Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Ray v. United States
481 U.S. 736
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1987-05-18
- Topic
- litigation
holding that the concurrent sentence doctrine does not preclude review of a sentence including a special assessment | holding that the concurrent sentence doctrine does not preclude review of a sentence including a special assessment | holding that the concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply where the total amount of the monetary assessment is dependent on the validity of each of the convictions | holding concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply where a monetary assessment is imposed on each count because of the collateral consequences of the multiple convictions, i.e. a defendant’s "liability to pay th[e] total depends on the validity of each of his ... convictions.” | rejecting application of “concurrent-sentence” doctrine to challenges to multiple convictions, since each conviction carried independent $50 assessments | holding concurrent sentence doctrine does not apply where a monetary assessment is imposed on each count because of the collateral consequences of the multiple convictions, i.e. a defendant's "liability to pay th[e] total depends on the validity of each of his . . . convictions." | discussing applicability of concurrent sentence doctrine where special assessments are charged | to imply that the special assessment was punitive, and therefore constituted punishment for purposes of the Assimilative Crimes Act | “As a practical matter, the concurrent- sentence doctrine was abrogated for direct appeal when Congress imposed a special assessment of $50 (now $100) for each separate felony conviction.” | “[T]he prophylactic protections that the Miranda 19 Case: 11-11928 Date Filed: 08/21/2013 Page: 20 of 29 warnings provide [are] to counteract the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation.” (internal quotation marks omitted) | special assessments sufficient to make sentences not concurrent on direct review | concurrent sentence doctrine inapplicable because of multiple special assessments | explaining the concurrent sentence doctrine
Citator
- Cited by
- 70 opinions
Petitioner was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to concurrent 7-year prison terms on all three counts, and to concurrent special parole terms of five years on the two possession counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed peti *737 tioner’s conspiracy conviction and one of his possession convictions. United States v. Sandoval, 791 F. 2d 929 (CA5 1986) (judg. order). Applying the so-called “concurrent sentence doctrine,” the court declined to review the second possession conviction because the sentences on the two possession counts were concurrent. We granted certiorari to review the role of the concurrent sentence doctrine in the federal courts. 479 U. S. 960 (1986).
It now appears, however, that petitioner is not in fact serving concurrent sentences. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3013 (1982 ed., Supp. Ill) provides that district courts shall assess a monetary charge “on any person convicted of an offense against the United States.” Pursuant to this section, the District Court imposed a $50 assessment on each count, in addition to the concurrent prison and parole terms, for a total of $150. Since petitioner’s liability to pay this total depends on the validity of each of his three convictions, the sentences are not concurrent. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the cause is remanded to that court so that it may consider petitioner’s challenge to his second possession conviction.
It is so ordered.