Smythe v. United States

Me. Justice Hablan,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered thé opinion of the court.

As the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals both held that the question of the liability of Smythe was determined for the Government by the decisions of this court — which view the defendants controverted — we must ascertain the import of those decisions. This course is made necessary by the contention of the defendants that the latest decision of this court, to which reference will be presently made, modified the earlier decisions upon which the Government relies.

The first case is that of United States v. Prescott, 3 How. 578, 587. That was an action, on the bond of a receiver of public moneys, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, and that he “ should well, truly and faithfully keep, safely, without loaning or using, all the public money collected by him, or otherwise at any time placed in his possession and.custody, till the same had been, or should be ordered by the proper department or officer of the Government, to be transferred or paid out,” etc.

The defence was that the money for the non-payment of which the United States sued had been feloniously stolen, taken and carried away from his possession by some unknown person or persons without fault or negligence on his part, and notwithstanding he had used ordinary care and diligence in keeping it. The receiver contended that he was liable only as a depositary for hire, unless his liability was enlarged by the- special contract to keep safely, which he insisted was not the case.

The court said : “ This is not a case of bailment, and, consequently, the law of bailment does not apply to it. The liability of the defendant, Prescott, arises out of his official bond, *164 and principles which are founded upon public policy.” Again: “ The condition of the bond has been broken, as the defendant, Prescott, failed to pay over the money received by him, when required to do so; and the question is, whether he shall be exonerated from the condition of his bond, on the ground that the rnoney had been stolen from him ? The objection to this de-fence is, that it is not within the condi tion of the bond; and. this would seem to be conclusive. The contract was entered into on his part, and there is no allegation of failure on the part of the Government;, how, then, can Prescott be discharged from his bond ? He knew the extent of his obligation, when he entered into it, and he has realized the fruits of this obligation by the enjoyment of the office. Shall he be discharged from liability, contrary to his own express undertaking? There is no principle on which such a defence can be sustained. The obligation to keep safely the public money is absolute,' without,any condition, express or implied; and nothing but the payment of it, when required, can discharge the bond. . . . Public policy requires that every depositar}'- of the public money should be held to a strict accountability. Not only that he should exercise the highest degree of vigilance, but that ‘ he should keep safely ’ the moneys which come to his hands. Any relaxation of this condition would open the door to frauds, which might be practiced with impunity. A depositary would have nothing more to do than to lay his- plans and arrange his proofs, so as to establish his loss, without laches on. his part. Xet such a principle be applied to our postmasters, collectors of the customs, receivers of public moneys, and others who receive more or less of the public funds, and what losses might not be anticipated by the public ? No such principle has been recognized or admitted as a legal defence. ... As every depositary receives the office with a full knowledge of its responsibilities, he cannot, in case of loss, complain of hardship. He must stand by his bond, and meet the hazards which he voluntarily incurs:”

The next case is that of United States v. Morgan, 11 How. 154, 158. That was an action upon the bond of a collector of customs, conditioned that he “ has truly and faithfully executed and discharged, and shall continue truly and faithfully to ex *165 ecute and discharge, all the duties of the said office.” The condition was alleged to have been broken in that the collector had not paid over large sums of money collected for the United States, and by not making seasonable returns of his accounts.

The court characterized as an erroneous impression that the collector “ was acting as a bailee, and under the responsibilities of only the ordinary diligence of a depositary as to the cancelled notes,'when in truth he was acting under his commission and duties by law, as collector, and under the conditions of his bond. The collector is no more to be treated as a bailee in this case than he would be if the notes were still considered for all purposes as money. He did not receive them as a bailee, but as a collecting officer. He is liable for them on his bond, and not on any original bailment-or lending. And if the case can be likened to any species of bailment in forwarding them, by which they were lost, it is that of a common carrier to transmit them to the Treasury, and in doing which he is not exonerated by ordinary diligence, but must answer for losses by larceny and even robbery. 2 Salk. 919; 8 Johns. 213; Angell on Carriers, §§ 1, 9.”

In United States v. Dashiel, 4 Wall. 182—which was an action on the bond of a paymaster in the army for not paying over or accounting for public money that came into his hands — the de-fence was-that without any want of proper care and vigilance on the part of the paymaster a certain part of the moneys had been stolen from him. The trial court held that the theft or robbery, if satisfactorily proved, was a good defence. _ But this court held otherwise upon the authority of United States v. Prescott and United States v. Morgan, above cited, and reversed the judgment.

