Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Remmer v. United States

74 S. Ct. 450

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1954-03-08
Topic: general

holding that presumption of prejudice applies when there is third-party communication with a juror regarding the matter pending before the jury | holding that information of possible juror bribery coming to light after the jury returned its verdict warranted a hearing | recognizing that in some circumstances a rebuttal presumption arises when communication occurs with a juror | holding that an improper communication to a single juror presumptively deprives a defendant of a fair trial | holding that allegations of influence by an unnamed person outside the jury required the holding of an evidentiary hearing to determine extrinsic influence | holding that the district court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate” | holding that extrajudicial communication with a juror “during a trial about the matter pending before the - 15 - jury” triggers a presumption of prejudice to the defendant | holding that defendant was entitled to hearing to determine effect of F.B.I. investigation in to allegation that someone had attempted to bribe a juror in a criminal case | holding that defendant was entitled to a hearing to determine effect of F.B.I. investigation in to allegation that someone had attempted to bribe a juror in a criminal case | holding that a trial court must conduct a hearing when any improper contact occurs with a juror during a criminal trial to determine the circumstances and the impact on the juror | holding that ex parte communications with the jury are "deemed presumptively prejudicial" if not made pursuant to court rules, instructions, or directions of the court "with full knowledge of the parties" | holding that a trial court should “determine the circumstances, the impact thereof 3 upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties 4 permitted to participate” | stating that the court “should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial” | stating that presumption of prejudice arises only when extraneous contact concerns the matter pending before the jury | clarifying that a case offers no guidance for habeas review under the AEDPA if the court did not apply AEDPA deference | finding that private communication between jurors and outside persons about the pending matter is presumptively prejudicial | clarifying that a case offers no guidance for habeas review under the AEDPA if the court did not apply AEDPA deference | explaining that any contact with a juror during trial “about the matter pending before the jury” is deemed presumptively prejudicial | ruling communication with juror during trial “about the matter pending before the jury” is presumptively prejudicial | noting that in criminal cases, “any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial” | stating that “private communication, contact, or tampering” with the jury is presumptively prejudicial | stating that “private communication, contact, or tampering” with the jury is presumptively prejudicial | stating that "private communication, contact, or tampering" with the jury is presumptively prejudicial | instructing that district courts should be reluctant “to haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extra- neous influences.” | remanding case to district court to determine whether attempted bribery of juror influenced him and made him prejudiced | remanding ,case to district court to determine whether attempted bribery of juror influenced him and made him prejudiced | indicating that when a trial court becomes aware of an occurrence that may have biased a juror, the court must “determine the circumstances, the impact thereof

Citator

Cited by: 782 opinions

REMMERv. UNITED STATES,347 U.S. 227(1954)

74 S.Ct. 450

REMMERv. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 304.

Argued February 1-2, 1954.

Decided March 8, 1954.

During the trial of petitioner in a Federal District Court on charges of willful evasion of federal income taxes, an unnamed person communicated with a juror who afterwards became the jury foreman, and remarked to him that he could profit by bringing in a verdict favorable to petitioner. The juror reported the incident to the judge, who informed the prosecuting attorneys and advised with them. As a result, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made an investigation and report, which was considered by the judge and prosecutors alone, but nothing further was said or done. Petitioner and his counsel first learned of the matter after a verdict of guilty had been rendered, and petitioner thereupon moved for a new trial, which was denied.Held:The case is remanded to the District Court with directions to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident complained of was harmful to petitioner, and if found to have been harmful, to grant a new trial. Pp. 228-230.

(a) In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. P. 229.

(b) The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. P. 229.

205 F.2d 277, judgment vacated.

J. Louis Monarchargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief wereSpurgeon Avakian, John R.GoldenandLeslie C. Gillen.Philip Elmanargued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief wereActing Solicitor GeneralStern, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. SlackandJoseph M. Howard.Page 228

MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury on several counts charging willful evasion of the payment of federal income taxes. A matter admitted by the Government to have been handled by the trial court in a manner that may have been prejudicial to the petitioner, and therefore confessed as error, is presented at the threshold and must be disposed of first.

After the jury had returned its verdict, the petitioner learned for the first time that during the trial a person unnamed had communicated with a certain juror, who afterwards became the jury foreman, and remarked to him that he could profit by bringing in a verdict favorable to the petitioner. The juror reported the incident to the judge, who informed the prosecuting attorneys and advised with them. As a result, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was requested to make an investigation and report, which was accordingly done. The F. B. I. report was considered by the judge and prosecutors alone, and they apparently concluded that the statement to the juror was made in jest, and nothing further was done or said about the matter. Neither the judge nor the prosecutors informed the petitioner of the incident, and he and his counsel first learned of the matter by reading of it in the newspapers after the verdict.

The above-stated facts were alleged in a motion for a new trial, together with an allegation that the petitioner was substantially prejudiced, thereby depriving him of a fair trial, and a request for a hearing to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident and its effect on the jury.^fn*A supporting affidavit of the petitioner'sPage 229attorneys recited the alleged occurrences and stated that if they had known of the incident they would have moved for a mistrial and requested that the juror in question be replaced by an alternate juror. Two newspaper articles reporting the incident were attached to the affidavit. The Government did not file answering affidavits. The District Court, without holding the requested hearing, denied the motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion, since the petitioner had shown no prejudice to him.205 F.2d 277,291. The case is here on writ of certiorari.346 U.S. 884.

In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.Mattoxv.United States,146 U.S. 140,148-150;Wheatonv.United States,133 F.2d 522,527.

We do not know from this record, nor does the petitioner know, what actually transpired, or whether the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless. The sending of an F. B. I. agent in the midst of a trial to investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress the juror and is very apt to do so unduly. A juror must feel free to exercise his functions without the F. B. I. or anyone else looking over his shoulder. The integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions. The trial court should not decide and take final actionex parteon information suchPage 230as was received in this case, but should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.

We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident complained of was harmful to the petitioner, and if after hearing it is found to have been harmful, to grant a new trial.Judgment vacated.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.Page 231

Page 228 The motion for a new trial was also grounded on many other contentions, several of which have also been presented to this Court. Because of our disposition of the case on the issue treated herein, we do not pass upon these additional questions. ↩