Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Queen of the Pacific
Queen of the Pac., 180 U.S. 49 (1901)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1901-01-07
- Topic
- general
Me. Justice Beown, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The Court of Appeals in its opinion dwelt upon several propositions arising upon the pleadings and evidence, but in the view we have taken of the case we shall find it necessary to discuss but one, which is, in substance, that the libellants did not, as required by the bill of lading, present to the company their claims for damage to the merchandise within thirty days from the date of the bills of lading, April 27 and 28, 1888. There is no pretence of a compliance with this condition. Two answers are made to this defence: First,.that the limitation applies only to claims against the steamship company or any of the stockholders of said company, and not to claims against the vessel; second, that the limitation is unreasonable. 1.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Queen of the Pacific. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 84 opinions
Headnotes
- Admiralty & Maritime Law — Bills of Lading — Notice-of-Claim Stipulations A bill-of-lading stipulation requiring that all claims for damage to merchandise be presented to the steamship company within thirty days applies to a suit in rem against the vessel as well as to a suit in personam against the company, because there is but one contract of affreightment between the shipper and the company in its individual capacity and as representative of the ship, and a shipper should not be able to evade the notice requirement merely by changing the form of the action. 180 U.S. at 55–56
- Admiralty & Maritime Law — Common Carriers — Conditions in Bills of Lading Restrictions on the liability of a common carrier inserted by the carrier in a bill of lading for its own benefit are to be narrowly construed, but they should not be frittered away by adherence to the letter of the contract in disregard of its intent and spirit. 180 U.S. at 55
- Admiralty & Maritime Law — Common Carriers — Reasonableness of Notice-of-Claim Stipulations Whether a stipulation requiring notice of loss within a fixed period is reasonable depends largely on the object of the notice and the length of the voyage, together with the time at which the loss occurred and all the circumstances of the particular case; a period reasonable for a vessel on short trips may be wholly unreasonable for one engaged in foreign or trans-Pacific trade, and the stipulation will not be enforced where under the circumstances it would work a manifest injustice or destroy the right of recovery. 180 U.S. at 56–57
- Admiralty & Maritime Law — Common Carriers — Notice-of-Claim Stipulations — Validity Common carriers may impose by contract just and reasonable limitations upon their common-law liability, such as a requirement that claims for loss or damage be presented within a fixed time, provided the limitation does not excuse the carrier from the consequences of its own negligence. 180 U.S. at 58–59
- Admiralty & Maritime Law — Bills of Lading — Thirty-Day Notice Provision — Reasonableness A thirty-day notice-of-claim provision in a bill of lading was reasonable where the vessel was engaged in short trips, the loss occurred the day after the bills of lading were signed, and the shippers were notified of the loss within three days thereafter, leaving them more than three weeks to investigate the facts and determine whether to present a claim; the shippers' failure to present the claim within the limited period barred recovery both against the company in personam and against the ship in rem. 180 U.S. at 57–59
QUEEN OF THE PACIFIC,180 U.S. 49(1901)
21 S.Ct. 278
QUEEN OF THE PACIFIC.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
No. 130.
Argued and submitted December 14, 1900.
Decided January 7, 1901.
THIS was a joint libel by the Bancroft-Whitney Company, a
California corporation, and the firm of Hellman, Haas Company
against the steamship, Queen of the Pacific, owned by the Pacific
Coast Steamship Company, to recover damages to certain
miscellaneous merchandise shipped April 29, 1888, at San
Francisco, to consignees at San Pedro in the State of California.
Page 50
The contracts of affreightment were evidenced by bills of
lading in the usual form and with the usual exception of perils
of the sea, and amongst others with the following stipulation:
"It is expressly agreed that all claims against the P.C.S.S.
Co., or any of the stockholders of said company, for damage to or
loss of any of the within merchandise, must be presented to the
company within thirty days from date hereof; and that after
thirty days from date hereof, no action, suit or proceeding, in
any court of justice, shall be brought against said P.C.S.S. Co.,
or any of the stockholders thereof, for any damage to or loss of
said merchandise; and the lapse of said thirty days shall be
deemed a conclusive bar and release of all right to recover
against said company, or any of the stockholders thereof, for any
such damage or loss."
