Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Steigleder v. McQuesten

198 U.S. 141

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1905-04-24
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • observing that citizenship and residence are “wholly different things within the meaning of the Constitution”
  • noting residence 14 and citizenship are “wholly different things” for diversity jurisdiction
  • residence and citizenship are “wholly different things” within the meaning of regulating jurisdiction of the courts
  • “[I]t has long been settled ... that a mere averment of residence in a particular state is not an averment of citizenship in that state for the purposes of jurisdiction”
  • bill in equity averred diversity; answer raised no issue as to citizenship of parties; case was referred to a master; in dictum, the Court stated that the master properly passed on the issue of jurisdiction
  • “[I]t has long been settled that residence and citizenship are wholly different things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining and regulating the jurisdiction of [federal courts].”
  • “[I]t has long been settled that residence and 26 citizenship were wholly different things . . . and that a mere averment of residence in a 27 particular state is not an averment of citizenship in that state for the purposes of 28 jurisdiction.”

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Steigleder v. McQuesten. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
127 opinions
STEIGLEDERv. McQUESTEN,198 U.S. 141(1905)
25 S.Ct. 616
STEIGLEDERv. McQUESTEN.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON.
No. 227.
Submitted April 14, 1905
Decided April 24, 1905.
An averment in the bill of the diverse citizenship of the parties is sufficient to make aprima faciecase of jurisdiction so far as it depends on citizenship. While under the act of 1789, an issue as to the fact of citizenship can only be made by plea of abatement, when the pleadings properly aver citizenship, it is the duty of the court, under the act of March 3, 1875, which is still in force, to dismiss the suit at any time when its want of jurisdiction appears. A motion to dismiss the cause, based upon proofs taken by the master, is an appropriate mode in which to raise the question of jurisdiction. Residence and citizenship are wholly different things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining and regulating the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States; and a mere averment of residence in a State is not an averment of citizenship in that State for the purposes of jurisdiction. One who has been for many years a citizen of a State is still a citizen thereof, although residing temporarily in another State but without any purpose of abandoning citizenship in the former.
THE bill filed in the Circuit Court by the plaintiff,
McQuesten, alleged her to be "a citizen of the United States and
of the State of Massachusetts, and residing at Turners Falls in
said State," while the defendants Steigleder and wife were
alleged to be "citizens of the State of Washington, and residing
at the city of Seattle in said State."
The object of the suit was to obtain a decree adjudging
defendants to be trustees for the plaintiff in respect of certain
real estate in King County, State of Washington. The defendants
demurred to the bill for want of equity. The demurrer was
overruled, and the defendants answered, without making any issue
as to the citizenship of the parties, but denying the alleged
trust, and averring that there had been a final settlement
between the parties before the institution of the suit in respect
of all the matters in dispute.
The cause was referred to a master, and, after proof was
Page 142
taken, the defendants moved the court to dismiss the suit for
want of jurisdiction, the reason assigned in the motion being
only that the plaintiff was, and for a long time prior to the
commencement of the suit had been, a "resident" of the State of
Washington, while the defendants were "residents" of the same
State.
The motion to dismiss was denied, and the case went to a
decree in favor of the plaintiff upon the merits.
The defendants were granted an appeal directly to this court,
the question of jurisdiction being certified.
Mr. John E. HumphriesandMr. George B. Colefor appellants.Mr. George McKayandMr. J.B. Howefor appellee.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The averment in the bill that the parties were citizens of different States was sufficient to make aprima faciecase of jurisdiction so far as it depended on citizenship. While under the judiciary act of 1789 an issue as to the fact of citizenship could only be made by plea in abatement, when the pleadings properly averred citizenship, the act of March 3, 1875,18 Stat. 470, 472, c. 137, made it the duty of the Circuit Court, at any time in the progress of a cause, to dismiss the suit, if it was satisfied either that it did not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the court, or that the parties were improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under the act of Congress.Sheppardv.Graves, 14 How. 505;Williamsv.Nottawa,104 U.S. 209,211;Farmingtonv.Pillsbury,114 U.S. 138,143;Littlev.Giles,118 U.S. 596,602;Morrisv.Gilmer,129 U.S. 315,326. This provision of the act of 1875 was not superseded by the judiciary act of 1887, 1888, and isPage 143still in force.Lehigh Min. Manuf. Co. v.Kelly,160 U.S. 327,339;Lake County Com'rsv.Dudley,173 U.S. 243,251;Defiance Water Co. v.Defiance,191 U.S. 184,194,195;Minnesotav.Northern Securities Co.,194 U.S. 48,66. The motion to dismiss the cause, based upon the proofs taken by the master, was, therefore, an appropriate mode in which to raise the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

It is to be observed that the grounds assigned for the motion to dismiss the cause, taken alone, did not distinctly raise any question concerning the absence of diverse citizenship; for the motion only stated that the plaintiff and the defendants were, respectively, residents of the State of Washington. But it has long been settled that residence and citizenship are wholly different things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws defining and regulating the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States; and that a mere averment of residence in a particular State is not an averment of citizenship in that State for the purposes of jurisdiction.Parkerv.Overman, 18 How. 137;Robertsonv.Cease,97 U.S. 646;Everhartv.Huntsville College,120 U.S. 223;Timmonsv.Elyton Land Co.,139 U.S. 378;Dennyv.Pironi,141 U.S. 121,123;Wolfev.Hartford L. A. Ins. Co.,148 U.S. 389.

But the Circuit Court treated the question of jurisdiction as raised and passed upon it. We must therefore look at the evidence bearing on that point.Defiance Water Co. v.Defiance,191 U.S. 184,194,195. The evidence warrants the conclusion reached by that court, namely, that the plaintiff was, for many years prior to the commencement of the action, a citizen of Massachusetts, and that her residence in the State of Washington, at and before the suit was brought, is not shown to be otherwise than temporary, without any fixed purpose to abandon citizenship in Massachusetts. So far as appears from the record, she was, when the suit was brought, a citizen of Massachusetts.

The Circuit Court did not err in taking jurisdiction of the cause, andIt will be so certified.Page 144