporation. Dr. S. Henry LaRocca performed the surgery at St. Charles General Hospital in New Orleans,Page 6Louisiana. Following surgery, the device's screws broke off inside Temple's back.

Temple filed suit against Synthes in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The suit, which rested on diversity jurisdiction, alleged defective design and manufacture of the device. At the same time, Temple filed a state administrative proceeding against Dr. LaRocca and the hospital for malpractice and negligence. At the conclusion of the administrative proceeding, Temple filed suit against the doctor and the hospital in Louisiana state court.

Synthes did not attempt to bring the doctor and the hospital into the federal action by means of a third-party complaint, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure14(a). Instead, Synthes filed a motion to dismiss Temple's federal suit for failure to join necessary parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure19. Following a hearing, the District Court ordered Temple to join the doctor and the hospital as defendants within twenty days or risk dismissal of the lawsuit. According to the court, the most significant reason for requiring joinder was the interest of judicial economy. App. C to Pet. for Cert. A-12. The court relied on this Court's decision inProvidentTradesmens Bank Trust Co. v.Patterson,390 U.S. 102(1968), wherein we recognized that one focus of Rule 19 is "the interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies."Id., at 111. When Temple failed to join the doctor and the hospital, the court dismissed the suit with prejudice.

Temple appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 898 F.2d 152 (1990) (judgt. order). The court deemed it "obviously prejudicial to the defendants to have the separate litigations being carried on," because Synthes' defense might be that the plate was not defective, but that the doctor and the hospital were negligent, while the doctor and hospital, on the other hand, might claim that they were not negligent, but that the plate was defective.Page 7App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3. The Court of Appeals found that the claims overlapped and that the District Court therefore had not abused its discretion in ordering joinder under Rule 19. A petition for rehearing was denied.

In his petition for certiorari to this Court, Temple contends that it was error to label joint tortfeasors as indispensable parties under Rule 19(b) and to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice for failure to join those parties. We agree. Synthes does not deny that it, the doctor, and the hospital are potential joint tortfeasors. It has long been the rule that it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit. SeeLawlorv.National ScreenService Corp.,349 U.S. 322,329-330(1955);Bigelowv.Old DominionCopper Mining Smelting Co.,225 U.S. 111,132(1912). See alsoNottinghamv.General American Communications Corp.,811 F.2d 873,880(CA5) (per curiam), cert. denied,484 U.S. 854(1987). Nothing in the 1966 revision of Rule 19 changed that principle. SeeProvident Bank,supra, at 116-117, n. 12. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 19(a) explicitly state that a tortfeasor with the usual "joint-and-several" liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability." 28 U.S.C. App., p. 595. There is nothing in Louisiana tort law to the contrary. SeeMullinv.Skains,252 La. 1009,1014,215 So.2d 643,645(1968); La. Civ. Code Ann., Arts.1794,1795(West 1987).

The opinion inProvident Bank, supra, does speak of the public interest in limiting multiple litigation, but that case is not controlling here. There, the estate of a tort victim brought a declaratory judgment action against an insurance company. We assumed that the policyholder was a person "who, under § (a), should be joined if `feasible.'"390 U.S., at 108, and went on to discuss the appropriate analysis under Rule 19(b), because the policyholder could not be joined without destroying diversity.Id., at 109-116. After examining the factors set forth in Rule 19(b), we determined that thePage 8action could proceed without the policyholder; he therefore was not an indispensable party whose absence required dismissal of the suit.Id., at 116, 119.

Here, no inquiry under Rule 19(b) is necessary, because the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) have not been satisfied. As potential joint tortfeasors with Synthes, Dr. LaRocca and the hospital were merely permissive parties. The Court of Appeals erred by failing to hold that the District Court abused its discretion in ordering them joined as defendants and in dismissing the action when Temple failed to comply with the court's order. For these reasons, we grant the petition for certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.It is so ordered.Page 9