The steamship left San Francisco about two o'clock in the
afternoon of April 29, 1888, bound for the port of San Diego and
intermediate ports, having on board a cargo of general
merchandise and upwards of two hundred persons. A little more
than twelve hours after she sailed, and about half past two
o'clock in the morning of the 30th, the steamer was seen to have
sprung a leak and to be taking in water through a watertight
compartment known as the starboard alleyway. At this time she had
a list of from five to eight degrees to starboard, which, when
she reached Port Hartford, four or five hours afterwards, had
increased to an angle of thirty degrees. When about two hundred
and fifty or three hundred yards from the wharf, where she
usually made her landing, she took the bottom in about
twenty-three feet of water, and in about twenty minutes
thereafter filled, sank and lay in a helpless condition for three
or four days. A diver, procured for that purpose, after repeated
efforts, found the leak and stopped it, whereupon the water was
pumped out of the vessel, and she was towed to San Francisco,
where she arrived the next day. Her cargo was all discharged upon
the wharf, and delivery thereof tendered and accepted by the
several owners, who gave the usual average bonds. On May 19, that
portion of the cargo belonging to Hellman, Hass Company was
sold by them at public auction. No claim for damage to the
merchandise was made
Page 51
upon the owners of the Queen prior to the sale, nor were they
invited to such sale. In short, nothing further appears to have
been done for nearly four years, though the steamer was
constantly running to and from San Francisco, when on April 28,
1892, this libel was filed. Exceptions to the libel were
interposed and overruled, (61 F. 213,) and the case
subsequently went to a hearing upon libel, answers and testimony,
and resulted in a decree for the libellants for the full amount
of their claim, (78 F. 155,) which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. 94 F. 180. Whereupon this writ of
certiorari was granted.
1. The first objection is quite too technical. It virtually assumes that there were two contracts, one with the company and one with the ship, the vehicle of transportation owned and employed by the company; and that while the company as to all its other property is protected by the contract, as to thisPage 52particular property, used in carrying it out, it is not so protected. But if such be the case with respect to this particular stipulation, must it not also be so with respect to the other stipulations in the bill of lading to which the company is a party but not the ship? Thus, "the responsibility of said company shall cease immediately on the delivery of the said goods from the ship's tackles." Can it be possible that the responsibility of the ship shall not cease at the same time? "The company shall not be held responsible for any damage or loss resulting from fire at sea or in port; accident to or from machinery, boilers or steam," etc.; but shall the company be exempt and not the ship? "It is expressly understood that the said company shall not be liable or accountable for weight, leakage, breakage, shrinkage, rust, etc., . . . nor for loss of specie, bullion, etc., unless shipped under its proper title or name, and extra freight paid thereon;" but shall the ship be liable for all these excepted losses notwithstanding that the company is exonerated? These questions can admit of but one answer. There was in truth but one contract, and that was between the libellants upon the one part, and the company in its individual capacity and as the representative of the ship, upon the other.
There is no doubt of the general proposition that restrictions upon the liability of a common carrier, inserted by him in the bill of lading for his own benefit and in language chosen by himself, must be narrowly construed, still they ought not to be wholly frittered away by an adherence to the letter of the contract in obvious disregard of its intent and spirit. It is too clear for argument that it was the intention of the company to require notice to be given of all claims for losses or damage to merchandise entrusted to its care, and as such damage could only come to it while the merchandise was upon one of its steamers or in the process of reception or delivery, and as the owner would have his option to sue eitherin remorin personam, it could never have been contemplated that in the one case he should be obliged to give notice and not in the other. In either event, the money to pay for such damage must come from the treasury of the company; and we ought not to give such an effect to the stipulation as would enable the owner ofPage 53the merchandise to avoid its operation by simply changing his form of action. It would be almost as unreasonable to give it this construction as to hold that it should apply if the action were in contract, but should not apply if it were in tort. The "claim" is in either case against the company, though thesuitmay be against its property.
2. The question of the reasonableness of the requirement is one largely dependent upon the object of the notice and the length of the voyage. Thus, a notice which would be perfectly reasonable as applied to steamers making daily trips, might be wholly unreasonable as applied to vessels engaged in a foreign trade. Indeed, a thirty-day notice, such as is involved in this case, would be wholly futile as applied to a steamship plying between San Francisco and trans-Pacific ports. Notice might also be deemed reasonable, or otherwise, according to the facts of the particular case. Thus, if the Queen had been driven out to sea and was not heard from for thirty days, obviously the provision would not apply, since its enforcement might wholly destroy the right of recovery. The question is whether under the circumstances of the particular case the requirement be a reasonable one or not.
