Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee for Human Rights
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts., 30 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1972)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1972-01-10
- Topic
- general
suggesting that the 60-day period does not begin until "written information regarding the basis of the decision was available." | suggesting that the 60-day period does not begin until “written information regarding the basis of the decision was available.” | relating the mootness doctrine to the Article III “case or controversy” requirement | relating the mootness doctrine to the Article III "case or controversy" requirement | whether shareholders will again submit proposed corporate charter amendment to ban making of napalm too speculative to prevent mootness | judicial review of an agency decision does not require agency to hold a formal evidentiary hearing | whether shareholders will again submit proposed corporate charter amendment to ban making of napalm too speculative to prevent mootness | judicial review of an agency decision does not require agency to hold a formal evidentiary hearing | federal courts may only entertain matters that present a “case” or “controversy” within the meaning of Article III | case moot when allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur | case moot when allegedly wrongful behavior could not be expected to recur | “Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” (quotation marks and citation omitted) | "Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy." (quotation marks and citation omitted) | there must be an actual case or controversy | declining to “speculate” regarding future action of the company
Citator
- Cited by
- 150 opinions
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Medical Committee for Human Rights acquired by gift five shares of stock in Dow Chemical Co. In March 1968, the Committee’s national chairman wrote a letter to the company expressing concern over its policy with respect to the production and sale of napalm. The letter also requested that there be included in the company’s proxy statement for 1968 a proposal to amend Dow’s Certificate of Incorporation to prohibit the sale of napalm unless the purchaser gives reasonable assurance that the napalm will not be used against human beings. Dow replied that the proposal was too late for inclusion in the 1968 proxy statement and for discussion at that year’s annual meeting, but that it would be reconsidered the following year.
In an exchange of letters with Dow in 1969, the Committee indicated its belief that it had a right under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR § 240.14a-8 (1970) (promulgated pursuant to § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a)), to have its proposal included in the company’s proxy statement for consideration by all shareholders. On February 7, 1969, Dow responded that it intended to omit the proposal (somewhat modified) from the 1969 statement under the authority of subsections of the SEC Rule relied on by the Committee that permitted omission of shareholder proposals under two sets of circumstances:
§ 240.14a-8 (c) (2) — “If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its management, or primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes”; or
*405 § 240.14a-8 (c) (5) — “If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.”
The Committee requested that Dow's decision be reviewed by the staff of the SEC. On February 18, 1969, the Chief Counsel for the Division of Corporation Finance wrote both Dow and the Committee to inform them that “this Division will not recommend any action to the Commission if this proposal is omitted from the management’s proxy material.” App. 21. The SEC Commissioners granted a request by the Committee that they review the Division’s decision and affirmed it. App. 43. The Committee then sought and obtained review of the Commission’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
On July 8, 1970, the Court of Appeals held that the decision of the SEC was reviewable under § 25 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78y (a); that while review of Dow’s decision was clearly available in district court, reviéw of the SEC’s decision could also be obtained in a court of appeals; that the validity of the Commission’s determination was extremely dubious, especially in light of its failure to state reasons supporting its conclusion; and that the case should be remanded to the Commission for reconsideration and a statement of reasons. 139 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 432 F. 2d 659. The Commission petitioned for review here, and we granted certiorari on March 22, 1971. 401 U. S. 973.
Events have taken place, subsequent to the decision by the court below, and some subsequent to our decision to grant certiorari, that require that we dismiss this case on the ground that it has now become moot. In January 1971, the Medical Committee again submitted
Respondent argues that it will continue to urge the adoption of the proposal and its inclusion in proxy statements, and that it is likely that Dow will reject inclusion in the future as it has in the past. It is true that in permitting the proposal to be included in the 1971 proxy statement Dow stated that it adhered to its opinion that the proposal might properly be omitted and that its inclusion was without prejudice to future exclusion. However, this does not create the controversy that is necessary for us to retain jurisdiction to decide the merits. Whether or not the Committee will actually resubmit its proposal or a similar one in 1974 is purely a matter of conjecture at this point, as is whether or not Dow will accept it. If Dow were likely to repeat its allegedly illegal conduct, the case would not be moot. See Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 43 (1944); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). However, in light of the meager support the proposal attracted, we can only speculate that Dow will continue to include the proposal when it again becomes eligible for inclusion, rather than to repeat this litigation. Thus, we find that "the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968). The case is therefore moot.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for dismissal.
MR. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.