Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb
481 U.S. 615
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1987-05-18
- Topic
- bankruptcy
holding that Jews may bring a claim against non-Jewish whites under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which forbids racially discriminatory interference with property rights | holding that Jews are not foreclosed from stating a claim under Section 1982 based upon the Court's reasoning in Saint Francis College | holding that Jews are not foreclosed from stating a claim under Section 1982 based upon the Court’s reasoning in Saint Francis College | concluding that discrimination against Jews and Arabs was covered by § 1982-the same statute the Court found in Jones to be a valid exercise of Congress’ Thirteenth Amendment power-without explicitly addressing the Thirteenth Amendment issue | holding members of Jewish faith constitute cognizable racial group for purposes of federal civil rights law | indicating that only racially-motivated actions are actionable under § 1982 and that Jews and Arabs are races that Congress intended to protect under the statute | holding that Jews can state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, another antidiscrimination statute enacted pursuant to, and contemporaneously with, the Thirteenth Amendment, because Jews "were among the peoples [at the time the statutes were adopted] considered to be distinct races" | holding that Jews can state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, another antidiscrimination statute enacted pursuant to, and con- temporaneously with, the Thirteenth Amendment, because Jews “were among the peoples [at the time the statutes were adopted] considered to be distinct races” | noting that 19th-century "definitions of race . . . were not the same as they are today," frequently encompassing characteristics better understood today as matters of religion or national origin | applying to § 1982 the discussion and holding of Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U. S. 604, 609-613 (1987), a case interpreting §1981 | recognizing racial discrimination claim by Jewish persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, because they were among the peoples considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute at the time it was passed | explaining “that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Jews cannot state a § 1982 claim against other white defendants” | reversing court of appeals dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim based upon plaintiffs’ status as Jewish people | explaining that although “Jews today are not thought to be members of a separate race,” they, are nonetheless protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because at the time of the statute’s adoption they “were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races” | explaining that although “Jews today are not thought to be members of a separate race,” they are nonetheless protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because at the time of the statute’s adoption they “were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races” | explaining that although “Jews today are not thought to be members of a separate race,” they are nonetheless protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because at the time of the statute’s adoption they “were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races” | individual may maintain section 1981 claim based on individual's status as a Jewish person | violation requires that interference was motivated by racial animus directed toward protected group | “The section forbids both official and private racially discriminatory interference with property rights.” | individual may maintain section 1981 claim based on individual’s status as a Jewish person | 42 U.S.C. § 1982 protects property rights of Jewish congregation in synagogue | same definition of race governs Section 1981 and 1982 actions | same definition of race governs Section 1981 and 1982 actions | section 1981 redresses intentional discrimination because of Indian ancestry
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- positive
- Cited by
- 146 opinions
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delivered the opinion of the Court.
On November 2, 1982, the outside walls of the synagogue of the Shaare Tefila Congregation in Silver Spring, Maryland, were sprayed with red and black paint and with large anti-Semitic slogans, phrases, and symbols. A few months later, the Congregation and some individual members brought this suit in the Federal District Court, alleging that defendants’ desecration of the synagogue had violated 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1982, 1985(3) and the Maryland common law of trespass, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On defendants’ motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), the District Court dismissed all the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 785 F. 2d 523 (CA4 1986). Petitioners petitioned for writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, 479 U. S. 812 (1986), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Section 1982 guarantees all citizens of the United States, “the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The section forbids both official and private racially discriminatory interference with property rights, Jones v. Alfred, H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968). Petitioners’ allegation was that they were deprived of the right to hold property in violation of § 1982 because the defendants were motivated by racial prejudice. They unsuccessfully argued in the District Court and Court of Appeals that Jews are not a racially distinct group, but that defendants’ conduct is actionable because they viewed Jews as racially distinct and were motivated by racial prejudice. The *617 Court of Appeals held that § 1982 was not “intended to apply to situations in which a plaintiff is not a member of a racially distinct group but is merely perceived to be so by defendants.” 785 F. 2d, at 526 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals believed that “[bjecause discrimination against Jews is not racial discrimination,” id., at 527, the District Court was correct in dismissing the § 1982 claim.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a charge of racial discrimination within the meaning of § 1982 cannot be made out by alleging only that the defendants were motivated by racial animus; it is necessary as well to allege that defendants’ animus was directed towards the kind of group that Congress intended to protect when it passed the statute. To hold otherwise would unacceptably extend the reach of the statute.
We agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Jews cannot state a § 1982 claim against other white defendants. That view rested on the notion that because Jews today are not thought to be members of a separate race, they cannot make out a claim of racial discrimination within the meaning of § 1982. That construction of the section we have today rejected in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, ante, p. 604. Our opinion in that case observed that definitions of race when § 1982 was passed were not the same as they are today, ante, at 609-613, and concluded that the section was “intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” Ante, at 613. As Saint Francis makes clear, the question before us is not whether Jews are considered to be a separate race by today’s standards, but whether, at the time § 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people that Congress intended to protect. It is evident from the legislative history of the section reviewed in Saint Francis College, a review that we need not repeat here, that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then con *618 sidered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute. Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action against other members of what today is considered to be part of the Caucasian race.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.