The Queen was engaged in short trips and in general trade to San Diego, doubtless delivering merchandise in different parcels and in different quantities to large numbers of consignees at the termini, and at intermediate ports. If any damage occurred to such articles, it was of the utmost importance to the company to have the claim made as soon as possible, while the witnesses, who must often be sailors, difficult to find and still more difficult to retain, might be reached, and while their memory was fresh, that the company might then know whether it had a defence to the claim. In case of a disaster occurring on such voyage, it could hardly fail to be known in San Francisco within three or four days from the time the steamer left there. As a matter of fact, the bills of lading in this case were signed April 27 and 28; the loss occurred on April 30, and notice was mailed to the shippers on May 2. There were thus over three weeks during which they were at liberty to makePage 54inquiries, examine into the facts, and determine whether to make claim upon the company or not.
Similar stipulations requiring notices of losses to be given to common carriers, express companies, telegraph and insurance companies have so often been upheld by the courts, when reasonable, that a review of the cases is quite unnecessary. Indeed, this is not the first time that the question has been before this court.
InExpress Co. v.Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, an agreement by an express company that it should not be liable for any loss of or damage to any package unless claim should be made therefor within ninety days from its delivery to the company, was held to be one which the company could rightfully make, since the time for transit required only about a day. InLewisv.GreatWestern Railway Co., 5 H. N. 867, there was a provision in the bill of lading that no claim for damage should be allowed, unless made within three days after the delivery of the goods. This was held to be valid. "The company, wishing to guard against any allegation of neglect in the delivery of goods confided to them, require that when the goods are delivered they shall be promptly examined and complaint at once made if there is occasion for it. Such a condition is perfectly reasonable. The law allows persons to make their own bargains in matters of this sort."
InGogginv.Kansas Pacific Railway Co.,12 Kan. 416, there was a requirement that claims for damage to live stock should be made in writing, before or at the time the stock was unloaded. Plaintiff alleged that he had signed the bill of lading under protest, and also verbally notified the servants of the company of the damage, before the cattle were unloaded from the cars, and immediately after giving verbal notice, sought for writing materials to make out a written notice, but before he was able to find them, the cattle were unloaded, so that no notice was given. A demurrer was sustained to this reply, the court holding that his inability to procure writing materials was no excuse for not giving notice for more than a year afterward. "The parties were competent to make the contract, and did make it, and it must be held good, unless it is contrary toPage 55public policy." See alsoWolfv.Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Penn. St. 83.
InAdams Express Co. v.Reagan,29 Ind. 21, where a package was shipped from a town in Indiana to Savannah, Georgia, during the civil war, when transportation was much interrupted, it was held that a condition that the carrier should not be liable unless a claim was presented within thirty days after shipment was unreasonable. It was put upon the ground that the country, being in an unsettled condition, occasioning great delays in shipments and in the transmission of mails, an attempt to incorporate this condition into their contract was placing it within the power of the company by a delay, which under the circumstances would, perhaps, not have been unreasonable, to prevent any claim for loss or damage, however gross may have been its negligence. It appeared that the plaintiff's agent delayed shipping the property for a month or more until Savannah was taken by the Federal troops, when he delivered it to the company and the receipt was executed. That the case was determined upon the particular facts is evident from the subsequent case ofUnited States Express Co. v.Harris,51 Ind. 127, in which a stipulation that the company was not to be liable for any loss, unless the claim therefor should be made in writing, at the office of shipment, within thirty days from the date of said receipt, was held to be binding and valid, though it was doubted whether the claim must be made at the office of the company, where the property had passed into the hands of another carrier, or might be made in such case upon some agent or officer chargeable with the loss. The former case was distinguished as being applicable to its own facts.
