Reddy v. Jones

How later courts describe this case

• concluding that delays caused by crowded court dock ets and understaffed prosecutors are chargeable to the State, but are weighed less heavily than intentional delay
• “It is beyond question that the closely related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to criminal as well as civil causes”
• over seven years between the date of the offense and the final appellate orders directing that the initial trial be held
• delay of more than four years from arrest until trial deemed presumptively prejudicial to defendant’s right to speedy trial and burden shifts to State to rebut presumption
• both holding that collateral estoppel does not require the prosecutor to abide by a former court decree suppressing evidence because it is not a "final judgment on the merits"
• both holding that collateral estop-pel does not require the prosecutor to abide by a former court decree suppressing evidence because it is not a “final judgment on the merits”
• state not collaterally estopped by prior suppression order; suppression order itself is interlocutory and not final judgment and state has no right of appeal from suppression order; declaration of mistrial means issue may be relitigated