Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
7 L. Ed. 2d 458
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1962-02-19
- Topic
- general
holding that summary judgment was often inappropriate in antitrust cases because of the emphasis on motive, intent, hostile witnesses, and the fact that the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators | holding agent potentially liable where he knew of the "obvious purpose and necessary effect" to eliminate independent stations and "had a personal stake in the outcome" | holding agent potentially liable where he knew of the “obvious purpose and necessary effect” to eliminate independent stations and “had a personal stake in the outcome” | finding that “determinations of motive and intent ... are questions better suited for the jury” | noting that summary judgment is inappropriate “where motive and intent play leading roles” | noting that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation | emphasizing that in antitrust cases, motive and intent are important issues | upholding summary judgment for defendants in civil rights suit by a black teacher alleging discriminatory discharge from employment and denial of due process | non-moving party entitled to have record viewed in the light most favorable to it | non-moving party entitled to have record viewed in the light most favorable to it | explaining that “[t]rial by affidavit is no substitute for trial Nos. 23AP-554 and 24AP-72 33 by jury,” because “[i]t is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross- examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised” | “summary judgment procedures should be used sparingly ... where motive and intent play leading roles” | corporation and its officers may properly be indicted for conspiracy when participation of independent parties in conspiracy is also alleged | summary judgment should rarely be used in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles | summary judgment should rarely be used in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles | where terminated employee brought defamation action against former employer, district court granted motion for summary judgment | summary judgment procedures should be used "sparingly” where the issues of motive and intent play "leading roles" | summary judgment unavailable in large complex antitrust litigation in which mental staté of defendant corporation’s officers was at issue, as this constituted disputed factual question requiring jury consideration rather than “trial by affidavit” | “[w]e believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles” | “summary judgment procedures should be used sparingly ... where the issues of motive and intent play leading roles” | attempt to drive independent station out of business by television network makes out § 1 violation even though network's position in market served by television station was limited | an antitrust action in which the court found a conspiracy among a corporation and its subsidiaries | “It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised” | summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles” | summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles” | summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles” | summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles” | in deciding a motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s allegation of exhaustion must be accepted as true | “summary judgment procedures should be used sparingly ... where the issues of motive and intent play leading roles” | summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litigation “where motive and intent play leading roles” | summary judgment is to be issued “sparingly” in litig
Citator
- Cited by
- 1133 opinions
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question involved here is whether this treble damage action based on alleged violations of the restraint of trade and monopoly sections of the Sherman Law1 was rightly terminated by a summary judgment of dismissal. The petitioner, Lou Poller, is the assignee of the Midwest Broadcasting Company, a dissolved corporation. In 1954 Midwest was the owner and operator of WCAN, an ultra high frequency (UHF)2 broadcasting station
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment the trial judge held that the injury suffered was damnum absque injuria, stating that CBS had a right to purchase WOKY, subject to Federal Communications Commission approval, and to cancel its affiliation contract with WCAN. 174 F. Supp. 802. The Court of Appeals affirmed with Judge Washington dissenting, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 284 F. 2d 599, and we granted certiorari, 365 U. S. 840. We now conclude that there was a genuine issue as to material facts and that summary judgment was not therefore in order.
I.
Summary judgment should be entered only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions filed in the case “show that [except as to the amount of damages] there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56 (c), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. This rule authorizes summary judgment “only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, . . . [and where] no genuine issue remains for trial . . . [for] the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try.” Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620, 627 (1944). We now examine the contentions of the parties to determine whether under the rule summary judgment was proper.
The respondents in their motion for summary judgment depended upon the affidavits of four persons. The first is Richard Salant, Vice President of CBS; another, Jay Eliasberg, Director of its Research Division; a third, Lee Bartell, who made the sale of WOKY to CBS at a $50,000 profit; finally, Thad Holt, a codefendant who received $10,000 from the transaction. These were supplemented by material taken from petitioner’s depositions of Salant and CBS President Stanton. It is readily apparent that each of these persons was an interested party.