There are doubtless some cases to the contrary, where upon the particular facts the condition was held to be unreasonable. InMissouri Pacific Railway Co. v.Harris,67 Tex. 166[67 Tex. 166], the requirement was that the shipper should give notice in writing of his claim to some officer of the company, or its nearest station agent, before the cattle were removed from their place of destination, and before they were mingled with other stock. The shipment was from an interior town in Texas to Chicago, the line of railway did not extend to the point of destination,Page 56and both parties understood that the carrier would transport the cattle from its own road over a connecting road. It was held that the failure of the answer to show that the carrier had an officer or agent so situated that the contract to give notice to such officer or agent was reasonable, was fatal on demurrer, and that no presumption could be indulged that the carrier had an officer near the place of destination. This case was evidently decided upon its special facts. In another case decided by the Supreme Court of Texas,Pacific Express Co. v.Darnell, 6 S.W. 765, a piece of machinery was delivered to an express company in Texas for shipment to Baltimore. The contract of shipment provided that the company should not be held liable for any claim arising from the contract, unless it were presented within sixty days of the date of the contract. Held, that the failure to present the claim was not a bar to the right of recovery, the restriction of presentment of claims without reference to the time of loss being unreasonable. The court seemed to assume that the stipulation imposed a restriction which in many cases would deny a right of action, and thereby permit the carrier to contract against his negligence, which is never allowed. The opinion seems to have gone off upon the point that, while the notice as applied to the facts might have been reasonable, it would be unreasonable when applied to a different state of facts. It is unnecessary to say that if, under the circumstances of a particular case, the stipulation were unreasonable, or worked a manifest injustice to the libellants, we should not give it effect. All that was decided inWestcottv.Fargo,61 N.Y. 542, was that a similar limitation of thirty days was pleaded as a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to recover, when it should have been set up in the answer. See alsoSouthernExpress Co. v.Caperton,44 Ala. 101.
Other analogous limitations upon the common-law liability of a carrier, not operating to restrict his liability for negligence, have been sustained by this court, viz., exempting the carrier from liability from losses by fire occasioned without his negligence,York Companyv.Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107;Bank of Kentuckyv.Adams Exp. Co.,93 U.S. 174; a restriction in value upon the property shipped,Railroad Co. v.Fraloff,Page 57100 U.S. 24;Hartv.Penn. Railroad Co.,112 U.S. 331; limiting its liability upon through shipments to losses occurring upon its own line,Railroad Co. v.Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; and providing that in the case of loss the carrier shall have the full benefit of any insurance that may be effected upon the goods,PhoenixIns. Co. v.Erie Western Transportation Co.,117 U.S. 312. Indeed, inRailroad Co. v.Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, in an elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley, it was held by this court that common carriers may impose almost any just and reasonable limitation upon their common-law liability, not amounting to an exemption from the consequences of their own negligence. The methods of transportation have changed so radically during the century which has just closed, that it seems almost necessary to the proper protection of a carrier, in transacting the enormous business of railway and steamship lines, that he should have the power by just and reasonable limitations incorporated in his contract, or brought to the attention of his shippers, to place some restrictions upon the unlimited liability of the common law, particularly where articles of great value, such as jewels, money, bullion, laces and precious stones, are transported without disclosing their contents, or articles or animals of exceptional value, such as race horses, are carried without information of their character; and that persons intending to make claims for losses should manifest their election to do so as soon as the circumstances can by reasonable diligence be ascertained. The law recognizes the fact that the measure of liability originally applied to a carter's wain or a waterman's hoy may often be illy adapted to the exigencies of modern commerce.
There is no hardship to the libellants in giving effect to the stipulation in this case. As was said of a similar condition inExpress Co. v.Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, 268: "It contravenes no public policy. It excuses no negligence. It is perfectly consistent with holding the carrier to the fullest measure of good faith, of diligence and of capacity, which the strictest rules of the common law ever required, and it is intrinsically just, as applied to the present case." The loss was known to the shippers within three days after it occurred. The steamer was then and continued to be in port, and the facts were easily ascertainable.Page 58Under the stipulation the company had a right to assume that the proper inquiries had been made, and that the shippers were either satisfied that the company was not liable, or that they had elected to rely upon their policies of insurance. Instead of giving notice libellants permitted four years to elapse before beginning suit, although both the ship and the company were readily accessible. True, the Court of Appeals found there was no change of circumstances and no loss of testimony in the mean time; but that is not material. The question concerns the binding effect of the stipulation. Had the ship been transferred to abona fidepurchaser there certainly would have been, had the witnesses whose testimony could explain the loss have disappeared, there probably would have been, laches, which would render the claim stale, irrespective of the stipulation; but the stipulation itself would be invalid only upon showing that under the circumstances of the particular case its enforcement would work a manifest injustice. In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether the limitation of thirty days for the commencement of suit be reasonable or not.
We are of opinion that the clause in question was perfectly reasonable, and the decree of the Court of Appeals must therefore beReversed, and the case remanded to the District Court for theNorthern District of California with directions to dismiss thelibel.Page 59