Substantially the same question arose in United States v. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83, which was an action upon a bond of a postmaster in North Carolina. The bond was conditioned, among other things, that the obligor would well and truly discharge, the duties of postmaster, and keep safely, without lending, using, depositing in banks, or exchanging for other funds, than as al-' lowed by law, all the public money at any time in his custody, till the same was ordered by the Postmaster General to be *166 transferred or paid out. In the spring of 1861, after the civil war commenced, the postmaster .was still in office, and had in his hands $330 of post office money belonging to the United States. At that time the United States was indebted to one Clemmens, a mail contractor in that region, for- postal service, in a sum exceeding $300. In August, 1861 the Confederate Congress passed an act appropriating the balances in the hands of such postmasters of the United States as at the commencement of the war resided within the limits of the Confederate States, to the pro rata payment of claims against the United States for postal service. The postmaster paid the $330 in his hands to Clemmens — relying upon the above act of the Confederate Congress and an official order from the Confederate Post Office Department directing him to make such.payment. It was admitted in the case that throughout the year 1862 the Confederate Government had force sufficient at its command to enforce its orders, and did enforce the orders of such Government, in that part of North Carolina in which Salem was situated, and “•that no protection was afforded to the citizens of that part of the State by the Government of the United States during that period.”

After observing that the postmaster had no right to select a creditor of the United States and pay what he might suppose the Government owed him, the court said that “ the acts of the Confederate Congress could have no force, as law, in divesting ■ or transferring rights, or as authority for any act opposed to the just authority of the Federal Government.” Referring to the statement of facts made in the case, and which were substantially as above recited, it said : “ This statement falls far short ■ of showing the application of any physical force to compel the defendant to pay the money to Clemmens. Nor is it in the least inconsistent with the fact that hé might have been desirous and willing to make -the payment. It shows no effort or endeavor to' secure the funds in his hands to the Government, to which he owed both the money and his allegiance. Nor does it prove that he would have suffered any inconvenience, or been punished by the Confederate authorities, if he had refused to pay the draft of the insurrectionary Post Office *167 Department orí him. We cannot see that it makes out any such loss of money, by inevitable overpowering force, ás could even on the mere prinoiple of bailment discharge a bailee. We cannot concede that a man, who, as a citizen, owes allegiance to the United States, and as an officer of the Government holds its money or property, is at liberty to turn over the latter to an insurrectionary Government, which- only demands it ,by ordinances and drafts drawn on the bailee, but which exercises no force or threat of personal violence to himself or property, in the enforcement of its illegal orders.” The court, reaffirming the docti’ine of the Prescott, Morgan and Dashiel cases, held that in an action on the bond of an officer receiving public funds the right of the Government to recover does not rest on an implied contract of bailment, but on the express contract in the bond to pay over the funds.

In Boyden v. United States, 13 Wall. 17, 21, which was an action upon the bond of a receiver of public moneys — the de-fence being that the receiver had been by irresistible force robbed of the moneys sued for — the court said : “ Were a •receiver of public moneys, who has given bond for the faithful performance of .his duties as required by law, a mere ordinary bailee, it might be that he would be relieved by proof that the money had been destroyed by fire, or stolen from him, or taken by1 irresistible force. He would then be bound only to the exercise of ordinary care, even though a bailee for hire. The contract of bailment implies no more except in the case of common carriers, and the duty of a receiver, virtute officii, is to bring to the discharge of his trust that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually bring to the conduct of their own affairs. He is to pay over the money in his hands as required by law, but he is not an insurer. He may, however, make himself an insurer by express contract, and this he does when he binds himself in a penal bond to perform the duties of his office without exception. There is an established difference between a duty created merely by law.and one to which is added the obligation of an express undertaking. The law does not compel to impossibilities, but it is a settled rule that if performance of an express engagement becomes impos- *168 sjble by reason of anything occurring after the contract was made, though unforeseen by the contracting party, and not within his control, he will not be excused.” Again, in the same case : “ It is true that in Prescott's case the defence set up was that the money had been stolen, while the defence set up here is robbery. But that can make no difference, unless it be held that the receiver is a mere bailee. If, as we have seen, his liability is to be measured by his bond, and that binds him to pay the money, then the cause which renders it impossible for him to pay is of no importance, for he has assumed the risk of it.”