Respondents appear to place most reliance on the Salant testimony, and we shall, therefore, take it up in some detail. It projects three defenses, the first being that there was no conspiracy for the following reasons: CBS-TV was not a separate entity but only a division of CBS, and therefore there could be no conspiracy between the two; Holt, the cover man in securing the option and purchase of WOKY, “had been given the particular job” by CBS and therefore was not a conspirator; and Bartell never shared in any illegal purpose that would bring him into the conspiracy. Secondly, in any event, the only issue in the case is the legality of the cancellation of the affiliation agreement by CBS which was merely the legal exercise by CBS of “the normal right of a producer to select the outlet for its product.” And, finally, the monopoly charges are entirely “frivolous.” The trial judge accepted the second defense.
III.
It may be that CBS by independent action could have exercised its granted right to cancel WCAN’s affiliation upon six months’ notice and independently purchased its own outlet in Milwaukee. However, if such a cancellation and purchase were part and parcel of unlaw
It is argued that CBS cannot conspire with itself. However, this begs the question for the allegation is that independent parties, i. e., Holt and Bartell, conspired with CBS and its officers.4 While respondents’ affidavits assert that Holt acted in good faith as a special agent or employee for CBS and that Bartell was completely free of any evil motives directed toward WCAN, the trial judge indicated a belief that Holt was “an independent actor” and would have submitted the question of his status to the jury had he not disposed of the case on other grounds. Furthermore, Poller submitted a deposition of Holt, an exhibit to which showed CBS had furnished Holt
Respondents’ answer to the charge that one of the purposes of the alleged conspiracy was to exert a restraining effect upon the development of UHF is that this is a
The record indicates that Poller had built up a profitable UHF operation, which was recognized as “the most successful” in the United States. Even CBS officials pointed to it as an example of how “a vigorously and
It may be that upon all of the evidence a jury would be with the respondents. But we cannot say on this record that “it is quite clear what the truth is.” Cer
IV.
Other contentions of respondents are subject to ready disposition. They say that no restraint of trade resulted from CBS' termination of its affiliation with WCAN for this enabled it to support WOKY, the other UHF station in the Milwaukee area, which based upon Poller's own allegations was doomed without an affiliation. To the extent that this argument suggests that there is no violation of the antitrust laws because the public will still receive the same service, it has been foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U. S. 207 (1959). And if it is meant to say that there was no restraint because CBS in canceling its affiliation with WCAN was merely doing what it had a right to do and the resulting demise of WCAN followed from normal market conditions, it erroneously assumes that CBS had an absolute right despite violations of the antitrust laws to exercise its contractual privilege. See Part III, supra. A further answer to the respondents’ conten
CBS contends that the monopolization charges are frivolous. We find the record unclear on these claims. In view of our remand for a trial on the merits, we forego any comment thereon. The complaint does not allege the relevant market involved. In the trial court it was argued that UHF broadcasting in Milwaukee was the market, but on the record here we are unable to determine that issue. It may well be that on a trial appropriate allegations and proof can be adduced showing violations of § 2. See generally International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U. S. 242, 249-252 (1959); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 648-654 (1957) (dissenting opinion). We believe it to be good judicial administration to withhold decision on these issues.
Reversed and remanded.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . . .” 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2.
The terms ultra high frequency (TJHF) and very high frequency (VHF) refer to the wave lengths of the electrical impulses which are projected by broadcasting stations to carry programs to receiving sets. Prior to 1952 only the VHF portion of the spectrum was authorized. Generally TV receivers are manufactured only to receive VHF signals and must be modified by an owner to receive UHF.
The conspirators were alleged to be Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.; CBS-TV; J. L. Van Volkenburg, President of CBS-TV; H. K. Akerberg, Vice President of CBS-TV; Bartell Broadcasters, Inc., owners of WOKY; and Thad Holt, a management consultant.
We do not pass upon the point urged by Poller that under the CBS corporate arrangement of divisions, with separate officers and autonomy in each, the divisions came within the rule as to corporate subsidiaries.
11 Pike and Fischer Radio Reg. 913, 914.
Indeed, such action would be unreasonable in light of the success of Midwest’s initial operation and its highly favorable prospects with the expanded facilities and new equipment.
Compare Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249, 256-257 (1948); Arenas v. United States, 322 U. S. 419, 434 (1944).