Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Pennsylvania v. Bruder

488 U.S. 9

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1988-10-31
Topic
litigation

holding that where defendant was subjected to an ordinary traffic stop, asked a "modest" number of questions, and requested to perform a simple balancing test, defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda | concluding that an ordinary traffic stop during which a police officer asks a driver a modest number of questions and requests him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists did not involve "custody" for purposes of Miranda rule | holding that sobriety testing during vehicle stop was not custodial interrogation | concluding that an ordinary traffic stop during which a police officer asks a driver a modest number of ques tions and requests him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists did not involve “custody” for purposes of Miranda rule | noting that factors relevant to whether questioning amounts to “custodial interrogation” are the location of the interrogation, whether the suspect is sequestered or held incommunicado, the number of police officers present, and the duration of the interrogation | explaining that a traffic stop does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda | explaining that a traffic stop does not constitute custody for purposes of Miranda | reaffirming holding of Be rkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984 | reaffirming Berkemer with respect to traffic stops where police do not delay formally arresting the suspect to subject them to “sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of the initial detention.” (quotation omitted) | single officer asking modest number of questions is standard in traffic stops | " Berkemer' s rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda," applied | “Berkemer’s rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda,” applied | “[R]outine roadside questioning of a driver during an ordinary traffic stop does not constitute a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.” | Persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. | "traffic stops commonly occur in the 'public view,' in an atmosphere far 'less police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself" | “[T]he ‘noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes of Miranda.’” | "traffic stops commonly occur in the 'public view,' in an atmosphere far 'less "police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] itself'" | “although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” ... "ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda ”; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984 | Ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda | "although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" . . . "ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes of Miranda "; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984 | a motorist is not “in custody” during the performance of field sobriety tests, and is therefore not entitled to a recitation of constitutional rights prior to the tests; a motorist’s response to questions about his drinking are admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings | ordinary traffic stops are not "custodial" for Miranda purposes | ordinary traffic stops are not "custodial” for Miranda purposes | a single police officer asking defendant a modest number of questions and requesting him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists constitutes an ordinary traffic stop and does not involve custody for purposes of Miranda.

Citator

Cited by
81 opinions
PENNSYLVANIAv. BRUDER,488 U.S. 9(1988)
PENNSYLVANIAv. BRUDER
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 88-161.
Decided October 31, 1988
After his vehicle was stopped by a police officer, respondent Bruder took field sobriety tests and, in answer to questions, stated that he had been drinking. He failed the tests and was then arrested and givenMirandawarnings. At his trial, his statements and conduct before arrest were admitted into evidence, and he was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the statements that Bruder uttered during the roadside questioning were elicited through custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed for lack ofMirandawarnings.Held:Bruder was not entitled to a recitation of his constitutional rights prior to arrest, and his roadside responses to questioning were admissible. The rule ofBerkemerv.McCarty,468 U.S. 420— that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for the purposes ofMiranda— governs this case. Although unquestionably a seizure, this stop had the same noncoercive aspects as theBerkemerdetention: a single police officer asking Bruder a modest number of questions and requesting him to perform simple tests in a location visible to passing motorists.

Certiorari granted;365 Pa. Super. 106,528 A.2d 1385, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
Because the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in this case is contrary toBerkemerv.McCarty,468 U.S. 420(1984), we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.

In the early morning of January 19, 1985, Officer Steve Shallis of the Newton Township, Pennsylvania, Police Department observed respondent Thomas Bruder driving very erratically along State Highway 252. Among other traffic violations, he ignored a red light. Shallis stopped Bruder's vehicle. Bruder left his vehicle, approached Shallis, and when asked for his registration card, returned to his car to obtain it. Smelling alcohol and observing Bruder's stumbling movements, Shallis administered field sobriety tests,Page 10including asking Bruder to recite the alphabet. Shallis also inquired about alcohol. Bruder answered that he had been drinking and was returning home. Bruder failed the sobriety tests, whereupon Shallis arrested him, placed him in the police car, and gave himMirandawarnings. Bruder was later convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. At his trial, his statements and conduct prior to his arrest were admitted into evidence. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed,365 Pa. Super. 106,528 A.2d 1385(1987), on the ground that the above statements Bruder had uttered during the roadside questioning were elicited through custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed for lack ofMirandawarnings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the State's appeal application.

InBerkemerv.McCarty, supra, which involved facts strikingly similar to those in this case, the Court concluded that the "noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not `in custody' for the purposes ofMiranda."Id., at 440. The Court reasoned that although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such traffic stops typically are brief, unlike a prolonged station house interrogation. Second, the Court emphasized that traffic stops commonly occur in the "public view," in an atmosphere far "less `police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue inMirandaitself."Id., at 438-439. The detained motorist's "freedom of action [was not] curtailed to `a degree associated with formal arrest.'"Id., at 440 (citingCaliforniav.Beheler,463 U.S. 1121,1125(1983)). Accordingly, he was not entitled to a recitation of his constitutional rights prior to arrest, and his roadside responses to questioning were admissible.1Page 11

The facts in this record, which Bruder does not contest, reveal the same noncoercive aspects as theBerkemerdetention: "a single police officer ask[ing] respondent a modest number of questions and request[ing] him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists."468 U.S., at 442(footnote omitted).2Accordingly,Berkemer's rule, that ordinary traffic stops do not involve custody for purposes ofMiranda, governs this case.3The judgment of the Pennsylvania Superior Court that evidence was inadmissible for lack ofMirandawarnings is reversed.It is so ordered.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the Court should not disturb the decision of the court below, and accordingly I join his dissent. I write separately to note my continuing belief that it is unfair to litigants and damaging to the integrity and accuracy of this Court's decisions to reverse a decision summarily without the benefit of full briefing on the merits ofPage 12the question decided.Rhodesv.Stewart, ante, p. 1 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);Buchananv.Stanships, Inc.,485 U.S. 265,269(1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);Commissionerv.McCoy,484 U.S. 3,7(1987) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). I therefore dissent from the Court's decision today to reverse summarily the decision below.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
The Court explains why it reverses the decision of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in this drunken driving case, but it does not explain why it granted certiorari.