At the same term of the court the case of Bevans v. United States, 13 Wall. 56, 60, was determined. That was a'suit upon a bond executed by Bevans, a receiver of public moneys, in a land district of Arkansas. The court reaffirmed the rule announced in the Prescott case, and said that “ it is not to be overlooked that Bevans was not an ordinary bailee of the Govern- ■ ment. Bailee he was undoubtedly, but by his bond he had insured the safekeeping and prompt payment of the public money which came to his hands. His obligation was, therefore, not less stringent than that of a common carrier, and in some respects it was greater ” — citing United States v. Prescott. In the same case the court, in reference to that part, of the defence attributing the loss of. the money in question to the action of the Confederate power, said: “ It may be a grave question whether the forcible taking of money belonging to the United States from the possession of one of her officers, or agents lawfully holding it, by a government of paramount force, which at the time was usurping the authority of the rightful government, and compelling obedience to itself exclusively throughout a State, wóuld not work a discharge of such officers or agents, if they were entirely free from fault-, though they had given bond to pay the money to the United States. This question has been thoroughly argued, but we do not propose now to consider it, for its decision is not' necessary to the case.”

The question thus reserved from decision arose and was decided in United States v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 337, 341-2, 346-7, 350, 352. That was an action on the bond of a surveyor of *169 customs at Nashville, he being also a depositary of public moneys at that city. The special defence was that the moneys, in question were seized by the Confederate authorities against the will and consent of the surveyor, and by the exercise of force which he was unable to resist, he being a loyal citizen and endeavoring faithfully to perform his duty. The court said: “This case brings up squarely the question whether the forcible' seizure, by the rebel authorities, of public moneys in the hands of loyal government agents, against their will, and without their fault or negligence, is, or is not, a sufficient discharge from the obligations of their official bonds. This precise question has not as yet been decided by this court. As the rebellion has been held to have been a public war, the question may be stated in a more general form, as follows: Is the act of a public, enemy in forcibly seizing or destroying property of the Government in the hands of a public officer, against his will, and without his fault, a discharge of his obligation to keep such property safely, and of his official bond, given to secure the faithful performance of that duty, and to have the property forthcoming when required ? . . .

“ That overruling force arising from inevitable necessity, or the act of a public enemy, is a sufficient answer for the loss of public property when the question is considered in reference to an officer’s obligation arising merely from his appointment, and aside from such a bond as exists in this case, seems almost self-evident. . . . These provisions [prescribing the conditions of the bonds of receivers, etc.] show that it is the manifest policy of the law to hold all collectors, receivers, and deposi-taries of the public money to a very strict accountability. The legislative anxiety on the subject culminates in requiring them to enter into bond with sufficient sureties for the performance of their duties, and in imposing criminal sanctions for the unauthorized use of the moneys. Whatever duty can be inferred from this course of legislation is justly exacted from the officers. No ordinary excuse can be allowed for the non-production of the money committed to their hands. Still they are nothing but bailees. To call them .anything else,- when they are expressly forbidden to touch or use- the public money except as *170 directed, would be an abuse of terms. But they are special bailees, subject to special obligations. It is evident that the ordinary law of bailment cannot be invoked to determine the degree of their responsibility. This is placed on a new basis. To the extent of the amount of their official bonds, it is fixed by special contract; and the policy of the law as to their general responsibility for amounts not covered by such bonds may be fairly presumed to be the same.” Referring to the adjudged cases, the court said : “ It appears from them all (except perhaps the New York case) that the official bond is regarded as laying the foundation of a more stringent responsibility upon collectors and receivers of public moneys. It is referred to as a special contract, by which they assume additional obligations with regard to the safekeeping and payment of those moneys, and as an indication of the policy of the law with regard to the nature of their responsibility. But, as before remarked, the decisions themselves do not go the length of making them' liable in cases of overruling necessity.” The opinion concludes: “No rule of public policy requires an officer to account for moneys which have been destroyed by an overruling necessity, or taken .from him by a public enemy, without any fault or neglect on his part.”

