Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
New Mexico v. Earnest
N.M. v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1986-09-03
- Topic
- litigation
How later courts describe this case
- state is entitled to an opportunity to overcome the weighty presumption of unreliability attaching to co-defendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient “indicia of reliability” to satisfy confrontation clause concerns
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed New Mexico v. Earnest. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 36 opinions
NEW MEXICOv. EARNEST,477 U.S. 648(1986)
NEW MEXICOv. EARNEST
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW MEXICO
No. 85-162.
Argued April 1, 1986
Decided June 27, 1986
AsLeev.Illinoismakes clear, to the extent thatDouglasv.Alabamainterpreted the Confrontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-examination prior to the admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no longer good law. AlthoughOhiov.Roberts,448 U.S. 56(1980), did not attempt to set forth specific standards for constitutional admissibility applicable to all categories of hearsay, seeUnited Statesv.Inadi,475 U.S. 387,392-393(1986), that decision did establish that a lack of cross-examination is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under the Confrontation Clause. SeeLeev.Illinois,supra, at 543.fn*In the instant case, therefore, the State is entitled to an opportunity to overcome the weightyPage 650presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement at issue bears sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns.Page 901
- Page 649 A brief ofamici curiaeurging reversal was filed for the State of Indiana et al. byLinley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana,William E. DailyandLisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Attorneys General,Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona,John J. Kelly, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut,Charles M. Oberly, Attorney General of Delaware,Richard Opper, Attorney General of Guam,Corinne K. A. Watanabe, Attorney General of Hawaii,Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho,Neil F.Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois,William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana,Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana,Irwin I.Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey,Anthony Celebrezze, Attorney General of Ohio,Michael Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma,Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina,W.J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee,Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas,David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah,Jeffrey Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont,William G. Broaddus, Attorney General of Virginia,Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, andArchieG. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming. Briefs ofamici curiaeurging affirmance were filed for the New Mexico Public Defender Department byDavid StaffordandSusan Gibbs;and for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. byBurt NeuborneandCharlesS. Sims. ↩
- Page 649 For example, in a case in which the State claims that a codefendant's confession is admissible because it "interlocks" with the defendant's confession,Leev.Illinoissets out the following test: "If those portions of the codefendant's purportedly `interlocking' statement which bear to any significant degree on the defendant's participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by the defendant's own confession, the admission of the statement poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In other words, when the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the codefendant's confession may not be admitted."476 U.S., at 545. ↩