InBerkemerv.McCarty,468 U.S. 420,440-442(1984), the Court concluded thatMirandawarnings are not required during a traffic stop unless the citizen is taken into custody; that there is no bright-line rule for determining when detentions short of formal arrest constitute custody; and that "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation,"468 U.S., at 442. The rule applied in Pennsylvania is strikingly similar to this Court's statement inBerkemer. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained in this case:
"In Pennsylvania, `custodial interrogation does not require that police make a formal arrest, nor that the police intend to make an arrest. . . . Rather, the test of custodial interrogation is whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.'Commonwealthv.Meyer,488 Pa. 297,307,412 A.2d 517,521(1980) (quotingCommonwealthv.Brown,473 Pa. 562,570,375 A.2d 1260,1264(1977). . . .
"InCommonwealthv.Meyer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the driver of a car involved in an accident who was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and who was told by police to wait at the scene until additional police arrived was in custody forPage 13purposes ofMiranda. TheMeyercourt reasoned that because the defendant had a reasonable belief that his freedom of action had been restricted, statements elicited before he received hisMirandawarnings should have been suppressed.488 Pa. at 307,412 A.2d at 522."365 Pa. Super. 106,111-112,528 A.2d 1385,1387(1987).


In itsBerkemeropinion, this Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion inCommonwealthv.Meyer,488 Pa. 297,412 A.2d 517(1980), with approval.468 U.S., at 441, n. 34. Thus, there appears to be no significant difference between the rule of law that is generally applied to traffic stops in Pennsylvania and the rule that this Court would approve in other States.

There is, however, a difference of opinion on the question whether the rule was correctly applied in this case. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania was divided on the issue. See365 Pa. Super., at 117,528 A.2d, at 1390(Rowley, J., concurring and dissenting). It was therefore quite appropriate for the prosecutor to seek review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. That court summarily denied review without opinion. See518 Pa. 635,542 A.2d 1365(1988). That action was quite appropriate for the highest court of a large State like Pennsylvania because such a court is obviously much too busy to review every arguable misapplication of settled law in cases of this kind.

For reasons that are unclear to me, however, this Court seems to welcome the opportunity to perform an error-correcting function in cases that do not merit the attention of the highest court of a sovereign State. See,e.g., Floridav.Meyers,466 U.S. 380(1984)(per curiam); Illinoisv.Batchelder,463 U.S. 1112(1983)(per curiam). Although there are cases in which "there are special and important reasons" for correcting an error that is committed by another court, see this Court's Rule 17.1, this surely is not such a case. The Court does not suggest that this case involves anPage 14important and unsettled question of federal law or that there is confusion among the state and federal courts concerning what legal rules govern the application ofMirandato ordinary traffic stops. Rather, the Court simply holds that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania misapplied our decision inBerkemerto "[t]he facts in this record."Ante, at 11. In my judgment this Court's scarce resources would be far better spent addressing cases that are of some general importance "beyond the facts and parties involved,"Boagv.MacDougall,454 U.S. 364,368(1982) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), than in our acting as "self-appointed . . . supervisors of the administration of justice in the state judicial systems,"Floridav.Meyers,466 U.S., at 385(STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Accordingly, because I would not disturb the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania — which, incidentally, is the court to which the petitioner asks us to direct the writ of certiorari — I respectfully dissent.Page 15
  1. Page 10 We did not announce an absolute rule for all motorist detentions, observing that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not "delay formally arresting detained motorists, and . . . subject them to sustainedPage 11and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their initial detention."Berkemerv.McCarty,468 U.S. 420,440(1984). ↩
  2. Page 11 Reliance on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision inCommonwealthv.Meyer,488 Pa. 297,412 A.2d 517(1980), to which we referred inBerkemer, see468 U.S., at 441, and n. 34, is inapposite.Meyerinvolved facts which we implied might properly remove its result fromBerkemer's application to ordinary traffic stops; specifically, the motorist inMeyercould be found to have been placed in custody for purposes ofMirandasafeguards because he was detained for over half an hour, and subjected to questioning while in the patrol car. Thus, we acknowledgedMeyer's relevance to the unusual traffic stop that involves prolonged detention. We expressly disapproved, however, the attempt to extrapolate from this sensitivity to uncommon detention circumstances any general proposition that custody exists whenever motorists think that their freedom of action has been restricted, for such a rationale would eviscerateBerkemeraltogether. SeeBerkemer, supra, at 436-437. ↩
  3. Page 11 We thus do not reach the issue whether recitation of the alphabet in response to custodial questioning is testimonial and hence inadmissible underMirandav.Arizona,384 U.S. 436(1966). ↩