We think the Government is quite correct in its conclusion that the Thomas case does not materially modify the decisions in previous cases. The general rule announced in those cases —and the question need not be discussed anew — is that the obligations of a public officer, who received public moneys under a'bond conditioned that he would discharge his duties according to law, and safely keep such moneys as came to his hands, by virtue of his office, are not to -be determined by the principles of the law of bailment, but by-the special contract evidenced by his bond conditioned as above stated; consequently, it is no defence to a suit brought by the Government upon such a bo'nd that the monej'S, which were in the custody of tlie officer, had be«¡n destroyed by fiie occurring without his fault or negligence.. This rule, so far from being modified by the Thomas case, is reaffirmed by it, subject, however, to the exception (which, indeed, some of the prior cases had, in effect, *171 intimated) that it was a valid defence that the failure of the officer to account for public moneys was attributable to overruling necessity or to the public enemy. ' The case now before us is not embraced by either exception. The result is that the special defence here made cannot, in view of former adjudications, avail the Superintendent or his sureties.

It is appropriate here to say that the rule established by this court in the Prescott case has been enforced by numerous decisions in staté courts. In Commonwealth v. Comly, 3 Barr, 312—which was an action on the bond of a collector of tolls, conditioned that he would “ account for and pay over all moneys he may receive for tolls,” and in which the defence was that the moneys sued for. had been stolen from the collector — the court said : “ The opinion of the court in the case of the United States v. Prescott is founded in sound policy and sound law. The responsibility of a public receiver is determined not by the law of bailment, which is called in to supply the place of a special agreement where there is none, but by the condition of his bond. The condition of it in this instance was to ‘account for and pay over’..the'moneys to be received ; and we would look in vain for a power to relieve him from the performance of it. . . . The keepers of the public moneys, or their sponsors, are to be held strictly to their contract, for if they were to be let off on. shallow pretenses, delinquencies, which are fearfully frequent already, would be incessant. A chancellor is not bound to control the legal effect of a contract in any case; and his discretion, were he at' liberty to use it, would be influenced by considerations of public policy.” To the same effect are Inhabitants v. Hazzard, 12 Cush. 112; Inhabitants v. McEachron, 33 N. J. L. 339; State v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607; Halbert v. State, 22 Indiana, 125 ; Morbeck v. State, 28 Indiana, 86; Ross v. Hatch, 5 Iowa, 149; Taylor v. Morton, 37 Iowa, 551.

AVe hold that as the accounts of the defendant Smythe showed a deficit of $25,000 in the moneys in his. custody as Superintendent of the Mint, the Government was entitled to a judgment for that amount unless, as the defendants contend, they were entitled to at least a credit for $1182, which, it is alleged, was the amount of treasury notes not entirely destroyed *172 bj the fire, but were only charred and which were taken possession of by government agents after the fire, and found to be in condition to be identified as to amount and date of issue.

A complete answer to this suggestion is to be found in sections 951 and 957 of the Revised Statutes — reproduced from the act of March 3, 1797, 1 Stat. 514, c. 20. Those sections are as follows:

§ 951. “In suits brought by the United States against individuals, no claim for a credit shall be admitted, upon trial, except such as appear to have been presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury, for their examination, and to have been by them disallowed, in whole or in part, unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is, at the 'time of the trial, in possession of vouchers not before in his power to procure, and that he was prevented from exhibiting a claim for such credit at the Treasury by absence from the United States or by some unavoidable accident.”

§ 957. “When suit is brought by the United States against any revenue officer or other person accountable for public money, who neglects or refuses to pay into the Treasury the sum or balance reported to be due to the United States, upon the adjustment of his account it shall be the duty of the court to grant judgment at the return term, upon motion, unless the defendant, in open court, (the United States attorney being present,) brakes and subscribes an oath that he is equitably entitled to credits which had been, previous to the commencement of the suit, submitted to the accounting officers of the Treasury, and rejected ; specifying in the affidavit each particular claim so rejected, and’ that he cahnot then safely come to trial. If the court, when such oath is made, Subscribed, and filed, is thereupon satisfied, a continuance until the next succeeding term may be granted. Such continuance may also, be granted when the suit is brought upon a bond or other sealed instrument, and the defendant pleads non est factum, ,or makes a motion to the court, verifying such plea or motion by his oath, and the court thereupon requires the production of the original bond, contract, or other paper certified in the affidavit. And no continuance shall be granted except as herein provided.”

