Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Sanford v. Kepner

73 S. Ct. 75

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1952-11-10
Topic
general

holding that this Court had "usurped an administrative function" in deciding that a license should be issued by the FPC without the conditions attached to it by the agency | holding that this Court had “usurped an administrative function” in deciding that a license should be issued by the FPC without the conditions attached to it by the agency | observing that "function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the [agency] for reconsideration" | observing that “function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the [agency] for reconsideration” | asserting that limits on the Federal Power Commission's power under one part of the Federal Power Act will not be read into a different part of the Act | explaining that the “guiding principle” of judicial review of an administrative action is that “the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare” | overturning judicial severance of license conditions, remanding instead to FPC for new license determination in light of invalid provisions | reviewing court erred in directing the issuance of a license rather than simply declaring the error of law which occurred | overturning judicial severance of license conditions, remanding instead to FPC for new license determination in light of invalid provisions | reversing court order which modified an FPC order granting a license | reversing court order which modified an FPC order granting a license | the lower court intruded on an administrative function in ordering the agency to strike an unlawful section of a license | the lower court intruded on an administrative function in ordering the agency to strike an unlawful section of a license | function of reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare, and matter once more goes to agency for reconsideration | the power “ ‘to affirm, modify, or set aside’ ... ‘in whole or in part’ ... is not power to exercise an essentially administrative function” | When reviewing an administrative 15 decision, “the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare.” | function of reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare, and matter once more goes to agency for reconsideration | “[T]he function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the [agency] for reconsideration” | “[T]he function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration.” | appeals court decision to issue a license as modified, without the inappropriate conditions, after a final review of the record had occurred, reversed on ground that the Court usurped an administrative function | “[T]he function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the [Agency] for reconsideration.” | "the power of Congress over public lands ... is 'without limitation.' " | civil action remedy 5That is, district court review under section 146 does not come into play until the Board issues a final decision pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.658(a | "(T)he guiding principle . . . is that the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration." | civil action remedy available only to an applicant “who has been finally denied a patent because of a Patent Office decision against him and in favor of his adversary on the question of priority” | “the power of Congress over public lands ... is ‘without limitation.’ ” | “the power of Congress over public lands ... is ‘without limitation.’ ” | “[T]he guiding principle ... is that the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration.” | "[

Citator

Cited by
114 opinions
SANFORDv. KEPNER,344 U.S. 13(1952)
73 S.Ct. 75
SANFORDv. KEPNER.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 46.
Argued October 24, 1952.
Decided November 10, 1952.
In a proceeding under R. S. § 4915, 35 U.S.C. § 63, brought by an applicant for a patent to review an adverse decision of a board of interference examiners, when a district court has found against petitioner on the issue of priority of invention it need not go further and consider the validity of a rival applicant's claim to a patent on the same device. Pp. 13-16.195 F.2d 387, affirmed.
In a proceeding under R. S. § 4915, 35 U.S.C. § 63,
the District Court found against petitioner on an issue
of priority of invention and dismissed the bill without
considering the validity of a rival applicant's claim to a
patent on the same device.99 F. Supp. 221. The Court
of Appeals affirmed.195 F.2d 387. This Court granted
certiorari.343 U.S. 976.Affirmed, p. 16.
J. Preston Sweckerargued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.Hugh M. Morrisargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief wereWilmer MechlinandGeorgeR. Ericson.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claiming he was the original and sole inventor of a mechanical device, the respondent Kepner asked the United States Patent Office for a patent. Later the petitioner Sanford filed a similar application making the same claim. As authorized by R. S. § 4904, 35 U.S.C. § 52, the Commissioner of Patents directed a board of interference examiners to hold hearings and determine thePage 14dispute over priority of invention — which of the two first used the device. The Board decided for respondent Kepner. Sanford's application for patent was accordingly refused. As authorized by R. S. § 4915, 35 U.S.C. § 63, Sanford brought this bill in equity praying that he be adjudged inventor of the device and entitled to a patent. Sanford also prayed that Kepner's claims be adjudged unpatentable, charging that many previous patents had been granted on Kepner's device, some of which had expired. Agreeing with the Board of Interference Examiners, the District Court found against Sanford on the issue of prior use. Since this was enough to justify refusal to issue Sanford a patent, the District Court declined to go further and consider Kepner's claim to a patent. Accordingly Sanford's bill was dismissed.99 F. Supp. 221. Agreeing with the District Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed.195 F.2d 387. The circuits have different views concerning the duty of district courts to consider and adjudicate questions of invention and patentability when parties urge them in R. S. § 4915 proceedings.fn*To settle these differences we granted certiorari.343 U.S. 976.

So far as relevant to the precise question here, R. S. § 4915, as now contained in 35 U.S.C. § 63, reads:
". . . whenever any applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of interference examiners, the applicant . . . may have remedy by bill in equity . . . and the court . . . may adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention . . . . And suchPage 15adjudication, if it be in favor of the right of the applicant, shall authorize the commissioner to issue such patent on the applicant filing in the Patent Office a copy of the adjudication and otherwise complying with the requirements of law."


The obvious purpose of the quoted part of R. S. § 4915 is to give a judicial remedy to an applicant who has been finally denied a patent because of a Patent Office decision against him and in favor of his adversary on the question of priority. When the trial court decides this factual issue of priority against him and thus affirms the refusal of the patent by the Patent Office, he has obtained the full remedy the statute gives him. Only if he wins on priority may he proceed. In that event, the statute says, the court may proceed to "adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law, to receive a patent for his invention . . . ." So adjudging, it may authorize issuance of the patent. But judicial authorization of issuance implies judicial sanction of patentability and for this reason this Court has said, "It necessarily follows that no adjudication can be made in favor of the applicant, unless the alleged invention for which a patent is sought is a patentable invention."Hillv.Wooster,132 U.S. 693,698. The principle of theHillcase is that the court must decide whether claims show patentable inventions before authorizing the Commissioner to issue a patent. No part of its holding or wording nor of that inHoover Co. v.Coe,325 U.S. 79, requires us to say R. S. § 4915 compels a district court to adjudicate patentability at the instance of one whose claim is found to be groundless. Sanford's claim was found to be groundless.

It is unlikely that this equity proceeding would develop a full investigation of validity. There would be no attack on the patent comparable to that of an infringement action. Here the very person who claimed an inventionPage 16now asks to prove that Kepner's similar device was no invention at all because of patents issued long before either party made claim for his discovery. There is no real issue of invention between the parties here and we see no reason to read into the statute a district court's compulsory duty to adjudicate validity.Affirmed.Page 17
  1. Page 14 In accord with the Court of Appeals,Hestonv.Kuhlke,179 F.2d 222;Smithv.Carter Carburetor Corp.,130 F.2d 555;ClevelandTrust Co. v.Berry,99 F.2d 517. Contra:Minneapolis HoneywellRegulator Co. v.Milwaukee Gas Specialty Co.,174 F.2d 203;Knutsonv.Gallsworthy, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 304,164 F.2d 497. ↩