Quercia v. United States

holding that the judge "may not assume the role of a witness” | stating that it is prejudicial error for the trial court to comment unfavorably on a witness | stating that it is prejudicial error for the trial court to comment unfavorably on a witness | stating that judges must be careful in instructions to limit comments on evidence so as not to sway or mislead jury | stating that judges must be careful in instructions to limit comments on evidence so as not to sway or mislead jury | holding that an instruction to the jury that the judge's opinion of the evidence was not binding on them was not sufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the judge's statement that people who wipe their hands while testifying are liars | holding that an instruction to the jury that the judge’s opinion of the evidence was not binding on them was not sufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the judge’s statement that people who wipe their hands while testifying are liars | holding that a trial judge may comment upon the evidence and express an opinion on the facts as long as the judge makes it clear to the jury that it is the trier of fact | affirming that judge may draw jury’s attention to parts of the evidence he thinks important | holding that an instruction to the jury that the judge’s opinion of the evidence was not binding on them was not sufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the judge’s statement that people who wipe their hands while testifying are liars | noting that in a jury trial in federal court, judge may "express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination" | noting that in a jury trial in federal court, judge may “express his opinion upon the facts, provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination” | reversing trial judge who gave his view that a government witness was entitled to credit because he did not frequent the courts, like defendant bondsmen | reversing trial judge who gave his view that a government witness was entitled to credit because he did not frequent the courts, like defendant bondsmen | recognizing longstanding principle that "[t]he influence of the trial judge on the jury 'is necessarily and properly of great weight' and 'his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling' " | reversing conviction because of trial judge’s improper comment to jury about his perception of defendant’s credibility on witness stand | stating that court may not “distort” or “add” to the evidence | finding prejudicial error in district court’s remarks to the jury that defendant’s hand wiping during his testimony “is almost always an indication of lying” | discussing 7 common-law authority of judge to comment on evidence and noting this authority was carried over in federal constitution | reversing conviction where the judge charged the jury that “I think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government’s testimony, was a lie” | stating that it is within the trial judge’s province to draw the jury’s attention to parts of evidence the Court thinks important, and that a trial judge “may analyze and dissect the evidence, but he may not either distort or add to it” | reversing where the trial judge “states as facts, rather than as testimony to be considered by the jury in deciding the facts, the whole case of the prosecution” | reversing conviction where the judge charged the jury that “I think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the Government's testimony, was a lie” | ordering the reversal of a judgment where "the trial judge did not analyze the evidence; he added to it, and he based his instruction [to the jury] upon his own addition" | finding the trial judge’s interference had been “highly prejudicial,” and observing that “[h]is definite and concrete assertion of fact, which he had made with all the p