*173 The defendants do not appear to have submitted to the accounting officers of the Treasury any request or claim for a credit for the $1182, and no such claim could be made for the first time at the trial. Before it could have been made there should have been affirmative proof by the defendants that it was pre-> sented to the proper accounting officer, and rejected, unless, indeed, such facts had appeared from the exemplified accounts produced and rélied upon by the Govérnment. If such claim had been presented to the proper officers before suit and been disallowed it would still have been open to the defendants at the trial to insist upon its being recognized and allowed. These conclusions are unavoidable in view of the former decisions of this court. United States v. Giles, 9 Cranch, 212, 239; Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396; United States v. Wilkins, 6 Wheat. 135, 143; Walton v. United States, 9 Wheat. 651; Cox v. United States, 6 Pet. 172, 202; United States v. Ripley, 7 Pet. 18, 25; United States v. Fillebrown, 7 Pet. 28, 48; United States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319; United States v. Hawkins, 10 Pet. 125; United States v. Laub, 12 Pet. 1; United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377; Gratiot v. United States, 4 How. 80, 112; United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 83, 105; DeGroot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431; United States v. Eckford, 6 Wall. 484; United States v. Gilmore, 7 Wall. 491; Halliburton v. United States, 13 Wall. 63.

It is said, however, that the Government has not suffered any substantial damage by the destruction of its own obligations, and that in no event is it entitled to a judgment for more than nominal damages, or at most for only such amount in damages as would meet the cost of reprinting new treasury notes to take the place of those destroyed by fire. If this view be sound, a public officer, receiving United States treasury notes for the Government, under a bond to safety keep them and pay them over to the United States whenever required by law or ordered to do so, could deliberately destroy or burn them, and, then admitting that he had done so, could prevent any judgment against him, except one that would cover merely the cost and trouble of printing new notes. Such a proposition cannot be entertained for a moment. The pica of non damnificatus has *174 no place in such a case as this. The treasury notes that came to the hands of Superintendent Smythe was money belonging to the United States and could be used, at its pleasure, in the business of the Government. By their destruction, if they were destroyed by fire in the manner claimed, the United States was deprived of so much money, and the condition of the officer’s bond that he would safely keep the moneys in his custody and turn them over to the Government, when required, cannot be met by the suggestion that the Government, if it so elects, can replace the notes destroyed by other notes and thus make itself whole, less the cost of printing new notes. It is for the Government, guided by the legislation of Congress, to determine when it shall or may issue new treasury notes, and it cannot be compelled to issue them in order to reimburse itself for the loss of those in the hands of an officer who was required, by the terms of his bond, to deliver them to the Treasury, but did not do so; The Government can stand upon the terms of its special contract with the Superintendent, and insist that he has not discharged his duties by safely keeping the moneys that came to his hands, and which he undertook to pay over, when required. It is sufficient in this case to say that the loss of the notes here in question cannot be attributed to overruling ne-' cessity or to any public enemy, and as they came to the hands of Superintendent Smythe, and as he did not keep the condition of his bond, the Government can look for reimbursement to that bond.

This view, it is contended, is not consistent with what was said in United States v. Morgan, 11 How. 154, above cited. It appeared in* evidence in that case that the collector received nearly $100,000 for duties in treasury notes, and cancelled them. The notes were then put up in a bundle to be sent to the Treasury 'Department, through'’the post office, and orders were given to the servant accustomed to deliver packages there to deliver those. But the bundle was stolen or lost. It appeared, also, that two of the notes for $500 each were altered and soon after-wards presented to the collector in payment of other duties, and wére received by him as genuine. The court, in that case, as already shown, reaffirmed the principle announced in United *175 States v. Prescott, 3 How. 578. After observing that the duty of the collector was to return the cancelled notes to the Treasury Department, and that he was technically liable for not having done so, the court said: “ The rule of damage would be the amount of the notes, unless it appeared, as here, that they had been cancelled, and unless it was shown that the Government had suffered, or was likely to suffer, damages less than their amount. How much is the real damage, under all the circumstances, is a question of fact for the jury, and should be passed on by them at another trial. Only tka,t amount rather than the whole bond need, in a liberal view of the law, and of his bond, be exacted; and that amount neither he nor his sureties can reasonably object to paying, when he, by the neglect of himself or his agent, has caused all the injury which he is in the end required to reimburse. And if any equities exist tjo relieve him from that, none of which are seen' by us, it must lie done by Congress and not the courts of law. Anything less than this — any less strict rule, in the public administration of the finances — would leave everything loose or unsettled, and cause infinite embarrassments in the accounting offices, and numerous losses to the Government. . . . Finally, we decide on this last question as a matter of law this, and this only, namely, that the collector is liable for all the actual damages sustained by his not returning the notes as required by law and official circulars; or for not putting them in the post office so as to be returned. 5 Stat. 203. But how much this damage was is a matter of proof before the jury, fixing the real amount likely to happen from their getting into circulation again, as two of them did here, from delay and inconvenience in obtaining the proper vouchers to settle accounts, from the want of evidence at the Department that the notes had been redeemed, or from any other direct consequence of the breach of the condition of his bond and of his instructions under it.” The court had previously said, in its opinion: “We doubt whether, under all the circumstances, after cancelled, they [the treasury notes] can be regarded as money, or money’s worth, for the purpose of sustaining this action, yet it is clear. that they still possess some value as vouchers, and as evidence fcr the Treasury Department *176 that they have been redeemed. .It is still clear, also, that, though cancelled, the Treasury Department, unless having possession of them, is exposed to expense and loss by their being altered, and the cancellation removed or extracted, and their getting again into circulation, as two did here, and being twice paid by the Government.”

The injury that might probably have come to the Government by reason of the neglect of the collector in the Morgan, •case was such that the court could not, as in the present, case, give any peremptory instruction to the jury. It could not have said, in the former case, that cancelled treasury notes were to be regarded as money, or that the Government was entitled to judgment for the face amount of those notes, prior to their being cancelled. Nor could it say, as matter of law, that the Government was, in fact, damaged by not having the cancelled treasury notes as vouchers. Such being the case, it was held that it was for the jury, under such evidence as might be adduced, to say what actual injury, if any, accrued to the United States by reason of the non-delivery of the cancelled treasury notes.

The present case cannot be controlled by the rule laid down in the Morgan, case. Here the treasury notes received. by Smythe were not cancelled and could be used as money. They were not safely kept nor were they'destroyed ib l ough overruling necessity or by the public enemy. Hence, there was a breach of his bond, and as the amount of- the treasury notes which he failed to deliver to the Government was clearlyshown, there was nothing in this case to refer to the jury. There was no question of damage to be ascertained by a jury; for if under the circumstances disclosed the defendants were liable at all, the Government,'as matter of law, was entitled to a judgment for the full amount shown to have been received by the Superintendent and not paid over by him, as required by his bond.

It remains to consider some minor objections to the judgment. It is contended that it was error to give interest on the amount of the judgment from April 1, 18.93, the date from which the accounts of the Superintendent were stated at the Treasury Department.

*177 The alleged fire occurred June 24, 1893, and on February 9, 1894, notice of the deficiency in the Superiatendent’s account was given to his sureties, as required by the act of August 8, 1888, 25 Stat. 387, c. 787. And this action was brought August 7, 1894. Interest, it is insisted, was recoverable at most only from the date of the notice to the sureties. This objection is met by section 3624 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: “ Whenever any person accountable for public money neglects- or refuses to pay into the Treasury the sum or balance reported to be due to the United States, upon the adjustment of his account, the First Comptroller of the Treasury shall institute suit for the recovery of the same, adding to the sum stated to be-due on such account, the commissions of the delinquent, which shall be forfeited in every instance where suit is commenced and judgment obtained thereon, and an interest of six per centum per annum, from the time of receiving the money until it shall be repaid into-the Treasury.”

This statute is mandatory, and the sureties on the bond of Superintendent Smythe must be held to have signed it in view of the requirement as to the date from which interest should be computed. It is not denied that the treasury notes in question were received at least as early as April 1, 1893.

It is also said that it was error, under the law of Louisiana, to have rendered an absolute judgment against Byrnes, the administrator of the succession of Conery, deceased ; that if any judgment was rendered it should have been against the-administrator, ‘payable only fn due course of administration. This objection is quite technical. If by the law of Louisiana- the judgment is so payable, it will be thus interpreted and enforced, subject, of course, to the priority given to the Government in the distribution of the proceeds of the estate of any person indebted to the United States whose estate is insufficient to pay all debts against it. Rev. Stat. secs. 3466, 3467.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, ii

Affirmed.